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WILL RUSSIA YIELD ON SYRIA?
Suren Grigoryan
Foreign Policy Journal
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2012/02/24/will-russia-yield-on-syria/
Feb 24 2012
Russia and China's vetoes on the UN Security Council resolution
condemning Syrian government's violent crackdown on opposition
and aimed at imposing greater international sanctions on Damascus
were largely viewed in the West, as well as in the Arab world, as a
critical obstacle for stopping the on-going bloodshed on the Syrian
streets. However, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's subsequent
visit to Damascus (on February 7th) put Russia in a position of being
the Bashar al-Assad regime's main protector and therefore welcomed
the lion's share of international pressure and criticism. Since the
criticism and pressure are growing concurrently with increasing number
of civilian deaths and worsening humanitarian situation in Syria,
the question arises, will Russia change its position on Syrian issue?
I think the timing of Moscow's activation on Syrian issue prompts the
answer to the question. By the time Russia's Foreign Minister visited
Damascus, there was already enough ground to assume that the political
regime in Syria was steadily heading toward a Libyan scenario. Assad's
denial to step down and transfer power to his deputy (a suggestion
included in the Arab League's plan), his belated and perhaps idle
efforts aimed at reforming the country's political system, and his
overt determination to stifle political opposition by military terror
had made his regime's political future extremely questionable even
before Lavrov's arrival to Damascus. It is hardly plausible that
Kremlin's decision-makers have underestimated these factors when
backing Syrian regime vis-a-vis international (particularly Western)
community. Then what's the point of standing behind the regime and
its leader who has crossed all possible red lines and is virtually
condemned to political fiasco?
Moscow's move was aimed at gaining an additional "platform" for
bargaining with the West. Given the forthcoming presidential elections
in Russian Federation such occasion may appear quite soon. The mass
demonstrations against the candidacy of ruling party (United Russia)
candidate and incumbent Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, that started
in December 2011 in Moscow revealed dissatisfaction by Putin's planned
return within many segments of Russian society. Alarming numbers of
demonstrators proves that despite the affluence of administrative,
financial, media, and other resources that Russia's ruling party
may employ for securing Putin's victory, the latter's ascendance
to power may be significantly thorny. Under these circumstances,
Russia's ruling class may exclude neither undesirable outcome of
the elections nor post-election turbulence. If such problems arise,
Russia's political regime will become extremely susceptible to Western
critique and even interference (whatever it implies), which in turn
may damage Putin's team standing significantly.
Here, Moscow may use its position on the Syrian issue as a kind
of ruse for keeping the West, and particularly the United States,
away from Russia's internal political "rumblings". In other words,
Moscow apparently counts on yielding Syria to the West in return
to the latter's non-interference to Russia's pre- and post-election
political life. It is worth mentioning also that the urgency of Syrian
issue increases its bargaining value day by day.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (RIA Novosti / Sergey Guneev)
Hence, as election day in Russia comes closer, one may expect Moscow
to change its position in regard to the Syrian issue literally at
first convenient occasion to do so. According to the Russian daily
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, in November 2011, Russia's President Medvedev
stated that if Bashal al-Assad is incapable of managing transformation
in his country, he has to leave. Thus Russia's leader made clear that
Moscow is leaving the paths for Assad's exit open, and may change
its position if needed.
As for China's position on the same issue, it is unlikely that Beijing
will stand alone with the Syrian government once Russia leaves it. By
calling recently on the Syrian government and the country's opposition
to halt acts of violence immediately, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister,
Mr. Zhai Jun, basically expressed Beijing's obsession with the burden
it assumed by vetoing the UN resolution.
Thus, as violence in Syria intensifies and international concerns with
the situation in this country increases, one may expect revision of
Russia's, and then China's, position on dealing with Syrian crisis,
which will give way to greater international pressure on Syrian
government and possibly intervention.
Suren Grigoryan is a political analyst, who worked for the Ministry
of Defense of Armenia for more than 10 years. His experiences in
the Armenian armed forces range from commanding troops in the field
to advising the government on the legal aspects of international
military cooperation and defense policy formation. Concurrently,
he provided violence risk assessment in the CIS countries for the
London based Exclusive Analysis Company that forecasts commercially
relevant political and violent risks worldwide. He also taught graduate
course on Comparative Politics called "The Politics of Empire and
Post-Imperialism" at the Yerevan State Linguistic University of
Armenia. Suren has two Bachelor degrees. The first is in Law, the
second, is in military command and engineering. He earned his Master's
degree (MSc) in Comparative Politics at the London School of Economics
and Political Science (United Kingdom). The area of Suren's expertise
and interest is the politics of the Post-Soviet space and the Middle
East. Currently he resides in the US.
Suren Grigoryan
Foreign Policy Journal
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2012/02/24/will-russia-yield-on-syria/
Feb 24 2012
Russia and China's vetoes on the UN Security Council resolution
condemning Syrian government's violent crackdown on opposition
and aimed at imposing greater international sanctions on Damascus
were largely viewed in the West, as well as in the Arab world, as a
critical obstacle for stopping the on-going bloodshed on the Syrian
streets. However, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's subsequent
visit to Damascus (on February 7th) put Russia in a position of being
the Bashar al-Assad regime's main protector and therefore welcomed
the lion's share of international pressure and criticism. Since the
criticism and pressure are growing concurrently with increasing number
of civilian deaths and worsening humanitarian situation in Syria,
the question arises, will Russia change its position on Syrian issue?
I think the timing of Moscow's activation on Syrian issue prompts the
answer to the question. By the time Russia's Foreign Minister visited
Damascus, there was already enough ground to assume that the political
regime in Syria was steadily heading toward a Libyan scenario. Assad's
denial to step down and transfer power to his deputy (a suggestion
included in the Arab League's plan), his belated and perhaps idle
efforts aimed at reforming the country's political system, and his
overt determination to stifle political opposition by military terror
had made his regime's political future extremely questionable even
before Lavrov's arrival to Damascus. It is hardly plausible that
Kremlin's decision-makers have underestimated these factors when
backing Syrian regime vis-a-vis international (particularly Western)
community. Then what's the point of standing behind the regime and
its leader who has crossed all possible red lines and is virtually
condemned to political fiasco?
Moscow's move was aimed at gaining an additional "platform" for
bargaining with the West. Given the forthcoming presidential elections
in Russian Federation such occasion may appear quite soon. The mass
demonstrations against the candidacy of ruling party (United Russia)
candidate and incumbent Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, that started
in December 2011 in Moscow revealed dissatisfaction by Putin's planned
return within many segments of Russian society. Alarming numbers of
demonstrators proves that despite the affluence of administrative,
financial, media, and other resources that Russia's ruling party
may employ for securing Putin's victory, the latter's ascendance
to power may be significantly thorny. Under these circumstances,
Russia's ruling class may exclude neither undesirable outcome of
the elections nor post-election turbulence. If such problems arise,
Russia's political regime will become extremely susceptible to Western
critique and even interference (whatever it implies), which in turn
may damage Putin's team standing significantly.
Here, Moscow may use its position on the Syrian issue as a kind
of ruse for keeping the West, and particularly the United States,
away from Russia's internal political "rumblings". In other words,
Moscow apparently counts on yielding Syria to the West in return
to the latter's non-interference to Russia's pre- and post-election
political life. It is worth mentioning also that the urgency of Syrian
issue increases its bargaining value day by day.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (RIA Novosti / Sergey Guneev)
Hence, as election day in Russia comes closer, one may expect Moscow
to change its position in regard to the Syrian issue literally at
first convenient occasion to do so. According to the Russian daily
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, in November 2011, Russia's President Medvedev
stated that if Bashal al-Assad is incapable of managing transformation
in his country, he has to leave. Thus Russia's leader made clear that
Moscow is leaving the paths for Assad's exit open, and may change
its position if needed.
As for China's position on the same issue, it is unlikely that Beijing
will stand alone with the Syrian government once Russia leaves it. By
calling recently on the Syrian government and the country's opposition
to halt acts of violence immediately, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister,
Mr. Zhai Jun, basically expressed Beijing's obsession with the burden
it assumed by vetoing the UN resolution.
Thus, as violence in Syria intensifies and international concerns with
the situation in this country increases, one may expect revision of
Russia's, and then China's, position on dealing with Syrian crisis,
which will give way to greater international pressure on Syrian
government and possibly intervention.
Suren Grigoryan is a political analyst, who worked for the Ministry
of Defense of Armenia for more than 10 years. His experiences in
the Armenian armed forces range from commanding troops in the field
to advising the government on the legal aspects of international
military cooperation and defense policy formation. Concurrently,
he provided violence risk assessment in the CIS countries for the
London based Exclusive Analysis Company that forecasts commercially
relevant political and violent risks worldwide. He also taught graduate
course on Comparative Politics called "The Politics of Empire and
Post-Imperialism" at the Yerevan State Linguistic University of
Armenia. Suren has two Bachelor degrees. The first is in Law, the
second, is in military command and engineering. He earned his Master's
degree (MSc) in Comparative Politics at the London School of Economics
and Political Science (United Kingdom). The area of Suren's expertise
and interest is the politics of the Post-Soviet space and the Middle
East. Currently he resides in the US.