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THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH PROCESS: NO PROGRESS IS EVIDENT
Politkom.ru
Jan 18 2012
Russia
by Sergey Markedonov, Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Strategic
and International Studies, Washington, D.C., USA
The year that has begun brought certain changes over time in the
Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. On 23-24 January, a meeting is
scheduled in a trilateral format among the presidents of Russia,
Azerbaijan, and Armenia. On the one hand, the upcoming summit meeting
is significant because it will occur after a break of many months. And
the point here is not the calendar. The previous trilateral meeting
in Kazan in June 2011 ended in failure. In the process the failure
followed an upsurge of too high expectations that the representatives
of the three countries, the cochairmen of the Minsk Group of the
OSCE, spread in the month before the summit meeting in the capital of
Tatarstan. It was clear to many experts even before the Kazan talks
that there would be no breakthrough, since the parties in the conflict
were not ready for compromises. But the political reality to no small
degree is formed from ideas being imposed. And so the landing after
flights in clouds of optimism is more difficult. Be that as it may,
after the trilateral meeting in Kazan, the negotiation process entered
a state of stagnation.
However, that is perfectly explainable. After the December elections
to the State Duma in Russia, foreign policy became secondary because
of the revival of the domestic political public process. As for the
Western countries, the consequences of the Near East "awakening"
together with the "Iranian problem" reduced interest in the South
Caucasus - which was not too significant anyway - almost to zero. Now
in the United States and in Europe, this region attracts attention
perhaps only in the context of the discussion of the possible scenarios
of an American-Iranian confrontation. The new meeting in Sochi in
theory is supposed to change the trend and give a certain impetus to
the business of settling the chronic conflict.
But that is only in theory. In reality the positions of the parties
have not undergone fundamental changes. In his New Year's address to
the nation, the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev was announcing
increased military expenditures by his country in 2011. And in the new
year, this course, according to the Azerbaijani leader, will remain
steady. At the recent expanded session of the republic's government,
Aliyev gave his interpretation of the negotiation process with the
Armenian side: "If some people believe that the main topic of the
talks is preventing war, I do not agree with that opinion. No one
wants war, and especially the Azerbaijani State, which has achieved
such big successes, does not want it. But that does not mean that the
negotiation process will be moved aside and that all efforts will
be directed to preventing war. That will not happen." In that way,
the head of Azerbaijan showed that the objective of the negotiation
process is not to find a compromise but a conversation from a position
of strength. In this connection it is no accident that at that same
session of the government, he did not forget to mention that the
Azerbaijani armed forces are the most powerful in the South Caucasus.
However, Azerbaijan is not entering the new year just with impressive
military indicators. Held on 4 January was the first session of the UN
Security Council in its new membership, in other words, with the new
non-permanent members of this prominent United Nations structure. For
the first time in the period since the dissolution of the USSR, this
honour was in fact awarded to Azerbaijan, which in the fall of 2011
survived a complicated competition to become the representative from
the group of countries of Eastern Europe. At that time, let us recall,
Baku's chief rival was Slovenia. And the fact that Azerbaijan received
support shows that many countries that are members of the United
Nations are interested in friendship with this country. It is true,
however, that there are several important nuances here. Azerbaijan
retains its appeal to others as a stably developing secular state
that follows a reasonable and balanced fo reign policy (oriented to
maintaining equal relations with the West and the East). But a country
that is going to be involved in a bloody conflict with unpredictable
consequences would hardly be so interesting to the world community. To
put it more precisely, this interest would be expressed not at all in
the way that it is today. In any case Baku considers its positions
sufficiently strong to make concessions. Of course, the growth in
the military budget and the alarmist rhetoric are not an invention
of 2011 or 2012. Such instruments have long been rationally used by
Azerbaijani diplomacy. And it is far from a fact that what was said
by the president of the Caspian republic will be put into practice.
However, the hard-line style altogether obviously indicates an
unwillingness to make compromise decisions.
The Armenian side today cannot boast of achievements in the United
Nations field. It is difficult to compare its social-economic
indicators and resources with Azerbaijani capabilities. But Yerevan
also has its reasons to be obstinate and hold to the old line. In
the first place, no one has as yet ruled out the factor of the CSTO
[Collective Security Treaty Organization]. Scepticism regarding this
structure is enormous, both inside it and outside its limits. This
scepticism applies to both Russia and other countries that are members
of the Organization, especially countries from Central Asia that are
linked with Baku by hundreds of threads. But Armenia's membership in
a military-political structure that Azerbaijan is not a member of has
a definite psychological effect. In the second place, the escalation
of the "Iranian problem" is also making Baku look not only in the
Armenian but also in a different direction. Tehran has been expressing
its dissatisfaction with the level of Azerbaijan's contacts with the
United States and Israel for a long time. In this situation building
up the confrontation with Armenia and the NKR [Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic] in view of the unclear prospect of playing a new Near
East game is dangerous. After all, in the event of the escalation of
the American-Iranian disagreements, even successful actions against
Armenian forces might be very strongly mixed. So should it take the
risk when behind it are subjects that are many times more dangerous?
The question, of course, is a rhetorical one. But it is difficult to
imagine that it is not being raised in Baku and in Yerevan. And in
the last case, they understand that to give in and seek compromises
is also not too advantageous, since the one across from you is no
less vulnerable than you yourself are. But since the Armenian side
considers itself the victor, it is not in its interests to stir up
the public with militaristic statements. Its calculation is altogether
different - to make time work to its advantage.
In that way, on the threshold of the Sochi meeting, Armenia and
Azerbaijan are not providing any reasons to believe that concessions
or compromises are possible. What is the sense of another summit
meeting other than to continue negotiations? That is not an idle
question. There are several reasons here that pertain both to
individual interests and to the peace process as a whole. If we are
speaking of the peace process, the Sochi meeting will give a certain
impetus to the talks and bring them out of the "sleeping state."
Another question is that there are no other options for resolving the
conflict other than raw "updated Madrid principles." But in any case
the dialogue and the parties in conflict remaining in certain confines
and under "supervision" are better than their pupation and being locked
up in their own radical agenda. The West today believes that Russian
"supervision" may not be an altogether good thing, but it is by no
means an infernal evil. I must speak specially about the "supervision."
After Dmitriy Medvedev in September 2011 became a "lame duck" (whose
lameness was intensified by the domestic politi cal failures of the
ruling party in the Duma elections), the format whose initiator is
customarily considered to be the man who at this point is still the
incumbent president of Russia was in a suspended state. In post-Soviet
space, politics is strongly personified. And so many people in
Baku and in Yerevan thought that the trilateral format might not
be of too much interest to Vladimir Putin (or any other leader of
Russia). It is not out of the question that at the meeting in Sochi,
Medvedev will give important explanations regarding Moscow's plans
for a Karabakh settlement. Most likely the point of them will amount
to saying that the person of the head of state is not primary. The
most important thing is Russia's interest in the South Caucasus and
its desire to preserve the position of mediator. Consequently, the
meeting in Sochi is needed to "mark out the position." And at the
same time to demonstrate "constructiveness" to the West.
France today is not in the best position. On the one hand, the sharp
deterioration in bilateral relations with Turkey specifically on the
"Armenian question" (in Baku there have already been voices heard
regarding the bias of Paris on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue). On the
other, the rating of the current head of state Nicolas Sarkozy on the
eve of the president election is frightfully low. In the United States,
the "Iranian issue" (and parallel with that the "Israeli" one as well)
has become paramount. And in fact election matters weighed down by the
economic crisis in no way promote the formulation of some alternative
to the current model of a resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani
confrontation. In that way, as of today the Sochi meeting is for the
most part advantageous for Moscow, which, however, will not bring
the keys to peace on a saucer with a light blue border.
Simply because it does not have them. It can only create certain
conditions to look for them.
[translated from Russian]
Politkom.ru
Jan 18 2012
Russia
by Sergey Markedonov, Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Strategic
and International Studies, Washington, D.C., USA
The year that has begun brought certain changes over time in the
Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. On 23-24 January, a meeting is
scheduled in a trilateral format among the presidents of Russia,
Azerbaijan, and Armenia. On the one hand, the upcoming summit meeting
is significant because it will occur after a break of many months. And
the point here is not the calendar. The previous trilateral meeting
in Kazan in June 2011 ended in failure. In the process the failure
followed an upsurge of too high expectations that the representatives
of the three countries, the cochairmen of the Minsk Group of the
OSCE, spread in the month before the summit meeting in the capital of
Tatarstan. It was clear to many experts even before the Kazan talks
that there would be no breakthrough, since the parties in the conflict
were not ready for compromises. But the political reality to no small
degree is formed from ideas being imposed. And so the landing after
flights in clouds of optimism is more difficult. Be that as it may,
after the trilateral meeting in Kazan, the negotiation process entered
a state of stagnation.
However, that is perfectly explainable. After the December elections
to the State Duma in Russia, foreign policy became secondary because
of the revival of the domestic political public process. As for the
Western countries, the consequences of the Near East "awakening"
together with the "Iranian problem" reduced interest in the South
Caucasus - which was not too significant anyway - almost to zero. Now
in the United States and in Europe, this region attracts attention
perhaps only in the context of the discussion of the possible scenarios
of an American-Iranian confrontation. The new meeting in Sochi in
theory is supposed to change the trend and give a certain impetus to
the business of settling the chronic conflict.
But that is only in theory. In reality the positions of the parties
have not undergone fundamental changes. In his New Year's address to
the nation, the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev was announcing
increased military expenditures by his country in 2011. And in the new
year, this course, according to the Azerbaijani leader, will remain
steady. At the recent expanded session of the republic's government,
Aliyev gave his interpretation of the negotiation process with the
Armenian side: "If some people believe that the main topic of the
talks is preventing war, I do not agree with that opinion. No one
wants war, and especially the Azerbaijani State, which has achieved
such big successes, does not want it. But that does not mean that the
negotiation process will be moved aside and that all efforts will
be directed to preventing war. That will not happen." In that way,
the head of Azerbaijan showed that the objective of the negotiation
process is not to find a compromise but a conversation from a position
of strength. In this connection it is no accident that at that same
session of the government, he did not forget to mention that the
Azerbaijani armed forces are the most powerful in the South Caucasus.
However, Azerbaijan is not entering the new year just with impressive
military indicators. Held on 4 January was the first session of the UN
Security Council in its new membership, in other words, with the new
non-permanent members of this prominent United Nations structure. For
the first time in the period since the dissolution of the USSR, this
honour was in fact awarded to Azerbaijan, which in the fall of 2011
survived a complicated competition to become the representative from
the group of countries of Eastern Europe. At that time, let us recall,
Baku's chief rival was Slovenia. And the fact that Azerbaijan received
support shows that many countries that are members of the United
Nations are interested in friendship with this country. It is true,
however, that there are several important nuances here. Azerbaijan
retains its appeal to others as a stably developing secular state
that follows a reasonable and balanced fo reign policy (oriented to
maintaining equal relations with the West and the East). But a country
that is going to be involved in a bloody conflict with unpredictable
consequences would hardly be so interesting to the world community. To
put it more precisely, this interest would be expressed not at all in
the way that it is today. In any case Baku considers its positions
sufficiently strong to make concessions. Of course, the growth in
the military budget and the alarmist rhetoric are not an invention
of 2011 or 2012. Such instruments have long been rationally used by
Azerbaijani diplomacy. And it is far from a fact that what was said
by the president of the Caspian republic will be put into practice.
However, the hard-line style altogether obviously indicates an
unwillingness to make compromise decisions.
The Armenian side today cannot boast of achievements in the United
Nations field. It is difficult to compare its social-economic
indicators and resources with Azerbaijani capabilities. But Yerevan
also has its reasons to be obstinate and hold to the old line. In
the first place, no one has as yet ruled out the factor of the CSTO
[Collective Security Treaty Organization]. Scepticism regarding this
structure is enormous, both inside it and outside its limits. This
scepticism applies to both Russia and other countries that are members
of the Organization, especially countries from Central Asia that are
linked with Baku by hundreds of threads. But Armenia's membership in
a military-political structure that Azerbaijan is not a member of has
a definite psychological effect. In the second place, the escalation
of the "Iranian problem" is also making Baku look not only in the
Armenian but also in a different direction. Tehran has been expressing
its dissatisfaction with the level of Azerbaijan's contacts with the
United States and Israel for a long time. In this situation building
up the confrontation with Armenia and the NKR [Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic] in view of the unclear prospect of playing a new Near
East game is dangerous. After all, in the event of the escalation of
the American-Iranian disagreements, even successful actions against
Armenian forces might be very strongly mixed. So should it take the
risk when behind it are subjects that are many times more dangerous?
The question, of course, is a rhetorical one. But it is difficult to
imagine that it is not being raised in Baku and in Yerevan. And in
the last case, they understand that to give in and seek compromises
is also not too advantageous, since the one across from you is no
less vulnerable than you yourself are. But since the Armenian side
considers itself the victor, it is not in its interests to stir up
the public with militaristic statements. Its calculation is altogether
different - to make time work to its advantage.
In that way, on the threshold of the Sochi meeting, Armenia and
Azerbaijan are not providing any reasons to believe that concessions
or compromises are possible. What is the sense of another summit
meeting other than to continue negotiations? That is not an idle
question. There are several reasons here that pertain both to
individual interests and to the peace process as a whole. If we are
speaking of the peace process, the Sochi meeting will give a certain
impetus to the talks and bring them out of the "sleeping state."
Another question is that there are no other options for resolving the
conflict other than raw "updated Madrid principles." But in any case
the dialogue and the parties in conflict remaining in certain confines
and under "supervision" are better than their pupation and being locked
up in their own radical agenda. The West today believes that Russian
"supervision" may not be an altogether good thing, but it is by no
means an infernal evil. I must speak specially about the "supervision."
After Dmitriy Medvedev in September 2011 became a "lame duck" (whose
lameness was intensified by the domestic politi cal failures of the
ruling party in the Duma elections), the format whose initiator is
customarily considered to be the man who at this point is still the
incumbent president of Russia was in a suspended state. In post-Soviet
space, politics is strongly personified. And so many people in
Baku and in Yerevan thought that the trilateral format might not
be of too much interest to Vladimir Putin (or any other leader of
Russia). It is not out of the question that at the meeting in Sochi,
Medvedev will give important explanations regarding Moscow's plans
for a Karabakh settlement. Most likely the point of them will amount
to saying that the person of the head of state is not primary. The
most important thing is Russia's interest in the South Caucasus and
its desire to preserve the position of mediator. Consequently, the
meeting in Sochi is needed to "mark out the position." And at the
same time to demonstrate "constructiveness" to the West.
France today is not in the best position. On the one hand, the sharp
deterioration in bilateral relations with Turkey specifically on the
"Armenian question" (in Baku there have already been voices heard
regarding the bias of Paris on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue). On the
other, the rating of the current head of state Nicolas Sarkozy on the
eve of the president election is frightfully low. In the United States,
the "Iranian issue" (and parallel with that the "Israeli" one as well)
has become paramount. And in fact election matters weighed down by the
economic crisis in no way promote the formulation of some alternative
to the current model of a resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani
confrontation. In that way, as of today the Sochi meeting is for the
most part advantageous for Moscow, which, however, will not bring
the keys to peace on a saucer with a light blue border.
Simply because it does not have them. It can only create certain
conditions to look for them.
[translated from Russian]