Tweet
APA, Azerbaijan
Jan 6 2012
US analyst: `The genocide question is a victory from the point of view
of Armenian Diaspora, on the part of the French National Assembly, on
the other hand, this is a failure'
[ 06 Jan 2012 13:48 ]
`French National Assembly's view infringes upon the Copenhagen
political criteria and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union'
`There is a possibility that Azerbaijan, benefiting from successive
securitizing moves in the region, may engage in a quick military move
against Karabakh'
New York. Isabel Levine ` APA. APA's interview with Mr. H. Akin Unver,
Turkey and Middle Eastern analyst at the Princeton University, New
Jersey
- What are your views on Armenia's negative insistence on
international community as the French National Assembly recently
passed the bill penalizing denial of the so-called genocides
recognized by the law?
- Events of 1909-15 are a part of Armenian national identity and it is
perhaps the only issue that binds the international Armenian Diaspora
together, without which, the Diaspora will most probably fall apart.
Therefore, the Diaspora's insistence on the genocide question is
linked to its raison d'être ` from their
point of view, this indeed, is a victory. On the part of the French
National Assembly, on the other hand, I think, this is a failure.
Whether one believes the events of 1909-15 are genocide or not, French
National Assembly's view on the matter extends way beyond legislating
on another country's history, and infringes upon the Copenhagen
political criteria for European Union membership, as well as the
Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
as it relates to freedom of expression.
To that end, I don't think any observer or scholar would associate
French National Assembly's move as a matter of principle or
retrospective legislation on human rights; it is a simple
pre-electoral and populist legislation, which is passed by less than
10% of the French National Assembly and therefore, does not represent
90% of the French people. More worrisome perhaps, is that the
legislation tramples the founding principles of the European Union and
is an inherently undemocratic (and even anti-democratic) move.
- What are the prospects of the Armenian-Turkish reconciliation in
conditions when the Armenian lobby does not disavow the global
campaign for recognition of `Armenian genocide' by parliaments, as
well as by the US Congress?
- This dilemma was addressed many times between Turkish and Armenian
governments; Turkey has been complaining about the Diaspora drawing a
wedge between Turkish and Armenian governments, whereas Armenia sees
the Diaspora a natural extension of the Armenian consciousness. In
return, the Diaspora will not accept any settlement with Turkey that
marginalizes the Diaspora's influence.
I believe the Diaspora's permanent role in this issue is to assert its
weight and influence over the negotiations by using its financial
capabilities and large amounts of money sent to Armenia from abroad,
which surpasses the Armenian national budget. Armenia is dependent on
Diaspora money and therefore, cannot sign bilateral agreements with
Turkey regarding the genocide question without the consent of the
Diaspora.
I do not believe that the radicalized segments of the Diaspora will
give up the genocide issue, nor will it simply disappear from the
Turkish-Armenian equation. The only way we can talk about a
Turkish-Armenian reconciliation without the influence of the Diaspora
is that either Turkey accepts genocide allegations and pay large
amounts of compensation (and possibly land transfers) in a protracted
legal process, or if Turkey creates an immediate need for the Republic
of Armenia (either through trade revenues that exceed Diaspora money,
or via a military-strategic necessity) which will create an urge for
the Armenian decision-makers to sideline the Diaspora and deal
directly with Turkey. Both of these options are quite unlikely at this
time, though.
- What should the US do in that case - stand aside (of the
reconciliation process) or continue participating in the processes?
- Even though the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs
Committee passed a non-binding resolution on the genocide issue in
March 2010, I think this is the furthest it can get in any American
institution as long as Turkey remains a key ally in post-war Iraq and
growing Iranian and Russian influence.
While the administration may issue statements calling for Turkey to
recognize the genocide allegations, it will refrain from doing
anything binding. Even though Turkey and Armenia had signed
reconciliation protocols in October 2009, there is very little move
towards honoring its principles as Turkey moves closer to Azerbaijan
for the future of the Nabucco pipeline deal.
I believe the future of Nabucco is closely linked to the future of
Turkish-Armenian reconciliation. As long as Turkish-Azeri relations
remain close and energy
politics remain the most important issue in Turkey's Caucasus policy,
I believe the United States will support Turkey's position with regard
to Armenia.
Although US Vice-President Joe Biden had suggested Turkey to `pursue
its protocol with Armenia' during his recent visit, Armenia is not a
priority either for Turkey or the United States at this moment.
- And how will the French National Assembly's `genocide' bill affect
to the Nagorno-Karabakh adjustment process?
- Most visibly, it will push Turkey towards Azerbaijan and will cause
the collapse of the Turkish-Armenian protocols. This is important, as
the US leave Iraq, and leaves a massive power vacuum in the Middle
East and Russia, Iran and Turkey move in to fill that gap; a conflict
is now more likely. There is a possibility that Azerbaijan, benefiting
from successive securitizing moves in the region, may engage in a
quick military move against Karabakh.
Russia certainly prepares for this possibility. When Russia extended
its use of Armenia's Gumru base, it also signed an agreement to
protect Armenia against external attacks. Russia is concerned with the
size of its military presence in Armenia because of Georgia's
annulment of the treaty that enabled Russian troops to use Georgian
territory to be transferred further south. The necessity to bolster
Russian military presence in Armenia may lead Russia to force its way
through Georgia, or rely solely on Azerbaijan for the transfer of its
troops to Armenia. This draws a strategic wedge between Russia and
Armenia, and renders Russia's commitment to protect Armenia uncertain.
Meanwhile, Russia also needs to guarantee its use of the Gabala radar
installation in Azerbaijan whose lease ends in 2012. Azerbaijan raised
the cost of the installation from 7 million to 100 million US dollars
per annum, while hinting at the possibility of negotiating the cost in
exchange for Russian support for its position over Karabakh.
In this scenario, Azerbaijan suddenly finds itself in a very
advantageous position strategically, having both Turkish and Russian
support over the Karabakh question. Sarkozy and the Armenian Diaspora
in France put Armenia in an extremely difficult situation over
Karabakh; I am not sure they realize this.
- Turkey has already agreed to host radar for the early warning
missile defence system being created by the United States and NATO. Do
you think the French Parliament's decision will influence Turkey's
activity as a NATO member, its place and importance in the region?
- The bill already started to affect Turkey's relations with France.
Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an announced an eight-point
sanctions list against France and unilaterally cancelled all military
cooperation agreements, including joint training, intelligence sharing
and air space ` territorial waters restrictions. Furthermore, Turkey
declared that it would stop cooperating with France in all European
Union projects (which essentially affects Turkey's relations with the
EU fundamentally). In many ways, Turkey's EU policy is changing to an
understanding similar to that of China, which considers the European
Union as an ineffectual political entity and instead deal with the
European countries individually.
In that regard, I think the NATO missile shield has more to do with
Turkey's commitment to its alliance with the United States and also
its concern with growing Russian and Iranian influence in the region.
Even though Turkey has cordial relations with both countries, Turkish
decision-makers understand that they need concrete balancing power
against Russia and Iran and I think missile shield must be interpreted
within the context of Turkey's own security concerns. Of course,
Turkey's NATO commitments will remain, but Turkish-French cooperation
within NATO will freeze in the short- to medium-term.
http://en.apa.az/news.php?id=163076
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Jan 6 2012
US analyst: `The genocide question is a victory from the point of view
of Armenian Diaspora, on the part of the French National Assembly, on
the other hand, this is a failure'
[ 06 Jan 2012 13:48 ]
`French National Assembly's view infringes upon the Copenhagen
political criteria and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union'
`There is a possibility that Azerbaijan, benefiting from successive
securitizing moves in the region, may engage in a quick military move
against Karabakh'
New York. Isabel Levine ` APA. APA's interview with Mr. H. Akin Unver,
Turkey and Middle Eastern analyst at the Princeton University, New
Jersey
- What are your views on Armenia's negative insistence on
international community as the French National Assembly recently
passed the bill penalizing denial of the so-called genocides
recognized by the law?
- Events of 1909-15 are a part of Armenian national identity and it is
perhaps the only issue that binds the international Armenian Diaspora
together, without which, the Diaspora will most probably fall apart.
Therefore, the Diaspora's insistence on the genocide question is
linked to its raison d'être ` from their
point of view, this indeed, is a victory. On the part of the French
National Assembly, on the other hand, I think, this is a failure.
Whether one believes the events of 1909-15 are genocide or not, French
National Assembly's view on the matter extends way beyond legislating
on another country's history, and infringes upon the Copenhagen
political criteria for European Union membership, as well as the
Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
as it relates to freedom of expression.
To that end, I don't think any observer or scholar would associate
French National Assembly's move as a matter of principle or
retrospective legislation on human rights; it is a simple
pre-electoral and populist legislation, which is passed by less than
10% of the French National Assembly and therefore, does not represent
90% of the French people. More worrisome perhaps, is that the
legislation tramples the founding principles of the European Union and
is an inherently undemocratic (and even anti-democratic) move.
- What are the prospects of the Armenian-Turkish reconciliation in
conditions when the Armenian lobby does not disavow the global
campaign for recognition of `Armenian genocide' by parliaments, as
well as by the US Congress?
- This dilemma was addressed many times between Turkish and Armenian
governments; Turkey has been complaining about the Diaspora drawing a
wedge between Turkish and Armenian governments, whereas Armenia sees
the Diaspora a natural extension of the Armenian consciousness. In
return, the Diaspora will not accept any settlement with Turkey that
marginalizes the Diaspora's influence.
I believe the Diaspora's permanent role in this issue is to assert its
weight and influence over the negotiations by using its financial
capabilities and large amounts of money sent to Armenia from abroad,
which surpasses the Armenian national budget. Armenia is dependent on
Diaspora money and therefore, cannot sign bilateral agreements with
Turkey regarding the genocide question without the consent of the
Diaspora.
I do not believe that the radicalized segments of the Diaspora will
give up the genocide issue, nor will it simply disappear from the
Turkish-Armenian equation. The only way we can talk about a
Turkish-Armenian reconciliation without the influence of the Diaspora
is that either Turkey accepts genocide allegations and pay large
amounts of compensation (and possibly land transfers) in a protracted
legal process, or if Turkey creates an immediate need for the Republic
of Armenia (either through trade revenues that exceed Diaspora money,
or via a military-strategic necessity) which will create an urge for
the Armenian decision-makers to sideline the Diaspora and deal
directly with Turkey. Both of these options are quite unlikely at this
time, though.
- What should the US do in that case - stand aside (of the
reconciliation process) or continue participating in the processes?
- Even though the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs
Committee passed a non-binding resolution on the genocide issue in
March 2010, I think this is the furthest it can get in any American
institution as long as Turkey remains a key ally in post-war Iraq and
growing Iranian and Russian influence.
While the administration may issue statements calling for Turkey to
recognize the genocide allegations, it will refrain from doing
anything binding. Even though Turkey and Armenia had signed
reconciliation protocols in October 2009, there is very little move
towards honoring its principles as Turkey moves closer to Azerbaijan
for the future of the Nabucco pipeline deal.
I believe the future of Nabucco is closely linked to the future of
Turkish-Armenian reconciliation. As long as Turkish-Azeri relations
remain close and energy
politics remain the most important issue in Turkey's Caucasus policy,
I believe the United States will support Turkey's position with regard
to Armenia.
Although US Vice-President Joe Biden had suggested Turkey to `pursue
its protocol with Armenia' during his recent visit, Armenia is not a
priority either for Turkey or the United States at this moment.
- And how will the French National Assembly's `genocide' bill affect
to the Nagorno-Karabakh adjustment process?
- Most visibly, it will push Turkey towards Azerbaijan and will cause
the collapse of the Turkish-Armenian protocols. This is important, as
the US leave Iraq, and leaves a massive power vacuum in the Middle
East and Russia, Iran and Turkey move in to fill that gap; a conflict
is now more likely. There is a possibility that Azerbaijan, benefiting
from successive securitizing moves in the region, may engage in a
quick military move against Karabakh.
Russia certainly prepares for this possibility. When Russia extended
its use of Armenia's Gumru base, it also signed an agreement to
protect Armenia against external attacks. Russia is concerned with the
size of its military presence in Armenia because of Georgia's
annulment of the treaty that enabled Russian troops to use Georgian
territory to be transferred further south. The necessity to bolster
Russian military presence in Armenia may lead Russia to force its way
through Georgia, or rely solely on Azerbaijan for the transfer of its
troops to Armenia. This draws a strategic wedge between Russia and
Armenia, and renders Russia's commitment to protect Armenia uncertain.
Meanwhile, Russia also needs to guarantee its use of the Gabala radar
installation in Azerbaijan whose lease ends in 2012. Azerbaijan raised
the cost of the installation from 7 million to 100 million US dollars
per annum, while hinting at the possibility of negotiating the cost in
exchange for Russian support for its position over Karabakh.
In this scenario, Azerbaijan suddenly finds itself in a very
advantageous position strategically, having both Turkish and Russian
support over the Karabakh question. Sarkozy and the Armenian Diaspora
in France put Armenia in an extremely difficult situation over
Karabakh; I am not sure they realize this.
- Turkey has already agreed to host radar for the early warning
missile defence system being created by the United States and NATO. Do
you think the French Parliament's decision will influence Turkey's
activity as a NATO member, its place and importance in the region?
- The bill already started to affect Turkey's relations with France.
Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an announced an eight-point
sanctions list against France and unilaterally cancelled all military
cooperation agreements, including joint training, intelligence sharing
and air space ` territorial waters restrictions. Furthermore, Turkey
declared that it would stop cooperating with France in all European
Union projects (which essentially affects Turkey's relations with the
EU fundamentally). In many ways, Turkey's EU policy is changing to an
understanding similar to that of China, which considers the European
Union as an ineffectual political entity and instead deal with the
European countries individually.
In that regard, I think the NATO missile shield has more to do with
Turkey's commitment to its alliance with the United States and also
its concern with growing Russian and Iranian influence in the region.
Even though Turkey has cordial relations with both countries, Turkish
decision-makers understand that they need concrete balancing power
against Russia and Iran and I think missile shield must be interpreted
within the context of Turkey's own security concerns. Of course,
Turkey's NATO commitments will remain, but Turkish-French cooperation
within NATO will freeze in the short- to medium-term.
http://en.apa.az/news.php?id=163076
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress