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News.Az, Azerbaijan
Jan 5 2012
Incentive for War: Does Baku really have it?
Thu 05 January 2012 07:51 GMT | 9:51 Local Time
During the 20 years of independence Armenia has lost more population
than it maintains it had lost during participation of Armenians in the
World War I, i.e. more than 1,5m people.
After many years of at times justified accusations for its overly
militaristic rhetoric, during 2011 Azerbaijani leadership has finally
made a visible shift in the articulation of strategy for regain of
territories occupied by Armenia. Azerbaijanis may still argue `What is
worse: military rhetoric or military occupation?' However, that theme
is not leading public appearances of president Aliyev, and other key
personalities of negotiations anymore.
President Aliyev marked his 50th birthday in December by inaugurating
just another full-featured settlement and employment facilities for
internally displaced persons. The emphasis of his speech there was not
war at all, but economic competition with Armenia: `As the years will
pass, we will be only stronger, and Armenia will only be weaker in all
respects - economically, polictically, and militarily.'
Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov, in his November interview to the
Austrian *Der Standard* daily almost complained that Azerbaijan's army
had less personnel than Armenia's - 63,000 against 71,000 - in a
situation when the population of Azerbaijan is at least three times
larger.
Thus, no sign of search for casus belli. Instead, the focus is on the
`years ahead.' The change is due to the dramatic developments in the
past 20 years that have totally changed the design of South Caucasus.
Share of Azerbaijan in the regional economy and population has rizen
from 45% to 75% and from 44% to 60%, respectively.
New discoveries of hydrocarbons as well as new oil and gas
transportation projects convince many in Baku that in the coming
decades the disparities will only grow in favor of Azerbaijan whereas
Armenia will struggle with its foreign debt, depopulation, and
economic stagnation.
Moreover, the understanding is clear that unlike 1990s and early 2K,
neither international assistance nor diaspora's solidarity-driven and
risky investments can help Armenia to keep up with Azerbaijan, and
Georgia.
Non-permaent membership in the UN Security Council in the years
2012-2013 only added commitment to this revision of strategy in Baku.
Speaking from the position of economic superiority and political
significance Baku is appealling more to peaceful competition, instead
of war advocacy.
Change in rhetoric does not mean giving up though. Military
preparations continue even at a greater scale. Baku has successfully
neutralized accusations by some pro-Armenian internationals regarding
the military spending of Azerbaijan: increasing military budget does
not undermine social spending at all - the country has plenty of cash
for both.
In terms of incentives for resumtion of war - what kind of picture do
we see on the other side of the frontline?
During the 20 years of independence Armenia has lost more population
than it maintains it had lost during participation of Armenians in the
World War I, i.e. more than 1,5m people. In the past three years,
Armenia's foreign debt to GDP ratio has risen from 16% to more than
42%. In 2012-2014 Armenia will have to pay up to 15% of its export
revenue to service the government-guaranteed debts - in contrat to
less than 5% in recent years. If prices of such strategic products as
copper and diamonds decline, in 2013 - the year of presidential
elections - the government will certainly default on its debts.
Due to high corruption and inefficiency, the US government stopped
providing grants under the Millenium Challenge Account. EU has ceased
its macro-financial assistance to Armenia too. These two grants had
amounted to 1,2% of the GDP in 2011. The closure of the programs
happened exactly at the time when Russian government forced Yerevan to
undersign the prolongation of military base agreement till 2044.
The above economic, demographic, and political trends are not expected
to show more mercy to Armenia in the next decades. Hence, Azerbaijan
has no particular reason to push for immediate and military resolution
of the conflict, whereas restoration of the past balance of economic
power can be seen as an attractive goal in Yerevan.
Armenia can only achieve that goal by launching hostilities anew, and
by ensuring active involvement of Russia, its Collective Security
Treaty Organization ally, in the war. Such a war would aim at
destruction of the key infrastructure that provides Azerbaijan with
long-term superiority. If Armenian President Serj Sargsyan had
whatsoever credible chances that Russia can be brought as a partner
into such an adventure, the war could start immediately.
In his recent list of *Endangered Species* Zbignev Brzezinski has
classified Georgia as Number One risk place given `America's decline'
and Russia's desire to reclaim its old sphere of influence. According
to him, Russia would intensify search of dominance over the southern
energy corridor to Europe. Indeed, if Georgia survives another
Russian political and/or military offensive, the same corridor can be
locked up by supporting a poverty-driven Armenian attack on
Azerbaijan.
Switch in the rhetoric and style of Azerbaijani leadership from
belligerence to the concept of persistent economic and political
competition comes very timely. It is a logical continuation of the
strategy of isolation of Armenia from regional energy and transport
development projects of global significance. In the past, Baku was
not yet convinced that the policy of isolation alone would yield huge
advantage to Azerbaijan, and therefore maintained routine talk about
resorting to war.
The paradox is that Baku's withdrawal from military rhetoric does not
make resumption of fight less likely. It simply marks a new phase in
the evolution of the conflict. One shall keep an eye more on
motivation of the two sides to engage in war rather than on public
statements which have practically lost any value.
Aybeniz Turan
News.Az
Jan 5 2012
Incentive for War: Does Baku really have it?
Thu 05 January 2012 07:51 GMT | 9:51 Local Time
During the 20 years of independence Armenia has lost more population
than it maintains it had lost during participation of Armenians in the
World War I, i.e. more than 1,5m people.
After many years of at times justified accusations for its overly
militaristic rhetoric, during 2011 Azerbaijani leadership has finally
made a visible shift in the articulation of strategy for regain of
territories occupied by Armenia. Azerbaijanis may still argue `What is
worse: military rhetoric or military occupation?' However, that theme
is not leading public appearances of president Aliyev, and other key
personalities of negotiations anymore.
President Aliyev marked his 50th birthday in December by inaugurating
just another full-featured settlement and employment facilities for
internally displaced persons. The emphasis of his speech there was not
war at all, but economic competition with Armenia: `As the years will
pass, we will be only stronger, and Armenia will only be weaker in all
respects - economically, polictically, and militarily.'
Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov, in his November interview to the
Austrian *Der Standard* daily almost complained that Azerbaijan's army
had less personnel than Armenia's - 63,000 against 71,000 - in a
situation when the population of Azerbaijan is at least three times
larger.
Thus, no sign of search for casus belli. Instead, the focus is on the
`years ahead.' The change is due to the dramatic developments in the
past 20 years that have totally changed the design of South Caucasus.
Share of Azerbaijan in the regional economy and population has rizen
from 45% to 75% and from 44% to 60%, respectively.
New discoveries of hydrocarbons as well as new oil and gas
transportation projects convince many in Baku that in the coming
decades the disparities will only grow in favor of Azerbaijan whereas
Armenia will struggle with its foreign debt, depopulation, and
economic stagnation.
Moreover, the understanding is clear that unlike 1990s and early 2K,
neither international assistance nor diaspora's solidarity-driven and
risky investments can help Armenia to keep up with Azerbaijan, and
Georgia.
Non-permaent membership in the UN Security Council in the years
2012-2013 only added commitment to this revision of strategy in Baku.
Speaking from the position of economic superiority and political
significance Baku is appealling more to peaceful competition, instead
of war advocacy.
Change in rhetoric does not mean giving up though. Military
preparations continue even at a greater scale. Baku has successfully
neutralized accusations by some pro-Armenian internationals regarding
the military spending of Azerbaijan: increasing military budget does
not undermine social spending at all - the country has plenty of cash
for both.
In terms of incentives for resumtion of war - what kind of picture do
we see on the other side of the frontline?
During the 20 years of independence Armenia has lost more population
than it maintains it had lost during participation of Armenians in the
World War I, i.e. more than 1,5m people. In the past three years,
Armenia's foreign debt to GDP ratio has risen from 16% to more than
42%. In 2012-2014 Armenia will have to pay up to 15% of its export
revenue to service the government-guaranteed debts - in contrat to
less than 5% in recent years. If prices of such strategic products as
copper and diamonds decline, in 2013 - the year of presidential
elections - the government will certainly default on its debts.
Due to high corruption and inefficiency, the US government stopped
providing grants under the Millenium Challenge Account. EU has ceased
its macro-financial assistance to Armenia too. These two grants had
amounted to 1,2% of the GDP in 2011. The closure of the programs
happened exactly at the time when Russian government forced Yerevan to
undersign the prolongation of military base agreement till 2044.
The above economic, demographic, and political trends are not expected
to show more mercy to Armenia in the next decades. Hence, Azerbaijan
has no particular reason to push for immediate and military resolution
of the conflict, whereas restoration of the past balance of economic
power can be seen as an attractive goal in Yerevan.
Armenia can only achieve that goal by launching hostilities anew, and
by ensuring active involvement of Russia, its Collective Security
Treaty Organization ally, in the war. Such a war would aim at
destruction of the key infrastructure that provides Azerbaijan with
long-term superiority. If Armenian President Serj Sargsyan had
whatsoever credible chances that Russia can be brought as a partner
into such an adventure, the war could start immediately.
In his recent list of *Endangered Species* Zbignev Brzezinski has
classified Georgia as Number One risk place given `America's decline'
and Russia's desire to reclaim its old sphere of influence. According
to him, Russia would intensify search of dominance over the southern
energy corridor to Europe. Indeed, if Georgia survives another
Russian political and/or military offensive, the same corridor can be
locked up by supporting a poverty-driven Armenian attack on
Azerbaijan.
Switch in the rhetoric and style of Azerbaijani leadership from
belligerence to the concept of persistent economic and political
competition comes very timely. It is a logical continuation of the
strategy of isolation of Armenia from regional energy and transport
development projects of global significance. In the past, Baku was
not yet convinced that the policy of isolation alone would yield huge
advantage to Azerbaijan, and therefore maintained routine talk about
resorting to war.
The paradox is that Baku's withdrawal from military rhetoric does not
make resumption of fight less likely. It simply marks a new phase in
the evolution of the conflict. One shall keep an eye more on
motivation of the two sides to engage in war rather than on public
statements which have practically lost any value.
Aybeniz Turan
News.Az