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Armenia-Turkey: the end of rapprochement

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  • Armenia-Turkey: the end of rapprochement

    Open Democracy
    Dec 30 2011


    Armenia-Turkey: the end of rapprochement
    Vicken Cheterian, 30 December 2011

    A diplomatic process designed to normalise relations between Armenia
    and Turkey led to the signing of two protocols in 2009. Its failure is
    rooted in the miscalculations of both sides, says Vicken Cheterian.

    The genocide museum in Yerevan lies north of the Armenian capital at
    the top of a hill called Tsitsernakapert. The physical effort of
    walking to the summit is an appropriate spur to the visitor to reflect
    on the hardship of hundreds of thousands of Ottoman citizens of
    Armenian origin, who in 1915 and subsequent years were forced by their
    state to walk to the Syrian desert, there or on the way to die of
    hunger, exhaustion or by an act of murder. Today, the end-point is the
    sight of a sober, forty-four-metre high stele pointing skywards, as if
    claiming justice; and beside it, a circular monument of twelve basalt
    slabs that both open to and protect the eternal flame.

    On 24 April each year, the day of commemoration of the Armenian
    genocide, thousands of people gather at Tsitsernakapert to place a
    flower at the monument - and then walk down the other side of the hill
    where, on a clear day, there is a magnificent view of Mount Ararat,
    with its white glaciers as if hanging from heaven. It is a poignant
    sight, for Ararat is both the visible totem of the Armenians yet
    remains unreachable to them, since it lies on the other side of the
    border that divides Armenia from Turkey. The two countries'
    300-kilometre-long frontier, which runs only 40 kilometres from the
    centre of Yerevan, is closed: the last closed border of the cold war.

    I went to Tsitsernakapert to visit Hayk Demoyan, the director of the
    genocide museum which is part of the cluster of monuments on the site.
    "This museum tells the history of not only the Armenian people, but
    also that of the Turkish people", Demoyan tells me. He refers to the
    the diplomatic exchanges since 2008 that sought to normalise
    Armenian-Turkish relations, saying that he expected these to prompt "a
    flow of Turkish visitors". It has proved a vain hope. "The
    international community, especially the Americans, did not exert
    enough sustained pressure on Turkey to open up the border", Demoyan
    says. "Now the process is at a dead-end".

    >From blockade to diplomacy

    The complicated relationship between Armenia and Turkey is rooted in
    the events of the great war of 1914-18, when the Ottoman
    administration deported en masse its Armenian citizens from their
    towns and villages in Anatolia, the prelude to the anihilation of
    almost the entire Armenian population of the empire. The legacy of
    this bitter history was such that only in the early 1990s, amid the
    break-up of the Soviet Union and Armenia's attempts to secure its
    independence, did a chance arise for Armenia and Turkey to move beyond
    deep antagonism and create normal relations.

    At the time, Armenia's new political leadership was trying to escape
    Moscow's influence and prepared to establish diplomatic relations with
    Turkey without preconditions. But the escalation of the conflict in
    Nagorno-Karabakh, an enclave inside the new state of Azerbaijan with a
    majority Armenian population, posed a major obstacle to this course.
    Turkey's then leadership supported Azerbaijan in this conflict,
    refused to open diplomatic links, and (in 1993) joined Azerbaijan in
    imposing an economic blockade on land-locked Armenia in an effort to
    force it to end its backing for the Karabakh Armenians' quest for
    self-determination.

    A frozen conflict ensued, until the war between Russia and Georgia in
    August 2008 overturned the region's geopolitical map. Ankara saw a
    chance to address this anomaly of its Caucasus policy. On 8 September
    2008, Turkey's head of state Abdüllah Gül visited Yerevan during a
    football world-cup qualifying match between the two national teams,
    and this was followed by a series of diplomatic meetings where
    practical steps were discussed.

    In fact, secret diplomatic talks had been held in Bern since 2007,
    mediated by the Swiss foreign ministry. The chain of diplomatic
    contacts culminated in the signing in Zurich on 10 October 2009 of two
    "protocols", dedicated to establishing diplomatic relations and on
    opening the borders. The ceremony, hosted by Swiss foreign minister
    Micheline Calmy-Rey, was attended by international dignitaries such as
    United States secretary of state Hillary Clinton and Russian foreign
    minister Sergei Lavrov.

    "What is ironic is the fact that during the cold war this border was
    not so hermeticaly closed as it is now. At the time, trains travelled
    regularly between Kars and Leninakan [now Gumri]", says Tatul
    Hakobyan, a Yerevan-based author who is finishing a book on
    Armenia-Turkey relations. Hakobyan's interpretation of the failure of
    dialogue is interesting: "The expectations of the various sides were
    based on wrong calculations. The Armenian side thought that it was
    possible to change the status quo on Armenian-Turkish relations
    without changing the status quo on the Karabakh issue. Turkey thought
    that dialogue with Armenia will lead to Armenian concessions on
    Karabakh. And the international community did not pay enough attention
    to details."

    The protocol-signing process in Zurich was fraught: the Turkish side
    wanted a public declaration linking the protocols with the Karabakh
    negotiations process, leading the Armenian delegation to boycott the
    ceremony, meaning that in the end there was no declaration. "In
    Zurich, the sides showed that they were not ready to compormise.
    Turkey wanted Armenian concessions on Karabakh, not just on the
    question of genocide and fixing the current border", says Hakobyan.

    The results of failure

    When the process began, both presidents took risks in the hope of
    bringing peace and stability to their countries. For Armenia's Serge
    Sarkissian, entering a dialogue with Turkey was a particularly bold
    step; he was already challenged by a powerful domestic opposition that
    contested the legitimacy of his election, and the diplomatic move so
    angered the Tashnaktsutyun party (which has a large diaspora base)
    that it left the government coalition in protest. The signing of the
    protocols also created a schism between Yerevan and Armenian
    communities abroad, which Sarkissian experienced directly when, during
    a foreign tour of diaspora communities, he was faced by demonstrations
    in Paris, Los Angeles and Beirut.

    For Turkey's diplomacy, the policy of rapprochement with Armenia was
    part of a wider effort to ease tensions in the Caucasus's several
    conflict-zones, especially that of Karabakh. They believed that
    ameliorating Ankara's relations with Armenia would facilitate
    negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Instead, they were
    confronted by a vehement reaction from Azerbaijan that accused Turkey
    of betraying Baku's interests. Baku threatened to suspend relations
    with Ankara and to cancel future hydrocarbon deals. As a result, the
    Turkish leadership insisted that Armenia made concessions over
    Karabakh on the grounds that this would enable the protocols to be
    ratified by the Turkish parliament. Ankara was here not just seeking
    measures additional to those foreseen in the protocols, but reverting
    to its earlier position that Armenian-Turkish relations can only move
    forward if Armenia complies with Azerbaijani demands on the Karabakh
    conflict.

    Thus, both Armenia and Turkey entered the process of negotiations
    without anticipating all the moves they might be expected to make, and
    were surprised along the way. Yerevan's diplomats proceeded to sign
    the protocols without consulting diaspora communities, amid protests
    by diaspora communities against the president of Armenia for the first
    time since independence. Ankara similarly misjudged its capacity to
    resist opposition from Baku, and even a reversal of its policy has not
    allayed Azerbaijani suspicions.

    The failure of the protocols is so great that it will have long-term
    consequences. "The failure of Armenian-Turkish negotiations will
    harden the Armenian position on Karabakh negotiations", according to
    Ara Tadevosyan, the director of the Media Max news agency in Yerevan.
    Even worse, what started as personal initiatives and cautious trust
    has turned into mistrust. Today, the Armenian leadership feels
    deceived by its Turkish equivalent: it signed two protocols for which
    it had already paid a political price back home, only to be asked to
    make further concessions on Nagorno-Karabakh.

    This perceived deception will harden Yerevan's position in relation to
    Turkey, only three years before the centenary commemoration of the
    Armenian genocide in 2015. Turkey's official reaction to the proposed
    outlawing of the denial of genocide in France shows that attitudes on
    its side are becoming even more intransigent. The hopes of 2009 look
    ever more distant.

    http://www.opendemocracy.net/vicken-cheterian/armenia-turkey-end-of-rapprochement

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