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TURKEY'S CHALLENGE TO FRENCH CO-CHAIRMANSHIP
Today's Zaman
Jan 31 2012
Turkey
Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu has spoken out once again
in opposition of France remaining part of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, following its adoption
of a law criminalizing the denial of the 1915 Armenian 'genocide.'
On CNN Turk's Egrisi Dogrusu program, Davutoglu declared that either
France should resign its co-chairmanship or Turkey should be made a
co-chair. This follows President Abdullah Gul's proposal that France
end its involvement in the mediation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
given that through this bill, it has renounced its neutrality. During
the program, leading journalist Taha Akyol asked whether Azerbaijanis
will call upon France to leave the Minsk Group.
In fact, Azerbaijan has on multiple occasions questioned the Minsk
Group's efforts on the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; there
has already been discussion of France's position in the Minsk Group,
as well as the possibility of bringing in Turkey as co-chair. In the
recent protest against the French bill, Azerbaijani youth demanded
France leave the Minsk Group. There is a strong belief among the
Azerbaijani public that France is not neutral and that any future
promises of objectivity are tempered by this new law. The key question
today, in my opinion, is not simply the neutrality of the group's
co-chairs. There is a complex matrix of demands and alliances at play,
including the suggested exclusion of France, challenges to the Minsk
Group's role in the resolution process and the possible inclusion
of Turkey.
The Minsk Group since its inception has almost exclusively focused
on peacemaking -- i.e. efforts toward achieving an agreement rather
than a comprehensive solution. Following the 2004 Prague Process,
more space was given to direct talks between the conflict parties.
Disappointed that the Minsk Group had not achieved even a basic outline
of a conflict resolution strategy, the Azerbaijani public was and
remains skeptical of the three OSCE Minsk Group co-chair countries'
objectivity. The Kazan meeting in June 2011, held before the official
meeting with the OSCE Minsk Group, was the most promising meeting
to date. It seems perhaps the OSCE Minsk Group never really served
as an effective mediator. It lacks the necessary carrot-and-stick
policies to actually persuade the parties to make concessions. During
the negotiation process, both sides on occasion accused the OSCE of
being biased.
Under these circumstances, anyone might question the effectiveness
of the current framework for negotiations. Questioning the neutrality
of France or other Minsk Group co-chairs is in fact coming very late
in the game -- the world's largest and most influential Armenian
communities are concentrated in the three co-chair countries of
the current OSCE Minsk Group. The US, despite initial opposition
from the State Department, provides direct financial aid to the
separatist authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia is Armenia's main
military and political ally, and France, with its traditional strong
cultural and social relations with Armenia, is its main lobbyist in
the European arena. Russia was and still is something of an unknown
quantity with regard to this conflict; in some situations, it has
acted in support of Armenia, while in other cases, it has strongly
advocated for peaceful conflict resolution. The US policy towards
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has always been pulled in opposing
directions, with its domestic politics (the influence of the Armenian
diaspora) in conflict with its economic and strategic interests in
the Caspian region. France has never had much incentive to act as
an honest broker in terms of eliciting Armenian concessions, which
would dissatisfy French-Armenians.
In this regard, i.e. if the current negotiations under the Minsk Group
format do not seem to be geared towards genuine conflict resolution, is
it time to be discussing Turkey's inclusion? Even if Azerbaijan were to
propose such a plan, there are a number of obstacles that preclude it.
Firstly, none of the current mediators can afford to withdraw or
terminate the mediation efforts under the current format. Their
national interests are at stake, and they are not keen to initiate
another mediator. Secondly, Armenia as direct party to the conflict
has always opposed Turkey's involvement in the resolution process
and strongly objects to the possibility of Turkey taking on the role
of co-chair.
I asked this question to Gerard Libaridian, former senior adviser to
Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrossian and current professor in the
history department at the University of Michigan, who said: "Ahmet
Davutoglu has always struck me as a most intelligent and visionary
statesman. It is unfortunate that he is increasingly grounding that
vision in failed experiments in history, for example the late Ottoman
Empire with its failed reforms and the consequences of those willful
failures, as well as the more recent Minsk Group process, which can
best be characterized as still-born mediation."
Thirdly, current negotiations under the auspices of the Minsk Group
are not doing enough to change the perceptions of the warring parties,
to transform their "zero-sum game" mentalities to visions of a win-win
solution, a shift that is essential to the solution of the conflict.
In this respect, it is also important to bear in mind that Turkey's
inclusion in the Minsk Group could be good opportunity to reinvigorate
the negotiations, but it is almost certain that not only would Armenia
directly oppose such a proposal, the other Minsk Group countries
would say -- diplomatically -- there is "no need to change the
existing format."
For these reasons, opening the debate on France's exclusion or
Turkey's inclusion will not be productive and is not something that
Azerbaijan can do. It would be naïve to believe Azerbaijan could
present a considerable challenge to France's co-chair position;
the co-chairs were specially appointed by the OSCE at the Budapest
Summit in December 1994 to lead the Minsk group.
To return to the question of the new French law, Turkey has tried to
recruit 60 French MPs to ask the constitutional council to examine the
bill to determine whether it is constitutional. If Turkey succeeds in
blocking the bill, will Ankara still push for France's abdication of
its Minsk Group seat? I think Ankara's energy could be best directed
towards challenging the Minsk Group's role in the resolution process;
in any case, due to the forthcoming elections in all three Minsk
Group co-chair countries as well as Armenia, most of us have already
accepted that 2012 is a lost year.
Today's Zaman
Jan 31 2012
Turkey
Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu has spoken out once again
in opposition of France remaining part of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, following its adoption
of a law criminalizing the denial of the 1915 Armenian 'genocide.'
On CNN Turk's Egrisi Dogrusu program, Davutoglu declared that either
France should resign its co-chairmanship or Turkey should be made a
co-chair. This follows President Abdullah Gul's proposal that France
end its involvement in the mediation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
given that through this bill, it has renounced its neutrality. During
the program, leading journalist Taha Akyol asked whether Azerbaijanis
will call upon France to leave the Minsk Group.
In fact, Azerbaijan has on multiple occasions questioned the Minsk
Group's efforts on the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; there
has already been discussion of France's position in the Minsk Group,
as well as the possibility of bringing in Turkey as co-chair. In the
recent protest against the French bill, Azerbaijani youth demanded
France leave the Minsk Group. There is a strong belief among the
Azerbaijani public that France is not neutral and that any future
promises of objectivity are tempered by this new law. The key question
today, in my opinion, is not simply the neutrality of the group's
co-chairs. There is a complex matrix of demands and alliances at play,
including the suggested exclusion of France, challenges to the Minsk
Group's role in the resolution process and the possible inclusion
of Turkey.
The Minsk Group since its inception has almost exclusively focused
on peacemaking -- i.e. efforts toward achieving an agreement rather
than a comprehensive solution. Following the 2004 Prague Process,
more space was given to direct talks between the conflict parties.
Disappointed that the Minsk Group had not achieved even a basic outline
of a conflict resolution strategy, the Azerbaijani public was and
remains skeptical of the three OSCE Minsk Group co-chair countries'
objectivity. The Kazan meeting in June 2011, held before the official
meeting with the OSCE Minsk Group, was the most promising meeting
to date. It seems perhaps the OSCE Minsk Group never really served
as an effective mediator. It lacks the necessary carrot-and-stick
policies to actually persuade the parties to make concessions. During
the negotiation process, both sides on occasion accused the OSCE of
being biased.
Under these circumstances, anyone might question the effectiveness
of the current framework for negotiations. Questioning the neutrality
of France or other Minsk Group co-chairs is in fact coming very late
in the game -- the world's largest and most influential Armenian
communities are concentrated in the three co-chair countries of
the current OSCE Minsk Group. The US, despite initial opposition
from the State Department, provides direct financial aid to the
separatist authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia is Armenia's main
military and political ally, and France, with its traditional strong
cultural and social relations with Armenia, is its main lobbyist in
the European arena. Russia was and still is something of an unknown
quantity with regard to this conflict; in some situations, it has
acted in support of Armenia, while in other cases, it has strongly
advocated for peaceful conflict resolution. The US policy towards
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has always been pulled in opposing
directions, with its domestic politics (the influence of the Armenian
diaspora) in conflict with its economic and strategic interests in
the Caspian region. France has never had much incentive to act as
an honest broker in terms of eliciting Armenian concessions, which
would dissatisfy French-Armenians.
In this regard, i.e. if the current negotiations under the Minsk Group
format do not seem to be geared towards genuine conflict resolution, is
it time to be discussing Turkey's inclusion? Even if Azerbaijan were to
propose such a plan, there are a number of obstacles that preclude it.
Firstly, none of the current mediators can afford to withdraw or
terminate the mediation efforts under the current format. Their
national interests are at stake, and they are not keen to initiate
another mediator. Secondly, Armenia as direct party to the conflict
has always opposed Turkey's involvement in the resolution process
and strongly objects to the possibility of Turkey taking on the role
of co-chair.
I asked this question to Gerard Libaridian, former senior adviser to
Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrossian and current professor in the
history department at the University of Michigan, who said: "Ahmet
Davutoglu has always struck me as a most intelligent and visionary
statesman. It is unfortunate that he is increasingly grounding that
vision in failed experiments in history, for example the late Ottoman
Empire with its failed reforms and the consequences of those willful
failures, as well as the more recent Minsk Group process, which can
best be characterized as still-born mediation."
Thirdly, current negotiations under the auspices of the Minsk Group
are not doing enough to change the perceptions of the warring parties,
to transform their "zero-sum game" mentalities to visions of a win-win
solution, a shift that is essential to the solution of the conflict.
In this respect, it is also important to bear in mind that Turkey's
inclusion in the Minsk Group could be good opportunity to reinvigorate
the negotiations, but it is almost certain that not only would Armenia
directly oppose such a proposal, the other Minsk Group countries
would say -- diplomatically -- there is "no need to change the
existing format."
For these reasons, opening the debate on France's exclusion or
Turkey's inclusion will not be productive and is not something that
Azerbaijan can do. It would be naïve to believe Azerbaijan could
present a considerable challenge to France's co-chair position;
the co-chairs were specially appointed by the OSCE at the Budapest
Summit in December 1994 to lead the Minsk group.
To return to the question of the new French law, Turkey has tried to
recruit 60 French MPs to ask the constitutional council to examine the
bill to determine whether it is constitutional. If Turkey succeeds in
blocking the bill, will Ankara still push for France's abdication of
its Minsk Group seat? I think Ankara's energy could be best directed
towards challenging the Minsk Group's role in the resolution process;
in any case, due to the forthcoming elections in all three Minsk
Group co-chair countries as well as Armenia, most of us have already
accepted that 2012 is a lost year.