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STRUGGLE FOR NAGORNO-KARABAKH 2.0: THE MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF AZERBAIJAN GROWS FURTHER
by Alexander Khramchikhin
DEFENSE and SECURITY
February 1, 2012 Wednesday
Source: Moskovskie Novosti, January 30, 2012, p. 6
[translated from Russian]
THE TEMPTATION TO SOLVE THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT BY THE MILITARY
WAY IS GROWING STRONGER; Although the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict outside
of Armenia and Azerbaijan have gone far to the periphery of public
attention, its growth into a new war looks practically inevitable
in the near future. This is explained by extreme hardening of the
parties, absolute incompatibility of their positions and, what is the
most important, by the fundamental impossibility of preserving of the
status quo forever for Azerbaijan and by the complete unacceptability
of breaking of the status quo for Armenia.
Although the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict outside of Armenia and
Azerbaijan have gone far to the periphery of public attention, its
growth into a new war looks practically inevitable in the near future.
This is explained by extreme hardening of the parties, absolute
incompatibility of their positions and, what is the most important, by
the fundamental impossibility of preserving of the status quo forever
for Azerbaijan and by the complete unacceptability of breaking of
the status quo for Armenia. No Minsk group can do anything to this,
although in this case its members (Russia, US, France) demonstrate a
unique unanimity unique for them. Despite their significant influence
on Baku and Yerevan it is not so strong to force one of these parties
to sacrifice its fundamental national interests. A compromise does
not look possible.
In case of a war each party has its own advantages. For Armenia this
is a convenient and perfectly arranged defensive position along the
entire frontline, as well as higher combat qualities of the servicemen
than those of the enemy. For Azerbaijan these are much bigger economic
capabilities. Officials in Baku keep repeating that the military
budget of Azerbaijan is bigger than the entire GDP of Armenia.
According to official data, as of January 1 of 2011 Azerbaijan had 381
tanks, 181 combat infantry vehicles and armored personnel carriers,
469 artillery systems, 79 combat airplanes and 26 strike helicopters.
On the same day, Armenia had 110 tanks, 140 combat infantry vehicles
and armored personnel carriers, 239 artillery systems, 16 combat
airplanes and 15 strike helicopters. Along with this, the armed forces
of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic fully integrated with the Armenian ones
are not taken into account. It is presumed that according to the
quantity of ground hardware they may even exceed the Armenian army
but they have no aviation at all.
On account of significant oil revenues Azerbaijan keeps increasing
the military superiority over Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
both in the air and on the ground. Correspondingly, the temptation
to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh problem by the military way grows
stronger. Quite possibly, Baku would have already attempted this
but for the Russian-Georgian war of 2008. It shocked the Azerbaijani
authorities because they imagined themselves "in the boots" of their
Georgian colleagues. The shock is over now and military advantage of
Azerbaijan is growing bigger.
Presence of the Russian base in Gyumri and membership in CSTO seems
to be a guarantee of protection from the Azerbaijani blow for Armenia.
However, most likely, this guarantee is illusory. Neither Kazakhstan,
nor Belarus, moreover so Central Asian countries will fight against
Azerbaijan on the side of Armenia. Russia will not do this too. In
reality, the Russian base is only a guarantee of protection from
interference of Turkey into the conflict (on the side of Azerbaijan).
If the war is purely Armenian-Azerbaijani like at the beginning
of the 1990s probability of Russia's interference into it on the
side of Armenia is close to zero, at least if the hostilities are
confined to the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and do not
touch Armenia proper.
As to the West, two opposite factors will have effect on its
positions. This is the powerful Armenian Diaspora (especially in the US
and France) and exceptional importance of Azerbaijan for numerous oil
and gas projects alternative to the Russian ones. It is difficult to
make a choice in this case. In any case, military interference of the
US, leaving apart the European countries, into the Nagorno-Karabakh
war is absolutely ruled out. The West will simply ardently demand
Yerevan and Baku to stop the war as soon as possible.
Incidentally, Russia will do the same.
Because time is working for Azerbaijan now a war is more beneficial
for Armenians. As long as forces of the parties are comparable they
can count on victory, that is on a very significant weakening of the
military potential of the enemy that Azerbaijan will have to restore
at least for 15-20 years afterwards. However, if Armenians start a
war they will be aggressors that attack a territory that belongs to
Azerbaijan from any standpoint. Even Russia understands this.
That is why it is possible to presume that the scenario most
beneficial from the standpoint of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic is to somehow provoke Azerbaijanis to attack the first as
soon as possible. Then Armenians being in a position of defenders on
a perfectly equipped, prepared and well studied position beneficial
from the military standpoint will be able to fulfill the main task of
the war: will eliminate the offensive potential of Azerbaijan. Along
with the military defeat Baku will also have a political defeat both
on international arena and at home. Then Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
will change its status from an absolutely unrecognized country to a
partially recognized one. At least, Armenia will recognize it.
Thus, both parties want a war. The main question is at which moment
their wishes will be brought into life.
by Alexander Khramchikhin
DEFENSE and SECURITY
February 1, 2012 Wednesday
Source: Moskovskie Novosti, January 30, 2012, p. 6
[translated from Russian]
THE TEMPTATION TO SOLVE THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT BY THE MILITARY
WAY IS GROWING STRONGER; Although the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict outside
of Armenia and Azerbaijan have gone far to the periphery of public
attention, its growth into a new war looks practically inevitable
in the near future. This is explained by extreme hardening of the
parties, absolute incompatibility of their positions and, what is the
most important, by the fundamental impossibility of preserving of the
status quo forever for Azerbaijan and by the complete unacceptability
of breaking of the status quo for Armenia.
Although the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict outside of Armenia and
Azerbaijan have gone far to the periphery of public attention, its
growth into a new war looks practically inevitable in the near future.
This is explained by extreme hardening of the parties, absolute
incompatibility of their positions and, what is the most important, by
the fundamental impossibility of preserving of the status quo forever
for Azerbaijan and by the complete unacceptability of breaking of
the status quo for Armenia. No Minsk group can do anything to this,
although in this case its members (Russia, US, France) demonstrate a
unique unanimity unique for them. Despite their significant influence
on Baku and Yerevan it is not so strong to force one of these parties
to sacrifice its fundamental national interests. A compromise does
not look possible.
In case of a war each party has its own advantages. For Armenia this
is a convenient and perfectly arranged defensive position along the
entire frontline, as well as higher combat qualities of the servicemen
than those of the enemy. For Azerbaijan these are much bigger economic
capabilities. Officials in Baku keep repeating that the military
budget of Azerbaijan is bigger than the entire GDP of Armenia.
According to official data, as of January 1 of 2011 Azerbaijan had 381
tanks, 181 combat infantry vehicles and armored personnel carriers,
469 artillery systems, 79 combat airplanes and 26 strike helicopters.
On the same day, Armenia had 110 tanks, 140 combat infantry vehicles
and armored personnel carriers, 239 artillery systems, 16 combat
airplanes and 15 strike helicopters. Along with this, the armed forces
of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic fully integrated with the Armenian ones
are not taken into account. It is presumed that according to the
quantity of ground hardware they may even exceed the Armenian army
but they have no aviation at all.
On account of significant oil revenues Azerbaijan keeps increasing
the military superiority over Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
both in the air and on the ground. Correspondingly, the temptation
to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh problem by the military way grows
stronger. Quite possibly, Baku would have already attempted this
but for the Russian-Georgian war of 2008. It shocked the Azerbaijani
authorities because they imagined themselves "in the boots" of their
Georgian colleagues. The shock is over now and military advantage of
Azerbaijan is growing bigger.
Presence of the Russian base in Gyumri and membership in CSTO seems
to be a guarantee of protection from the Azerbaijani blow for Armenia.
However, most likely, this guarantee is illusory. Neither Kazakhstan,
nor Belarus, moreover so Central Asian countries will fight against
Azerbaijan on the side of Armenia. Russia will not do this too. In
reality, the Russian base is only a guarantee of protection from
interference of Turkey into the conflict (on the side of Azerbaijan).
If the war is purely Armenian-Azerbaijani like at the beginning
of the 1990s probability of Russia's interference into it on the
side of Armenia is close to zero, at least if the hostilities are
confined to the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and do not
touch Armenia proper.
As to the West, two opposite factors will have effect on its
positions. This is the powerful Armenian Diaspora (especially in the US
and France) and exceptional importance of Azerbaijan for numerous oil
and gas projects alternative to the Russian ones. It is difficult to
make a choice in this case. In any case, military interference of the
US, leaving apart the European countries, into the Nagorno-Karabakh
war is absolutely ruled out. The West will simply ardently demand
Yerevan and Baku to stop the war as soon as possible.
Incidentally, Russia will do the same.
Because time is working for Azerbaijan now a war is more beneficial
for Armenians. As long as forces of the parties are comparable they
can count on victory, that is on a very significant weakening of the
military potential of the enemy that Azerbaijan will have to restore
at least for 15-20 years afterwards. However, if Armenians start a
war they will be aggressors that attack a territory that belongs to
Azerbaijan from any standpoint. Even Russia understands this.
That is why it is possible to presume that the scenario most
beneficial from the standpoint of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic is to somehow provoke Azerbaijanis to attack the first as
soon as possible. Then Armenians being in a position of defenders on
a perfectly equipped, prepared and well studied position beneficial
from the military standpoint will be able to fulfill the main task of
the war: will eliminate the offensive potential of Azerbaijan. Along
with the military defeat Baku will also have a political defeat both
on international arena and at home. Then Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
will change its status from an absolutely unrecognized country to a
partially recognized one. At least, Armenia will recognize it.
Thus, both parties want a war. The main question is at which moment
their wishes will be brought into life.