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RUSSIA AND IRAN: UNEASY NEIGHBORS - SINCE THE 16TH CENTURY
Voice of America
http://blogs.voanews.com/russia-watch/2012/01/23/russia-and-iran-uneasy-neighbors-since-the-16th-century/
Jan 23 2012
Countries without natural borders are like amoebas. Over centuries,
they expand and contract, expand and contract.
As the Western world wonders why Russia has such a nuanced policy
toward Iran's nuclear program, it is important to skip back over four
centuries of history.
Under Ivan the Terrible, Russia defeated the Tatars and Russia started
to expand east to Siberia and south to the Caspian Sea. There, it
first encountered Persia, forerunner to modern Iran.
Persia's first ambassador to Russia visited the Kremlin four centuries
ago, in 1592. For the next century, wary coexistence ensued between
the two empires, one Christian, the other Muslim.
Then, in 1722, Russia expanded south again, embarking on the first of
four successful wars against Persia. Steadily, Russia gobbled up chunks
of Persia's Central Asian Empire. With the 1828 Treaty of Turkemnchay,
the Caspian Sea became a Russian lake.
One author of that treaty was Russia's new ambassador to Persia,
Alexander Griboyedev, a witty and charming poet and playwright,
recently arrived from the court in St. Petersburg.
But Persian resentment of the treaty boiled over when an Armenian
eunuch escaped from the Shah's harem and two Armenian girls escaped
from the harem of his son-in-law. Under terms of the new treaty,
Armenians were allowed safe passage from Persia to Russian-controlled
Armenia. Ambassador Griboyedev stood on principle, and protected his
Armenian charges.
What happened next, made the Iranian seizure of the United States
embassy in Tehran in 1979, or the sacking of the British embassy two
months ago, look like tea parties.
A mob of thousands of rioting Persian overwhelmed the Russian Embassy's
Cossack guards and slaughtered everyone inside. A few days later, the
remains of the eunuch were so disfigured that he was only recognized
by a scar on his hand.
When Griboyedev's 16-year-old bride, Nino, learned of her husband's
fate, she became so distraught that she miscarried, and lost their
baby. For the rest of her life, she refused all suitors. Today, a
larger than life Griboyedev statue in Moscow is a popular meeting
point for young people. In St. Petersburg, Griboyedev Canal is a
picturesque waterway in the heart of historic city.
The embassy slaughter may live on in Russian's popular image of Iran.
But it did not deter the Kremlin, which retained control of Northern
Iran through 1946.
In 1907, with the military rise of Germany, Russia and Britain
decided to stop wasting their energy in their "Great Game" over the
former Persian empire. That year, they signed in St. Petersburg, the
Anglo-Russian Convention. Under this treaty, Persia was divided up
between a northern Russian zone, a central neutral zone governed by a
Shah, and a southern British zone. This allowed Britain to develop oil
deposits in southern Iran and to build a refinery in Abadan. Founded
in 1909, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company grew into what is known today
as BP.
This division continued until August of 1941, when Britain and the
Soviet Union conducted a joint, three-week military campaign and
deposed the pro-German Shah, installed his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
For the next five years, the two foreign nations to oversaw what had
now come to be called Iran.
In early 1946, the British pulled out, but the Red Army stayed in
Northern Iran well beyond an exit deadline stipulated in the Teheran
Conference of 1943.
By early 1946, the Cold War was starting and Stalin tried to prolong
control over northern Iran by setting up two puppet Soviet republics
and signing a oil treaty with Teheran that gave the Soviet Union
ownership of 51 percent of northern Iran's oil deposits. But soon after
Red Army troops withdrew from northern Iran, the puppet republics
collapsed. In late 1947, Iran's parliament refused to ratify the
oil agreement.
With this history in mind, I could barely repress a smile Wednesday
as I sat in the Russian Foreign Ministry's comfortable new press
auditorium building. Minister Sergei Lavrov, perhaps hoping that no
one in the hall knew history, was sternly warning that interference
in the internal affairs of Iran is "impermissible."
Here, morality in diplomacy may be dictated by changing realities on
the ground.
Six decades of oil earnings and a swelling young population have
given Iran a powerful military machine. Now, it may be building a
nuclear bomb.
In contrast, the Russian amoeba has retreated. With an aging and
shrinking population, Kremlin power projection has dramatically ebbed
from the Soviet era high water mark.
In the Caspian, post-Soviet Moscow's control has receded to about 20
percent of the 7,000 km shoreline. And half of the Russia portion is
in Dagestan, where currently the hottest insurgency is underway in
Russia's Islamic south. Instead of Moscow reaching across the Caspian
to destabilize Northern Iran, Moscow now fears Iran reaching across
the Caspian to destabilize southern Russia.
Last year's Arab Spring, ended a series of Soviet legacy
relationships. Russian influence in the Mediterranean receded to a
toehold in Tarsus, a naval base on Syria's coast. Now, Russia seeks
to prop up Syria's government, its last Arab ally in the Mediterranean.
This month, Russia sent to Syria its last aircraft carrier and fresh
supplies of bullets for Syria's army. But a large question mark hangs
over the future of Syria.
And the Russian public has little taste in overseas military
entanglement, whether Syria or Iran.
In Central Asia, Russia talks loudly, but acts cautiously, In June
2010, Roza Otunbayeva, then president of Kyrgyzstan, publicly asked
Moscow four times to send troops to end ethnic rioting in Osh.
President Medvedev replied that he would study the matter.
Russia's political system may be authoritarian. But the Kremlin
keeps its ear close to the ground through an extensive public opinion
polling system.
A weakened military, an aging population, and little popular support
for military adventures - these were not the concerns of Ivan the
Terrible, or of his modern day equivalent, Joseph Stalin.
So, today, as the Russian amoeba retracts, there is no indication
that Russia's leaders want to tangle with Teheran.
Voice of America
http://blogs.voanews.com/russia-watch/2012/01/23/russia-and-iran-uneasy-neighbors-since-the-16th-century/
Jan 23 2012
Countries without natural borders are like amoebas. Over centuries,
they expand and contract, expand and contract.
As the Western world wonders why Russia has such a nuanced policy
toward Iran's nuclear program, it is important to skip back over four
centuries of history.
Under Ivan the Terrible, Russia defeated the Tatars and Russia started
to expand east to Siberia and south to the Caspian Sea. There, it
first encountered Persia, forerunner to modern Iran.
Persia's first ambassador to Russia visited the Kremlin four centuries
ago, in 1592. For the next century, wary coexistence ensued between
the two empires, one Christian, the other Muslim.
Then, in 1722, Russia expanded south again, embarking on the first of
four successful wars against Persia. Steadily, Russia gobbled up chunks
of Persia's Central Asian Empire. With the 1828 Treaty of Turkemnchay,
the Caspian Sea became a Russian lake.
One author of that treaty was Russia's new ambassador to Persia,
Alexander Griboyedev, a witty and charming poet and playwright,
recently arrived from the court in St. Petersburg.
But Persian resentment of the treaty boiled over when an Armenian
eunuch escaped from the Shah's harem and two Armenian girls escaped
from the harem of his son-in-law. Under terms of the new treaty,
Armenians were allowed safe passage from Persia to Russian-controlled
Armenia. Ambassador Griboyedev stood on principle, and protected his
Armenian charges.
What happened next, made the Iranian seizure of the United States
embassy in Tehran in 1979, or the sacking of the British embassy two
months ago, look like tea parties.
A mob of thousands of rioting Persian overwhelmed the Russian Embassy's
Cossack guards and slaughtered everyone inside. A few days later, the
remains of the eunuch were so disfigured that he was only recognized
by a scar on his hand.
When Griboyedev's 16-year-old bride, Nino, learned of her husband's
fate, she became so distraught that she miscarried, and lost their
baby. For the rest of her life, she refused all suitors. Today, a
larger than life Griboyedev statue in Moscow is a popular meeting
point for young people. In St. Petersburg, Griboyedev Canal is a
picturesque waterway in the heart of historic city.
The embassy slaughter may live on in Russian's popular image of Iran.
But it did not deter the Kremlin, which retained control of Northern
Iran through 1946.
In 1907, with the military rise of Germany, Russia and Britain
decided to stop wasting their energy in their "Great Game" over the
former Persian empire. That year, they signed in St. Petersburg, the
Anglo-Russian Convention. Under this treaty, Persia was divided up
between a northern Russian zone, a central neutral zone governed by a
Shah, and a southern British zone. This allowed Britain to develop oil
deposits in southern Iran and to build a refinery in Abadan. Founded
in 1909, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company grew into what is known today
as BP.
This division continued until August of 1941, when Britain and the
Soviet Union conducted a joint, three-week military campaign and
deposed the pro-German Shah, installed his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
For the next five years, the two foreign nations to oversaw what had
now come to be called Iran.
In early 1946, the British pulled out, but the Red Army stayed in
Northern Iran well beyond an exit deadline stipulated in the Teheran
Conference of 1943.
By early 1946, the Cold War was starting and Stalin tried to prolong
control over northern Iran by setting up two puppet Soviet republics
and signing a oil treaty with Teheran that gave the Soviet Union
ownership of 51 percent of northern Iran's oil deposits. But soon after
Red Army troops withdrew from northern Iran, the puppet republics
collapsed. In late 1947, Iran's parliament refused to ratify the
oil agreement.
With this history in mind, I could barely repress a smile Wednesday
as I sat in the Russian Foreign Ministry's comfortable new press
auditorium building. Minister Sergei Lavrov, perhaps hoping that no
one in the hall knew history, was sternly warning that interference
in the internal affairs of Iran is "impermissible."
Here, morality in diplomacy may be dictated by changing realities on
the ground.
Six decades of oil earnings and a swelling young population have
given Iran a powerful military machine. Now, it may be building a
nuclear bomb.
In contrast, the Russian amoeba has retreated. With an aging and
shrinking population, Kremlin power projection has dramatically ebbed
from the Soviet era high water mark.
In the Caspian, post-Soviet Moscow's control has receded to about 20
percent of the 7,000 km shoreline. And half of the Russia portion is
in Dagestan, where currently the hottest insurgency is underway in
Russia's Islamic south. Instead of Moscow reaching across the Caspian
to destabilize Northern Iran, Moscow now fears Iran reaching across
the Caspian to destabilize southern Russia.
Last year's Arab Spring, ended a series of Soviet legacy
relationships. Russian influence in the Mediterranean receded to a
toehold in Tarsus, a naval base on Syria's coast. Now, Russia seeks
to prop up Syria's government, its last Arab ally in the Mediterranean.
This month, Russia sent to Syria its last aircraft carrier and fresh
supplies of bullets for Syria's army. But a large question mark hangs
over the future of Syria.
And the Russian public has little taste in overseas military
entanglement, whether Syria or Iran.
In Central Asia, Russia talks loudly, but acts cautiously, In June
2010, Roza Otunbayeva, then president of Kyrgyzstan, publicly asked
Moscow four times to send troops to end ethnic rioting in Osh.
President Medvedev replied that he would study the matter.
Russia's political system may be authoritarian. But the Kremlin
keeps its ear close to the ground through an extensive public opinion
polling system.
A weakened military, an aging population, and little popular support
for military adventures - these were not the concerns of Ivan the
Terrible, or of his modern day equivalent, Joseph Stalin.
So, today, as the Russian amoeba retracts, there is no indication
that Russia's leaders want to tangle with Teheran.