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ABKHAZIA: ONCE AGAIN ABOUT THE RAIL ROAD
Vestnik Kavkaza
Nov 29 2012
Russia
Spartak Zhidkov, Abkhazia. Exclusively to Vestnik Kavkaza
The victory of Ivanishvili's coalition in the parliamentary elections
has remarkably revived domestic Georgian politics. Perhaps in the
near future analysts will be observing an impressive struggle for
power and control of the new team against the old. As can be seen,
the failure of the one enemy of Russia in former Soviet space cannot
but make Moscow politicians happy. Therefore, despite the rather
skeptical approach of many experts to the warming of relations between
Russia and Georgia, the diplomatic initiatives of the "Georgian Dream"
are generally welcomed.
One of the initiatives of the new Georgian Minister for Reintegration,
Paata Zakareishvili, was rather shocking to the Georgian public. He
has not only offered to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as
part of the conflict, but also to legitimize the Abkhaz and South
Ossetian passports in Georgia. At the same time he proposed restoring
rail traffic through Abkhazia, which affects the interests of all
Transcaucasian countries.
The idea of Zakareishvili provoked unexpectedly sharp criticism from
the Azerbaijanis, who are always rather indifferent to any events in
the Caucasus not dealing with the Karabakh issue. But this time Baku
made it clear they are extremely concerned about Tbilisi's plants
to run a railway through Abkhazia. Some Azerbaijani experts saw in
Zakareishvili's project quite an obvious intention to involve Russia
and Armenia in the project, since Russia is in need of ways to supply
its military bases on the territory of Armenia, while Yerevan has been
seeking an escape from the Azerbaijani blockade for many years now. As
you know, trains between Russia and Armenia can travel only via two
rail lines: through Abkhazia and through Azerbaijan. Zakareishvili
had to persuade Baku that Georgia has no hostile intentions towards
Azerbaijan.
By and large, the measures proposed by Zakareishvili in respect to
Abkhazia and Ossetia in themselves are reasonable. However, of course,
a new minister cannot question the main tenets of the foreign policy
of his country and has no right to discuss the issue of recognizing
the independence of Abkhazia. At a time when "Georgian Dream" is
conducting a death struggle against the president, who has a lot of
opportunities for revenge, such a proposal would be tantamount to
scoring an own goal. But the rhetoric of Zakareishvili is noteworthy
only because he called for abandoning an aggressive accusatory tone
regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which has been a necessity for
any Georgian politician in the past two decades.
However, Abkhazia did not demonstrate an emotional reaction to
Zakareishvili's ideas.
The attitude of the Abkhazians to the opening of rail transit of goods
from Russia through Georgia to Armenia, and eventually to other Black
Sea countries, is rather complex. First of all, this initiative would
indeed allow Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh to improve their situations.
Thus, the restoration of a rail link would strengthen the authority
of the chief ally of the Armenians - Russia - in the South Caucasus.
Freight and passenger trains can bring Abkhazia very real financial
dividends. On the other hand, all these positive results, taken
together, cannot outweigh the concerns of Sukhumi about the "rail
project." This does not only concern military security, but also
political security. To understand why, it is necessary to go back
twenty years.
The Georgian-Abkhazian war began in August 1992. The motives which
prompted the Georgian government to send troops to Abkhazia were
primarily because of the domestic political situation in Georgia. The
military forces that overthrew Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia
were actively getting rid of Gamsakhurdia's legacy - in particular,
of a Georgian-Abkhazian agreement signed on August 27, 1991, which
provided self-government to Abkhazia. In the summer of 1992, the
Georgian State Council was preparing a campaign against Abkhazia, but
needed an official excuse, a satisfactory explanation for the world
community. Guerrilla attacks of supporters of the ousted president,
Zviadists, who blew up railway tracks in Samegrelo, in western Georgia,
became a pretext for the war. An expeditionary force, gathering against
Abkhazians, was openly formed in Tbilisi and was aimed at restoring
"order on the railroad." Even when Georgian troops entered Abkhazia
and conflict broke out, during the first few days and weeks the
leaders of the State Council tried associate the slogan "to protect
the railroad" to the events in Abkhazia, which very soon turned into
a war. Only when it became clear that it would be too hard to regard
the Abkhazian campaign as a counter-terrorism operation did the main
aim become a struggle for the territorial integrity of Georgia.
Moreover, very soon it became clear that it was no accident that the
Georgian military were associated with the campaign on the Abkhazian
railroad. The railroad was essential to the plan "Sword" of the
Georgian military, which was to culminate in the capture of Abkhazia.
The Georgian plan was foiled after guerrillas in western Georgia
planted explosives on the rail lines and stopped the transit of
trains. When the Georgian army entered the territory of the republic
by road, it was stopped half-way, and although in the first five days
of war the Georgians took control of three-quarters of the Abkhazian
coast, the war scenario was altered.
A year later, the Abkhazians, with the support of volunteers from the
North Caucasus and other regions of Russia, defeated the Georgians
and expelled their army from Abkhazia, while the Zviadists, using the
defeat of the government army, organized a new rebellion in Western
Georgia. However, in early October 1993 Eduard Shevardnadze quickly
made Georgia part of the CIS and asked Boris Yeltsin's help against
the rebels. Moscow agreed to help in the fight against the Zviadists,
but not against the Abkhazians. At that moment the Georgian diplomatic
services began to work on a new plan. In mid-October Georgia, Armenia
and Azerbaijan agreed to cooperate "in the protection of railways"
in Western Georgia, which was the epicenter of the civil war. Georgia
even agreed to deploy Russian troops along the railroad tracks between
Kutaisi and Tbilisi. Armenian troops had to guard a section of the
road between Poti and Kutaisi, Azerbaijan - a section between Tbilisi
and the Azerbaijani border. Soon it became clear that Azerbaijan and
Armenia, occupied with their own conflict, did not intend to get
involved in the Georgian conflict. But nevertheless Shevardnadze
sanctioned the entrance of Russian troops to Georgia and at the
beginning of November 1993 they defeated the Zviadists. Luckily,
the Georgian plan to occupy Abkhazia was not supported in Moscow,
which realized at that time that such an operation would destroy
Russia's position in the Caucasus.
Not surprisingly, after the end of the Georgian-Abkhaz war the
"order on the railroad" became a very sensitive topic in Abkhazia,
even more hated than "normalization of the situation in Afghanistan"
in the Soviet Union. However, after the signing of a ceasefire and
separation of the parties (in April-May 1994), the railroad again
became an irritant in Georgian-Abkhazian and in Russian-Abkhazian
relations.
>>From 1994 to 1996 the Georgian government hoped that Moscow would
help Georgia return its refugees to Abkhazia. The situation with a de
facto independent Abkhazia and a weakened Georgia which did not dare
to start a new war was good enough for Russia and did not counter
its own interests. With one exception: Armenia, which was the only
recognized independent country at the time in the South Caucasus which
still had friendly relations with Russia, despite the fact that it
won the Karabakh war, remained blocked by Turkey and Azerbaijan. The
only land connection between the Russian bases in Armenia and Russia
passed through Georgia. In 1994 - 1995 negotiations on the resumption
of rail traffic on the territory of Abkhazia were very frequent. In
these discussions Abkhazia was given the role of a disabled partner
who was not taken seriously. All this increased tensions between
Abkhazia and Russia, to the satisfaction of Georgia.
But more importantly, Tbilisi wanted to profit from the situation not
only in the diplomatic arena. Once it became clear that the Abkhazians
did not intend to allow the return of Georgian refugees to Abkhazia
unless they agreed to submit to the authorities of Abkhazia, Georgia
started to negotiate with the Russian military, persuading it to
open the Georgian-Abkhaz border in order to allow refugees to safely
return to Abkhazia. Thus, in September 1994, Russian General Georgy
Kondratyev tried to open the border, despite the opposition of the
commander of the Russian peacekeeping forces, General Vasily Yakushev.
The incident was extinguished, but a similar attempt was made in
September 1995. The events of the fall of 1995 coincided with a new
round of talks between Russia and Georgia on the resumption of rail
traffic through Abkhazia. The railroad might have been opened, if
Shevardnadze had not dismissed a pro-Russian security officer, Igor
Giorgadze, which led to a deterioration in relations between Russia
and Georgia. In January 1996 the CIS introduced collective sanctions
against Abkhazia, which were de facto abolished with the coming to
power of Putin in Russia, but were formally cancelled only six months
before Moscow's recognition of Abkhazia's independence in March 2008.
It is therefore easy to understand why all the talk about the opening
of the railway to traffic is not welcomed by the Abkhazians. Sukhumi
sees this project as Georgian and as threatening not only to the
security of the small country but also Russian-Abkhaz friendship.
Russia might not receive a guaranteed connection with its bases in
Armenia, since in case of any crisis Georgia could control the passage
of trains. By giving Georgia access to Abkhazia, the influence of
Russia in Abkhazia will be to a certain extent endangered and Russia
might be blackmailed by Georgia in regard to the Abkhaz question to
get access to its bases in Armenia. One should not exclude a situation
in which Georgia would try to put pressure on South Ossetia, using
Russia's reluctance to jeopardize its "Abkhazian" rail link. It
would not be a serious risk to the borders of South Ossetia, but
it might become dangerous for Russian-Abkhaz and Russian-Ossetian
relations. In general, the agreement on the resumption of traffic
through Abkhazia opens up tremendous opportunities for political
games. Do Russia and Armenia need this? It depends on many factors,
including the position of Azerbaijan, the situation in Iran and the
possibility of an agreement between Moscow and Tbilisi which will
not concern Abkhazian issues...Does Abkhazia need this? Absolutely not.
This does not mean that the Abkhazian side will not seriously consider
the resumption of rail traffic through its territory. But in any case,
Sukhumi should have a solid guarantee that such a move will not cause
numerous problems to Abkhazia in the future. It is easier to avoid them
now by preserving the existing situation. For many years the people
of Abkhazia have been suspicious of any talk about the resumption
of rail traffic through their territory. Before the train between
Moscow and Sukhumi was launched, the Abkhazians ignored the decay of
stations and railroads. Even the poorest people preferred buses to
trains. The proposal to blow up the rail bridge over the Inguri River,
which marks the Georgian-Abkhazian border, to raize it to the ground,
was at one time very popular among the citizens of Abkhazia. This
does not contradict the current efforts of the Abkhazian government to
restore transport links, including the railroad, because Abkhazia is
thinking about passenger and cargo transportation to Russia and from
Russia. Abkhazia has enough contacts with its northern neighbor and
with Turkey by sea. In the light of the above-described circumstances,
any attempts to force the reconstruction of the Black Sea railroad
should be treated with caution, while the arguments of skeptics
should be more valued. Even despite the fact that Abkhazia indeed
could solve some of its problems by restoring rail transit. After all,
the Abkhazian authorities and the Abkhazian people value the security
of their country much more.
http://vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/politics/34297.html
Vestnik Kavkaza
Nov 29 2012
Russia
Spartak Zhidkov, Abkhazia. Exclusively to Vestnik Kavkaza
The victory of Ivanishvili's coalition in the parliamentary elections
has remarkably revived domestic Georgian politics. Perhaps in the
near future analysts will be observing an impressive struggle for
power and control of the new team against the old. As can be seen,
the failure of the one enemy of Russia in former Soviet space cannot
but make Moscow politicians happy. Therefore, despite the rather
skeptical approach of many experts to the warming of relations between
Russia and Georgia, the diplomatic initiatives of the "Georgian Dream"
are generally welcomed.
One of the initiatives of the new Georgian Minister for Reintegration,
Paata Zakareishvili, was rather shocking to the Georgian public. He
has not only offered to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as
part of the conflict, but also to legitimize the Abkhaz and South
Ossetian passports in Georgia. At the same time he proposed restoring
rail traffic through Abkhazia, which affects the interests of all
Transcaucasian countries.
The idea of Zakareishvili provoked unexpectedly sharp criticism from
the Azerbaijanis, who are always rather indifferent to any events in
the Caucasus not dealing with the Karabakh issue. But this time Baku
made it clear they are extremely concerned about Tbilisi's plants
to run a railway through Abkhazia. Some Azerbaijani experts saw in
Zakareishvili's project quite an obvious intention to involve Russia
and Armenia in the project, since Russia is in need of ways to supply
its military bases on the territory of Armenia, while Yerevan has been
seeking an escape from the Azerbaijani blockade for many years now. As
you know, trains between Russia and Armenia can travel only via two
rail lines: through Abkhazia and through Azerbaijan. Zakareishvili
had to persuade Baku that Georgia has no hostile intentions towards
Azerbaijan.
By and large, the measures proposed by Zakareishvili in respect to
Abkhazia and Ossetia in themselves are reasonable. However, of course,
a new minister cannot question the main tenets of the foreign policy
of his country and has no right to discuss the issue of recognizing
the independence of Abkhazia. At a time when "Georgian Dream" is
conducting a death struggle against the president, who has a lot of
opportunities for revenge, such a proposal would be tantamount to
scoring an own goal. But the rhetoric of Zakareishvili is noteworthy
only because he called for abandoning an aggressive accusatory tone
regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which has been a necessity for
any Georgian politician in the past two decades.
However, Abkhazia did not demonstrate an emotional reaction to
Zakareishvili's ideas.
The attitude of the Abkhazians to the opening of rail transit of goods
from Russia through Georgia to Armenia, and eventually to other Black
Sea countries, is rather complex. First of all, this initiative would
indeed allow Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh to improve their situations.
Thus, the restoration of a rail link would strengthen the authority
of the chief ally of the Armenians - Russia - in the South Caucasus.
Freight and passenger trains can bring Abkhazia very real financial
dividends. On the other hand, all these positive results, taken
together, cannot outweigh the concerns of Sukhumi about the "rail
project." This does not only concern military security, but also
political security. To understand why, it is necessary to go back
twenty years.
The Georgian-Abkhazian war began in August 1992. The motives which
prompted the Georgian government to send troops to Abkhazia were
primarily because of the domestic political situation in Georgia. The
military forces that overthrew Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia
were actively getting rid of Gamsakhurdia's legacy - in particular,
of a Georgian-Abkhazian agreement signed on August 27, 1991, which
provided self-government to Abkhazia. In the summer of 1992, the
Georgian State Council was preparing a campaign against Abkhazia, but
needed an official excuse, a satisfactory explanation for the world
community. Guerrilla attacks of supporters of the ousted president,
Zviadists, who blew up railway tracks in Samegrelo, in western Georgia,
became a pretext for the war. An expeditionary force, gathering against
Abkhazians, was openly formed in Tbilisi and was aimed at restoring
"order on the railroad." Even when Georgian troops entered Abkhazia
and conflict broke out, during the first few days and weeks the
leaders of the State Council tried associate the slogan "to protect
the railroad" to the events in Abkhazia, which very soon turned into
a war. Only when it became clear that it would be too hard to regard
the Abkhazian campaign as a counter-terrorism operation did the main
aim become a struggle for the territorial integrity of Georgia.
Moreover, very soon it became clear that it was no accident that the
Georgian military were associated with the campaign on the Abkhazian
railroad. The railroad was essential to the plan "Sword" of the
Georgian military, which was to culminate in the capture of Abkhazia.
The Georgian plan was foiled after guerrillas in western Georgia
planted explosives on the rail lines and stopped the transit of
trains. When the Georgian army entered the territory of the republic
by road, it was stopped half-way, and although in the first five days
of war the Georgians took control of three-quarters of the Abkhazian
coast, the war scenario was altered.
A year later, the Abkhazians, with the support of volunteers from the
North Caucasus and other regions of Russia, defeated the Georgians
and expelled their army from Abkhazia, while the Zviadists, using the
defeat of the government army, organized a new rebellion in Western
Georgia. However, in early October 1993 Eduard Shevardnadze quickly
made Georgia part of the CIS and asked Boris Yeltsin's help against
the rebels. Moscow agreed to help in the fight against the Zviadists,
but not against the Abkhazians. At that moment the Georgian diplomatic
services began to work on a new plan. In mid-October Georgia, Armenia
and Azerbaijan agreed to cooperate "in the protection of railways"
in Western Georgia, which was the epicenter of the civil war. Georgia
even agreed to deploy Russian troops along the railroad tracks between
Kutaisi and Tbilisi. Armenian troops had to guard a section of the
road between Poti and Kutaisi, Azerbaijan - a section between Tbilisi
and the Azerbaijani border. Soon it became clear that Azerbaijan and
Armenia, occupied with their own conflict, did not intend to get
involved in the Georgian conflict. But nevertheless Shevardnadze
sanctioned the entrance of Russian troops to Georgia and at the
beginning of November 1993 they defeated the Zviadists. Luckily,
the Georgian plan to occupy Abkhazia was not supported in Moscow,
which realized at that time that such an operation would destroy
Russia's position in the Caucasus.
Not surprisingly, after the end of the Georgian-Abkhaz war the
"order on the railroad" became a very sensitive topic in Abkhazia,
even more hated than "normalization of the situation in Afghanistan"
in the Soviet Union. However, after the signing of a ceasefire and
separation of the parties (in April-May 1994), the railroad again
became an irritant in Georgian-Abkhazian and in Russian-Abkhazian
relations.
>>From 1994 to 1996 the Georgian government hoped that Moscow would
help Georgia return its refugees to Abkhazia. The situation with a de
facto independent Abkhazia and a weakened Georgia which did not dare
to start a new war was good enough for Russia and did not counter
its own interests. With one exception: Armenia, which was the only
recognized independent country at the time in the South Caucasus which
still had friendly relations with Russia, despite the fact that it
won the Karabakh war, remained blocked by Turkey and Azerbaijan. The
only land connection between the Russian bases in Armenia and Russia
passed through Georgia. In 1994 - 1995 negotiations on the resumption
of rail traffic on the territory of Abkhazia were very frequent. In
these discussions Abkhazia was given the role of a disabled partner
who was not taken seriously. All this increased tensions between
Abkhazia and Russia, to the satisfaction of Georgia.
But more importantly, Tbilisi wanted to profit from the situation not
only in the diplomatic arena. Once it became clear that the Abkhazians
did not intend to allow the return of Georgian refugees to Abkhazia
unless they agreed to submit to the authorities of Abkhazia, Georgia
started to negotiate with the Russian military, persuading it to
open the Georgian-Abkhaz border in order to allow refugees to safely
return to Abkhazia. Thus, in September 1994, Russian General Georgy
Kondratyev tried to open the border, despite the opposition of the
commander of the Russian peacekeeping forces, General Vasily Yakushev.
The incident was extinguished, but a similar attempt was made in
September 1995. The events of the fall of 1995 coincided with a new
round of talks between Russia and Georgia on the resumption of rail
traffic through Abkhazia. The railroad might have been opened, if
Shevardnadze had not dismissed a pro-Russian security officer, Igor
Giorgadze, which led to a deterioration in relations between Russia
and Georgia. In January 1996 the CIS introduced collective sanctions
against Abkhazia, which were de facto abolished with the coming to
power of Putin in Russia, but were formally cancelled only six months
before Moscow's recognition of Abkhazia's independence in March 2008.
It is therefore easy to understand why all the talk about the opening
of the railway to traffic is not welcomed by the Abkhazians. Sukhumi
sees this project as Georgian and as threatening not only to the
security of the small country but also Russian-Abkhaz friendship.
Russia might not receive a guaranteed connection with its bases in
Armenia, since in case of any crisis Georgia could control the passage
of trains. By giving Georgia access to Abkhazia, the influence of
Russia in Abkhazia will be to a certain extent endangered and Russia
might be blackmailed by Georgia in regard to the Abkhaz question to
get access to its bases in Armenia. One should not exclude a situation
in which Georgia would try to put pressure on South Ossetia, using
Russia's reluctance to jeopardize its "Abkhazian" rail link. It
would not be a serious risk to the borders of South Ossetia, but
it might become dangerous for Russian-Abkhaz and Russian-Ossetian
relations. In general, the agreement on the resumption of traffic
through Abkhazia opens up tremendous opportunities for political
games. Do Russia and Armenia need this? It depends on many factors,
including the position of Azerbaijan, the situation in Iran and the
possibility of an agreement between Moscow and Tbilisi which will
not concern Abkhazian issues...Does Abkhazia need this? Absolutely not.
This does not mean that the Abkhazian side will not seriously consider
the resumption of rail traffic through its territory. But in any case,
Sukhumi should have a solid guarantee that such a move will not cause
numerous problems to Abkhazia in the future. It is easier to avoid them
now by preserving the existing situation. For many years the people
of Abkhazia have been suspicious of any talk about the resumption
of rail traffic through their territory. Before the train between
Moscow and Sukhumi was launched, the Abkhazians ignored the decay of
stations and railroads. Even the poorest people preferred buses to
trains. The proposal to blow up the rail bridge over the Inguri River,
which marks the Georgian-Abkhazian border, to raize it to the ground,
was at one time very popular among the citizens of Abkhazia. This
does not contradict the current efforts of the Abkhazian government to
restore transport links, including the railroad, because Abkhazia is
thinking about passenger and cargo transportation to Russia and from
Russia. Abkhazia has enough contacts with its northern neighbor and
with Turkey by sea. In the light of the above-described circumstances,
any attempts to force the reconstruction of the Black Sea railroad
should be treated with caution, while the arguments of skeptics
should be more valued. Even despite the fact that Abkhazia indeed
could solve some of its problems by restoring rail transit. After all,
the Abkhazian authorities and the Abkhazian people value the security
of their country much more.
http://vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/politics/34297.html