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U.S. AND ABKHAZIAN RAILWAY
Igor Muradyan
Story from Lragir.am News:
http://www.lragir.am/index.php/eng/0/comments/view/28359
15:50 10/12/2012
Average American diplomats signals to Russian experts that the U.S.
does not mind lifting of the blockade of the Abkhazian railway. There
are serious reasons for this.
Georgia's isolation from Russia did not bring anything to the U.S. and
the Western community but additional problems and the feeling of
potential and real risks. The U.S. has built an adequate social and
political model of co-existence of Georgia with the foreign world,
including (though strange it may seem) with Russia.
The U.S. has always been interested in "transit" Georgia with all its
parallel attributes, which has proven right in recent years. This model
would suit Russia perfectly if Georgia stopped irritating Moscow. Of
course, the question of Georgia's accession to NATO remains, but it
is unlikely, even after the "historic" Chicago Summit, that NATO will
make the desired decision for Georgia.
Georgia, weakened by Russia, is an endless consumer of the donor
assistance and will be waiting for a new war. This waiting may be an
acceptable condition for other nations, but not Georgians, who are
not focused on waiting for long, but on the rule "here and now".
The country, which has experienced a period of favorite positions,
will not return to the position of the Eurasian marginal, and will
prefer a not-rich, but some "model" of existence, realizing that
being in this region, it cannot lead a multidirectional policy.
Russia showed its "respect" toward the American-Atlantic transit
corridor in Georgia quite convincingly, and it became the main factor
of losing if not the interest, then the attention of the Euro-Atlantic
community in Georgia. Actually, after the military conflict in August
2008, the Georgian transit corridor became Russian. Russia will have
to be satisfied with Georgia's distancing now and in the future.
However, the Georgian-Russian relations are not the only circumstance
to be taken into account during the consideration of the current
situation by Americans. Being in a state of communication and
political isolation, the South Caucasus was heavily dependent on the
Turkish-Azerbaijani unit, which does not correspond to the interests
of either the U.S. or Russia, or other countries in the region.
It is necessary to note that the unblocking of the railway towards
the Abkhazian direction will be attractive for Iran, but the Americans
understand very well that this direction is related to the relations
between Iran and the U.S. partners in Europe, so this factor is no
more a big threat for the U.S. strategy.
The U.S. would like to exploit the Georgian transit corridor under
the economic support of Russia in order to shift away the material
and political expenses. The only question is whether the United States
may, in a certain period, assume waiting positions, and this gap may
be favorable for the possible activities of the Armenian lobby in
Washington in the direction of acceleration of positive reaction to
the opening of the transport directions.
Saakashvili's team has been consistent to this issue, who retained his
policy calibrated and capable to lead to results. But, most likely,
the "team" failed to understand that Moscow won't communicate with
Saakashvili anyway, due to other issues.
It seems that both Georgia and Russia hurry because the Caucasian
past demonstrated that the factor of time in this region is important,
and missing the moment, you can never reach after it.
H. Clinton's famous statements on Russia's attempts to integrate the
post-Soviet territory should not be mechanically connected with the
reopening of the Abkhazian railways. The Russian-Georgian relations
are a special case and are least dangerous for the U.S. interests,
since Georgia is firm and won't return to the Russian orbit.
There comes a time when Russia does not lose but only pretends that it
is worried with the fate of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This is just
a demagogic and not very persuasive technique in dealing with Georgia
and Armenia on the opening of the Abkhazian road. All interested
parties may wish to collect "points" in this political bargaining,
but all the parties are afraid of failure and delay of the project.
Igor Muradyan
Story from Lragir.am News:
http://www.lragir.am/index.php/eng/0/comments/view/28359
15:50 10/12/2012
Average American diplomats signals to Russian experts that the U.S.
does not mind lifting of the blockade of the Abkhazian railway. There
are serious reasons for this.
Georgia's isolation from Russia did not bring anything to the U.S. and
the Western community but additional problems and the feeling of
potential and real risks. The U.S. has built an adequate social and
political model of co-existence of Georgia with the foreign world,
including (though strange it may seem) with Russia.
The U.S. has always been interested in "transit" Georgia with all its
parallel attributes, which has proven right in recent years. This model
would suit Russia perfectly if Georgia stopped irritating Moscow. Of
course, the question of Georgia's accession to NATO remains, but it
is unlikely, even after the "historic" Chicago Summit, that NATO will
make the desired decision for Georgia.
Georgia, weakened by Russia, is an endless consumer of the donor
assistance and will be waiting for a new war. This waiting may be an
acceptable condition for other nations, but not Georgians, who are
not focused on waiting for long, but on the rule "here and now".
The country, which has experienced a period of favorite positions,
will not return to the position of the Eurasian marginal, and will
prefer a not-rich, but some "model" of existence, realizing that
being in this region, it cannot lead a multidirectional policy.
Russia showed its "respect" toward the American-Atlantic transit
corridor in Georgia quite convincingly, and it became the main factor
of losing if not the interest, then the attention of the Euro-Atlantic
community in Georgia. Actually, after the military conflict in August
2008, the Georgian transit corridor became Russian. Russia will have
to be satisfied with Georgia's distancing now and in the future.
However, the Georgian-Russian relations are not the only circumstance
to be taken into account during the consideration of the current
situation by Americans. Being in a state of communication and
political isolation, the South Caucasus was heavily dependent on the
Turkish-Azerbaijani unit, which does not correspond to the interests
of either the U.S. or Russia, or other countries in the region.
It is necessary to note that the unblocking of the railway towards
the Abkhazian direction will be attractive for Iran, but the Americans
understand very well that this direction is related to the relations
between Iran and the U.S. partners in Europe, so this factor is no
more a big threat for the U.S. strategy.
The U.S. would like to exploit the Georgian transit corridor under
the economic support of Russia in order to shift away the material
and political expenses. The only question is whether the United States
may, in a certain period, assume waiting positions, and this gap may
be favorable for the possible activities of the Armenian lobby in
Washington in the direction of acceleration of positive reaction to
the opening of the transport directions.
Saakashvili's team has been consistent to this issue, who retained his
policy calibrated and capable to lead to results. But, most likely,
the "team" failed to understand that Moscow won't communicate with
Saakashvili anyway, due to other issues.
It seems that both Georgia and Russia hurry because the Caucasian
past demonstrated that the factor of time in this region is important,
and missing the moment, you can never reach after it.
H. Clinton's famous statements on Russia's attempts to integrate the
post-Soviet territory should not be mechanically connected with the
reopening of the Abkhazian railways. The Russian-Georgian relations
are a special case and are least dangerous for the U.S. interests,
since Georgia is firm and won't return to the Russian orbit.
There comes a time when Russia does not lose but only pretends that it
is worried with the fate of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This is just
a demagogic and not very persuasive technique in dealing with Georgia
and Armenia on the opening of the Abkhazian road. All interested
parties may wish to collect "points" in this political bargaining,
but all the parties are afraid of failure and delay of the project.