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HEALING WOUNDS: SEEKING CLOSURE FOR THE 1915 ARMENIAN MASSACRES
Richard Falk & Hilal Elver
MWC News
http://mwcnews.net/focus/editorial/16137-armenian-massacres.html
(Media With Conscience)
Jan 12 2012
Recently the National Assembly, France's lower legislative chamber,
voted to criminalize the denial of the Armenian genocide in 1915,
imposing a potential prison sentence of up to one year as well as
a maximum fine of 45, 000 Euros. The timing of this controversial
initiative seemed to represent a rather blatant Sarkhozy bid for
the votes of the 500,000 French citizens of Armenian descent in
the upcoming presidential election. It follows similar pre-election
initiatives in 2001 when the French Parliament officially declared that
the massacres of Armenians in 1915 were an instance of genocide and
in 2006 when the Assembly first voted to criminalize Armenian genocide
denial, an initiative that never became law because the French Senate
failed to give its assent. And this hopefully may happen again with
respect to this recent Assembly move.
Predictably, the French action was perceived by Turkey as a hostile
provocation. The Turkish government, which has so far refused to
describe the 1915 events as 'genocide,' immediately reacted, warning
France of adverse economic consequences if this initiative went
forward, and has reacted by withdrawing its ambassador and freezing
inter-governmental economic relations. The Turkish Prime Minister,
Recip Teyyip Erdogan, denounced the action of the French Assembly that
had been initiated by a prominent member of Sarkhozy's party. Erdogan,
known for his forthrightness, advised the French Government that
instead of criminalizing the Turkish unwillingness to acknowledge the
1915 events as genocide, France should busy itself with determining
whether its harsh tactics used during the 1950s in Algeria, and
supposedly responsible for up to a million Algerian deaths during
the long French campaign to hold onto to its north African colony
constituted genocide.
There are many issues raised by this turn for the worse in
French-Turkish relations, and its embittering dialogue about
historic events. Perhaps, the most important, is whether it is ever
justifiable to criminalize the expression of an opinion about a set
of past occurrences that goes against a societal consensus. It is
true that genocide or Holocaust denial can be hurtful to those who
are survivors or descendants of survivors, and identify with the
victims of such severe wrongdoing, and its attendant suffering,
but whether the sensitivities of these communities should ever
be protected by the criminal law seems doubtful, conflicting with
freedom of expression and censuring inquiries into historical events
that are unpopular and controversial, but occasionally illuminating
enough to challenge conventional wisdom. It would seem that informed
agreement and social pressure should be sufficient to deter all but
the most extremist instances of denial if a genuine and sufficient
consensus exists as to the locus of responsibility and the character
of the events. In this instance, such criminalization is especially
unfortunate as even if the facts of the 1915 events are reasonably
well established, the relevance of genocide is certainly ambiguous
and somewhat problematic, especially from a legal perspective.
Against this background, where Turkey has not yet been willing to
describe the events of 1915 as 'genocide' the criminalization of
the denial is more likely to raise tensions that encourage a long
overdue accommodation. Of course, there are related irritants to the
Turkish-Armenian relationship, especially the unresolved conflict
over the future of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave in Azerbaijan. Among
thoughtful Turks there continues to be some questioning of the
character of the World War I events in question, not about their
tragic character or even a willingness to condemn Ottoman wrongdoing,
but there remains a Turkish governmental and societal reluctance to
pin the label of genocide on these occurrences. It is well known that
the Armenian diaspora has long been seeking to induce key governments
around the world to make formal declarations to the effect that what
happened in 1915 was genocide, and some 25 governments have done
so, as have many lesser political entities such as sub-divisions
of the state or cities. Such efforts to legalize historical truth,
as distinct from mourning historical events, is itself
a political gimmick to circumvent diplomacy and accommodation. But to
criminalize genocidal denial represents a still further escalation
of Armenian efforts to resolve the controversy over this potent
g-word through branding of denial as a crime. We would insist that
rather than resolving the conflict, such steps make a politics of
reconciliation that much more difficult for both parties.
The discourse on genocide has always been confusing, multi-layered, and
often toxic. The word 'genocide' is weighted down by its implications,
explaining both why there is such a strong impulse to invoke it
and an equally intense effort to deny its applicability. We need
to distinguish genocide as a crime in international law from the
political assessment of historic events as genocide due to a clear
pattern of deliberate killing of an ethnic or religious group. And
such a political assessment needs to be further distinguished from a
moral condemnation of a pattern designed to destroy systematically a
beleaguered minority that might properly be described as 'genocidal,'
or what has been more recently described as 'ethnic cleansing' in the
setting of Bosnia, which is distinct from the judicially certified
'genocide' that shook the foundations of Rwanda in 1994.
>From a legal perspective it is not plausible to call these events
in 1915 as genocide. After all, the word did not exist until coined
by Rafael Lemkin in 1943, and the crime was not so delimited until
the Genocide Convention came into force in 1951. Beyond this, and
more telling than this technical observation, is the fact that the
indictments at Nuremberg did not charge the surviving Nazi leaders with
genocide, but convicted these Germans of 'crimes against humanity'
for their connection with genocidal conduct, and even here only if
the alleged criminal acts were associated with World War II, found
by the tribunal to be an unlawful war, and thus a 'crime against
peace.' If the Holocaust perpetrated against Jews and others did not
seem to the Nuremberg tribunal to be a distinct crime, then it seems
untenable to regard the Armenian tragedy as embodying the crime of
genocide. When the UN expert body, the International Law Commission,
put into words what was done at Nuremberg it explicitly affirmed the
Roman dictum prohibiting retroactivity: no crime without law (nulla
crimen sine lege). Such a dictum touches on a fundamental component
of justice to the effect that behavior, however detestable from moral
and political points of view, is not a 'crime' until so designated in
advance of the acts in question by a competent judicial body. This
principle has never been contested, and it pertains to the genocide
debate whenever attached to pre-1951 events, whether the Armenian
experience or to the destruction of a variety of indigenous peoples in
various parts of the world or to the barbarous institution of slavery.
At the same time, if what took place in 1915 were to have occurred
anytime after the Genocide Convention became effective, it would seem
beyond any reasonable doubt to qualify as genocide. The International
Court of Justice in the course of examining the Bosnian allegations
of genocide, put the bar high by requiring written or documentary
evidence of a clear intent by Serbian governmental leaders to commit
the crime of genocide that was not available (except the particular
incident involving the horrific massacre of several thousand Bosnian
males at Srbrenica in 1995 was declared to be genocide). While such
evidence was difficult to provide to the satisfaction of the World
Court in relation to this notorious Bosnian experience of the 1990s
partly as a result of a questionable arrangement with the ad hoc
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia not to release
documentary evidence tying the Belgrade regime to the anti-Muslim
cleansing operations in Bosnia, the situation with respect to Armenia
is different. Unlike Bosnia, documentary evidence from the ruling
Ottoman authorities does exist in sufficient quantity and quality to
make a persuasive argument to the effect that 'genocide' took place
in 1915, but because the events occurred 36 years before genocide
formally became a crime such a showing is legally irrelevant.
If this reasoning is accepted, it has important implications,
including establishing some political space for bringing closure to
the issue: Turkey could formally declare that if what happened to the
Armenians in 1915 took place in the 1960s it would have been genocide,
while those on the Armenian side could accept the idea that the 1915
massacres were not then genocide, but that their extent, character,
and evidence would constitute genocide if taking place now, or anytime
after 1951. The French move, if indeed it becomes law, is irresponsible
in the extreme as it disallows the explorations of constructive ways
that the violence and suffering of the past might be mitigated. As
post-apartheid South Africa has illustrated, it might sometimes be
politically and morally preferable for a victimized people to opt for
'truth and reconciliation' than to insist on the criminalization of
past wrongs however heinous.
It seems to me that such an approach would have mutual benefits. It
would bring a conflict that has endured for decades nearer to closure.
It would allow Armenians to regard their victimization as genocide
from a political and moral perspective, while enabling Turkey to make
such a concession without fearing such legal implications as Armenian
demands for reparations and the recovery of lost property. Turkish
good faith and remorse could be further expressed by appropriating
funds for the establishment of a major museum of Armenian History
and Culture in Ankara, by recognizing April 24th as a day of Armenian
remembrance, and by encouraging honest historical inquiry into these
horrific occurrences.
Of course, such a politics of reconciliation can only have any hope
of succeeding if there is a large display of good will and a sincere
search by Turkish and Armenian leaders for positive relations between
the two peoples. It is to be expected that extremists on both sides
would strenuously object to such an accommodation. Admittedly,
there would not be complete satisfaction even among that largely
silent majority of Armenians and Turks who might welcome a pacifying
development. What would be created is valuable- a new opening that
would allow a more benevolent future to unfold for both peoples that
could include a joint cathartic reexamination of the past. Such a
development might add to the solemnity and dignity of the expected
worldwide observances in 2015 of the 100th anniversary of these events
and avoid these occasions from being little more than sad remembrances
and shrill recriminations.
From: A. Papazian
Richard Falk & Hilal Elver
MWC News
http://mwcnews.net/focus/editorial/16137-armenian-massacres.html
(Media With Conscience)
Jan 12 2012
Recently the National Assembly, France's lower legislative chamber,
voted to criminalize the denial of the Armenian genocide in 1915,
imposing a potential prison sentence of up to one year as well as
a maximum fine of 45, 000 Euros. The timing of this controversial
initiative seemed to represent a rather blatant Sarkhozy bid for
the votes of the 500,000 French citizens of Armenian descent in
the upcoming presidential election. It follows similar pre-election
initiatives in 2001 when the French Parliament officially declared that
the massacres of Armenians in 1915 were an instance of genocide and
in 2006 when the Assembly first voted to criminalize Armenian genocide
denial, an initiative that never became law because the French Senate
failed to give its assent. And this hopefully may happen again with
respect to this recent Assembly move.
Predictably, the French action was perceived by Turkey as a hostile
provocation. The Turkish government, which has so far refused to
describe the 1915 events as 'genocide,' immediately reacted, warning
France of adverse economic consequences if this initiative went
forward, and has reacted by withdrawing its ambassador and freezing
inter-governmental economic relations. The Turkish Prime Minister,
Recip Teyyip Erdogan, denounced the action of the French Assembly that
had been initiated by a prominent member of Sarkhozy's party. Erdogan,
known for his forthrightness, advised the French Government that
instead of criminalizing the Turkish unwillingness to acknowledge the
1915 events as genocide, France should busy itself with determining
whether its harsh tactics used during the 1950s in Algeria, and
supposedly responsible for up to a million Algerian deaths during
the long French campaign to hold onto to its north African colony
constituted genocide.
There are many issues raised by this turn for the worse in
French-Turkish relations, and its embittering dialogue about
historic events. Perhaps, the most important, is whether it is ever
justifiable to criminalize the expression of an opinion about a set
of past occurrences that goes against a societal consensus. It is
true that genocide or Holocaust denial can be hurtful to those who
are survivors or descendants of survivors, and identify with the
victims of such severe wrongdoing, and its attendant suffering,
but whether the sensitivities of these communities should ever
be protected by the criminal law seems doubtful, conflicting with
freedom of expression and censuring inquiries into historical events
that are unpopular and controversial, but occasionally illuminating
enough to challenge conventional wisdom. It would seem that informed
agreement and social pressure should be sufficient to deter all but
the most extremist instances of denial if a genuine and sufficient
consensus exists as to the locus of responsibility and the character
of the events. In this instance, such criminalization is especially
unfortunate as even if the facts of the 1915 events are reasonably
well established, the relevance of genocide is certainly ambiguous
and somewhat problematic, especially from a legal perspective.
Against this background, where Turkey has not yet been willing to
describe the events of 1915 as 'genocide' the criminalization of
the denial is more likely to raise tensions that encourage a long
overdue accommodation. Of course, there are related irritants to the
Turkish-Armenian relationship, especially the unresolved conflict
over the future of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave in Azerbaijan. Among
thoughtful Turks there continues to be some questioning of the
character of the World War I events in question, not about their
tragic character or even a willingness to condemn Ottoman wrongdoing,
but there remains a Turkish governmental and societal reluctance to
pin the label of genocide on these occurrences. It is well known that
the Armenian diaspora has long been seeking to induce key governments
around the world to make formal declarations to the effect that what
happened in 1915 was genocide, and some 25 governments have done
so, as have many lesser political entities such as sub-divisions
of the state or cities. Such efforts to legalize historical truth,
as distinct from mourning historical events, is itself
a political gimmick to circumvent diplomacy and accommodation. But to
criminalize genocidal denial represents a still further escalation
of Armenian efforts to resolve the controversy over this potent
g-word through branding of denial as a crime. We would insist that
rather than resolving the conflict, such steps make a politics of
reconciliation that much more difficult for both parties.
The discourse on genocide has always been confusing, multi-layered, and
often toxic. The word 'genocide' is weighted down by its implications,
explaining both why there is such a strong impulse to invoke it
and an equally intense effort to deny its applicability. We need
to distinguish genocide as a crime in international law from the
political assessment of historic events as genocide due to a clear
pattern of deliberate killing of an ethnic or religious group. And
such a political assessment needs to be further distinguished from a
moral condemnation of a pattern designed to destroy systematically a
beleaguered minority that might properly be described as 'genocidal,'
or what has been more recently described as 'ethnic cleansing' in the
setting of Bosnia, which is distinct from the judicially certified
'genocide' that shook the foundations of Rwanda in 1994.
>From a legal perspective it is not plausible to call these events
in 1915 as genocide. After all, the word did not exist until coined
by Rafael Lemkin in 1943, and the crime was not so delimited until
the Genocide Convention came into force in 1951. Beyond this, and
more telling than this technical observation, is the fact that the
indictments at Nuremberg did not charge the surviving Nazi leaders with
genocide, but convicted these Germans of 'crimes against humanity'
for their connection with genocidal conduct, and even here only if
the alleged criminal acts were associated with World War II, found
by the tribunal to be an unlawful war, and thus a 'crime against
peace.' If the Holocaust perpetrated against Jews and others did not
seem to the Nuremberg tribunal to be a distinct crime, then it seems
untenable to regard the Armenian tragedy as embodying the crime of
genocide. When the UN expert body, the International Law Commission,
put into words what was done at Nuremberg it explicitly affirmed the
Roman dictum prohibiting retroactivity: no crime without law (nulla
crimen sine lege). Such a dictum touches on a fundamental component
of justice to the effect that behavior, however detestable from moral
and political points of view, is not a 'crime' until so designated in
advance of the acts in question by a competent judicial body. This
principle has never been contested, and it pertains to the genocide
debate whenever attached to pre-1951 events, whether the Armenian
experience or to the destruction of a variety of indigenous peoples in
various parts of the world or to the barbarous institution of slavery.
At the same time, if what took place in 1915 were to have occurred
anytime after the Genocide Convention became effective, it would seem
beyond any reasonable doubt to qualify as genocide. The International
Court of Justice in the course of examining the Bosnian allegations
of genocide, put the bar high by requiring written or documentary
evidence of a clear intent by Serbian governmental leaders to commit
the crime of genocide that was not available (except the particular
incident involving the horrific massacre of several thousand Bosnian
males at Srbrenica in 1995 was declared to be genocide). While such
evidence was difficult to provide to the satisfaction of the World
Court in relation to this notorious Bosnian experience of the 1990s
partly as a result of a questionable arrangement with the ad hoc
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia not to release
documentary evidence tying the Belgrade regime to the anti-Muslim
cleansing operations in Bosnia, the situation with respect to Armenia
is different. Unlike Bosnia, documentary evidence from the ruling
Ottoman authorities does exist in sufficient quantity and quality to
make a persuasive argument to the effect that 'genocide' took place
in 1915, but because the events occurred 36 years before genocide
formally became a crime such a showing is legally irrelevant.
If this reasoning is accepted, it has important implications,
including establishing some political space for bringing closure to
the issue: Turkey could formally declare that if what happened to the
Armenians in 1915 took place in the 1960s it would have been genocide,
while those on the Armenian side could accept the idea that the 1915
massacres were not then genocide, but that their extent, character,
and evidence would constitute genocide if taking place now, or anytime
after 1951. The French move, if indeed it becomes law, is irresponsible
in the extreme as it disallows the explorations of constructive ways
that the violence and suffering of the past might be mitigated. As
post-apartheid South Africa has illustrated, it might sometimes be
politically and morally preferable for a victimized people to opt for
'truth and reconciliation' than to insist on the criminalization of
past wrongs however heinous.
It seems to me that such an approach would have mutual benefits. It
would bring a conflict that has endured for decades nearer to closure.
It would allow Armenians to regard their victimization as genocide
from a political and moral perspective, while enabling Turkey to make
such a concession without fearing such legal implications as Armenian
demands for reparations and the recovery of lost property. Turkish
good faith and remorse could be further expressed by appropriating
funds for the establishment of a major museum of Armenian History
and Culture in Ankara, by recognizing April 24th as a day of Armenian
remembrance, and by encouraging honest historical inquiry into these
horrific occurrences.
Of course, such a politics of reconciliation can only have any hope
of succeeding if there is a large display of good will and a sincere
search by Turkish and Armenian leaders for positive relations between
the two peoples. It is to be expected that extremists on both sides
would strenuously object to such an accommodation. Admittedly,
there would not be complete satisfaction even among that largely
silent majority of Armenians and Turks who might welcome a pacifying
development. What would be created is valuable- a new opening that
would allow a more benevolent future to unfold for both peoples that
could include a joint cathartic reexamination of the past. Such a
development might add to the solemnity and dignity of the expected
worldwide observances in 2015 of the 100th anniversary of these events
and avoid these occasions from being little more than sad remembrances
and shrill recriminations.
From: A. Papazian