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House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia Hearing
Congressional Documents and Publications
December 5, 2012
"Iranian Influence in the South Caucasus and the Surrounding Region."
Testimony by Rep. Meeks, Gregory W. - (D-NY)
Thank you Chairman Burton, for holding this hearing, which I am sad
to say is likely your last on this committee, after almost three
decades of service in the House of Representatives. Mr. Chairman,
it has been an honor to serve on this subcommittee with you, and
I hope that you will continue to prosper and enjoy life with your
wonderful wife and your family.
We are dealing with an important question today, as the South Caucasus
region represents a complex web of both regional alliances and
conflicts, bitter rivalries, varying degrees of western orientation,
disparate economic trajectories and a potential venue for instability
or even violence.
In terms of viewing the South Caucasus region from the perspective of
this subcommittee, it is important to note that some of our strongest
instruments, the Euro-Atlantic institutions of NATO and the European
Union, have a weak presence in this region, and therefore are not as
influential as they are in the Balkans, for instance. Ultimately,
this means that Europe and the United States have less leverage in
the region.
This allows other countries in the region to compete for political,
economic and military influence. I believe that Armenia, Azerbaijan
and Georgia represent trustworthy allies of the United States, but I
realize full well that their bilateral relationships are complicated,
and that they all have to take their immediate neighborhood into
account.
With only two open borders, and one of them being with Iran, Armenia
faces the constant threat of isolation, and this is a core driver in
managing Armenia's relationship with Iran.
Azerbaijan has a sizeable Diaspora in northern Iran, but a vastly
different strategic, social and political orientation than Iran's
leadership. Despite a potential religious kinship between Iran
and Azerbaijan, Iran has historically sided with Armenia over the
contested region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore, Azerbaijan enjoys
a solid relationship with Israel, which further distances Baku and
Tehran from one another.
Georgia has the strongest western orientation in the region, and
my sense is that this will remain intact even after their change of
government. But like any other country, Georgia is seeking economic
opportunities everywhere, including potential trade or investment
relations with Iran.
I believe there is a potential for Iran to exploit the complicated
relationships between each of these countries, and that others in
the region have interests that compete or overlap with Iran.
Simultaneously, each of the South Caucasus nations play an important
role in western relations with Iran, particularly their ability to
comply with international sanctions, and I think it is important for
US policy towards the region to find ways to facilitate and strengthen
this compliance.
Russia appears to want to limit both the influence of the United States
and Turkey in the South Caucasus, so I am curious to hear our panel's
views on how Russia and Iran manage their relationship in the region.
I have followed with great interest Turkey's attempts to normalize
relations with Armenia, and my sense is that such a step holds the
greatest potential to improve both stability and prosperity in the
region. Lifting Armenia's isolation would not only allow Yerevan
greater independence from Iranian and Russian influence, it would
also be mutually beneficial for Turkey and Armenia in a number of
ways. I am interested in hearing the panel's perspectives on whether
this is an issue the Turkish and Armenian governments might be able
to re-engage on.
What we can all agree on, is that it is in no one's interest to see
a nuclear armed Iran, and I look forward to exploring how the South
Caucasus region can help the United States and Europe to prevent
this outcome.
Thank you, I yield back.
Read this original document at:
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/HHRG-112-FA14-MState-M001137-20121205.pdf
Congressional Documents and Publications
December 5, 2012
"Iranian Influence in the South Caucasus and the Surrounding Region."
Testimony by Rep. Meeks, Gregory W. - (D-NY)
Thank you Chairman Burton, for holding this hearing, which I am sad
to say is likely your last on this committee, after almost three
decades of service in the House of Representatives. Mr. Chairman,
it has been an honor to serve on this subcommittee with you, and
I hope that you will continue to prosper and enjoy life with your
wonderful wife and your family.
We are dealing with an important question today, as the South Caucasus
region represents a complex web of both regional alliances and
conflicts, bitter rivalries, varying degrees of western orientation,
disparate economic trajectories and a potential venue for instability
or even violence.
In terms of viewing the South Caucasus region from the perspective of
this subcommittee, it is important to note that some of our strongest
instruments, the Euro-Atlantic institutions of NATO and the European
Union, have a weak presence in this region, and therefore are not as
influential as they are in the Balkans, for instance. Ultimately,
this means that Europe and the United States have less leverage in
the region.
This allows other countries in the region to compete for political,
economic and military influence. I believe that Armenia, Azerbaijan
and Georgia represent trustworthy allies of the United States, but I
realize full well that their bilateral relationships are complicated,
and that they all have to take their immediate neighborhood into
account.
With only two open borders, and one of them being with Iran, Armenia
faces the constant threat of isolation, and this is a core driver in
managing Armenia's relationship with Iran.
Azerbaijan has a sizeable Diaspora in northern Iran, but a vastly
different strategic, social and political orientation than Iran's
leadership. Despite a potential religious kinship between Iran
and Azerbaijan, Iran has historically sided with Armenia over the
contested region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore, Azerbaijan enjoys
a solid relationship with Israel, which further distances Baku and
Tehran from one another.
Georgia has the strongest western orientation in the region, and
my sense is that this will remain intact even after their change of
government. But like any other country, Georgia is seeking economic
opportunities everywhere, including potential trade or investment
relations with Iran.
I believe there is a potential for Iran to exploit the complicated
relationships between each of these countries, and that others in
the region have interests that compete or overlap with Iran.
Simultaneously, each of the South Caucasus nations play an important
role in western relations with Iran, particularly their ability to
comply with international sanctions, and I think it is important for
US policy towards the region to find ways to facilitate and strengthen
this compliance.
Russia appears to want to limit both the influence of the United States
and Turkey in the South Caucasus, so I am curious to hear our panel's
views on how Russia and Iran manage their relationship in the region.
I have followed with great interest Turkey's attempts to normalize
relations with Armenia, and my sense is that such a step holds the
greatest potential to improve both stability and prosperity in the
region. Lifting Armenia's isolation would not only allow Yerevan
greater independence from Iranian and Russian influence, it would
also be mutually beneficial for Turkey and Armenia in a number of
ways. I am interested in hearing the panel's perspectives on whether
this is an issue the Turkish and Armenian governments might be able
to re-engage on.
What we can all agree on, is that it is in no one's interest to see
a nuclear armed Iran, and I look forward to exploring how the South
Caucasus region can help the United States and Europe to prevent
this outcome.
Thank you, I yield back.
Read this original document at:
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/HHRG-112-FA14-MState-M001137-20121205.pdf