Tweet
'WAR IN IRAN WILL SLOW KARABAKH NEGOTIATION PROCESS'
News.Az
Fri 27 January 2012 08:00 GMT | 8:00 Local Time
News.Az interviews Maxim Minayev, leading expert of the Russian
Political Center.
What do you think about the meeting of the Azerbaijani and Armenian
presidents with the mediation of president Medvedev, which some
skeptics considered formal for the outgoing Russian president?
I think that we are talking about double content of the event. On the
one hand, to expect that the meeting would end with some progress
in the current situation would be at leave naive. Medvedev's
administration during his tenure proved that it is not so capable
of settling serious interstate conflicts in the territory of the
post-Soviet space. The only episode it proved to be relatively
effective is the episode associated with the conflict on the South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, but it generally is not an element of diplomacy
or foreign policy but an element of direct military confrontation.
Of course, now that almost one month remains before the presidential
elections in Russia, is should not be expected that Medvedev will
make a surprise and resolve the conflict. Nevertheless, the second
component of this meeting is that during the reign of Medvedev, Moscow
supported the negotiation process and the direct line of communication
with the Armenian and Azerbaijani leadership. In this context, the
current meeting is valuable because during it, Moscow could once
again carry out the coordination of positions in controversial issues.
Regardless of the efficiency of such agreement, the fact is there
and Moscow has the idea of what position Baku and Yerevan hold in the
current issue. And naturally, the meeting will be a useful tool for
the foreign policy team of Putin, when it will address the issue of
Karabakh in the summer or autumn.
Do you assume that Putin, if wins the elections, will maintain the
rate of the mediation which Medvedev did?
The Ossetian conflict showed that the territorial problem not only
in the Caucasus but also around the perimeter of Russian borders
is a very dangerous component of bilateral relations. This is a
problematic point which can explode at any moment and lead to an open
military confrontation. Seemingly, Moscow in 2008 understood that
it's not good the delay the resolution of such problems. Naturally,
it's easier to solve problem through political methods rather than
by tanks and aircraft.
So I think that this problem will be close to Putin and he will
seek to actively engage in it. It's necessary to consider here
another point. Putin's foreign policy doctrine, which is now being
actively formulated and is under development, is largely focused on
post-Soviet space. This space will within â~@~Kâ~@~Kspecial attention
of the Kremlin. And no matter how will be the new position of the
Kremlin's administration, it will be anyway carefully concentrated
in all issues associated with this region.
And here we must take into account the personal profile of the
future administration and foreign policy team. There will be a place
for specialists in post-Soviet region and they will take a prominent
position. It will not be diplomats, but the people who occupy positions
in the top echelons of the political leadership. And they will act
not less diplomatically than in the foreign policy line, which is
more effective because the experience showed that the traditional
diplomacy in the post-Soviet space doesn't work and the complex of
political and economical tools in necessary here. In the context,
the entire network of territorial problems (Karabakh, Transdniestria,
South Ossetia and Abkhazia) will be actively dealt with. We will judge
its efficiency based on the activity of the foreign policy team of
Putin. But to my mind, given promising personal steps of Putin and his
entourage in terms of the appointment of new players and consolidation
of the current positions, these actions set up in a positive way.
How would the possible war of the West against Iran affect the
situation in the South Caucasus?
I think this problem is much more relevant for Azerbaijan because
in this case, the country will encounter more flow of refugees from
the northwestern regions of Iran where many Azerbaijanis dwell. These
people most likely will try to cross the border and settle mainly in
Azerbaijan. But it's not the possible problem of one country.
This will affect the whole situation because first of all, it will
change the political situation in the Caspian as Iran in such a way
will fall out of the inter-state Caspian debates and thus, a problem
will occur on the delineation of spheres of influence in the Caspian
Sea. Second - the US will have an additional opportunity to build a
military base in Azerbaijan. Since, there is a possibility that it
will use military facilities in the country for military operations
and intelligence activities. We cannot say the Azerbaijan will become
a springboard for the US presence.
Since, Azerbaijan officially stated that it is not going to help any
anti-Iranian operation.
Yes, and this option is more than likely considering the Uzbek
scenario where there are one or two NATO facilities and the intensity
of consultations between Baku and the North Atlantic Alliance.
And finally, the fact that the war will unleash on the vicinity of the
borders of the post-Soviet space will seriously delay the Karabakh
negotiation process and maybe the sides will just have to freeze
discussions on this issue. The Iran's agenda will first lead to the
fact that Moscow, instead of concentrating in the post-Soviet space
(as it plans to do so), it will have to direct its whole attention
to the situation in the Middle East because it cannot escape the
Iranian problem.
This topic is just going to take much of the agenda and time of those
who will formally oversee the direction of the South Caucasus. And all
the rest, including Yerevan and Baku will have to adjust their position
in accordance with the events around Iran, especially Azerbaijan
which will generally be at the forefront. Since, I assume that in the
event of the military conflict in the region, it will not be limited
to missile attacks. It will most likely be followed by ground attacks
with all its consequences. Of course, the US can break the resistance
of Iran, but what will follow it - we saw in the example of Iraq. That
is, civil war and partisan resistance to military interventionists.
Another thing is that despite the escalation of the situation, for now,
the possibility of such conflict is not high because of the elections
in the US. And even after the elections, the military conflict will
not be favorable for any sides - neither the opposition nor Obama,
because he doesn't want serious problems in the Middle East during
his electioneering.
News.Az
Fri 27 January 2012 08:00 GMT | 8:00 Local Time
News.Az interviews Maxim Minayev, leading expert of the Russian
Political Center.
What do you think about the meeting of the Azerbaijani and Armenian
presidents with the mediation of president Medvedev, which some
skeptics considered formal for the outgoing Russian president?
I think that we are talking about double content of the event. On the
one hand, to expect that the meeting would end with some progress
in the current situation would be at leave naive. Medvedev's
administration during his tenure proved that it is not so capable
of settling serious interstate conflicts in the territory of the
post-Soviet space. The only episode it proved to be relatively
effective is the episode associated with the conflict on the South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, but it generally is not an element of diplomacy
or foreign policy but an element of direct military confrontation.
Of course, now that almost one month remains before the presidential
elections in Russia, is should not be expected that Medvedev will
make a surprise and resolve the conflict. Nevertheless, the second
component of this meeting is that during the reign of Medvedev, Moscow
supported the negotiation process and the direct line of communication
with the Armenian and Azerbaijani leadership. In this context, the
current meeting is valuable because during it, Moscow could once
again carry out the coordination of positions in controversial issues.
Regardless of the efficiency of such agreement, the fact is there
and Moscow has the idea of what position Baku and Yerevan hold in the
current issue. And naturally, the meeting will be a useful tool for
the foreign policy team of Putin, when it will address the issue of
Karabakh in the summer or autumn.
Do you assume that Putin, if wins the elections, will maintain the
rate of the mediation which Medvedev did?
The Ossetian conflict showed that the territorial problem not only
in the Caucasus but also around the perimeter of Russian borders
is a very dangerous component of bilateral relations. This is a
problematic point which can explode at any moment and lead to an open
military confrontation. Seemingly, Moscow in 2008 understood that
it's not good the delay the resolution of such problems. Naturally,
it's easier to solve problem through political methods rather than
by tanks and aircraft.
So I think that this problem will be close to Putin and he will
seek to actively engage in it. It's necessary to consider here
another point. Putin's foreign policy doctrine, which is now being
actively formulated and is under development, is largely focused on
post-Soviet space. This space will within â~@~Kâ~@~Kspecial attention
of the Kremlin. And no matter how will be the new position of the
Kremlin's administration, it will be anyway carefully concentrated
in all issues associated with this region.
And here we must take into account the personal profile of the
future administration and foreign policy team. There will be a place
for specialists in post-Soviet region and they will take a prominent
position. It will not be diplomats, but the people who occupy positions
in the top echelons of the political leadership. And they will act
not less diplomatically than in the foreign policy line, which is
more effective because the experience showed that the traditional
diplomacy in the post-Soviet space doesn't work and the complex of
political and economical tools in necessary here. In the context,
the entire network of territorial problems (Karabakh, Transdniestria,
South Ossetia and Abkhazia) will be actively dealt with. We will judge
its efficiency based on the activity of the foreign policy team of
Putin. But to my mind, given promising personal steps of Putin and his
entourage in terms of the appointment of new players and consolidation
of the current positions, these actions set up in a positive way.
How would the possible war of the West against Iran affect the
situation in the South Caucasus?
I think this problem is much more relevant for Azerbaijan because
in this case, the country will encounter more flow of refugees from
the northwestern regions of Iran where many Azerbaijanis dwell. These
people most likely will try to cross the border and settle mainly in
Azerbaijan. But it's not the possible problem of one country.
This will affect the whole situation because first of all, it will
change the political situation in the Caspian as Iran in such a way
will fall out of the inter-state Caspian debates and thus, a problem
will occur on the delineation of spheres of influence in the Caspian
Sea. Second - the US will have an additional opportunity to build a
military base in Azerbaijan. Since, there is a possibility that it
will use military facilities in the country for military operations
and intelligence activities. We cannot say the Azerbaijan will become
a springboard for the US presence.
Since, Azerbaijan officially stated that it is not going to help any
anti-Iranian operation.
Yes, and this option is more than likely considering the Uzbek
scenario where there are one or two NATO facilities and the intensity
of consultations between Baku and the North Atlantic Alliance.
And finally, the fact that the war will unleash on the vicinity of the
borders of the post-Soviet space will seriously delay the Karabakh
negotiation process and maybe the sides will just have to freeze
discussions on this issue. The Iran's agenda will first lead to the
fact that Moscow, instead of concentrating in the post-Soviet space
(as it plans to do so), it will have to direct its whole attention
to the situation in the Middle East because it cannot escape the
Iranian problem.
This topic is just going to take much of the agenda and time of those
who will formally oversee the direction of the South Caucasus. And all
the rest, including Yerevan and Baku will have to adjust their position
in accordance with the events around Iran, especially Azerbaijan
which will generally be at the forefront. Since, I assume that in the
event of the military conflict in the region, it will not be limited
to missile attacks. It will most likely be followed by ground attacks
with all its consequences. Of course, the US can break the resistance
of Iran, but what will follow it - we saw in the example of Iraq. That
is, civil war and partisan resistance to military interventionists.
Another thing is that despite the escalation of the situation, for now,
the possibility of such conflict is not high because of the elections
in the US. And even after the elections, the military conflict will
not be favorable for any sides - neither the opposition nor Obama,
because he doesn't want serious problems in the Middle East during
his electioneering.