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THE TURKISH-IRANIAN ALLIANCE THAT WASN'T
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137773/f-stephen-larrabee/the-turkish-iranian-alliance-that-wasnt?page=show
How the Two Countries Are Competing After the Arab Spring
F. Stephen Larrabee
July 11, 2012
In Reset, Stephen Kinzer argues that the United States should partner
with Iran and Turkey to promote democracy and combat extremism in
the Middle East. Although it is hard to imagine Iran as a friend of
Washington, Turkey is ready to play that role.
Turkish PM Erdogan (left) with Iranian President Ahmadinejad last
September. (Courtesy Reuters)
One of the most controversial elements of Turkish foreign policy
has been the attempt by the Justice and Development party (AKP) to
cultivate closer ties to Iran. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's
rapprochement with Tehran has raised concerns in Western capitals that
Ankara is drifting away from the West. Differences over Iran's nuclear
program have heightened these fears. In defiance of the United States
and other key NATO members, such as the United Kingdom and France,
Turkey has downplayed the danger posed by Iran's nuclear policy and
attempt to elude constraints imposed by the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty. The most acute example was in June 2010, when, bucking its
Western allies, Ankara voted against a new UN sanctions regime that
would target Iran's military.
Worries about Ankara's eastward drift, however, exaggerate the degree
of common interests between Turkey and Iran. Beneath an amicable
veneer, relations between the two countries are marked by mistrust
and unease. Turkey and Iran have been strategic rivals since the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the Persian Safavid dynasty
blunted the Ottoman Empire's eastward expansion. The Arab Spring has
given this historical rivalry new life. Since the summer of 2011,
conflicts between the two countries have become more visible on Syria,
missile defense, secularism, Palestine, Iraq, and the Kurdish issue. As
pressures for greater democracy in the Middle East have intensified,
Turkey and Iran have clashed more openly and each side has sought to
expand its influence at the expense of the other.
Syria marks the most serious source of discord. Ankara's vociferous
criticism of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, as well as its support
for the Syrian opposition, has angered Iranian leaders. Syria is
Iran's closest ally. Assad's downfall would deal a major blow to
Iran's regional ambitions and leave Tehran ever more isolated.
Consequently, in recent months, the ayatollahs in Iran have stepped
up military support for Assad and, at the same time, accused Erdogan
of openly interfering in Syrian internal affairs. Tensions increased
at the end of June, after Syria downed a Turkish fighter jet. In
response, Erdogan bluntly warned Damascus to keep troops away from
the Turkish-Syrian border and requested a special meeting with its
NATO allies to discuss a common approach.
Beyond Syria, Ankara's agreement last September to host a NATO
early-warning radar on Turkish soil has also infuriated the
ayatollahs. Iranian commentators have claimed that the missile
shield aims to protect Israel and target Iranian missiles. Last
October, General Massoud Jazayeri, the deputy head of the Iranian
armed forces, called on Turkey to "rethink its long-term strategic
interests and draw lessons from the bitter historical experiences of
other countries." Turkey, however, has shown no sign of backing down.
To add insult to Iranian injury, the same month as the announcement
about the NATO radar, Erdogan made a tour of northern Africa. In
Cairo, his remarks about the importance of secularism drew strong
criticism from the Iranian leadership. Clerics in Tehran, including
Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, a former chief of the judiciary
and a close adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, accused Turkey
of promoting a westernized version of Islam to advance its regional
ambitions. Shahroudi's criticism reflects Tehran's concern about
the popularity of the Turkish model, with its emphasis on democracy
and secularism. But it also speaks to fears in Iran that Turkey is
winning the political-ideological struggle for the allegiance of an
increasing number of Muslims across the Middle East.
But it is not only in Cairo that Erdogan has trampled on issues
that Tehran considers its own. In championing Palestinian rights,
Erdogan has, in effect, hijacked the Palestinian issue and stolen
Iran's thunder. His support and his strident criticism of the Israeli
offensive in Gaza increased his popularity on the Arab street. Today,
he is seen by many Arabs as the only Muslim leader willing to stand
up to Israel and forcefully defend Muslim interests. This has left
the Iranian leadership fuming on the sidelines, struggling to get
back in the game but with no viable plan for doing so.
Since the end of 2011, Iraq has also emerged as an important
battleground between Turkey and Iran. The withdrawal of U.S. combat
forces has left a power vacuum there that Iran has sought to exploit.
Turkey has an interest in a stable, economically prosperous, and
independent Iraq. It does not want to see the country turned into
an Iranian satellite or become a springboard for the expansion of
radical Islamist ideology.
However, over the last year, Erdogan's relationship with Iraqi Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government has deteriorated. Maliki is
widely viewed by Ankara as Tehran's man in Baghdad. He has close ties
to the Iranian leadership, built up during his years of exile in Iran
during Saddam Hussein's rule. Since the withdrawal of U.S. troops
from Iraq, he has steadily sought to consolidate his political power.
His attempt to strengthen ties with the radical militant group Asaib
Ahl al-Haq, which the U.S. military claims is financed and trained by
Iran's elite Quds Force, has alarmed Turkish officials who fear that
these ties could shift the balance of political power in Baghdad in
Iran's favor.
The tension between Maliki and Erdogan intensified last January,
after Maliki issued a warrant for the arrest of Iraqi Vice President
Tariq al-Hashimi, a Sunni who was charged with abetting terrorism.
Hashimi subsequently fled to northern Iraq, where he has been under
the protection of the Kurdish regional government, which has refused
Baghdad's request for his extradition. Turkish officials saw Maliki's
gambit as an effort to undercut the Sunnis and Kurds and increase
Shia political dominance. They fear that Maliki's attempt to curtail
Sunni and Kurdish influence could increase the risk of a return to
sectarian violence and lead to the breakup of Iraq, with the Kurds
in the north gaining full independence.
Moreover, as a result of the increased unrest in Syria, the
Kurdish issue is rapidly acquiring an important new dimension. It
is no longer a disparate issue in separate countries where Kurdish
communities reside. Contact between the Kurds in Iran, Iraq, Syria,
and Turkey is increasing in an attempt to develop a coordinated
approach. At the same time, the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers' Party,
which has been fighting Turkey for Kurdish independence since 1984)
has stepped up its attacks from its havens in the Qandil mountains
in northern Iraq. Turkish officials worry that Iran and Syria could
actively support the PKK, as they did in the l980s and early 1990s,
in order to try to weaken Ankara.
Economic problems between Turkey and Iran have risen as well. In the
last decade, trade and financial ties have expanded significantly,
especially in the energy field. Iran is the second-largest supplier of
natural gas to Turkey, behind Russia. It also provides 30 percent of
Turkey's crude oil imports. But on several occasions, Iran abruptly
cut off gas to Turkey for several weeks. Those stoppages, largely
due to Iran's antiquated distribution infrastructure, have caused
considerable economic hardship for Turkey's population and tarnished
Iran's reputation as a reliable partner. The closed nature of Iran's
economy has created significant difficulties as well.
Turkish exporters face high tariffs on consumer goods, frequent changes
in tariff rates, delays in import permits, overpriced fuel during
transport, and prolonged delays at customs gates. These obstacles
have caused many exporters to curtail business with Iran and seek
more hospitable markets for their goods.
Finally, the growing instability in the Middle East unleashed by the
Arab Spring has prompted Ankara to align its policy more closely
with Washington. In addition to the decision to deploy the NATO
early-warning radar, in April Erdogan, in tandem with U.S. sanctions,
agreed to reduce oil purchases from Tehran by 20 percent. These moves
do not, however, mark a fundamental shift in Turkish policy toward
Iran. As in the past, Ankara is likely to remain reluctant to join
an openly anti-Iranian coalition. However, any honeymoon between
Turkey and Iran is clearly over. In the coming decade, the struggle
for regional influence between the two powers is likely to grow and
increasingly reshape the politics of the Middle East.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137773/f-stephen-larrabee/the-turkish-iranian-alliance-that-wasnt?page=show
How the Two Countries Are Competing After the Arab Spring
F. Stephen Larrabee
July 11, 2012
In Reset, Stephen Kinzer argues that the United States should partner
with Iran and Turkey to promote democracy and combat extremism in
the Middle East. Although it is hard to imagine Iran as a friend of
Washington, Turkey is ready to play that role.
Turkish PM Erdogan (left) with Iranian President Ahmadinejad last
September. (Courtesy Reuters)
One of the most controversial elements of Turkish foreign policy
has been the attempt by the Justice and Development party (AKP) to
cultivate closer ties to Iran. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's
rapprochement with Tehran has raised concerns in Western capitals that
Ankara is drifting away from the West. Differences over Iran's nuclear
program have heightened these fears. In defiance of the United States
and other key NATO members, such as the United Kingdom and France,
Turkey has downplayed the danger posed by Iran's nuclear policy and
attempt to elude constraints imposed by the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty. The most acute example was in June 2010, when, bucking its
Western allies, Ankara voted against a new UN sanctions regime that
would target Iran's military.
Worries about Ankara's eastward drift, however, exaggerate the degree
of common interests between Turkey and Iran. Beneath an amicable
veneer, relations between the two countries are marked by mistrust
and unease. Turkey and Iran have been strategic rivals since the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the Persian Safavid dynasty
blunted the Ottoman Empire's eastward expansion. The Arab Spring has
given this historical rivalry new life. Since the summer of 2011,
conflicts between the two countries have become more visible on Syria,
missile defense, secularism, Palestine, Iraq, and the Kurdish issue. As
pressures for greater democracy in the Middle East have intensified,
Turkey and Iran have clashed more openly and each side has sought to
expand its influence at the expense of the other.
Syria marks the most serious source of discord. Ankara's vociferous
criticism of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, as well as its support
for the Syrian opposition, has angered Iranian leaders. Syria is
Iran's closest ally. Assad's downfall would deal a major blow to
Iran's regional ambitions and leave Tehran ever more isolated.
Consequently, in recent months, the ayatollahs in Iran have stepped
up military support for Assad and, at the same time, accused Erdogan
of openly interfering in Syrian internal affairs. Tensions increased
at the end of June, after Syria downed a Turkish fighter jet. In
response, Erdogan bluntly warned Damascus to keep troops away from
the Turkish-Syrian border and requested a special meeting with its
NATO allies to discuss a common approach.
Beyond Syria, Ankara's agreement last September to host a NATO
early-warning radar on Turkish soil has also infuriated the
ayatollahs. Iranian commentators have claimed that the missile
shield aims to protect Israel and target Iranian missiles. Last
October, General Massoud Jazayeri, the deputy head of the Iranian
armed forces, called on Turkey to "rethink its long-term strategic
interests and draw lessons from the bitter historical experiences of
other countries." Turkey, however, has shown no sign of backing down.
To add insult to Iranian injury, the same month as the announcement
about the NATO radar, Erdogan made a tour of northern Africa. In
Cairo, his remarks about the importance of secularism drew strong
criticism from the Iranian leadership. Clerics in Tehran, including
Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, a former chief of the judiciary
and a close adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, accused Turkey
of promoting a westernized version of Islam to advance its regional
ambitions. Shahroudi's criticism reflects Tehran's concern about
the popularity of the Turkish model, with its emphasis on democracy
and secularism. But it also speaks to fears in Iran that Turkey is
winning the political-ideological struggle for the allegiance of an
increasing number of Muslims across the Middle East.
But it is not only in Cairo that Erdogan has trampled on issues
that Tehran considers its own. In championing Palestinian rights,
Erdogan has, in effect, hijacked the Palestinian issue and stolen
Iran's thunder. His support and his strident criticism of the Israeli
offensive in Gaza increased his popularity on the Arab street. Today,
he is seen by many Arabs as the only Muslim leader willing to stand
up to Israel and forcefully defend Muslim interests. This has left
the Iranian leadership fuming on the sidelines, struggling to get
back in the game but with no viable plan for doing so.
Since the end of 2011, Iraq has also emerged as an important
battleground between Turkey and Iran. The withdrawal of U.S. combat
forces has left a power vacuum there that Iran has sought to exploit.
Turkey has an interest in a stable, economically prosperous, and
independent Iraq. It does not want to see the country turned into
an Iranian satellite or become a springboard for the expansion of
radical Islamist ideology.
However, over the last year, Erdogan's relationship with Iraqi Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government has deteriorated. Maliki is
widely viewed by Ankara as Tehran's man in Baghdad. He has close ties
to the Iranian leadership, built up during his years of exile in Iran
during Saddam Hussein's rule. Since the withdrawal of U.S. troops
from Iraq, he has steadily sought to consolidate his political power.
His attempt to strengthen ties with the radical militant group Asaib
Ahl al-Haq, which the U.S. military claims is financed and trained by
Iran's elite Quds Force, has alarmed Turkish officials who fear that
these ties could shift the balance of political power in Baghdad in
Iran's favor.
The tension between Maliki and Erdogan intensified last January,
after Maliki issued a warrant for the arrest of Iraqi Vice President
Tariq al-Hashimi, a Sunni who was charged with abetting terrorism.
Hashimi subsequently fled to northern Iraq, where he has been under
the protection of the Kurdish regional government, which has refused
Baghdad's request for his extradition. Turkish officials saw Maliki's
gambit as an effort to undercut the Sunnis and Kurds and increase
Shia political dominance. They fear that Maliki's attempt to curtail
Sunni and Kurdish influence could increase the risk of a return to
sectarian violence and lead to the breakup of Iraq, with the Kurds
in the north gaining full independence.
Moreover, as a result of the increased unrest in Syria, the
Kurdish issue is rapidly acquiring an important new dimension. It
is no longer a disparate issue in separate countries where Kurdish
communities reside. Contact between the Kurds in Iran, Iraq, Syria,
and Turkey is increasing in an attempt to develop a coordinated
approach. At the same time, the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers' Party,
which has been fighting Turkey for Kurdish independence since 1984)
has stepped up its attacks from its havens in the Qandil mountains
in northern Iraq. Turkish officials worry that Iran and Syria could
actively support the PKK, as they did in the l980s and early 1990s,
in order to try to weaken Ankara.
Economic problems between Turkey and Iran have risen as well. In the
last decade, trade and financial ties have expanded significantly,
especially in the energy field. Iran is the second-largest supplier of
natural gas to Turkey, behind Russia. It also provides 30 percent of
Turkey's crude oil imports. But on several occasions, Iran abruptly
cut off gas to Turkey for several weeks. Those stoppages, largely
due to Iran's antiquated distribution infrastructure, have caused
considerable economic hardship for Turkey's population and tarnished
Iran's reputation as a reliable partner. The closed nature of Iran's
economy has created significant difficulties as well.
Turkish exporters face high tariffs on consumer goods, frequent changes
in tariff rates, delays in import permits, overpriced fuel during
transport, and prolonged delays at customs gates. These obstacles
have caused many exporters to curtail business with Iran and seek
more hospitable markets for their goods.
Finally, the growing instability in the Middle East unleashed by the
Arab Spring has prompted Ankara to align its policy more closely
with Washington. In addition to the decision to deploy the NATO
early-warning radar, in April Erdogan, in tandem with U.S. sanctions,
agreed to reduce oil purchases from Tehran by 20 percent. These moves
do not, however, mark a fundamental shift in Turkish policy toward
Iran. As in the past, Ankara is likely to remain reluctant to join
an openly anti-Iranian coalition. However, any honeymoon between
Turkey and Iran is clearly over. In the coming decade, the struggle
for regional influence between the two powers is likely to grow and
increasingly reshape the politics of the Middle East.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress