Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

Testimony by Michael Rubin: House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Eu

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • Testimony by Michael Rubin: House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Eu

    Congressional Documents and Publications
    December 5, 2012


    House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia Hearing

    "Iranian Influence in the South Caucasus and the Surrounding Region.";
    Testimony by Michael Rubin, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute



    An Iranian attempt to assassinate Israeli diplomats in Georgia last
    February and a subsequent plot to target Americans in Azerbaijan
    demonstrate the reality of the Islamic Republic's terror sponsorship
    and reach. This should not surprise. The Islamic Revolution was about
    ideology. Infusing the speeches of revolutionary leader Ayatollah
    Ruhollah Khomeini and written into the founding statute of the Islamic
    Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is the call to export revolution. In
    recent years, senior Iranian officials have reinforced the notion that
    the Islamic Republic cannot limit itself to soft power strategies as
    it tries to influence neighbors. For a number of reasons, both
    strategic and historical, the Caucasus is front-and-center in the
    Islamic Republic's attempts to expand Revolutionary Guards operations.

    Iranians proudly trace their country's lineage back to the Persian
    Empire, yet most Iranians feel history has been unkind. In the last
    two centuries - a flash in the pan to the Islamic notion of history -
    Iran has lost half its territory. The 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay
    confirmed the loss of what today are Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia
    to the Russian Empire. From an Iranian perspective, these collectively
    constituted not a peripheral province but rather the second most
    important region, one over which the crown prince would always rule as
    governor. This does not mean that the Iranians seek to reacquire lost
    territory; they do, however, see it as their near abroad and believe
    they a natural right to dominate the Caucasus economically,
    politically, and diplomatically.

    Iranian Strategy and Soft-Power

    Export of Revolution remains a core Iranian goal. In 2008, former
    President Mohammad Khatami suggested that Khomeini's push to expand
    the Islamic Revolution beyond Iran's borders was more symbolic than
    real, and geared more to building Iran up as an example to emulate
    rather than a call for subversion abroad. "What did the Imam want, and
    what was his purpose of exporting the revolution? Did he wish us to
    export revolution by means of gunpowder or groups sabotaging other
    countries?" Khatami asked rhetorically, before declaring that Khomeini
    "meant to establish a role model here, one in which people should see
    that in this society, the economy, science, and dignity of man are
    respected.... n1

    Iranian authorities were furious. Not only had Khatami tacitly
    acknowledged that the regime sanctioned Iranian terror support, but he
    also diluted a pillar of the revolution. Seventy-seven members of
    parliament demanded the Intelligence Ministry punish Khatami for his
    comments. n2 Lest anyone accept Khatami's revisionism, then-Judiciary
    Chief Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi reinforced Tehran's
    commitment to export revolution. Speaking to the armed forces, he
    declared the IRGC to be "the hope of Islamic national and Islamic
    liberation movements." n3 The Iranian government has even been so bold
    as to include a line-item for "resistance" in its budget. n4

    This does not mean that the Supreme Leader and the IRGC will not
    sometimes check the drive to export revolution. Iranian officials, for
    example, give Islamists in both Chechnya and Dagestan a wide berth so
    as to avoid antagonizing Moscow, whose support Tehran values for its
    nuclear program. Still, the State Department should not assume that
    pragmatism means Iran's leadership is open to compromise for peace.
    For the Islamic Republic's ideologues, pragmatism involves temporarily
    subordinating certain ideological goals to pursue others. Rather than
    identify formulas for peace, the regime uses pragmatism to find new
    and creative ways to undermine enemies.

    While journalists focus on headlines involving violence and terrorism,
    the Iranian strategy is more sophisticated, especially in its use of
    soft-power. Too often, American policymakers misconstrue soft-power.
    When Harvard Professor Joseph Nye, Jr., coined the term, he did not
    suggest soft power should be exclusive of hard power. The Islamic
    Republic provides a useful example of how adversaries can combine hard
    and soft power strategies.

    Beyond head-grabbing bombings and assassination plots, the Islamic
    Republic seeks to expand its reach through education and with
    charities. Iran provides educational scholarships in order to
    indoctrinate clergy in surrounding states and to radicalize the next
    generation. Charities not only serve as a mechanism to win hearts and
    minds, but the IRGC will also often leverage Iranian aid organizations
    to support terror operations.

    Afghanistan provides a useful example to demonstrate how Iranians
    leverage education. In Kabul, Ayatollah Asif Mohseni, a figure
    beholden to Tehran because his religious credentials are not
    recognized in Najaf, founded Khatam al-Anbia University. Its
    professors are trained in Iran, Iranian officials set its curriculum,
    and regime-approved publishers supply its library. In 2010, the budget
    for that single Iranian-backed university was greater than the Afghan
    government's entire higher education budget. While the Armenian
    government is more opaque, the Iranian government operates a branch of
    the Islam Azad University in Armenia and may subsidize other programs.

    Subverting Azerbaijan

    Within the Caucasus, the Islamic Republic concentrates its subversion
    efforts at Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is one of only three countries
    beyond Iran--Bahrain and Iraq being the others--which is majority
    Twelver Shi'ite. Because these countries' success challenges the claim
    that the Islamic Republic's rule is divinely-inspired, Tehran subverts
    them.

    Azerbaijani success is especially threatening to the Islamic Republic
    of Iran because of the links between the two peoples. Millions of
    Azeris reside in Iran--more than twice as many as live in independent
    Azerbaijan. Ali Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Leader, is ethnically Azeri.
    Baku's rejection of religious populism and its mosque-state separation
    contrast sharply with Iran's theocracy. The fact that Azerbaijanis
    enjoy a greater life expectancy than Iranians, are more literate, and,
    because of recent sanctions on Iran, enjoy greater purchasing power
    embarrasses the Iranian clergy. It is hard for the Supreme Leader to
    claim that he presides over a near perfect Islamic system as the
    deputy of the messiah on earth when secular governments perform
    better.

    Beyond outright terrorism, such as the recent alleged Iranian plot to
    attack the Eurovision finals in Azerbaijan, n5 the Islamic Republic
    has employed a number of strategies to undercut Azerbaijan's
    pro-Western and secular orientation. Even prior to Azerbaijan's
    independence from the Soviet Union, Iranian missionaries operated in
    rural Azerbaijan. Iranian authorities helped support the fiercely
    anti-American Islamic Party of Azerbaijan in the early years of
    Azerbaijani independence but, after that group--true to the Hezbollah
    model so often employed by Iranian proxies--began sponsoring a
    militia, Azerbaijani authorities cracked down, arresting party leaders
    and banning Iranian broadcasting from Azerbaijani territory. n6

    The Iranians may have been down, but not out. To reverse the old
    saying, if they could not bring Muhammad to the mountain, they instead
    would bring the mountain to Muhammad. Instead of sending missionaries
    to Azerbaijan, they arranged scholarships to bring young Azerbaijani
    students to Qom where they could indoctrinate them into the Iranian
    regime's interpretations of Shi'ite Islam. This has been a tactic
    which has paid long-term dividends to the Islamic Republic. Because
    Saddam Hussein made it so difficult for foreign students to study in
    Najaf in the 1980s and 1990s, for example, a generation of Bahraini
    clerics traveled to Qom for study. Many of these same clerics today
    are at the forefront of the Bahraini Shi'ite uprising against the
    Bahraini royal family.

    At the height of the Armenia-Azerbaijan war over Nagorno-Karabakh,
    Iranian authorities sought to exploit and radicalize many Azerbaijani
    refugees seeking refuge in Iran. Perhaps because training clerics and
    indoctrinating refugees pays only long-term dividends, Tehran has
    turned to other strategies to undercut Azerbaijani stability; Azeri
    authorities accuse Iran of promoting separatist ambition among
    Azerbaijan's Talysh minority. Iranian academics have, for example,
    sponsored an International Talysh Association to support "oppressed"
    Azerbaijani Talysh. n7

    Iranian authorities also utilize charities to expand their influence.
    Of myriad Iranian charities, the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee (IKRC)
    is the regime's chief aid organization abroad. With assets supplied by
    the Supreme Leader, the Committee sponsors programs similar to those
    conducted by Western NGOs for orphans, the disabled, and the elderly,
    and it also provides food aid, blankets, fuel, sponsors medical
    clinics, and offers interest-free loans. n8 It also spreads influence
    in a way few Western organizations could, sponsoring mass weddings for
    those for whom the price of weddings would otherwise put marriage out
    of reach. n9

    While IKRC's activities might look benign, its track record is more
    sinister. In 1997, its office provided cover for surveillance against
    the U.S. Embassy in Tajikistan. n10 In 2010, the U.S. Treasury
    Department designated the IKRC branch in Lebanon to be a terrorist
    entity for its aid and assistance to Hezbollah. n11 With both the IRGC
    and IKRC funded from the same trough, it is likely that IKRC offices
    in Azerbaijan, n12 not only in Baku but also in provincial towns like
    Lankaran, Ganja, and Goychay, may also provide cover for IRGC
    operations.

    The United States can take solace in the fact that Azerbaijan remains
    a steady ally. While fears of Iranian encroachment should not derail
    U.S. pressure to support democratization and respect for human rights
    in Azerbaijan, U.S. officials should also recognize that the Islamic
    Republic will seek to hijack legitimate protest, as it does in
    Bahrain. Nevertheless, Iranian penetration of Azerbaijan remains
    unfulfilled, largely because of Baku's recognition of the Iranian
    threat and also because Iran's oil dispute with Azerbaijan in the
    Caspian Sea remains a major irritant in bilateral relations. The
    Azerbaijani people remain largely pro-Western and unwilling to accept
    Iranian domination.

    Is Armenia is the weak link?

    The same cannot be said for Armenia. Ties between Iran and Armenia run
    deep, and predate Iran's Islamic Revolution. Armenians form the bulk
    of Iran's sizeable Christian community. While the Islamic Republic
    will broker no Sunni mosque in Tehran, an Armenian cathedral sits in
    the heart of the city. The southern Isfahan neighborhood of Julfa is a
    veritable "little Armenia" with Armenian churches and schools dotting
    roads and alleys. Even Iranian soldiers, when they fancy a drink
    stronger than the local Coca-Cola knock-off, will head into Armenian
    pizzerias for some homemade vodka. Anti-Turkish posters and banners
    are a fixture of many Armenian neighborhoods, in Isfahan and
    elsewhere. In 2011, Armenian television purchased Iranian soap operas
    from Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting. n13

    There is nothing necessarily wrong with cultural links between Iran
    and Armenia. The problem for the United States is that Armenia
    provides the central pivot for a Russia-Iran Axis which increasingly
    undermines both U.S. interests and national security. In 2007, Yerevan
    State University awarded Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad its
    gold medal. "Armenia and Iran will be relatives eternally,"
    Ahmadinejad declared upon receiving his honorary doctorate. n14

    In 2008, U.S. diplomats concluded that Armenia shipped Iran weaponry,
    which the Islamic Republic used to kill Americans. John D. Negroponte,
    then deputy secretary of state at, expressed his "deep concerns about
    Armenia's transfer of arms to Iran which resulted in the death and
    injury of U.S. soldiers in Iraq" to Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan.
    n15

    Whereas the Armenian government has long sought to keep its banking
    cooperation with Iran outside the limelight, Armenia's warm embrace of
    Iran is readily apparent. Indeed, sanctioned Iranian banks operate in
    Yerevan. n16 Other Iranian businesses continue to dot the Armenian
    capital. While Iranians can get visas on demand upon arrival in
    Armenia, the Iranian Foreign Minister now pressures his Armenian
    counterpart to allow completely visa-free travel for Iranians into
    Armenia. This could greatly facilitate Iranian efforts target Western
    interests not only in Armenia, but also in neighboring Georgia. In
    October 2011, a member of Armenia's Nuclear Energy Organization
    suggested that Iran had enticed several Armenian nuclear scientists to
    work in Iran's nuclear program. n17

    While the Armenian-American community is vibrant, it is unfortunate
    that organizations representing the Armenian Diaspora in the United
    States and the congressmen who partner with them do not do more to
    encourage change in the Armenian government's behavior. They need not
    drop their advocacy for recognition of the Armenian genocide but by
    ignoring Armenia's pro-Iranian orientation, the Armenian-American
    community squanders an opportunity to build a true strategic
    partnership between Washington and Yerevan.

    Could Georgia and Turkey Shift into Tehran's Camp?

    The strategic situation has never been more perilous. The victory of
    Bidzina Ivanishvili's Georgian Dream party in October 2012 elections
    threatens to radically reorient the Republic of Georgia which, under
    President Mikheil Saakashvili has been reliably pro-Western. While
    Western press has focused on the antipathy between Saakashvili and the
    Kremlin, a reorientation of Georgia's relationship with Iran might
    accompany its shift to Moscow. It is conceivable that Tbilisi could
    become in the near future an uninviting and perhaps even dangerous
    city for Western interests.

    Georgia is not the only country in play. While there remains sectarian
    tension between Turkey and Iran, it would be a mistake for American
    policymakers to assume Turkey will cooperate with the West regarding
    Iran. To dismiss Turkish outreach to Iran--such as Turkey's recent
    gold for gas scheme--as simply economic opportunism misses the point.
    Likewise, the dispute between Turkey and Iran over the situation in
    Syria is temporary. Just three years ago, Turkish Prime Minister Recep
    Tayyip Erdogan was hosting joint cabinet meetings with Syria, and
    inviting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to vacation with him on the
    Turkish Mediterranean coast.

    Today, Turkey and Iran share many interests: They are both supporters
    not only of Hamas, but also of its most militant faction, and both
    embrace increasingly extreme rhetoric toward Israel. Turkish and
    Iranian leaders coordinate closely on international efforts to
    restrict free speech to prevent criticism of Islam. Turkey is almost
    alone in joining Latin America's increasingly anti-American alliance
    of Nicaragua, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia in providing Iranians
    visa-free entry. The United States should not count on Turkey's
    intelligence service to monitor and report upon Iranian operatives
    traversing Turkey. Hakan Fidan, Turkey's intelligence chief, makes
    little secret of his preference for Tehran over Washington, raising
    questions both about the wisdom of U.S. intelligence sharing with
    Turkey, and the possibility that technology shared with Turkey--such
    as F-35 Joint Strike Fighter coding and software--might leak to
    American enemies. In 2010, the Turkish daily Hurriyet reported the
    Turkish and Chinese Air Forces had conducted joint war games without
    first alerting the Pentagon or NATO. Such exercises would not have
    been possible without Tehran's cooperation; the Chinese fighters had
    refueled in Iran. n18

    Conclusion

    Iranian officials often quip that they play chess while Americans play
    checkers. The IRGC and Qods Force have global reach, and will confront
    the United States wherever they can, so long as they can do so an
    maintain plausible deniability. As Iran's nuclear program increases
    tension and sanctions strain the Iranian economy, the Caucasus and
    surrounding regions will increasingly become targets for Iranian
    influence and, perhaps, Iranian terrorism. Not only will the Islamic
    Republic continue to target the Republic of Azerbaijan and exploit its
    warm ties with Armenia, but Iranian authorities will also increasingly
    try to leverage leadership changes and ideological solidarity in
    Georgia and Turkey. Across administrations, U.S. strategy is too often
    reactive rather than proactive. Alas, the absence of a coherent U.S.
    strategy to counter and roll back Iranian influence in the Caucasus
    increasingly proves the Iranian quip correct.

    n1 "Khatami: Dar Zamineh-e tahrif andisheh-ha-ye hazirat-e Imam 'alam
    khatar mikonam" [Khatami: I Find Danger in the Distortion of His
    Excellence the Imam's Thoughts], Emrooz (Tehran), May 3, 2008.

    n2 "Jamayeh-i Avari Imza 'Alebeh Khatami," ["Gathering Signatures
    Against Khatami,"] E'temad (Tehran), May 7, 2008

    n3 "Iran's Forces Are Models of Resistance," Press TV (Tehran), May 22, 2008.

    n4 Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998),

    n5 "Azerbaijan Jails 4 for Eurovision Plot," Hurriyet Daily News,
    December 3, 2012.

    n6 Igor Rotar, "Islamic Fundamentalism in Azerbaijan: Myth or
    Reality?" Jamestown Foundation Prism, Aug. 31, 2000.

    n7 Jonathan Eric Lewis, "Replace Turkey as a Strategic Partner?"
    Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2006; Vladimir Socor, "Talysh Issue,
    Dormant in Azerbaijan, Reopened in Armenia," Eurasia Daily Monitor,
    May 27, 2005.

    n8 Ali Alfoneh and Ahmad Majidyar, "Iranian Influence in Afghanistan:
    Imam Khomeini Relief Committee," AEI Middle East Outlook, July 2010.

    n9 "Jashan-e Komiteh-e Emdad Baraye zawjha-ye Afghan," ("Relief
    Committee Celebration for Afghan Husbands,") Fararu.com, May 24, 2012.

    Author was an intern based at the U.S. Embassy in Tajikistan at the time.

    n11 "Fact Sheet: U.S. Treasury Department Targets Iran's Support for
    Terrorism Treasury Announces New Sanctions against Iran's Islamic
    Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force Leadership," U.S. Treasury
    Department, August 3, 2010.

    n12 "Hamayat az Moharoman-e Jomhori Azerbaijan," "Support for the
    Disadvantaged of Azerbaijan," Imam Khomeini Relief Committee,
    http://www.emdad.ir/beinolmelal/dafater/azarbayjan.asp (Accessed
    December 3, 2012).

    n13 "Kodam Keshvarha Moshtare Saryarha-ye Irani Hastand?" ("Which
    Countries Are Customers of Iranian Soap Operas?"), Alef.ir (Tehran),
    August 9, 2011.

    n14 "Ahmadinejad YSU Guest," Yerevan State University, October 22, 2007.

    n15 Eli Lake, "WikiLeaks: Armenia sent Iran arms used to kill U.S.
    troops," The Washington Times, November 29, 2010.

    n16 "Recent OFAC Actions - June 16, 2010," U.S. Treasury Department,
    http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20100616.aspx

    n17 "Eda'ye Mohajerat-e Daneshmandan-e Hasteh-aye Armenisten beh
    Iran," ("Alleged Emigration of Nuclear Scientists from Armenia to
    Iran"), 'Asr-e Iran, October 30, 2011.

    n18 "Chinese Warplanes Refueled in Iran en route to Turkey," Hurriyet
    Daily News, October 11, 2010.

    Read this original document at:
    http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/HHRG-112-FA14-WState-RubinM-20121205.pdf

Working...
X