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RUSSIA'S HOPE FOR WAR
Igor Muradyan
Story from Lragir.am News:
http://www.lragir.am/engsrc/comments26744.html
Published: 15:55:39 - 03/07/2012
The foreign policies of Russia and Turkey are increasingly similar,
both in goals and approaches because both states are getting closer
to one status in international relations, transforming to regional
great powers. Russia certainly continues to claim its advantage
over Turkey, and one of the important reasons is that current
Turkish-Russian relations are not becoming closer is that Russia
does not recognize Turkey as a great power equal to itself. In fact,
Russia has considerable advantage in the military and economic
spheres, as well as its position among the leading countries of the
world. However, Turkey has levers and positions in Russia, namely in
a number of regions which Russia does not have in Turkey.
At the same time, disagreement between Turkey and Russia over regional
issues grows not only in the Black Sea, Caucasus, Central Asia but
also the Near East, and partly in the Balkans.
Notably, the policies of Russia and Turkey relating to the framework of
the Armenian-Azerbaijani issue are mirror images not only in general
terms but also by separate events and steps. Turkey is involved in
Near East developments on its own initiative, as well as external
initiatives and cannot pay proper attention to the Caucasus.
Moreover, there it will encounter resistance of not only Russia
but also the United States. Analogically, Russia is not trying to
accelerate its expansion towards the Caucasus.
Nevertheless, Azerbaijan is increasingly serving as Turkey's important
foreign policy reserve. Azerbaijan is increasingly suitable as a
reserve rather than a partner whose urgent issues were resolved in
an absolutely unbeneficial situation.
Knowing that even if they have to limit or wind up ambitious plans in
the Near East, it will not be able to unfold its policy appropriately
and strengthen its foothold in the Black Sea and the Caucasus, Turkey
nevertheless tries to apply other approaches and style in the region.
Turkey is trying to maintain tension and even escalation in the
South Caucasus and bring about a situation which would require direct
intervention by NATO, including Turkey.
Now it is difficult to tell to what extent Turkey's goals are agreed
with the United States but most probably the Americans did not want
to have Turkey as a partner in such a region as the South Caucasus,
especially from the point of view of a war.
It is hard to assume that Russia is interested in resumption of
large-scale military actions between Armenia and Azerbaijan and NATO
intervention in regional developments. At the same time, tension in
the South Caucasus is favorable for Russia because it will "confirm
legitimacy" of its military presence. In other words, Russia and
Turkey demonstrate similar interests regarding this tactics.
Regarding war as such Turkey has assumed increase of it importance and
a more significant role as a state which can influence the beginning,
process and end of war, i.e. the role of a regional director. It
would be a mistake to disagree that Russia would be reluctant to
play a similar role and it is more than appropriate because the other
position would mean concessions to Turkey.
Something similar took place during the first war in Karabakh. Russia
tried to limit the offensives of the Karabakh forces and Turkey
threatened to start a war. At that time, Brent Scowcroft, special
adviser to the U.S. president on national security, confessed that the
Americans scared Turks by Russian rockets. Apparently, this time the
Americans will prefer the same tactics but will it function this time?
In any case, having armed Azerbaijan to the teeth, Russia will try
to demonstrate to Turkey and the West that it can manipulate the
Armenian troops, preventing military defeat of Azerbaijan. Russia
will thus try to prove able to control the situation and at the same
time again reach an agreement with Turkey.
Hence, one should expect a stab in the back" from Russia. It is
necessary to draw relevant conclusions and make use of advantages of
the future war, which Armenia already has now and which can be wasted
as a result of the position of Russia in the second stage of war.
Igor Muradyan
Story from Lragir.am News:
http://www.lragir.am/engsrc/comments26744.html
Published: 15:55:39 - 03/07/2012
The foreign policies of Russia and Turkey are increasingly similar,
both in goals and approaches because both states are getting closer
to one status in international relations, transforming to regional
great powers. Russia certainly continues to claim its advantage
over Turkey, and one of the important reasons is that current
Turkish-Russian relations are not becoming closer is that Russia
does not recognize Turkey as a great power equal to itself. In fact,
Russia has considerable advantage in the military and economic
spheres, as well as its position among the leading countries of the
world. However, Turkey has levers and positions in Russia, namely in
a number of regions which Russia does not have in Turkey.
At the same time, disagreement between Turkey and Russia over regional
issues grows not only in the Black Sea, Caucasus, Central Asia but
also the Near East, and partly in the Balkans.
Notably, the policies of Russia and Turkey relating to the framework of
the Armenian-Azerbaijani issue are mirror images not only in general
terms but also by separate events and steps. Turkey is involved in
Near East developments on its own initiative, as well as external
initiatives and cannot pay proper attention to the Caucasus.
Moreover, there it will encounter resistance of not only Russia
but also the United States. Analogically, Russia is not trying to
accelerate its expansion towards the Caucasus.
Nevertheless, Azerbaijan is increasingly serving as Turkey's important
foreign policy reserve. Azerbaijan is increasingly suitable as a
reserve rather than a partner whose urgent issues were resolved in
an absolutely unbeneficial situation.
Knowing that even if they have to limit or wind up ambitious plans in
the Near East, it will not be able to unfold its policy appropriately
and strengthen its foothold in the Black Sea and the Caucasus, Turkey
nevertheless tries to apply other approaches and style in the region.
Turkey is trying to maintain tension and even escalation in the
South Caucasus and bring about a situation which would require direct
intervention by NATO, including Turkey.
Now it is difficult to tell to what extent Turkey's goals are agreed
with the United States but most probably the Americans did not want
to have Turkey as a partner in such a region as the South Caucasus,
especially from the point of view of a war.
It is hard to assume that Russia is interested in resumption of
large-scale military actions between Armenia and Azerbaijan and NATO
intervention in regional developments. At the same time, tension in
the South Caucasus is favorable for Russia because it will "confirm
legitimacy" of its military presence. In other words, Russia and
Turkey demonstrate similar interests regarding this tactics.
Regarding war as such Turkey has assumed increase of it importance and
a more significant role as a state which can influence the beginning,
process and end of war, i.e. the role of a regional director. It
would be a mistake to disagree that Russia would be reluctant to
play a similar role and it is more than appropriate because the other
position would mean concessions to Turkey.
Something similar took place during the first war in Karabakh. Russia
tried to limit the offensives of the Karabakh forces and Turkey
threatened to start a war. At that time, Brent Scowcroft, special
adviser to the U.S. president on national security, confessed that the
Americans scared Turks by Russian rockets. Apparently, this time the
Americans will prefer the same tactics but will it function this time?
In any case, having armed Azerbaijan to the teeth, Russia will try
to demonstrate to Turkey and the West that it can manipulate the
Armenian troops, preventing military defeat of Azerbaijan. Russia
will thus try to prove able to control the situation and at the same
time again reach an agreement with Turkey.
Hence, one should expect a stab in the back" from Russia. It is
necessary to draw relevant conclusions and make use of advantages of
the future war, which Armenia already has now and which can be wasted
as a result of the position of Russia in the second stage of war.