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TURKEY, NAGORNO-KARABAKH AND THE SOUTH CAUCASUS
Today's Zaman
Aug 28 2012
Turkey
At the end of last week, Foreign Minister Ahmet DavutoÄ~_lu was
quoted as saying he wanted Azerbaijan and Armenia to meet in Turkey
to discuss the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict because Ankara believes its
current policies, aimed at regional conflict settlement, have made
Turkey a leader in the region.
With the Syrian crisis and all the chaos that is presently going on
in the region, including the new wave of violence committed by the
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), it seems a bit strange that DavutoÄ~_lu
would suddenly decide to raise the Karabakh issue. Furthermore,
the very suggestion is unrealistic and something of a non-starter,
simply because Turkey is not viewed as a neutral actor.
Therefore, the reaction from the deputy foreign minister of Armenia,
Shavarsh Kocharyan, came as little surprise. Kocharyan responded:
â~@~\For the resolution of the conflict it would be productive if
Turkey could encourage Azerbaijan to negotiate with the real party to
the conflict, Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey at least should not continue
to support the everything-or-nothing position of Azerbaijan. If
the Turkish minister of foreign affairs truly wants to support the
settlement of the conflict, Turkey should not attempt to distort the
essence of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem.â~@~]
While I would agree that Turkey cannot take on a role as mediator
because it supports Azerbaijan's arguments, at the same time such a
response from Armenia would make one believe that Yerevan is working
around the clock to find a solution, which is clearly not the case.
Yerevan is not unhappy with the status quo. It continues to control the
internationally recognized Azerbaijani region of Nagorno-Karabakh as
well as occupying a further seven surrounding provinces, with Yerevan
facing very little international criticism or external pressure. For
Azerbaijan, an independent Karabakh is not an option.
For Armenia, it is the only option. As the clocks ticks along,
the more entrenched the problem becomes, making the status quo more
difficult to change. This in turn leads to greater frustration in Baku
and more talk of taking back its lands by military force, which in
turn increases the siege mentality in Yerevan, locking the conflict
into a vicious circle. Turkey, being close to Azerbaijan and having
no diplomatic ties with Armenia, is far from well-placed to play a
mediating role in the conflict.
More broadly, Turkey would like to increase its influence in the
South Caucasus, a region of growing geostrategic importance and,
to this end, over the last few years, Turkey has strengthened ties
economically, politically and vis--vis security with both Azerbaijan
and Georgia. Ankara really stepped up efforts in the aftermath of the
August 2008 Russo-Georgia War, which shattered the political status
quo in the region. Turkey launched two initiatives that it hoped would
bring about greater regional stability as well as allowing Turkey to
play a larger role in regional conflicts, such as Nagorno-Karabakh.
The first was the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform and the
second a process of rapprochement with Armenia, with which Turkey has
had a closed border and no diplomatic ties since 1993. Both of these
initiatives also came at a time when Ankara's relations with Russia
were witnessing a dramatic improvement. Indeed, Turkey's foreign
policy in the South Caucasus will be considerably shaped by Ankara's
relations with Russia and, to a lesser extent, the EU as it takes on
a great role there.
Alas, Ankara miscalculated and neither initiative bore fruit. The
failed rapprochement with Armenia -- principally a consequence of
Turkey deciding to link it to progress over Karabakh -- only served
to increase regional tensions and undermine international efforts
to resolve the Karabakh conflict, resulting in a stalling of peace
talks and increased cease-fire violations. Turkey underestimated the
reaction of Azerbaijan to rapprochement with Yerevan and the ability
of the Armenian diaspora to pressure Armenia's leadership. Ankara's
credibility was damaged, relations with Azerbaijan were shaken and
Armenia's leadership declared Turkey dishonest and not to be trusted.
While Azerbaijan and Turkey repaired and even deepened their ties,
Yerevan went on to further increase security ties with Moscow, with
any new Turkish initiatives viewed more skeptically than ever.
As for the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform -- aimed at
building confidence via the creation of a forum to establish dialogue
among the three countries of the South Caucasus, Turkey and Russia --
it never really got off the ground. Launched without much thought,
it received very little enthusiasm from most of those invited to join
and excluded important international actors such as the EU and US.
Therefore, it never really got off the starting block. If Turkey is
really serious about being a credible regional player, it needs to
find a way of getting its rapprochement with Armenia back on track
and without making any link to Nagorno-Karabakh, given that it has
been duly recognized that Ankara has no role to play in the solution
of this conflict.
From: Baghdasarian
Today's Zaman
Aug 28 2012
Turkey
At the end of last week, Foreign Minister Ahmet DavutoÄ~_lu was
quoted as saying he wanted Azerbaijan and Armenia to meet in Turkey
to discuss the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict because Ankara believes its
current policies, aimed at regional conflict settlement, have made
Turkey a leader in the region.
With the Syrian crisis and all the chaos that is presently going on
in the region, including the new wave of violence committed by the
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), it seems a bit strange that DavutoÄ~_lu
would suddenly decide to raise the Karabakh issue. Furthermore,
the very suggestion is unrealistic and something of a non-starter,
simply because Turkey is not viewed as a neutral actor.
Therefore, the reaction from the deputy foreign minister of Armenia,
Shavarsh Kocharyan, came as little surprise. Kocharyan responded:
â~@~\For the resolution of the conflict it would be productive if
Turkey could encourage Azerbaijan to negotiate with the real party to
the conflict, Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey at least should not continue
to support the everything-or-nothing position of Azerbaijan. If
the Turkish minister of foreign affairs truly wants to support the
settlement of the conflict, Turkey should not attempt to distort the
essence of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem.â~@~]
While I would agree that Turkey cannot take on a role as mediator
because it supports Azerbaijan's arguments, at the same time such a
response from Armenia would make one believe that Yerevan is working
around the clock to find a solution, which is clearly not the case.
Yerevan is not unhappy with the status quo. It continues to control the
internationally recognized Azerbaijani region of Nagorno-Karabakh as
well as occupying a further seven surrounding provinces, with Yerevan
facing very little international criticism or external pressure. For
Azerbaijan, an independent Karabakh is not an option.
For Armenia, it is the only option. As the clocks ticks along,
the more entrenched the problem becomes, making the status quo more
difficult to change. This in turn leads to greater frustration in Baku
and more talk of taking back its lands by military force, which in
turn increases the siege mentality in Yerevan, locking the conflict
into a vicious circle. Turkey, being close to Azerbaijan and having
no diplomatic ties with Armenia, is far from well-placed to play a
mediating role in the conflict.
More broadly, Turkey would like to increase its influence in the
South Caucasus, a region of growing geostrategic importance and,
to this end, over the last few years, Turkey has strengthened ties
economically, politically and vis--vis security with both Azerbaijan
and Georgia. Ankara really stepped up efforts in the aftermath of the
August 2008 Russo-Georgia War, which shattered the political status
quo in the region. Turkey launched two initiatives that it hoped would
bring about greater regional stability as well as allowing Turkey to
play a larger role in regional conflicts, such as Nagorno-Karabakh.
The first was the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform and the
second a process of rapprochement with Armenia, with which Turkey has
had a closed border and no diplomatic ties since 1993. Both of these
initiatives also came at a time when Ankara's relations with Russia
were witnessing a dramatic improvement. Indeed, Turkey's foreign
policy in the South Caucasus will be considerably shaped by Ankara's
relations with Russia and, to a lesser extent, the EU as it takes on
a great role there.
Alas, Ankara miscalculated and neither initiative bore fruit. The
failed rapprochement with Armenia -- principally a consequence of
Turkey deciding to link it to progress over Karabakh -- only served
to increase regional tensions and undermine international efforts
to resolve the Karabakh conflict, resulting in a stalling of peace
talks and increased cease-fire violations. Turkey underestimated the
reaction of Azerbaijan to rapprochement with Yerevan and the ability
of the Armenian diaspora to pressure Armenia's leadership. Ankara's
credibility was damaged, relations with Azerbaijan were shaken and
Armenia's leadership declared Turkey dishonest and not to be trusted.
While Azerbaijan and Turkey repaired and even deepened their ties,
Yerevan went on to further increase security ties with Moscow, with
any new Turkish initiatives viewed more skeptically than ever.
As for the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform -- aimed at
building confidence via the creation of a forum to establish dialogue
among the three countries of the South Caucasus, Turkey and Russia --
it never really got off the ground. Launched without much thought,
it received very little enthusiasm from most of those invited to join
and excluded important international actors such as the EU and US.
Therefore, it never really got off the starting block. If Turkey is
really serious about being a credible regional player, it needs to
find a way of getting its rapprochement with Armenia back on track
and without making any link to Nagorno-Karabakh, given that it has
been duly recognized that Ankara has no role to play in the solution
of this conflict.
From: Baghdasarian