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ANDREI RYABOV: "ARMED CONFLICT MAY LEAD TO IRREPARABLE CONSEQUENCES FOR RUSSIA'S SOUTH CAUCASUS POLICIES"
David Stepanyan.
Vestnik Kavkaza
Jan 17 2012
Russia
Andrei Ryabov, expert from Moscow Karnega Research Center, told VK
about the main threats that might undermine Russian influence on the
South Caucasus, as well as about Moscow's choice of opportunities to
maintain peace in the region and about the role of the US in creation
of the 'regulated chaos' atmosphere. He also touched upon the issue
of OSCE Minsk Group efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
- OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs keep trying to find a peaceful solution
to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. What prognoses could you make on
the prospects of these efforts?
- In general, Russian and foreign experts agree that the threat
of a new violent breakout in the Nagorno-Karabakh is a distinct
possibility. It seems, however, that a solid and rational position of
the mediator powers, especially Russia, may prove efficient in keeping
the conflict is a 'frozen' stage for a rather long period of time
despite the desire of both sides to tip the military balance. However,
everyone, including the conflict parties, understands that a new armed
conflict in this region (in the Wider West Asia as the Americans call
it) would lead to grave consequences for all its countries, and not
only for South Caucasian states. First of all, I mean the threat to
Russian interests in Armenia and Azerbaijan. A new Nagorno-Karabakh
war would have devastating effect on Russia's authority on the
South Caucasus, and Russia has considerable strategic interests in
Armenia and energetic ties to Azerbaijan. These problems are becoming
more and more topical for Russia as we can't seem to agree with our
Western partners on oil and gas transportation trough South Caucasian
territory. For example, Turkey refused to participate in our 'Southern
Stream' project.
- How could you characterize the trilateral meetings of Russian
president Dmitry Medvedev with his Azerbaijani and Armenian
counterparts?
- The very fact that there were 6 of them during Medvedev's presidency
indicates that the settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is one of
the most important priorities for Russia. The general expert opinion
on the matter is that now there are no favorable preconditions
for resolving the conflict and they are unlikely to appear any
time soon, so the only thing that mediators can do is to guard the
status-quo and prevent a new war from breaking out. After the August
War with Georgia there were a lot of concerns that Russia intends
make a 'general revision' of the region's state borders/ However,
Russia obviously had no plans like that or even means to carry them
out. Russia decided to observe status-quo. Today, Russian-Georgian
relations seem to be more stable and don't offer any reasons to
fear any new developments. So now Russia is much more concerned with
the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, as both sides race to increase their
military potentials. And Moscow understands that an armed conflict
might lead to irreparable consequences for all Russian politics on
the South Caucasus. In case of war Russia will lose all its value as
a strategic partner for both sides, that is why Medvedev was trying
so hard to at leas maintain status-quo and why the future president
is likely to carry on with this political course.
- Do other OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs agree with Russia's position
in the matter? What are their interests in the region?
- No one is interested in a new armed conflict; there are far too
many geopolitical risks to it. US and France are also interested in
maintaining status-quo. Of course, it can't remain like that forever,
but currently there's no better alternative. And it seems that Europe
and US have finally come to realize and recognize Russia's exclusive
position in the matter. The fact that all other co-chairs virtually
recognized their inability to do anything about the conflict during
the Astana OSCE proves the point.
- So you don't believe that the USA is planning to use the issue
of Iran to pressure Russia into giving up its lead position in the
Karabakh process?
- No, I don't. I'm not a partisan of the 'regulated chaos' theory. I
also don't believe that US is trying to talk Azerbaijan into offering
its territory as a site of US missile launch against Iran in return
for a permission to break the Karabakh staus-quo. The situation in
the Middle East is far too complicated, and recently got even more
complex after the events of the 'Arab spring'. Syria is a crucial
link in this region, and how the situation turns out there is yet
unknown. In these conditions it is really hard to make the chaos
'regulated' and adapting such a policy would be a mistake for any
state no matter the resources it possesses. Plus there's the global
economic crisis, so I don't believe that current US administration
would risk taking such a step.
As for the general pattern of the so-called 'Arab revolutions', in the
case of Syria one can see a considerable influence of conservative
Arab states, such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia. They offer the US to
replace Israel as their main 'western partner' and demonstrate that
their moderate Islam open to certain modernization is much better than
the alternative. As for Libya, one can see that the events played
out just like the West planned. But this game is dangerous not only
for Libyans, but for the West as well as there is no foretelling how
the situation will end.
David Stepanyan.
Vestnik Kavkaza
Jan 17 2012
Russia
Andrei Ryabov, expert from Moscow Karnega Research Center, told VK
about the main threats that might undermine Russian influence on the
South Caucasus, as well as about Moscow's choice of opportunities to
maintain peace in the region and about the role of the US in creation
of the 'regulated chaos' atmosphere. He also touched upon the issue
of OSCE Minsk Group efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
- OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs keep trying to find a peaceful solution
to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. What prognoses could you make on
the prospects of these efforts?
- In general, Russian and foreign experts agree that the threat
of a new violent breakout in the Nagorno-Karabakh is a distinct
possibility. It seems, however, that a solid and rational position of
the mediator powers, especially Russia, may prove efficient in keeping
the conflict is a 'frozen' stage for a rather long period of time
despite the desire of both sides to tip the military balance. However,
everyone, including the conflict parties, understands that a new armed
conflict in this region (in the Wider West Asia as the Americans call
it) would lead to grave consequences for all its countries, and not
only for South Caucasian states. First of all, I mean the threat to
Russian interests in Armenia and Azerbaijan. A new Nagorno-Karabakh
war would have devastating effect on Russia's authority on the
South Caucasus, and Russia has considerable strategic interests in
Armenia and energetic ties to Azerbaijan. These problems are becoming
more and more topical for Russia as we can't seem to agree with our
Western partners on oil and gas transportation trough South Caucasian
territory. For example, Turkey refused to participate in our 'Southern
Stream' project.
- How could you characterize the trilateral meetings of Russian
president Dmitry Medvedev with his Azerbaijani and Armenian
counterparts?
- The very fact that there were 6 of them during Medvedev's presidency
indicates that the settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is one of
the most important priorities for Russia. The general expert opinion
on the matter is that now there are no favorable preconditions
for resolving the conflict and they are unlikely to appear any
time soon, so the only thing that mediators can do is to guard the
status-quo and prevent a new war from breaking out. After the August
War with Georgia there were a lot of concerns that Russia intends
make a 'general revision' of the region's state borders/ However,
Russia obviously had no plans like that or even means to carry them
out. Russia decided to observe status-quo. Today, Russian-Georgian
relations seem to be more stable and don't offer any reasons to
fear any new developments. So now Russia is much more concerned with
the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, as both sides race to increase their
military potentials. And Moscow understands that an armed conflict
might lead to irreparable consequences for all Russian politics on
the South Caucasus. In case of war Russia will lose all its value as
a strategic partner for both sides, that is why Medvedev was trying
so hard to at leas maintain status-quo and why the future president
is likely to carry on with this political course.
- Do other OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs agree with Russia's position
in the matter? What are their interests in the region?
- No one is interested in a new armed conflict; there are far too
many geopolitical risks to it. US and France are also interested in
maintaining status-quo. Of course, it can't remain like that forever,
but currently there's no better alternative. And it seems that Europe
and US have finally come to realize and recognize Russia's exclusive
position in the matter. The fact that all other co-chairs virtually
recognized their inability to do anything about the conflict during
the Astana OSCE proves the point.
- So you don't believe that the USA is planning to use the issue
of Iran to pressure Russia into giving up its lead position in the
Karabakh process?
- No, I don't. I'm not a partisan of the 'regulated chaos' theory. I
also don't believe that US is trying to talk Azerbaijan into offering
its territory as a site of US missile launch against Iran in return
for a permission to break the Karabakh staus-quo. The situation in
the Middle East is far too complicated, and recently got even more
complex after the events of the 'Arab spring'. Syria is a crucial
link in this region, and how the situation turns out there is yet
unknown. In these conditions it is really hard to make the chaos
'regulated' and adapting such a policy would be a mistake for any
state no matter the resources it possesses. Plus there's the global
economic crisis, so I don't believe that current US administration
would risk taking such a step.
As for the general pattern of the so-called 'Arab revolutions', in the
case of Syria one can see a considerable influence of conservative
Arab states, such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia. They offer the US to
replace Israel as their main 'western partner' and demonstrate that
their moderate Islam open to certain modernization is much better than
the alternative. As for Libya, one can see that the events played
out just like the West planned. But this game is dangerous not only
for Libyans, but for the West as well as there is no foretelling how
the situation will end.