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Huffington Post
Jan 2 2012
The Passions of ErdoÄ?an
by Brent E. Sasley.Assistant Professor of Political Science,
University of Texas at Arlington
Students of international relations spend much time and energy
studying leaders of countries, in order to be able to understand,
explain, and if possible anticipate their foreign policies. Some of
these leaders, though, confound our best efforts by alternating
between what seem to be careful reasoned policy and then veering
wildly in the opposite direction by letting their unfiltered emotions
get the best of them.
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an is one such leader: in
particular, his insistence on using emotional and affective frameworks
to structure his decision-making. And yet, at times he is capable of
(or interested in) containing his emotional reactions.
His early life was suffused with religious inclinations. The story is
told of his time in primary school: once when the headmaster called
students to pray, ErdoÄ?an was the only one to respond. He later
enrolled in an imam-hatip (prayer-leader and preacher) school. As a
good soccer player, ErdoÄ?an was offered a position on Turkey's top
team, but only if he shaved his beard. Considered a sign of a pious
Muslim, he refused to shave, forfeiting the position.
These religious inclinations and his stubbornness in meeting them
remained as he moved into politics. He joined the youth branch of the
Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party), the country's first
avowedly Islamist political party. In their 1997 book, Turkey
Unveiled: Atatürk and After, Nicole and Hugh Pope note that when he
became mayor of Istanbul, ErdoÄ?an is reported to have said that "women
should try first to find fulfilment in family life, and, failing that,
should confine themselves to voluntary work for the party." He is
cited as asserting, in July 1996, that democracy was not a goal, but
an instrument for the Islamists, implying a lack of commitment to the
secular state.
He might, then, have been expected to follow Turkey's first Islamist
Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan, in adopting a rigid and
confrontational policy based on his affective attachment to Islam both
in the domestic public sphere and in Turkey's foreign policy. But
ErdoÄ?an proved far more flexible and adaptable: he learned from the
confrontation Erbakan created with the Kemalist state, which led to
Erbakan's ouster and a crackdown on Islamists throughout the country.
When he came to power in 2002, ErdoÄ?an repeatedly and publicly
proclaimed his loyalty to the secular state, the constitution, and
Ataturk's legacy, and declared his wish to avoid confrontations with
the military. He was largely successful.
It is clear, then, that ErdoÄ?an can control his passions when he wants
to. But there are times when he seems unable to: when his emotional
reactions get the better of him, and suffuse his public rhetoric on
foreign affairs and infuse his specific foreign policies.
To some degree, this is both natural and useful. Researchers have
found that our emotions can provide strategic benefit for us, acting
as a form of survival mechanism. Fear, for example, can be a powerful
motivator preventing us from engaging in potentially harmful activity.
Sometimes our emotions make us better as individuals, by prompting us
to "do the right thing." ErdoÄ?an's outrage on behalf of Palestinians
and Syrians is admirable, however slow or uneven his response to both
has been.
Lately, though, ErdoÄ?an appears to have given himself over to his
emotions completely, without incorporating a "thinking" element. His
reaction to the decision in the French parliament, on criminalizing
denial of the Armenia Genocide, has been about as un-diplomatic as
possible. (His Foreign Minister, Ahmet DavutoÄ?lu, has been no less
intemperate.)
In response, ErdoÄ?an has withdrawn Turkey's ambassador to France,
suspended political relations, demanded a severing of economic ties,
and cancelled joint military activities. In all of this, ErdoÄ?an has
verbally abused France.
ErdoÄ?an's anger is completely understandable. As Joost Lagendijk has
pointed out, the issue is far more complex than is warranted by a
simple parliamentary vote. However, Turkey is not in a position to let
its Prime Minister's negative emotions govern its foreign policy. In
this case, pure emotional reactions harm, not help, Turkey.
Faddish proclamations notwithstanding, Turkey's hoped-for position as
a regional leader is unlikely to pan out. Relations with Syria, once
the cornerstone for Turkey's "zero problems" foreign policy, have
clearly deteriorated as the Syrian regime has ignored Ankara's calls
for an end to the killing of its citizens. The strategic relationship
with Israel has all but ended, while relations with Iran, too, have
declined as Turkey has struggled to adapt to the fluid dynamics of
Middle Eastern politics. Meanwhile, the government's anger and fear at
domestic criticism of its policies has heightened in recent weeks,
leading to a mass arrest of Turkish journalists that has the European
Union expressing increasing concern over Turkey's appropriateness as a
candidate for membership.
The regional and global system is in flux. The last time Turkey faced
a similar situation was the end of the Cold War. Then, Ankara let
itself be carried away with hope and joy that its position at the
center of several volatile and strategic regions would earn it a
privileged seat at the geopolitical table.
That didn't happen. And today, Turkey faces a similar condition, but
with a prime minister more prone to react from his gut without
including other calculations. In this case, his emotions have no
strategic value, and instead are endangering Turkey's regional
influence and ability to meet its broader security and foreign policy
interests. ErdoÄ?an, and his government, should step back and reassess.
Clearly, it needs to react to the French decision on the Armenian
genocide. But it should do so more cautiously, with more thought put
into the specifics of the reaction.
This should be part of a broader reassessment of its foreign policy,
with a new framework to be put in place that accounts -- as best as
possible -- for the unstable nature of regional and global politics.
Only by doing so will Turkey be able to claim a leadership role in
world affairs.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brent-sasley/the-passions-of-erdoan_b_1176937.html
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Jan 2 2012
The Passions of ErdoÄ?an
by Brent E. Sasley.Assistant Professor of Political Science,
University of Texas at Arlington
Students of international relations spend much time and energy
studying leaders of countries, in order to be able to understand,
explain, and if possible anticipate their foreign policies. Some of
these leaders, though, confound our best efforts by alternating
between what seem to be careful reasoned policy and then veering
wildly in the opposite direction by letting their unfiltered emotions
get the best of them.
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an is one such leader: in
particular, his insistence on using emotional and affective frameworks
to structure his decision-making. And yet, at times he is capable of
(or interested in) containing his emotional reactions.
His early life was suffused with religious inclinations. The story is
told of his time in primary school: once when the headmaster called
students to pray, ErdoÄ?an was the only one to respond. He later
enrolled in an imam-hatip (prayer-leader and preacher) school. As a
good soccer player, ErdoÄ?an was offered a position on Turkey's top
team, but only if he shaved his beard. Considered a sign of a pious
Muslim, he refused to shave, forfeiting the position.
These religious inclinations and his stubbornness in meeting them
remained as he moved into politics. He joined the youth branch of the
Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party), the country's first
avowedly Islamist political party. In their 1997 book, Turkey
Unveiled: Atatürk and After, Nicole and Hugh Pope note that when he
became mayor of Istanbul, ErdoÄ?an is reported to have said that "women
should try first to find fulfilment in family life, and, failing that,
should confine themselves to voluntary work for the party." He is
cited as asserting, in July 1996, that democracy was not a goal, but
an instrument for the Islamists, implying a lack of commitment to the
secular state.
He might, then, have been expected to follow Turkey's first Islamist
Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan, in adopting a rigid and
confrontational policy based on his affective attachment to Islam both
in the domestic public sphere and in Turkey's foreign policy. But
ErdoÄ?an proved far more flexible and adaptable: he learned from the
confrontation Erbakan created with the Kemalist state, which led to
Erbakan's ouster and a crackdown on Islamists throughout the country.
When he came to power in 2002, ErdoÄ?an repeatedly and publicly
proclaimed his loyalty to the secular state, the constitution, and
Ataturk's legacy, and declared his wish to avoid confrontations with
the military. He was largely successful.
It is clear, then, that ErdoÄ?an can control his passions when he wants
to. But there are times when he seems unable to: when his emotional
reactions get the better of him, and suffuse his public rhetoric on
foreign affairs and infuse his specific foreign policies.
To some degree, this is both natural and useful. Researchers have
found that our emotions can provide strategic benefit for us, acting
as a form of survival mechanism. Fear, for example, can be a powerful
motivator preventing us from engaging in potentially harmful activity.
Sometimes our emotions make us better as individuals, by prompting us
to "do the right thing." ErdoÄ?an's outrage on behalf of Palestinians
and Syrians is admirable, however slow or uneven his response to both
has been.
Lately, though, ErdoÄ?an appears to have given himself over to his
emotions completely, without incorporating a "thinking" element. His
reaction to the decision in the French parliament, on criminalizing
denial of the Armenia Genocide, has been about as un-diplomatic as
possible. (His Foreign Minister, Ahmet DavutoÄ?lu, has been no less
intemperate.)
In response, ErdoÄ?an has withdrawn Turkey's ambassador to France,
suspended political relations, demanded a severing of economic ties,
and cancelled joint military activities. In all of this, ErdoÄ?an has
verbally abused France.
ErdoÄ?an's anger is completely understandable. As Joost Lagendijk has
pointed out, the issue is far more complex than is warranted by a
simple parliamentary vote. However, Turkey is not in a position to let
its Prime Minister's negative emotions govern its foreign policy. In
this case, pure emotional reactions harm, not help, Turkey.
Faddish proclamations notwithstanding, Turkey's hoped-for position as
a regional leader is unlikely to pan out. Relations with Syria, once
the cornerstone for Turkey's "zero problems" foreign policy, have
clearly deteriorated as the Syrian regime has ignored Ankara's calls
for an end to the killing of its citizens. The strategic relationship
with Israel has all but ended, while relations with Iran, too, have
declined as Turkey has struggled to adapt to the fluid dynamics of
Middle Eastern politics. Meanwhile, the government's anger and fear at
domestic criticism of its policies has heightened in recent weeks,
leading to a mass arrest of Turkish journalists that has the European
Union expressing increasing concern over Turkey's appropriateness as a
candidate for membership.
The regional and global system is in flux. The last time Turkey faced
a similar situation was the end of the Cold War. Then, Ankara let
itself be carried away with hope and joy that its position at the
center of several volatile and strategic regions would earn it a
privileged seat at the geopolitical table.
That didn't happen. And today, Turkey faces a similar condition, but
with a prime minister more prone to react from his gut without
including other calculations. In this case, his emotions have no
strategic value, and instead are endangering Turkey's regional
influence and ability to meet its broader security and foreign policy
interests. ErdoÄ?an, and his government, should step back and reassess.
Clearly, it needs to react to the French decision on the Armenian
genocide. But it should do so more cautiously, with more thought put
into the specifics of the reaction.
This should be part of a broader reassessment of its foreign policy,
with a new framework to be put in place that accounts -- as best as
possible -- for the unstable nature of regional and global politics.
Only by doing so will Turkey be able to claim a leadership role in
world affairs.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brent-sasley/the-passions-of-erdoan_b_1176937.html
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress