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IRAN-ARMENIA INTERACTIONS: OUTLOOKS AND RELEVANT COMPONENTS
Payvand
http://www.payvand.com/news/12/jan/1161.html
Jan 16 2012
Iran
By Elyas Vahedi, Member of Iran and Eurasia Research Center's Council
of Writers (Source: Iran Review)
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's recent visit to Armenia was another
step in Iran's enhanced efforts to get closer to its northern
neighbor. On the one hand, the visit has been considered very important
in terms of bilateral benefits and advantages and can actually promote
relations between Tehran and Yerevan. On the other hand, some analysts,
who have an eye on the complex situation in South Caucasus, maintain
that Iran should take regional and transregional factors into account
before regulating relations with countries in that region, including
Armenia. Otherwise, they say, bolstering bilateral relations will
not only fail to increase Iran's national clout in the region, but
also be followed by tangible negative results.
Mr. Ahmadinejad has made several trips to Armenia in the past six
years. Diversification of foreign trade and increasing Iran's
economic and political exchanges with that country, as part of
the geostrategic expanse of South Caucasus, is per se a valuable
policy. This reality, however, should not be ignored that South
Caucasus region has an intricate geography which can give birth to
complex regional arrangements. The Islamic Republic of Iran, as a
neighbor with many historical commonalities, has many opportunities
and advantages in that region, which if used correctly, can help the
country to increase its influence in that region.
Expansion of relations between Iran and Armenia is per se a correct
policy based on the principle of good neighborly relations. However,
the energy that Iran has put in its efforts to establish diplomatic
ties at the highest level (as evidenced by Iranian president's
frequent visits to Armenia in the past six years) have not been
matched by benefits that those visits have had for Iran's national
interests. Speaking in geographic terms, Armenia is a land-locked
country which has no access to free waters or even regional waters
such as the Caspian Sea. Although it has occupied Mountainous
Karabakh and seven Azeri areas around it to use them as trump card,
regional economic exchanges (including construction of huge oil and
gas pipelines) have been rapidly going on with no regard for Armenia.
Due to absence of oil and gas reserves, Armenia has to expand
relations with all neighbors. It lacks proper relations with Turkey and
Azerbaijan and Yerevan's relations with Georgia are not warm either,
due to ethnic reasons and Tbilisi's confrontation with Russia.
Therefore, Yerevan has no other choice but to have good relations with
Russia and Iran. Armenia's relations with Russia have been marked with
Moscow's influence over Yerevan. Russia has used this situation as a
tool to prevent further expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) toward the east.
In expanding ties with Iran, Armenia is welcoming Iran ties because it
has no other choice and bilateral relations, thus far, have benefited
Yerevan more than Tehran. An example was during Karabakh conflict.
Without economic support from Russia and Iran, Armenia would have most
probably lost that war. A reason for instability in South Caucasus is
the nature of government in Armenia which is influenced by a special
interpretation of the nation-state idea. According to that idea,
all Turkish countries are considered enemy of Armenia. That idea
was fostered after the fall of the Soviet Union and has intensified
regional tensions by putting much emphasis on ethnic and territorial
claims.
Armenia's insistence on the occupation of Karabakh despite adoption
of four resolutions by the United Nations Security Council against it,
in addition to Yerevan's territorial claims to eastern parts of Turkey
and allegations about genocide of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire
(which has been used as an excuse by Western countries which consider
it as important as Holocaust) have become indispensable components
of the foreign policy of the Armenian government. Moreover, such
ideas have also been sanctified by non-state institutions as well
as by the Armenian diaspora outside the country. Therefore, when big
regional states decide to further strengthen the current government
in Yerevan, they should pay close attention to protecting regional
peace and stability as a precondition for the expansion of ties.
Iran's overzealous efforts to develop relations with Armenia will
not only have negative effects on Tehran's relations with Baku and
Ankara, but also undermine Iran's role in more consequential political
equations of the region. It will also weaken Iran's standing among
Muslim states (considering that most of them have been condemning
Armenia for the occupation of a part of a Muslim nation of Azerbaijan)
and will cause division among Shias. The Islamic Republic of Iran,
in line with its ideological mission in foreign policy and based on
the opportunities provided to it by regional developments in the past
two decades, is considered the hub for the management of the Shia
world and a major source of dynamism in the Islamic world. Even if we
don't care much for that role, other countries define their regional
policies toward us on its basis.
Some Arab countries, for example, have been openly talking about
the threat stemming from the establishment of a Shia Crescent in the
Middle East region. Even moderate states like Turkey have, at times,
considered Iran's opportunities to influence the Shia population as
a ground for rivalry and have even taken sides with Sunni states.
Transregional powers also aim to strip Iran of its control over Shia
communities in the region. Despite all these facts, Iran's policy in
South Caucasus does not help protect the integrity of the Shia world.
If the current trend continues, the Shia world may be divided into
such distinct areas as Iranian, Turkish, and Arab Shiism. In return,
Iran will win relations with Armenia, which cannot be considered a
trump card. Armenia, on the other hand, cannot be a trusted partner
for lasting relations. The country has already rejected Iran's proposed
mediation in Karabakh dispute, though Azerbaijan hailed it.
Therefore, if restitution of ties between Armenia and Turkey actually
takes place, Armenia will most probably forget about good neighborly
relations with Iran and do its best to be accepted in political
arrangements of the Western world.
On the other hand, Iran's unusual diplomatic efforts to increase its
influence in Armenia will not only upset Azerbaijan and Turkey, but
will also have the same effect on the United States and even Russia. A
result of that situation is reflected in US efforts to pave the way
for further influence of Israel in Azerbaijan and the Central Asia.
Diplomatic contacts between Iran and Armenia have been characterized
with implied support for Armenia's positions (as was exemplified
last year by one of the special envoys of President Ahmadinejad who
clearly defended clams about genocide of Armenians) and lack of clear
support for territorial rights of Azerbaijan. This can further increase
negative impact of Iran's efforts at improving relations with Armenia.
Although Iran's strategy toward South Caucasus since the fall of
the former Soviet Union has been generally ineffective and Iran
has never taken good advantage of opportunities offered to it with
regard to political issues (like Karabakh crisis) and political ones
(construction of energy transmission lines), at least, Tehran tried
to avoid of being known as supporting Armenians. During the past
few years, however, even this consideration has been ignored on many
occasions and instead of trying to create balancing opportunities,
Iran's foreign policy has sufficed to superficial measures such as
increased contacts with a single country. It is not the feat of a
diplomatic apparatus to arrange a presidential visit to a country with
no major visitors, but the main feat is to remove misunderstandings
and tensions with more important countries where the enemies of Iran
have effectively filled Tehran's void.
Last but not least, under the present regional circumstances, continued
relations with Armenia should be suitably managed in order to both
increase Iran's influence in South Caucasus, and prevent Armenia from
getting too much inclined toward the West. Certain factors such as the
final decision of the Russian government in its dealings with the West,
Turkey's determination to reopen borders with Armenia, and resolution
of the dispute in Karabakh are out of Iran's control. Therefore, it is
imperative for Iran's diplomatic apparatus to think about the country's
declining position in other regional equations. Otherwise, it is not an
achievement for Iran to spend so much diplomatic energy on improving
relations with a country, whose economic and political capacities
are very limited and has been forced to have Iran as its seventh
trade partner with an annual bilateral trade volume not exceeding 200
million dollars. The Islamic Republic of Iran can regulate relations
with such countries in proportion to its regional and international
weight. As a result, Tehran is expected to be more careful about its
ideological interests (promotion of Islam and Shiism) and, at least,
protest to the continued occupation of Karabakh by Armenia and that
country's insulting treatment of Islam's sacred values. If Iran managed
to take good advantage of its strategic regional opportunities, it
could be very influential in determining political behavior of such
countries as Armenia and Azerbaijan.
... Payvand News - 01/16/12 ... --
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Payvand
http://www.payvand.com/news/12/jan/1161.html
Jan 16 2012
Iran
By Elyas Vahedi, Member of Iran and Eurasia Research Center's Council
of Writers (Source: Iran Review)
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's recent visit to Armenia was another
step in Iran's enhanced efforts to get closer to its northern
neighbor. On the one hand, the visit has been considered very important
in terms of bilateral benefits and advantages and can actually promote
relations between Tehran and Yerevan. On the other hand, some analysts,
who have an eye on the complex situation in South Caucasus, maintain
that Iran should take regional and transregional factors into account
before regulating relations with countries in that region, including
Armenia. Otherwise, they say, bolstering bilateral relations will
not only fail to increase Iran's national clout in the region, but
also be followed by tangible negative results.
Mr. Ahmadinejad has made several trips to Armenia in the past six
years. Diversification of foreign trade and increasing Iran's
economic and political exchanges with that country, as part of
the geostrategic expanse of South Caucasus, is per se a valuable
policy. This reality, however, should not be ignored that South
Caucasus region has an intricate geography which can give birth to
complex regional arrangements. The Islamic Republic of Iran, as a
neighbor with many historical commonalities, has many opportunities
and advantages in that region, which if used correctly, can help the
country to increase its influence in that region.
Expansion of relations between Iran and Armenia is per se a correct
policy based on the principle of good neighborly relations. However,
the energy that Iran has put in its efforts to establish diplomatic
ties at the highest level (as evidenced by Iranian president's
frequent visits to Armenia in the past six years) have not been
matched by benefits that those visits have had for Iran's national
interests. Speaking in geographic terms, Armenia is a land-locked
country which has no access to free waters or even regional waters
such as the Caspian Sea. Although it has occupied Mountainous
Karabakh and seven Azeri areas around it to use them as trump card,
regional economic exchanges (including construction of huge oil and
gas pipelines) have been rapidly going on with no regard for Armenia.
Due to absence of oil and gas reserves, Armenia has to expand
relations with all neighbors. It lacks proper relations with Turkey and
Azerbaijan and Yerevan's relations with Georgia are not warm either,
due to ethnic reasons and Tbilisi's confrontation with Russia.
Therefore, Yerevan has no other choice but to have good relations with
Russia and Iran. Armenia's relations with Russia have been marked with
Moscow's influence over Yerevan. Russia has used this situation as a
tool to prevent further expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) toward the east.
In expanding ties with Iran, Armenia is welcoming Iran ties because it
has no other choice and bilateral relations, thus far, have benefited
Yerevan more than Tehran. An example was during Karabakh conflict.
Without economic support from Russia and Iran, Armenia would have most
probably lost that war. A reason for instability in South Caucasus is
the nature of government in Armenia which is influenced by a special
interpretation of the nation-state idea. According to that idea,
all Turkish countries are considered enemy of Armenia. That idea
was fostered after the fall of the Soviet Union and has intensified
regional tensions by putting much emphasis on ethnic and territorial
claims.
Armenia's insistence on the occupation of Karabakh despite adoption
of four resolutions by the United Nations Security Council against it,
in addition to Yerevan's territorial claims to eastern parts of Turkey
and allegations about genocide of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire
(which has been used as an excuse by Western countries which consider
it as important as Holocaust) have become indispensable components
of the foreign policy of the Armenian government. Moreover, such
ideas have also been sanctified by non-state institutions as well
as by the Armenian diaspora outside the country. Therefore, when big
regional states decide to further strengthen the current government
in Yerevan, they should pay close attention to protecting regional
peace and stability as a precondition for the expansion of ties.
Iran's overzealous efforts to develop relations with Armenia will
not only have negative effects on Tehran's relations with Baku and
Ankara, but also undermine Iran's role in more consequential political
equations of the region. It will also weaken Iran's standing among
Muslim states (considering that most of them have been condemning
Armenia for the occupation of a part of a Muslim nation of Azerbaijan)
and will cause division among Shias. The Islamic Republic of Iran,
in line with its ideological mission in foreign policy and based on
the opportunities provided to it by regional developments in the past
two decades, is considered the hub for the management of the Shia
world and a major source of dynamism in the Islamic world. Even if we
don't care much for that role, other countries define their regional
policies toward us on its basis.
Some Arab countries, for example, have been openly talking about
the threat stemming from the establishment of a Shia Crescent in the
Middle East region. Even moderate states like Turkey have, at times,
considered Iran's opportunities to influence the Shia population as
a ground for rivalry and have even taken sides with Sunni states.
Transregional powers also aim to strip Iran of its control over Shia
communities in the region. Despite all these facts, Iran's policy in
South Caucasus does not help protect the integrity of the Shia world.
If the current trend continues, the Shia world may be divided into
such distinct areas as Iranian, Turkish, and Arab Shiism. In return,
Iran will win relations with Armenia, which cannot be considered a
trump card. Armenia, on the other hand, cannot be a trusted partner
for lasting relations. The country has already rejected Iran's proposed
mediation in Karabakh dispute, though Azerbaijan hailed it.
Therefore, if restitution of ties between Armenia and Turkey actually
takes place, Armenia will most probably forget about good neighborly
relations with Iran and do its best to be accepted in political
arrangements of the Western world.
On the other hand, Iran's unusual diplomatic efforts to increase its
influence in Armenia will not only upset Azerbaijan and Turkey, but
will also have the same effect on the United States and even Russia. A
result of that situation is reflected in US efforts to pave the way
for further influence of Israel in Azerbaijan and the Central Asia.
Diplomatic contacts between Iran and Armenia have been characterized
with implied support for Armenia's positions (as was exemplified
last year by one of the special envoys of President Ahmadinejad who
clearly defended clams about genocide of Armenians) and lack of clear
support for territorial rights of Azerbaijan. This can further increase
negative impact of Iran's efforts at improving relations with Armenia.
Although Iran's strategy toward South Caucasus since the fall of
the former Soviet Union has been generally ineffective and Iran
has never taken good advantage of opportunities offered to it with
regard to political issues (like Karabakh crisis) and political ones
(construction of energy transmission lines), at least, Tehran tried
to avoid of being known as supporting Armenians. During the past
few years, however, even this consideration has been ignored on many
occasions and instead of trying to create balancing opportunities,
Iran's foreign policy has sufficed to superficial measures such as
increased contacts with a single country. It is not the feat of a
diplomatic apparatus to arrange a presidential visit to a country with
no major visitors, but the main feat is to remove misunderstandings
and tensions with more important countries where the enemies of Iran
have effectively filled Tehran's void.
Last but not least, under the present regional circumstances, continued
relations with Armenia should be suitably managed in order to both
increase Iran's influence in South Caucasus, and prevent Armenia from
getting too much inclined toward the West. Certain factors such as the
final decision of the Russian government in its dealings with the West,
Turkey's determination to reopen borders with Armenia, and resolution
of the dispute in Karabakh are out of Iran's control. Therefore, it is
imperative for Iran's diplomatic apparatus to think about the country's
declining position in other regional equations. Otherwise, it is not an
achievement for Iran to spend so much diplomatic energy on improving
relations with a country, whose economic and political capacities
are very limited and has been forced to have Iran as its seventh
trade partner with an annual bilateral trade volume not exceeding 200
million dollars. The Islamic Republic of Iran can regulate relations
with such countries in proportion to its regional and international
weight. As a result, Tehran is expected to be more careful about its
ideological interests (promotion of Islam and Shiism) and, at least,
protest to the continued occupation of Karabakh by Armenia and that
country's insulting treatment of Islam's sacred values. If Iran managed
to take good advantage of its strategic regional opportunities, it
could be very influential in determining political behavior of such
countries as Armenia and Azerbaijan.
... Payvand News - 01/16/12 ... --
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress