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Today's Zaman, Turkey
Dec 11 2012
The fog of war in the Caucasus: 3 scenarios
ZAUR SHIRIYEV
There has been much debate recently on the risk of an escalation of
armed conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, with the main fear
being that a minor local accident could provoke a full-scale war.
Discussions have increased due to stagnation in the peace process and
rumors of an airport operating in occupied territories of Azerbaijan
by de-facto authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh. But contrary to local
experts, I believe that such a scenario is less likely along the Line
of Contact (LOC), where local army commanders cannot act without
permission of the highest command, namely the leadership of the two
countries.
Indeed, war is seen as a last resort, a negative development for both
sides. In the case of Azerbaijan, the country could lose the trust of
energy consumers, which has been especially important since 2012 --
Azerbaijan wants to be part of large-scale gas pipeline projects that
link directly to European markets. The risk is also that the war will
not bring peace, only another period of stagnation. Moreover, while
many military experts predict the overall victory of Azerbaijan, there
is also a slight chance that this victory will be Pyrrhic one, due to
the inevitable loss of political and financial stability -- anything
Azerbaijan has to offer will be compromised or lost.
There is a domestic political dimension to war: the general public in
Azerbaijan is not confident in the negotiations and prospects for a
peaceful solution, and the prevailing belief is that war is the only
option in order to liberate the occupied territories. This majority
supports a quick military solution, and there is pressure on the
government to take such an action. The thinking is that it is `better
to die once rather than each and every time,' and this camp is not
completely satisfied with the government expenditure on the military
budget, which from their point of view is useless in the absence of
action.
There is a possibility of war, but not in the sense that local and
international experts think, in terms of a local incident on the LOC
turning into full-scale conflict. A local incident between combat
soldiers seems a less likely trigger than a political provocation --
for instance, starting flights from the Khojali Airport in occupied
Nagorno-Karabakh. The flights have yet to commence, but Azerbaijani
officials have already blasted the potential move as a clear violation
of their country's airspace. The airport has been ready since May
2011, but for more than a year its opening has been delayed `for
technical reasons.' Armenia understands that according to the
international civil aviation code, Azerbaijan has the right to take
action to stop flights from this airport.
The scenario could unfold as follows: Armenia declares that the first
flight will be from Yerevan to Karabakh. To reduce the risk of an
Azeri response, the first passengers would probably include
politicians, children and people whose death would be a PR nightmare
for Azerbaijan. In this case, Azerbaijan declares before the
international media that they will not tolerate such action, and ask
for pressure on Armenia; then, contrary to Armenian expectations,
Azerbaijan sends short-range missiles to the take-off and landing
strip at the Karabakh airport, forcing the plane to fly back to
Yerevan. Armenian experts have agreed that a big danger for the
Armenian air defense may lie in sudden missile or artillery strikes,
as well as the fact that Khojali airport is just 40-50 kilometers from
one of the big air defense systems located in either Terter or Ganja
in Azerbaijan. If missiles cause human casualties, it is likely that
Armenia will respond indirectly, through the international media. In
the case that Armenia takes a hard line position, they will again
raise the question of de jure recognition of the self-proclaimed
Nagorno-Karabakh separatist entity as an independent republic. If this
happens, the second stage will consist of Azerbaijani military action,
which most probably will escalate into a full-scale war.
The second war scenario is the `almost local war' scenario. As stated
above, one potential spark would be an Azeri answer to the Armenian
recognition of the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan could
launch military action with the aim of taking back the occupied
territories, using its air force in the first stage. The difficulty
here is how to predict and manage the reaction of the international
mediators. One option is that Russia will tolerate Azerbaijani action,
and allow it to take back two or three adjunct territories. It may
then declare that, in accordance with both the 1994 ceasefire
agreement -- which clearly stipulates the deployment of peacekeepers
by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the 2008 Moscow
Declaration -- in which both conflict parties agreed on the `non use
of force,' Moscow will deploy CIS peacekeepers to Karabakh. In this
scenario, conflict resolution will be fully in Moscow's hands, and
Russia will consolidate and build its presence in region.
The less likely war scenario is a `planned war.' Prominent local
experts believe that in the future Azerbaijan will refuse to continue
negotiations and initiate military action to take back the occupied
territories. However, the `planned war' is a part of the `final
resolution' of the Karabakh conflict. In one `planned war' scenario,
the Azerbaijani side starts a war mainly using air forces and Special
Forces, liberating the Aghdam and Fuzuli territories (which are
partially occupied), then, at the intervention of international
mediators, stops the war, and the parties immediately open talks for a
peace deal. This scenario involves, crucially, defeating the
secessionist political entity (so-called Karabakh authorities). A
historical example is the case of Srpska Krajina in Croatia, when, in
1995, Croatia's four-day blitzkrieg resulted in the restoration of
Croatia's territorial integrity.
Finally, the quote from the great Russian writer Leo Tolstoy's `War
and Peace' tells us more, as `the strongest of all warriors are these
two: time and patience.' In this context, we can add one more:
political will, which will be decisive on the question of whether to
live in peace or war.
Dec 11 2012
The fog of war in the Caucasus: 3 scenarios
ZAUR SHIRIYEV
There has been much debate recently on the risk of an escalation of
armed conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, with the main fear
being that a minor local accident could provoke a full-scale war.
Discussions have increased due to stagnation in the peace process and
rumors of an airport operating in occupied territories of Azerbaijan
by de-facto authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh. But contrary to local
experts, I believe that such a scenario is less likely along the Line
of Contact (LOC), where local army commanders cannot act without
permission of the highest command, namely the leadership of the two
countries.
Indeed, war is seen as a last resort, a negative development for both
sides. In the case of Azerbaijan, the country could lose the trust of
energy consumers, which has been especially important since 2012 --
Azerbaijan wants to be part of large-scale gas pipeline projects that
link directly to European markets. The risk is also that the war will
not bring peace, only another period of stagnation. Moreover, while
many military experts predict the overall victory of Azerbaijan, there
is also a slight chance that this victory will be Pyrrhic one, due to
the inevitable loss of political and financial stability -- anything
Azerbaijan has to offer will be compromised or lost.
There is a domestic political dimension to war: the general public in
Azerbaijan is not confident in the negotiations and prospects for a
peaceful solution, and the prevailing belief is that war is the only
option in order to liberate the occupied territories. This majority
supports a quick military solution, and there is pressure on the
government to take such an action. The thinking is that it is `better
to die once rather than each and every time,' and this camp is not
completely satisfied with the government expenditure on the military
budget, which from their point of view is useless in the absence of
action.
There is a possibility of war, but not in the sense that local and
international experts think, in terms of a local incident on the LOC
turning into full-scale conflict. A local incident between combat
soldiers seems a less likely trigger than a political provocation --
for instance, starting flights from the Khojali Airport in occupied
Nagorno-Karabakh. The flights have yet to commence, but Azerbaijani
officials have already blasted the potential move as a clear violation
of their country's airspace. The airport has been ready since May
2011, but for more than a year its opening has been delayed `for
technical reasons.' Armenia understands that according to the
international civil aviation code, Azerbaijan has the right to take
action to stop flights from this airport.
The scenario could unfold as follows: Armenia declares that the first
flight will be from Yerevan to Karabakh. To reduce the risk of an
Azeri response, the first passengers would probably include
politicians, children and people whose death would be a PR nightmare
for Azerbaijan. In this case, Azerbaijan declares before the
international media that they will not tolerate such action, and ask
for pressure on Armenia; then, contrary to Armenian expectations,
Azerbaijan sends short-range missiles to the take-off and landing
strip at the Karabakh airport, forcing the plane to fly back to
Yerevan. Armenian experts have agreed that a big danger for the
Armenian air defense may lie in sudden missile or artillery strikes,
as well as the fact that Khojali airport is just 40-50 kilometers from
one of the big air defense systems located in either Terter or Ganja
in Azerbaijan. If missiles cause human casualties, it is likely that
Armenia will respond indirectly, through the international media. In
the case that Armenia takes a hard line position, they will again
raise the question of de jure recognition of the self-proclaimed
Nagorno-Karabakh separatist entity as an independent republic. If this
happens, the second stage will consist of Azerbaijani military action,
which most probably will escalate into a full-scale war.
The second war scenario is the `almost local war' scenario. As stated
above, one potential spark would be an Azeri answer to the Armenian
recognition of the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan could
launch military action with the aim of taking back the occupied
territories, using its air force in the first stage. The difficulty
here is how to predict and manage the reaction of the international
mediators. One option is that Russia will tolerate Azerbaijani action,
and allow it to take back two or three adjunct territories. It may
then declare that, in accordance with both the 1994 ceasefire
agreement -- which clearly stipulates the deployment of peacekeepers
by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the 2008 Moscow
Declaration -- in which both conflict parties agreed on the `non use
of force,' Moscow will deploy CIS peacekeepers to Karabakh. In this
scenario, conflict resolution will be fully in Moscow's hands, and
Russia will consolidate and build its presence in region.
The less likely war scenario is a `planned war.' Prominent local
experts believe that in the future Azerbaijan will refuse to continue
negotiations and initiate military action to take back the occupied
territories. However, the `planned war' is a part of the `final
resolution' of the Karabakh conflict. In one `planned war' scenario,
the Azerbaijani side starts a war mainly using air forces and Special
Forces, liberating the Aghdam and Fuzuli territories (which are
partially occupied), then, at the intervention of international
mediators, stops the war, and the parties immediately open talks for a
peace deal. This scenario involves, crucially, defeating the
secessionist political entity (so-called Karabakh authorities). A
historical example is the case of Srpska Krajina in Croatia, when, in
1995, Croatia's four-day blitzkrieg resulted in the restoration of
Croatia's territorial integrity.
Finally, the quote from the great Russian writer Leo Tolstoy's `War
and Peace' tells us more, as `the strongest of all warriors are these
two: time and patience.' In this context, we can add one more:
political will, which will be decisive on the question of whether to
live in peace or war.