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December 30, 2011 Friday 5:26 PM EST
Turkey: Cold War v2.0
I have recently read an opinion by Fehim Tastekin, a Turkish Caucasus
expert, who regularly writes for the Turkish daily Radikal. I find the
article very important, so I translated it to the attention of FPA
Blogs followers:
------
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalYazar&ArticleID=1073865& YazarþHIM-TASTEKIN&Date=30.12.2011&CategoryID=100
Amidst its growing engagement in the Middle East and the Arab Spring,
as well as its resurrecting Kurdish insurgency problem, Turkey
installed the NATO Missile Defense Shield in September 2011. Many
observers interpreted Turkey's decision as a move against Iran, as a
response to its expanding nuclear and missile capabilities, while
Turkish officials indicated that the installment of this missile
shield in Turkey was agreed upon much earlier and has nothing to do
with Iran. The purpose of the missile shield also exposed differences
within NATO countries. For example, French President Sarkozy had
claimed "We call a cat, a cat; today's threat is Iran", while Turkish
Prime Minister Erdogan said "We also call a cat, a cat, but we haven't
specified a threat like [Iran]". Hillary Clinton too had commented on
the matter by "The shield is not directed against Russia; in fact it
has to do with Iran".
Russia wasn't convinced however; Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs
Sergei Lavrov indicated "words fly, military technic is permanent; we
want written guarantees". To follow up, Russia's decision to re-direct
Kaliningrad missiles to European capitals increased the
interpretations of a 'new Cold War'. Yet, some observers indicate that
Russia's Kaliningrad move is not a mere reaction, but a part of a more
profound thinking. According to Nevazisimaya Gazeta, Kremlin was
informed of a U.S.-backed Israeli air raid against Iranian nuclear
facilities and argued "... there will soon be a surprise raid. Iran
will retaliate and the war will spread out. If Iran is invaded, Russia
will not sit idly and will certainly send military aid." Indeed,
Russia Minister of Defense supported this perception, explicitly
warning the United States in a Reuters interview that "an attack
against Iran would be a wrong decision".
Though more troublesome perhaps, is that Russia's mistrust towards
NATO's missile shield was not confined to words. Soon after the
installment of the missile shield, Russia made the following moves:
- Complete and urgent modernization of the 102nd Military base in Armenia
- Units close to Yerevan were deployed to Gumru, closer to the Turkish border
- Military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia were put under alarm on
December 1, 2011
- Some ships from Russia's Black Sea fleet were re-deployed closer to
the Georgian territorial waters.
- Missile command base at Dagestan was ordered to be ready for battle
- Guided missile frigates in the Khazar fleet were re-deployed to
Mahackale and Kaspiysk.
- Alexander-E missiles were sent to the Krasnodar base, their range
covering the NATO missile shield in Malatya
- Kuznetsov aircraft carrier was sent to Tartus, which is interpreted
as a dual move against a possible military intervention to Iran and
Syria
Russia also considers the possibility of an Azeri military move
towards Karabakh to reclaim that territory lost to Armenia. When
Russia extended its use of Armenia's Gumru base, it also signed an
agreement to protect Armenia against external attacks. Additionally,
Russia is worried about its military presence in Armenia because of
Georgia's annulment of the treaty that enabled Russian troops to use
Georgian territory to be transferred further south. The necessity to
bolster Russian military presence in Armenia may lead Russia to force
its way through Georgia. Meanwhile, Russia also needs to guarantee its
use of the Gebele radar installation in Azerbaijan whose lease ends in
2012. Azerbaijan raised the cost of the installation from 7 million to
100 million US dollars per annum, while hints at the possibility of
negotiating the cost in exchange for Russian support for its
territorial demands over Karabakh.
Russia also considered Gebele radar installation as a test case for
American intentions. When the Bush administration considered the
installation of the radar site in Poland in 2007, Russia suggested
that two countries should use Gebele radar base (with 6000 kilometer
range extending from the Indian Ocean to North Africa) together. Bush
government's refusal was interpreted by Russia as a sign of American
expansionism, as the Gebele radar base is more than sufficient to act
as an early warning system against Iran. Together with the
installation of the NATO missile defense shield in Turkey, Russia no
longer believes that this is intended as protection against Iran.
On the other hand, NATO shield was an interesting move on the part of
the Turkish government. It successfully silenced those who interpret
Turkish foreign policy as 'moving away from the West' and also those
who criticize Turkey for deteriorating relations with Israel as well
as those who question Turkey's commitment to its partnership with the
United States. It allowed Turkish diplomats to argue "see, we are
protecting Israel at the expense of deteriorating our relations with
Iran and Russia".
[end of article]
---------
All this makes me think that Turkey might be returning back to its
'lone wolf' foreign policy and siege mentality:
The problem is, just as Assad's suppression methods and Turkey's
belligerent stance against him had caused the collapse of Turkey's
'zero problems policy' in the south, NATO missile shield not only
caused the collapse of this doctrine vis-à-vis Iran, but also
vis-à-vis Russia and by extension, the Caucasus. Systemic constraints
are pushing Turkey back to its pre-2002, traditional foreign policy
understanding and a return back to its Cold War role: covering NATO's
southern flank. What makes Turkey's new role 'updated' is that the
Middle East is more active and more relevant to American interests
than it was through the Cold War and therefore, Turkey may be the
bridgehead of a new and more difficult dual-containment policy against
Shia and Russian influence.
The new Cold War v2.0 is more complex and difficult for Turkey, which
requires quicker balancing and more intricate set of
interdependencies. At a time when Turkey's domestic Kurdish problem is
intensifying, simultaneously countering Russian AND Iranian influence
at such proximity is a heavy burden for any country. Following months
will create more visible cross-regional entrenchments and the United
States must find a way to re-assert its relevance and weight in the
wider region, certainly for Turkey, for any strategy of containment to
succeed - if there still is such a strategy.
December 30, 2011 Friday 5:26 PM EST
Turkey: Cold War v2.0
I have recently read an opinion by Fehim Tastekin, a Turkish Caucasus
expert, who regularly writes for the Turkish daily Radikal. I find the
article very important, so I translated it to the attention of FPA
Blogs followers:
------
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalYazar&ArticleID=1073865& YazarþHIM-TASTEKIN&Date=30.12.2011&CategoryID=100
Amidst its growing engagement in the Middle East and the Arab Spring,
as well as its resurrecting Kurdish insurgency problem, Turkey
installed the NATO Missile Defense Shield in September 2011. Many
observers interpreted Turkey's decision as a move against Iran, as a
response to its expanding nuclear and missile capabilities, while
Turkish officials indicated that the installment of this missile
shield in Turkey was agreed upon much earlier and has nothing to do
with Iran. The purpose of the missile shield also exposed differences
within NATO countries. For example, French President Sarkozy had
claimed "We call a cat, a cat; today's threat is Iran", while Turkish
Prime Minister Erdogan said "We also call a cat, a cat, but we haven't
specified a threat like [Iran]". Hillary Clinton too had commented on
the matter by "The shield is not directed against Russia; in fact it
has to do with Iran".
Russia wasn't convinced however; Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs
Sergei Lavrov indicated "words fly, military technic is permanent; we
want written guarantees". To follow up, Russia's decision to re-direct
Kaliningrad missiles to European capitals increased the
interpretations of a 'new Cold War'. Yet, some observers indicate that
Russia's Kaliningrad move is not a mere reaction, but a part of a more
profound thinking. According to Nevazisimaya Gazeta, Kremlin was
informed of a U.S.-backed Israeli air raid against Iranian nuclear
facilities and argued "... there will soon be a surprise raid. Iran
will retaliate and the war will spread out. If Iran is invaded, Russia
will not sit idly and will certainly send military aid." Indeed,
Russia Minister of Defense supported this perception, explicitly
warning the United States in a Reuters interview that "an attack
against Iran would be a wrong decision".
Though more troublesome perhaps, is that Russia's mistrust towards
NATO's missile shield was not confined to words. Soon after the
installment of the missile shield, Russia made the following moves:
- Complete and urgent modernization of the 102nd Military base in Armenia
- Units close to Yerevan were deployed to Gumru, closer to the Turkish border
- Military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia were put under alarm on
December 1, 2011
- Some ships from Russia's Black Sea fleet were re-deployed closer to
the Georgian territorial waters.
- Missile command base at Dagestan was ordered to be ready for battle
- Guided missile frigates in the Khazar fleet were re-deployed to
Mahackale and Kaspiysk.
- Alexander-E missiles were sent to the Krasnodar base, their range
covering the NATO missile shield in Malatya
- Kuznetsov aircraft carrier was sent to Tartus, which is interpreted
as a dual move against a possible military intervention to Iran and
Syria
Russia also considers the possibility of an Azeri military move
towards Karabakh to reclaim that territory lost to Armenia. When
Russia extended its use of Armenia's Gumru base, it also signed an
agreement to protect Armenia against external attacks. Additionally,
Russia is worried about its military presence in Armenia because of
Georgia's annulment of the treaty that enabled Russian troops to use
Georgian territory to be transferred further south. The necessity to
bolster Russian military presence in Armenia may lead Russia to force
its way through Georgia. Meanwhile, Russia also needs to guarantee its
use of the Gebele radar installation in Azerbaijan whose lease ends in
2012. Azerbaijan raised the cost of the installation from 7 million to
100 million US dollars per annum, while hints at the possibility of
negotiating the cost in exchange for Russian support for its
territorial demands over Karabakh.
Russia also considered Gebele radar installation as a test case for
American intentions. When the Bush administration considered the
installation of the radar site in Poland in 2007, Russia suggested
that two countries should use Gebele radar base (with 6000 kilometer
range extending from the Indian Ocean to North Africa) together. Bush
government's refusal was interpreted by Russia as a sign of American
expansionism, as the Gebele radar base is more than sufficient to act
as an early warning system against Iran. Together with the
installation of the NATO missile defense shield in Turkey, Russia no
longer believes that this is intended as protection against Iran.
On the other hand, NATO shield was an interesting move on the part of
the Turkish government. It successfully silenced those who interpret
Turkish foreign policy as 'moving away from the West' and also those
who criticize Turkey for deteriorating relations with Israel as well
as those who question Turkey's commitment to its partnership with the
United States. It allowed Turkish diplomats to argue "see, we are
protecting Israel at the expense of deteriorating our relations with
Iran and Russia".
[end of article]
---------
All this makes me think that Turkey might be returning back to its
'lone wolf' foreign policy and siege mentality:
The problem is, just as Assad's suppression methods and Turkey's
belligerent stance against him had caused the collapse of Turkey's
'zero problems policy' in the south, NATO missile shield not only
caused the collapse of this doctrine vis-à-vis Iran, but also
vis-à-vis Russia and by extension, the Caucasus. Systemic constraints
are pushing Turkey back to its pre-2002, traditional foreign policy
understanding and a return back to its Cold War role: covering NATO's
southern flank. What makes Turkey's new role 'updated' is that the
Middle East is more active and more relevant to American interests
than it was through the Cold War and therefore, Turkey may be the
bridgehead of a new and more difficult dual-containment policy against
Shia and Russian influence.
The new Cold War v2.0 is more complex and difficult for Turkey, which
requires quicker balancing and more intricate set of
interdependencies. At a time when Turkey's domestic Kurdish problem is
intensifying, simultaneously countering Russian AND Iranian influence
at such proximity is a heavy burden for any country. Following months
will create more visible cross-regional entrenchments and the United
States must find a way to re-assert its relevance and weight in the
wider region, certainly for Turkey, for any strategy of containment to
succeed - if there still is such a strategy.