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AKCAM: GENOCIDE RECOGNITION IS ABOUT JUSTICE, NOT FREEDOM OF THOUGHT
by Taner Akcam
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2012/01/25/akcam-genocide-recognition-is-about-justice-not-freedom-of-thought/
January 25, 2012
The following interview with Prof. Taner Akcam, the Robert Aram,
Marianne Kaloosdian and Stephen and Marion Mugar Chair in Armenian
Genocide Studies at Clark University, appeared in Le Monde on Jan. 7.
The interview was conducted by Guillaume Perrier. Below is the
interview in English.
Taner Akcam Q. What is your opinion, not about the genocide denial
law itself, but about the effects it can have on the debate among
intellectuals and civil society in Turkey?
A. As the saying goes, there's no such thing as bad publicity.
Although, in the short run, the French law has been very negatively
received in Turkey, I believe that in the long run, the effect will
be positive. Within its own borders, Turkey can try and continue to
suppress, and muzzle, and deny the truth, but internationally there
will be continual reminders (such as the French law) of an issue that
Turkey must confront and ultimately resolve.
Even if one opposes this legal initiative, it shows that Turkey cannot
escape by sticking its head in the sand. For this reason, the French
initiative cannot be considered as a simple "law" in the technical
sense of the term for France. For better or worse, it has become part
of the international campaign to recognize the Armenian Genocide.
Turkey's hysteria, and anger, and temper tantrums will pass and
some of the negative developments that have occurred will be quickly
forgotten. What will remain is the heavy reality of a very serious
unresolved problem. Such an outcome will, I expect, support the
position of those intellectuals who assert that confronting and
remembering history is strongly connected to the creation of a
democratic society.
Regardless of France's ultimate aims or intentions, Turkish society and
its educated classes are once again reminded that we need to resolve
this very fundamental issue. Some may object that "this should have
happened some other way," but if you don't solve your problems on
your own, often enough someone else will force a solution on you.
That's the way it's always been in this world.
Everyone has to realize this basic fact: On the subject of 1915,
Turkey has followed a politics of purposeful amnesia and delaying
tactics. Turkey has swept the issue under the rug, buried it and
pretended it didn't exist, all in the hopes that everyone's memory
would be short and the whole thing would be forgotten. This is what
they've been doing for about a hundred years.
Every year after April 24th, the commentary in most of the daily
newspapers is something along the lines of "Whew, great, we got
through another year of this." With 2015 approaching, the tactic is
the same. They know the subject is going to be brought up, especially
abroad, and everything is geared towards getting through 2015 with
the least amount of damage. That's why there's so much anger towards
France's law. Turkey is angry at being reminded. Such memory is a
ghost that has haunted them for decades.
I've been dealing with the Armenian Genocide topic for many years now,
but when it comes up with other Turkish intellectuals, I've always
sensed a certain lack of interest, as if to say, "Where'd you come up
with this problem, anyway? Don't we have enough issues to deal with?"
For them the subject has always seemed a bit unreal, inauthentic,
and imposed from the outside.
My international colleagues speak of my "courage" to pursue this
subject in the face of "threats and dangers" from Turkey. However,
that has never really been my problem. My biggest challenge was
loneliness. I have had a hard time trying to explain the significance
of 1915 even to my closest friends in Turkey. In 1997, I wrote an
essay titled, "Walking around like a leper in my own country." That's
how I felt-like a leper, a pariah. It wasn't a matter of "fear" and
"courage." What bothered me the most was their indifference, their
lack of interest, and the resulting alienation and loneliness I felt.
When I'd depart from Turkey, since my flight usually took off at
around 5 a.m., I would stay up all night talking with Hrant Dink.
Every one of those conversations revolved around our loneliness. We
felt that no one seemed really interested in understanding and
listening to us. The question that we most often struggled with was,
"How can we reach our friends and acquaintances so that they see
just how important this subject really is?" One of Hrant's biggest
challenges was isolation. In the end, his alienation by and from us,
Turkish intellectuals, was a contributing factor in his murder.
Hrant's death was a turning point. Turkish intellectuals took more
interest in the events of 1915. We began to understand that 1915
has even more to do with today than with the past. Gradually, the
connection between democracy-building and human rights, on the one
hand, and remembering and confronting history, on the other, became
clearer and more acceptable across a broader swath of Turkish society.
The civil-democratic activism that coalesced after Hrant's death played
an important role in this change. However, this emergent opposition
is still lacking in strength. I believe that we still need much more
external pressure. That is where the French law comes in.
Q. Do you think international pressure is positive or negative on
Turkey? Don't you fear it will lead Turkey to a more nationalist,
defensive approach?
A. I am reminded of an incident on Jan. 4 or 5, 2007. The prosecutor's
office at Sisli, in an effort to put pressure on Hrant's legal defense,
had targeted me for investigation because of an article in which I'd
used the word "genocide." After giving the prosecutor my statement, I
headed over to the Agos newspaper office. Hrant and I were chatting. As
in the past, he was criticizing France's initiatives.
"Stop, Hrant," I told him. "If France weren't taking this initiative,
no one here would be holding a microphone to your mouth. Don't forget,"
I added, "the only reason people know who you are is because France
keeps up this business with the law. If people outside the country
weren't doing this you'd have a lot of trouble finding anyone willing
to listen to you."
"You're right," he admitted. "The only time it's remembered is when
there is outside pressure."
This is something that the West needs to realize. It just isn't
possible to change Turkey's position regarding the subject of 1915
based solely on internal democratic opposition. Turkish democratic
and civil society activists don't possess that kind of strength. The
assassination of Hrant Dink is evidence of this weakness. Today,
there's a very genuine activist movement that goes by the name
"Friends of Hrant" that has gained significant public support in
Turkey, yet Hrant's real murderers still roam the country freely.
Those countries that condone and enable Turkey's politics of denial
for their own economic, political, and strategic advantage should
understand one thing: "Denial" is a structure. To understand why
Turkey continues to deny what happened in 1915, you should compare
it with the racist regime of South Africa. The institutions, system,
and mindset of apartheid were established upon racial differences, and
the denial of genocide is similar. By denying what happened in 1915,
Turkey reproduces the institutions, social relations, and mindset
that created 1915.
Genocide denial goes beyond the defense of a former regime whose
institutions and mindset were realized as genocide in the past. Denial
also fuels a politics of continuing aggression, both inside and
outside Turkey, against anyone who opposes the denialist mentality.
This is why Hrant Dink's actual murderers are still at large. This
is why attacks are organized against Armenians and their memorials
in Europe. This is why in America campaigns of hate and hostility
are organized against me and other intellectuals.
What should be clear to everyone is this: In Turkey, genocide denial
is an industry. It is also a state policy of primary importance. The
National Security Council, Turkey's highest constitutional authority,
established in 2001 a Coordinating Committee for the Fight Against
Baseless Claims of Genocide. All of the important ministries, including
the Armed Forces, are represented on this committee, which is chaired
by the vice prime minister. I repeat: Denying the genocide is one of
the most important national policies of the Turkish state.
You need to realize that you aren't just confronting a simple "denial,"
but you're up against a "denialist regime."
As long as Turkey continues this state policy of genocide denial
through its institutions, relations, and mentality, Ankara will be
sensitive to external pressure. In fact, this pressure should be
increased. What happened in Libya and Syria needs to happen in Turkey
also, with regard to genocide denial, even if the content and scope
of the pressure are different.
If the West is serious about democracy in the Middle East, it cannot
build democracy by supporting a denialist regime. Historical denial,
both as institution and mindset, is probably the greatest stumbling
block to peace and democracy in the Middle East. Why do Christians,
Kurds, and Arabs in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq feel intimidated by
Turkey? Why aren't they keen on Turkey's intervention for democracy
and human rights? Because they see, in today's denialist regime of
Turkey, the Unionists' mentality that committed crimes against them
in the past.
The South African regime didn't collapse from internal pressure alone.
The support of international public opinion was also very important.
As long as the West allows Turkey's denialist politics to continue,
genocide denial will go on.
We are faced with the huge issue of how to prevent mass murders
and genocides in today's global community. To that end, the space
for genocide denial in the international arena must be narrowed and
ultimately eliminated. Turkey's denial policy should be reconsidered
within this perspective of prevention of genocide in the global world.
Yes, it's always possible that external pressure may have negative
consequences. History provides examples of this. We must remember not
to go to extremes. If we take the position that external pressure
is always bad, we play into the hands of dictators who would like
nothing better than to perpetuate their crimes with impunity. The
apartheid regime of South Africa, Latin American dictatorships, and
the repressive Arab regimes have all taken this attitude. On the other
hand, if we say, "It doesn't matter what's going on internally, we're
going to impose change from the outside," the most disgraceful example
is the invasion of Iraq. So we need to stay away from either extreme.
Instead of asking, "Yes or no to external pressure?", we should be
asking, "What kind of external pressure?"
The refusal to exert pressure is another position to be avoided. For
example, the West (especially the U.S. and UK) have created their own
kind of "external pressure" model based on their own calculations. For
the sake of perceived economic, political, and military strategic
interests, they turn a blind eye to a denialist regime. Their refusal
enables Turkey to swagger, bully, and threaten other countries. This
must stop. Turkey will not give up its denial policy without external
pressure.
Actually, what I want is in Turkey's best interest. In the end,
what outcome could be better than the creation of a society that
respects democracy and human rights and that confronts its history
without shame? I have a hard time understanding what could possibly
be negative about creating external pressure towards this end.
Opponents will counter that external pressure is not motivated by a
desire to bring democracy to Turkey. They will say that the West exerts
pressure in order to limit Turkey's power. Is there a grain of truth in
this outlook? Of course there is, but the remedy is simple: Don't let
others limit you. If you don't want them to use your faults against
you, then correct those faults so they can't. Do your homework. No
country has ever been hurt by democracy or respect for human rights.
I'm pushing 60 years of age, and by now, I'm sick and tired of these
"external pressure" arguments. In the 1980's, Turkey's military
regime was supported for the same reason and thousands of people were
killed, tortured, or thrown in jail. Turkish generals were like the
West's spoiled brats, killing as they pleased. They hated any kind of
pressure, didn't want anyone "meddling in their internal affairs." The
same game is being played over the "denial of history."
Moreover, the really important question isn't even "What kind
of external pressure?" We must ask how this external pressure
will establish a healthy and positive relationship with the
internal democratization process. The biggest problem right now is
incompatibility and lack of harmony. Positive communication channels
must be created between Turkey's domestic, democratic opposition and
the world beyond its borders. Real dialogue has yet to be established
between internal and external activist groups that must unite in
order to change the denialist regime. Looking at France, I can say
that what we have here is a dialogue of the deaf.
I can't say whether France's indifference to Turkey's democratic
opposition has anything to do with it, but the nationalist leanings of
Turkish intellectuals definitely play a role in this futile dialogue
between parties who cannot hear each other. A very significant majority
of Turkish intellectuals still views any foreign initiative with a
great deal of suspicion and doubt. This attitude feels so natural to
them that unfortunately they have no idea that it springs from a deep
well of nationalist tendencies.
Turkish national identity has from the beginning been defined in
opposition to the "terrible West that wants to meddle with our internal
affairs from outside." Undoubtedly, when one looks at the history of
Ottoman Turks, one can hardly claim that the West played a positive
role. However, the damage done by the West was not limited to meddling
with the Ottomans for colonialist self-interest. On the contrary,
the West committed a great error in not having interfered enough. A
whole series of Western interventions against the Ottomans throughout
the 19th century were critically important in the formulation of what
we now call international law. In other words, we need to re-examine
the idea that "all external pressure is wrong."
During Turkey's bid for European Union membership, Turkish
intellectuals and the society, in general, softened their stance
against "foreign interference." Turkish society understood that
outside pressure, especially by the European Greens or some of the
other left wing parties, was not motivated solely by malice. In fact,
it was accepted as a positive influence. The same kind of acceptance
must be generated towards the concept of genocide recognition.
In today's globally connected world, the whole idea of "external" and
"internal" is very problematic. We must create a global awareness of
genocides and their prevention without making these distinctions of
"external" and "internal." Genocide denial and the struggle against
it are part of global democracy and human rights. You can't speak of
it as "external." Recognition is an issue relevant to all of humanity.
Q. Since you published a Shameful Act, it opened a door in Turkey,
there's been an evolution on the 1915 issue in Turkey. How do you
see the debate in Turkey? What's your opinion about the different
initiatives that have appeared recently [April 24 commemorations,
the ozur diliyoruz campaign, the conference in Diyarbakir]? Do you
hope for eventual recognition of the genocide from Turkey?
A. Turkey's domestic opposition should be taken more seriously. A group
of individuals are in the thick of an honorable struggle that truly
deserves more respect. Although Hrant Dink's death was a turning point
of sorts, they still don't receive enough international support or
interest. No one's asking them, "How are you doing? What do you need?"
Even if the draft bill in France came to be as the product of differing
interests, even if it is disregarded, I wish those working for the
law in France would ask Turkish grassroots activists what they think
of such an initiative. I would like to see this as a starting point
for dialogue. This channel of communication hasn't been opened and
should be built as soon as possible.
A major reason the "bridge" hasn't been built is the complete lack
of interest outside of Turkey, particularly by the Armenian Diaspora,
in Turkey's growing democratization. Indeed, despite the pro-democracy
movement's positive aspects and successes, the struggle within Turkey
will get nowhere on its own. The "denial coalition and industry"
can't be changed by domestic pressure alone, but it can be defeated
if-and only if-the internal opposition joins forces with a harmonious
and balanced external pressure.
Dialogue between Turkey's civil activists and the worldwide struggle
for "genocide recognition" is urgently needed. One reason it has yet to
be initiated is the decades-old mutual prejudices about ethno-religious
and other social attributes. Also, Turkey's civil activists have yet
to appreciate the significance of genocide recognition within their
own democracy struggles. While Turkish activists perceive international
demands for genocide recognition as distractions or obstacles to their
own agenda, a large portion of the diaspora fails to appreciate the
strong bond between genocide recognition and democracy-building in
Turkey. If anything, they tend to belittle and underestimate this
process.
However, I don't want to lay too much blame on either side. In truth,
the issue goes beyond mutual perceptions of malice or benevolence. An
even deeper problem is actually that the sides are struggling for
disparate goals.
Genocide recognition, in essence, is about justice, not freedom of
expression or thought. A democratic or free society, such as France
or the U.S., may still have unresolved historical injustices, for
example towards Algeria or Native Americans. Turkish civil society
still believes that its own problems are due to limitations on the
freedom of thought. Other goals, such as justice and confronting
history, are dismissed as unaffordable luxuries or deferred to some
imaginary future. Hence the negative reaction to demands for simple
truth and justice.
This is the dilemma that must be surmounted. Justice and confronting
history can be achieved only with the establishment of a free and
democratic society. The campaign for "truth and justice" and the
movement for "freedom and democracy" are not mutually exclusive, nor
should they result in confrontation. Quite the contrary, they are, and
ought to be, inseparable goals. The demands of the diaspora and Turkish
society must be brought together. The duty to build bridges between
foreign and domestic civil activism is the most urgent thing right now.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
by Taner Akcam
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2012/01/25/akcam-genocide-recognition-is-about-justice-not-freedom-of-thought/
January 25, 2012
The following interview with Prof. Taner Akcam, the Robert Aram,
Marianne Kaloosdian and Stephen and Marion Mugar Chair in Armenian
Genocide Studies at Clark University, appeared in Le Monde on Jan. 7.
The interview was conducted by Guillaume Perrier. Below is the
interview in English.
Taner Akcam Q. What is your opinion, not about the genocide denial
law itself, but about the effects it can have on the debate among
intellectuals and civil society in Turkey?
A. As the saying goes, there's no such thing as bad publicity.
Although, in the short run, the French law has been very negatively
received in Turkey, I believe that in the long run, the effect will
be positive. Within its own borders, Turkey can try and continue to
suppress, and muzzle, and deny the truth, but internationally there
will be continual reminders (such as the French law) of an issue that
Turkey must confront and ultimately resolve.
Even if one opposes this legal initiative, it shows that Turkey cannot
escape by sticking its head in the sand. For this reason, the French
initiative cannot be considered as a simple "law" in the technical
sense of the term for France. For better or worse, it has become part
of the international campaign to recognize the Armenian Genocide.
Turkey's hysteria, and anger, and temper tantrums will pass and
some of the negative developments that have occurred will be quickly
forgotten. What will remain is the heavy reality of a very serious
unresolved problem. Such an outcome will, I expect, support the
position of those intellectuals who assert that confronting and
remembering history is strongly connected to the creation of a
democratic society.
Regardless of France's ultimate aims or intentions, Turkish society and
its educated classes are once again reminded that we need to resolve
this very fundamental issue. Some may object that "this should have
happened some other way," but if you don't solve your problems on
your own, often enough someone else will force a solution on you.
That's the way it's always been in this world.
Everyone has to realize this basic fact: On the subject of 1915,
Turkey has followed a politics of purposeful amnesia and delaying
tactics. Turkey has swept the issue under the rug, buried it and
pretended it didn't exist, all in the hopes that everyone's memory
would be short and the whole thing would be forgotten. This is what
they've been doing for about a hundred years.
Every year after April 24th, the commentary in most of the daily
newspapers is something along the lines of "Whew, great, we got
through another year of this." With 2015 approaching, the tactic is
the same. They know the subject is going to be brought up, especially
abroad, and everything is geared towards getting through 2015 with
the least amount of damage. That's why there's so much anger towards
France's law. Turkey is angry at being reminded. Such memory is a
ghost that has haunted them for decades.
I've been dealing with the Armenian Genocide topic for many years now,
but when it comes up with other Turkish intellectuals, I've always
sensed a certain lack of interest, as if to say, "Where'd you come up
with this problem, anyway? Don't we have enough issues to deal with?"
For them the subject has always seemed a bit unreal, inauthentic,
and imposed from the outside.
My international colleagues speak of my "courage" to pursue this
subject in the face of "threats and dangers" from Turkey. However,
that has never really been my problem. My biggest challenge was
loneliness. I have had a hard time trying to explain the significance
of 1915 even to my closest friends in Turkey. In 1997, I wrote an
essay titled, "Walking around like a leper in my own country." That's
how I felt-like a leper, a pariah. It wasn't a matter of "fear" and
"courage." What bothered me the most was their indifference, their
lack of interest, and the resulting alienation and loneliness I felt.
When I'd depart from Turkey, since my flight usually took off at
around 5 a.m., I would stay up all night talking with Hrant Dink.
Every one of those conversations revolved around our loneliness. We
felt that no one seemed really interested in understanding and
listening to us. The question that we most often struggled with was,
"How can we reach our friends and acquaintances so that they see
just how important this subject really is?" One of Hrant's biggest
challenges was isolation. In the end, his alienation by and from us,
Turkish intellectuals, was a contributing factor in his murder.
Hrant's death was a turning point. Turkish intellectuals took more
interest in the events of 1915. We began to understand that 1915
has even more to do with today than with the past. Gradually, the
connection between democracy-building and human rights, on the one
hand, and remembering and confronting history, on the other, became
clearer and more acceptable across a broader swath of Turkish society.
The civil-democratic activism that coalesced after Hrant's death played
an important role in this change. However, this emergent opposition
is still lacking in strength. I believe that we still need much more
external pressure. That is where the French law comes in.
Q. Do you think international pressure is positive or negative on
Turkey? Don't you fear it will lead Turkey to a more nationalist,
defensive approach?
A. I am reminded of an incident on Jan. 4 or 5, 2007. The prosecutor's
office at Sisli, in an effort to put pressure on Hrant's legal defense,
had targeted me for investigation because of an article in which I'd
used the word "genocide." After giving the prosecutor my statement, I
headed over to the Agos newspaper office. Hrant and I were chatting. As
in the past, he was criticizing France's initiatives.
"Stop, Hrant," I told him. "If France weren't taking this initiative,
no one here would be holding a microphone to your mouth. Don't forget,"
I added, "the only reason people know who you are is because France
keeps up this business with the law. If people outside the country
weren't doing this you'd have a lot of trouble finding anyone willing
to listen to you."
"You're right," he admitted. "The only time it's remembered is when
there is outside pressure."
This is something that the West needs to realize. It just isn't
possible to change Turkey's position regarding the subject of 1915
based solely on internal democratic opposition. Turkish democratic
and civil society activists don't possess that kind of strength. The
assassination of Hrant Dink is evidence of this weakness. Today,
there's a very genuine activist movement that goes by the name
"Friends of Hrant" that has gained significant public support in
Turkey, yet Hrant's real murderers still roam the country freely.
Those countries that condone and enable Turkey's politics of denial
for their own economic, political, and strategic advantage should
understand one thing: "Denial" is a structure. To understand why
Turkey continues to deny what happened in 1915, you should compare
it with the racist regime of South Africa. The institutions, system,
and mindset of apartheid were established upon racial differences, and
the denial of genocide is similar. By denying what happened in 1915,
Turkey reproduces the institutions, social relations, and mindset
that created 1915.
Genocide denial goes beyond the defense of a former regime whose
institutions and mindset were realized as genocide in the past. Denial
also fuels a politics of continuing aggression, both inside and
outside Turkey, against anyone who opposes the denialist mentality.
This is why Hrant Dink's actual murderers are still at large. This
is why attacks are organized against Armenians and their memorials
in Europe. This is why in America campaigns of hate and hostility
are organized against me and other intellectuals.
What should be clear to everyone is this: In Turkey, genocide denial
is an industry. It is also a state policy of primary importance. The
National Security Council, Turkey's highest constitutional authority,
established in 2001 a Coordinating Committee for the Fight Against
Baseless Claims of Genocide. All of the important ministries, including
the Armed Forces, are represented on this committee, which is chaired
by the vice prime minister. I repeat: Denying the genocide is one of
the most important national policies of the Turkish state.
You need to realize that you aren't just confronting a simple "denial,"
but you're up against a "denialist regime."
As long as Turkey continues this state policy of genocide denial
through its institutions, relations, and mentality, Ankara will be
sensitive to external pressure. In fact, this pressure should be
increased. What happened in Libya and Syria needs to happen in Turkey
also, with regard to genocide denial, even if the content and scope
of the pressure are different.
If the West is serious about democracy in the Middle East, it cannot
build democracy by supporting a denialist regime. Historical denial,
both as institution and mindset, is probably the greatest stumbling
block to peace and democracy in the Middle East. Why do Christians,
Kurds, and Arabs in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq feel intimidated by
Turkey? Why aren't they keen on Turkey's intervention for democracy
and human rights? Because they see, in today's denialist regime of
Turkey, the Unionists' mentality that committed crimes against them
in the past.
The South African regime didn't collapse from internal pressure alone.
The support of international public opinion was also very important.
As long as the West allows Turkey's denialist politics to continue,
genocide denial will go on.
We are faced with the huge issue of how to prevent mass murders
and genocides in today's global community. To that end, the space
for genocide denial in the international arena must be narrowed and
ultimately eliminated. Turkey's denial policy should be reconsidered
within this perspective of prevention of genocide in the global world.
Yes, it's always possible that external pressure may have negative
consequences. History provides examples of this. We must remember not
to go to extremes. If we take the position that external pressure
is always bad, we play into the hands of dictators who would like
nothing better than to perpetuate their crimes with impunity. The
apartheid regime of South Africa, Latin American dictatorships, and
the repressive Arab regimes have all taken this attitude. On the other
hand, if we say, "It doesn't matter what's going on internally, we're
going to impose change from the outside," the most disgraceful example
is the invasion of Iraq. So we need to stay away from either extreme.
Instead of asking, "Yes or no to external pressure?", we should be
asking, "What kind of external pressure?"
The refusal to exert pressure is another position to be avoided. For
example, the West (especially the U.S. and UK) have created their own
kind of "external pressure" model based on their own calculations. For
the sake of perceived economic, political, and military strategic
interests, they turn a blind eye to a denialist regime. Their refusal
enables Turkey to swagger, bully, and threaten other countries. This
must stop. Turkey will not give up its denial policy without external
pressure.
Actually, what I want is in Turkey's best interest. In the end,
what outcome could be better than the creation of a society that
respects democracy and human rights and that confronts its history
without shame? I have a hard time understanding what could possibly
be negative about creating external pressure towards this end.
Opponents will counter that external pressure is not motivated by a
desire to bring democracy to Turkey. They will say that the West exerts
pressure in order to limit Turkey's power. Is there a grain of truth in
this outlook? Of course there is, but the remedy is simple: Don't let
others limit you. If you don't want them to use your faults against
you, then correct those faults so they can't. Do your homework. No
country has ever been hurt by democracy or respect for human rights.
I'm pushing 60 years of age, and by now, I'm sick and tired of these
"external pressure" arguments. In the 1980's, Turkey's military
regime was supported for the same reason and thousands of people were
killed, tortured, or thrown in jail. Turkish generals were like the
West's spoiled brats, killing as they pleased. They hated any kind of
pressure, didn't want anyone "meddling in their internal affairs." The
same game is being played over the "denial of history."
Moreover, the really important question isn't even "What kind
of external pressure?" We must ask how this external pressure
will establish a healthy and positive relationship with the
internal democratization process. The biggest problem right now is
incompatibility and lack of harmony. Positive communication channels
must be created between Turkey's domestic, democratic opposition and
the world beyond its borders. Real dialogue has yet to be established
between internal and external activist groups that must unite in
order to change the denialist regime. Looking at France, I can say
that what we have here is a dialogue of the deaf.
I can't say whether France's indifference to Turkey's democratic
opposition has anything to do with it, but the nationalist leanings of
Turkish intellectuals definitely play a role in this futile dialogue
between parties who cannot hear each other. A very significant majority
of Turkish intellectuals still views any foreign initiative with a
great deal of suspicion and doubt. This attitude feels so natural to
them that unfortunately they have no idea that it springs from a deep
well of nationalist tendencies.
Turkish national identity has from the beginning been defined in
opposition to the "terrible West that wants to meddle with our internal
affairs from outside." Undoubtedly, when one looks at the history of
Ottoman Turks, one can hardly claim that the West played a positive
role. However, the damage done by the West was not limited to meddling
with the Ottomans for colonialist self-interest. On the contrary,
the West committed a great error in not having interfered enough. A
whole series of Western interventions against the Ottomans throughout
the 19th century were critically important in the formulation of what
we now call international law. In other words, we need to re-examine
the idea that "all external pressure is wrong."
During Turkey's bid for European Union membership, Turkish
intellectuals and the society, in general, softened their stance
against "foreign interference." Turkish society understood that
outside pressure, especially by the European Greens or some of the
other left wing parties, was not motivated solely by malice. In fact,
it was accepted as a positive influence. The same kind of acceptance
must be generated towards the concept of genocide recognition.
In today's globally connected world, the whole idea of "external" and
"internal" is very problematic. We must create a global awareness of
genocides and their prevention without making these distinctions of
"external" and "internal." Genocide denial and the struggle against
it are part of global democracy and human rights. You can't speak of
it as "external." Recognition is an issue relevant to all of humanity.
Q. Since you published a Shameful Act, it opened a door in Turkey,
there's been an evolution on the 1915 issue in Turkey. How do you
see the debate in Turkey? What's your opinion about the different
initiatives that have appeared recently [April 24 commemorations,
the ozur diliyoruz campaign, the conference in Diyarbakir]? Do you
hope for eventual recognition of the genocide from Turkey?
A. Turkey's domestic opposition should be taken more seriously. A group
of individuals are in the thick of an honorable struggle that truly
deserves more respect. Although Hrant Dink's death was a turning point
of sorts, they still don't receive enough international support or
interest. No one's asking them, "How are you doing? What do you need?"
Even if the draft bill in France came to be as the product of differing
interests, even if it is disregarded, I wish those working for the
law in France would ask Turkish grassroots activists what they think
of such an initiative. I would like to see this as a starting point
for dialogue. This channel of communication hasn't been opened and
should be built as soon as possible.
A major reason the "bridge" hasn't been built is the complete lack
of interest outside of Turkey, particularly by the Armenian Diaspora,
in Turkey's growing democratization. Indeed, despite the pro-democracy
movement's positive aspects and successes, the struggle within Turkey
will get nowhere on its own. The "denial coalition and industry"
can't be changed by domestic pressure alone, but it can be defeated
if-and only if-the internal opposition joins forces with a harmonious
and balanced external pressure.
Dialogue between Turkey's civil activists and the worldwide struggle
for "genocide recognition" is urgently needed. One reason it has yet to
be initiated is the decades-old mutual prejudices about ethno-religious
and other social attributes. Also, Turkey's civil activists have yet
to appreciate the significance of genocide recognition within their
own democracy struggles. While Turkish activists perceive international
demands for genocide recognition as distractions or obstacles to their
own agenda, a large portion of the diaspora fails to appreciate the
strong bond between genocide recognition and democracy-building in
Turkey. If anything, they tend to belittle and underestimate this
process.
However, I don't want to lay too much blame on either side. In truth,
the issue goes beyond mutual perceptions of malice or benevolence. An
even deeper problem is actually that the sides are struggling for
disparate goals.
Genocide recognition, in essence, is about justice, not freedom of
expression or thought. A democratic or free society, such as France
or the U.S., may still have unresolved historical injustices, for
example towards Algeria or Native Americans. Turkish civil society
still believes that its own problems are due to limitations on the
freedom of thought. Other goals, such as justice and confronting
history, are dismissed as unaffordable luxuries or deferred to some
imaginary future. Hence the negative reaction to demands for simple
truth and justice.
This is the dilemma that must be surmounted. Justice and confronting
history can be achieved only with the establishment of a free and
democratic society. The campaign for "truth and justice" and the
movement for "freedom and democracy" are not mutually exclusive, nor
should they result in confrontation. Quite the contrary, they are, and
ought to be, inseparable goals. The demands of the diaspora and Turkish
society must be brought together. The duty to build bridges between
foreign and domestic civil activism is the most urgent thing right now.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress