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FRANCE-TURKEY: THE NIGHT WILL END
by Maxime Gauin*
Today's Zaman
Jan 31 2012
Turkey
The Armenian claims have been discussed in the French Parliament since
1975 (rejected in 1975, 1985, 1987 and 1996, adopted from 1998-2001),
but, clearly, the discussions and the vote had never come so far.
What has happened since December could appropriately be called
the culmination of stupidity. One senator, Sophie Joissains of
the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP or Union for a Popular
Movement), elected from Bouches-du-Rhône -- the county with the most
vituperative Armenian community of France -- even expressed regret
that the Treaty of Sèvres was never implemented. On the other hand,
if in the National Assembly chairman of the Franco-Turkish Friendship
group, Michel Diefenbacher, was a bit alone in maintaining honor by
his good speech delivered against the Boyer bill, a significant number
of members of parliament fought the text fiercely in the Senate,
accumulating motions of dismissal, cancellation of amendments and
speeches to defend their position.
The responsibility falls primarily on Nicolas Sarkozy, who pressured
the UMP group to either abstain from voting or vote for the bill.
Indeed, the main change in comparison to the vote of May 4, 2011,
when the previous Armenian bill was rejected, is the change of votes
within the UMP: 19 voted against, but 137 did so on May 4, 2011; 56
abstained, but only 10 did during the preceding vote; 57 voted for,
but only nine did the last year. The Socialist group was pressured as
well, but the results were much more mixed: On May 4, 2011, 21 voted
against the bill, 39 for and 55 abstained; on January 23, 2012, 26
voted against, 56 for and 48 abstained. In addition to the courageous
fight of the Socialist chairman of the Law Committee, who presented in
vain a motion of dismissal, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Jean-Louis Carrère, also a Socialist, repeatedly expressed his anger
against the bill and voted accordingly. Other examples can be provided.
We have not been closer to a rupture in Turkish-French relations since
the Ankara Agreement of 1921. Regardless, paradoxically, the crisis
can be resolved by the collapse of Armenian nationalism in France.
Indeed, the Boyer bill is totally unconstitutional (a violation of
free speech, among other rights) and is backed by a January 2001 law
of that recognizes the unsubstantiated "Armenian genocide" claims.
Article 34 of the French Constitution precisely defines the scope
of the law and there is no legal value for simple statements. The
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Council is clear: When two laws
are closely connected, and when someone is apprehended for having
violated one of them, the council can check both; if an article of law
is pure rhetoric, it is simply censored. As a result, if 60 senators
(among the 86 who voted against) take the issue to the Constitutional
Council, the two bills will be thrown out. If not, the first person
to be charged could file a Priority Question of Constitutionality; it
would take more time, but the result would be exactly the same. In any
case, the Armenian nationalist leaders would have to explain to their
activists why they vehemently supported the suicidal second bill. The
strident hostility of most editorialists, of many historians, jurists
and other intellectuals as well as many ordinary citizens, shows that
the throwing out of these bills would be welcomed. For the moment, the
Turkish government's reactions are relatively quiet, chiefly because
of this constitutionality problem. That is why we can hope that the
Armenian nationalists will not completely achieve their traditional
objective: to create crisis between Turkey and other countries.
The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) joined the Italian Fascists
and the Nazi regime in the 1930s not only for ideological reasons, but
also with the hope of sparking a war with Ankara. The ARF shamelessly
joined the USSR in 1972 to participate in the destabilization of a
NATO member. Since 1987, hindering the Turkish candidacy to the EU
has been one of the main objectives of Armenian nationalist groups.
On the other hand, it would be totally wrong for the Turkish side to
simply wait in the hope that the Constitutional Council finishes off
Armenian nationalism in France. Turkey believed Armenian nationalism
was dead in 1923, for example, but it was not. More particularly for
the current French case, the pressures on the Socialist group are
mostly due to the close relations between ARF leader Mourad Papazian
and the Socialist candidate for the presidency, Francois Hollande.
There is no miraculous method through which to seize the current
situation and thoroughly crush Armenian nationalism in France.
However, there are partial, efficient solutions. One of them is to
organize, by all legal means, the defeat of a significant number of
deputies who voted for the Boyer bill in the National Assembly.
Another is to finally translate into French the main scholarly
contributions to the Armenian question and other sensitive aspects of
Ottoman and Turkish history published during the last 20 years -- those
of Ferudun Ata, Edward J. Erickson, Yusuf Halacoglu, Guenter Lewy,
Justin McCarthy and others. More generally, relations with France
(the second-largest investor in Turkey) deserve new, additional,
permanent structures and, in such a perspective, US-Turkish relations
could provide a certain inspiration.
Between 1921 and 1922 the Franco-Turkish alliance was restored, in
great part by two ministers of foreign affairs: Raymond Poincaré
from the center right and Aristide Briand from the center left. We
could have a kind of new Raymond Poincaré with Alain Juppé. A new
Aristide Briand is wanted.
*Maxime Gauin is a researcher at the International Strategic Research
Organization (USAK) in Ankara.
by Maxime Gauin*
Today's Zaman
Jan 31 2012
Turkey
The Armenian claims have been discussed in the French Parliament since
1975 (rejected in 1975, 1985, 1987 and 1996, adopted from 1998-2001),
but, clearly, the discussions and the vote had never come so far.
What has happened since December could appropriately be called
the culmination of stupidity. One senator, Sophie Joissains of
the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP or Union for a Popular
Movement), elected from Bouches-du-Rhône -- the county with the most
vituperative Armenian community of France -- even expressed regret
that the Treaty of Sèvres was never implemented. On the other hand,
if in the National Assembly chairman of the Franco-Turkish Friendship
group, Michel Diefenbacher, was a bit alone in maintaining honor by
his good speech delivered against the Boyer bill, a significant number
of members of parliament fought the text fiercely in the Senate,
accumulating motions of dismissal, cancellation of amendments and
speeches to defend their position.
The responsibility falls primarily on Nicolas Sarkozy, who pressured
the UMP group to either abstain from voting or vote for the bill.
Indeed, the main change in comparison to the vote of May 4, 2011,
when the previous Armenian bill was rejected, is the change of votes
within the UMP: 19 voted against, but 137 did so on May 4, 2011; 56
abstained, but only 10 did during the preceding vote; 57 voted for,
but only nine did the last year. The Socialist group was pressured as
well, but the results were much more mixed: On May 4, 2011, 21 voted
against the bill, 39 for and 55 abstained; on January 23, 2012, 26
voted against, 56 for and 48 abstained. In addition to the courageous
fight of the Socialist chairman of the Law Committee, who presented in
vain a motion of dismissal, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Jean-Louis Carrère, also a Socialist, repeatedly expressed his anger
against the bill and voted accordingly. Other examples can be provided.
We have not been closer to a rupture in Turkish-French relations since
the Ankara Agreement of 1921. Regardless, paradoxically, the crisis
can be resolved by the collapse of Armenian nationalism in France.
Indeed, the Boyer bill is totally unconstitutional (a violation of
free speech, among other rights) and is backed by a January 2001 law
of that recognizes the unsubstantiated "Armenian genocide" claims.
Article 34 of the French Constitution precisely defines the scope
of the law and there is no legal value for simple statements. The
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Council is clear: When two laws
are closely connected, and when someone is apprehended for having
violated one of them, the council can check both; if an article of law
is pure rhetoric, it is simply censored. As a result, if 60 senators
(among the 86 who voted against) take the issue to the Constitutional
Council, the two bills will be thrown out. If not, the first person
to be charged could file a Priority Question of Constitutionality; it
would take more time, but the result would be exactly the same. In any
case, the Armenian nationalist leaders would have to explain to their
activists why they vehemently supported the suicidal second bill. The
strident hostility of most editorialists, of many historians, jurists
and other intellectuals as well as many ordinary citizens, shows that
the throwing out of these bills would be welcomed. For the moment, the
Turkish government's reactions are relatively quiet, chiefly because
of this constitutionality problem. That is why we can hope that the
Armenian nationalists will not completely achieve their traditional
objective: to create crisis between Turkey and other countries.
The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) joined the Italian Fascists
and the Nazi regime in the 1930s not only for ideological reasons, but
also with the hope of sparking a war with Ankara. The ARF shamelessly
joined the USSR in 1972 to participate in the destabilization of a
NATO member. Since 1987, hindering the Turkish candidacy to the EU
has been one of the main objectives of Armenian nationalist groups.
On the other hand, it would be totally wrong for the Turkish side to
simply wait in the hope that the Constitutional Council finishes off
Armenian nationalism in France. Turkey believed Armenian nationalism
was dead in 1923, for example, but it was not. More particularly for
the current French case, the pressures on the Socialist group are
mostly due to the close relations between ARF leader Mourad Papazian
and the Socialist candidate for the presidency, Francois Hollande.
There is no miraculous method through which to seize the current
situation and thoroughly crush Armenian nationalism in France.
However, there are partial, efficient solutions. One of them is to
organize, by all legal means, the defeat of a significant number of
deputies who voted for the Boyer bill in the National Assembly.
Another is to finally translate into French the main scholarly
contributions to the Armenian question and other sensitive aspects of
Ottoman and Turkish history published during the last 20 years -- those
of Ferudun Ata, Edward J. Erickson, Yusuf Halacoglu, Guenter Lewy,
Justin McCarthy and others. More generally, relations with France
(the second-largest investor in Turkey) deserve new, additional,
permanent structures and, in such a perspective, US-Turkish relations
could provide a certain inspiration.
Between 1921 and 1922 the Franco-Turkish alliance was restored, in
great part by two ministers of foreign affairs: Raymond Poincaré
from the center right and Aristide Briand from the center left. We
could have a kind of new Raymond Poincaré with Alain Juppé. A new
Aristide Briand is wanted.
*Maxime Gauin is a researcher at the International Strategic Research
Organization (USAK) in Ankara.