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TURKEY'S SOUTH CAUCASUS AGENDA
Onnik Krikorian
http://araratmagazine.org/2012/07/turkeys-south-caucasus-agenda/
July 17th, 2012
Onnik Krikorian is a journalist, photojournalist and blogger based
in Yerevan, Armenia. He is also the Caucasus Regional Editor for
Global Voices Online and posts for the London-based Frontline Club,
His project on overcoming negative stereotypes in the South Caucasus
is available online at http://www.oneworld.am/diversity.
See more articles by Onnik Krikorian
Strategically situated as a major conduit for vital energy resources,
the South Caucasus has long been an area for competing regional and
geopolitical interests. But while competition between Russia and the
United States has preoccupied many analysts since 1991 when the three
countries making up the region declared their independence from the
former Soviet Union, some consider that Turkey could also play an
important role in the Caucasus. Despite its well-known problems with
Armenia, this is particularly true since tensions between Russia and
Georgia culminated in the August 2008 war.
At the beginning of March therefore, an international conference
held in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, brought together analysts,
diplomats and decision makers from Turkey, the South Caucasus, and
international bodies to discuss Ankara's perceived and potential agenda
in the region. Organized by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies
Foundation (TESEV) and the Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF),
the question posed was what role could Turkey play in stabilizing
the South Caucasus and how could civil society contribute to peace
building despite low levels of civic engagement?
Despite an initiative to launch a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation
Platform in 2008 and attempts the following year to establish
diplomatic relations with Armenia and open the border closed in
1993, participants considered that Turkey is punching well below its
weight. TESEV Foreign Policy Program's Aybars Gorgulu explained why.
"The South Caucasus is little discussed or known in Turkey while
successive governments neglected the region for too long," he said.
"When the Soviet Union collapsed, Armenia and Georgia were not in
Turkey's list of priorities. Instead, an opportunity was seen in
the Turkic world, and financial and political resources were used to
create a sphere of influence there. Relations with Azerbaijan also
became the backbone of Turkey's foreign policy towards the region,
largely driven by identity and kinship type factors, which some argue
limited its success."
Indeed, noted Gorgulu, Turkey's good relations with Azerbaijan and the
solidarity between the two countries complicated Turkey's relationship
with Armenia. "Both already had serious disagreements such as border
recognition and the [1915] Genocide, but Turkey's unconditional
support for Azerbaijan [in the conflict with Armenia over Karabakh]
became another source of conflict," he noted.
"Turkey's policy in the early 1990s was based on a romantic and
idealized notion more defined by a gap between expectation and actual
capability."
On the other hand, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Turkey made a
distinction in its foreign policy between the Caucasus and Central
Asia. "It started to adopt a more constructive and comprehensive
foreign policy strategy," Gorgulu argued. "So, in that sense,
Turkey can be considered a latecomer to the region. The energy card
was highly important for Turkey as a hub for the transportation of
Caspian oil and gas to the West, and so, like Azerbaijan, Georgia
also became an important country, especially after the construction
of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline."
Nevertheless, he continued, Armenia was always the missing piece in the
puzzle. "Relations with Azerbaijan are still the backbone of Turkey's
policy towards the region and even though the 'One Nation-Two States'
motto does not really reflect the political reality," he stressed,
"it is still reflected in official rhetoric and solidarity between
Turkish and Azerbaijan state elites remains strong while there is
domestic support as well."
As for Armenia, after the much publicized "football diplomacy"
initiative, expectations were raised for normalization, but the
situation is now deadlocked with no breakthrough likely in the near
future. And while civil society in Turkey is developing, there still
remains little interest in the South Caucasus on both the state and
NGO level. Even so, there has been significant progress in terms
of dialogue between Armenian and Turkish NGOs, and in the absence
of official relations, Gorgulu argued, it is the responsibility of
civil society to continue with this process.
Photo: Russian Military Road Block, Gori, Georgia, August 2008. The
conflict between Russia and Georgia is seen as the main stimulus behind
Turkey's initiative to engage with the South Caucasus © Onnik Krikorian
The Official View from Turkey
A Georgian priest comforts a resident of Gori during the Russian
military occupation of the town in August 2008. The conflict between
Russia and Georgia is seen as the main stimulus behind Turkey's
initiative to engage with the South Caucasus © Onnik Krikorian
Not surprisingly, the official line from Levent Murat Burhan, the
Turkish Ambassador to Georgia, focused mainly on the problems in
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Karabakh. "Situated at the crossroads of
East and West as well as North and South, and home to a multitude of
different ethnicities, languages and religions, the South Caucasus
is one of the most challenging in the global political landscape,"
he said. "Its huge potential has not been fully realized because
of conflict and shortcomings in terms of political, economic, and
social development."
The August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia demonstrated the
danger posed by persisting protracted conflicts and why the present
status quo is neither desirable nor sustainable in the long term,
Burhan argued. As such, he concluded, the region is a priority in
Turkish foreign policy.
Burhan provided examples of this Turkish approach in terms of
supporting security and stability and creating a climate of regional
cooperation. Initially supported officially in Yerevan as well as by
the international community, even if controversial for many in the
Diaspora, Turkey in particular remains committed to the normalization
process with Armenia, he stated, believing that the two protocols
signed in Zurich at the end of October 2009 represented a unique
historical opportunity to establish peace and stability in the South
Caucasus.
Nevertheless, he added, Turkey considers that the normalization process
with Armenia and resolution of the Karabakh conflict are connected
and that they therefore affect each other. "With the stalemate [over
the disputed territory] also negatively affecting regional dynamics,
and even though the Turkey-Armenia and the Armenia-Azerbaijan tracks
are to be negotiated separately, there is a relation between the two,"
he said. "A positive move in one will help facilitate progress in
the other."
"A more general example, related to this, is that we believe the
unsolved conflicts in the South Caucasus are the main obstacles
to peace and stability in the region," he continued. "Therefore,
immediately following the Georgian-Russian conflict in August 2008
we introduced an initiative to bring together regional Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) members. The Caucasus
Stability and Cooperation Platform initiative was launched after the
outbreak of hostilities and we believe it is the right mechanism to
address all regional problems."
The Armenian Perspective
Naturally, the Armenian position presented by former Turkish Armenian
Reconciliation Commission (TARC) member and Yerevan State University
Professor David Hovannisyan was more critical. "Bilateral relations
should simply be that," he countered. "They aren't multilateral,
so when the Turkish government decided to make linkages between the
Armenia-Turkish normalization process and the conflict between Armenia
and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh it wasn't fair or helpful in
creating a more positive environment for further dialogue."
Hovannisyan also said that he considered the proposal of a Caucasus
Stability and Cooperation platform was naive. "Considered seriously,
the initiative was a good one but it was also completely idealistic
and unrealistic," he explained. "Even if the Turkish initiative did
reduce tensions in the region during and after the August 2008 war,
it couldn't become a new process. There is instead the need for
trust, new open-minded elites, new governments, and a real process
of democratization in all the countries in the region."
In combination with involvement in the European Union's Eastern
Partnership, Turkey's role could be more active, but ultimately it
is limited in terms of Armenian-Turkish relations, Hovannisyan
continued. "There are normal diplomatic procedures for the
establishment of diplomatic relations so why did Armenia and Turkey
begin to discuss the text of the protocols? It was from our point
of view genocide so if we really want to create a real process of
reconciliation between two nations there also needs to be an apology."
Flanked by an Armenian security detail, the car carrying Turkish
President Abdullah Gul drives from Zvartnots Airport to Downtown
Yerevan less than one month after the August 2008 war between Georgia
and Russia © Onnik Krikorian
Challenging the Status Quo in the South Caucasus
Chaired by Guenther Baechler, the Swiss Ambassador to Georgia, the
first of three panels examined the current role of Turkey in the South
Caucasus and how that should develop in the future. The panel addressed
whether Turkey is living up to its potential and whether there is a
systematic approach in terms of any strategy for the future. Was the
absence of reference to Russia and Iran in the Turkish Ambassador's
address diplomatic courtesy in order not to address competitors in
the region?
Temel Iskit, a retired Turkish Ambassador, considered these important
questions that had to be answered. Iskit also thought that while the
Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform was a positive initiative
on the part of Turkey, its timing was not helpful. "Turkey was not
seen as an objective player in the region," he said. "It was, and
still is, considered to be closer to Azerbaijan than Armenia. Even
so, the initiative was welcomed by Armenia and not Azerbaijan and
Georgia because it was the first time Ankara initially approached
Yerevan without preconditions."
Armenia was eager to participate in the initiative, he explained,
and even if this didn't happen, one by-product was the resulting
approach towards Armenia in the form of a road map, enhanced by
"football diplomacy," before the ill-fated signing of two protocols
to normalize relations. "Even if Turkey hoped normalization might
also contribute to resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict it
was not perceived as such by Azerbaijan. Perceptions therefore need
to be changed in all three countries," Iskit said.
"There are two tracks, Armenia-Turkey and Armenia-Azerbaijan,
but unfortunately at some point they start to converge. In Turkey,
people's sympathies are with Azerbaijan so this creates political
pressure on the government even if there is has been a change in
terms of the country's attitude to Armenia and even the Genocide. Of
course, it is slow to change, but over time both Armenia and Turkey
will fully understand they share a common history. This is a long-term
transformation and civil society is already playing a role in this."
The View from Azerbaijan
Avaz Hasanov, Director of Society for Humanitarian Research in Baku
says the Azerbaijani government as well as domestic society fully
supports Turkey's desire to resolve the Karabakh conflict while
rapprochement is also in the interest of the US, EU, and partly Russia
too. "Since the normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey
will build peace and stability in the South Caucasus, integration into
Europe will naturally increase as well," Hasanov opined. "Georgia is
more active here, but Euro-integration will promote democratization
and realization of peace in the region."
Nevertheless, he added, energy and communication projects involving
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey but excluding Armenia do not help
realize this goal.
"Azerbaijan considers the economic blockade [of Armenia] as the main
tool to push for a favorable resolution of the Karabakh conflict,"
Hasanov argued. "So, the support of Turkey in terms of normalizing
relations can also help overcome the myths and stereotypes prevalent in
Armenian and Azerbaijani societies. [...] Unfortunately, however, much
of civil society instead helps maintains the status quo by mirroring
public opinion in its resistance to compromise for the sake of peace
as well as the region's future. There is also no political will."
Relics of War, Karabakh © Onnik Krikorian
The International Community's Perspective
"Turkey could potentially become a key actor in the South Caucasus,
but why does Turkey not occupy that role in reality?" asked moderator
Dieter Boden, a German diplomat and former Special Representative of
the UN Secretary General on the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict and previously
head of the OSCE Special Mission to Georgia.
"Turkey has articulated itself as a central country in quite a few
places, but relatively speaking this has been felt less strongly in
the Caucasus," Nigar Goksel responded. "One reason for this could be
that Turkey is cautious about stepping on Russia's toes."
Goksel, a Senior Analyst and Caucasus Coordinator with the European
Stability Initiative (ESI), also believed that unrealistic expectations
were set in attempts to improve relations with Armenia.
"Many in the West believed that with so many stalemates in the region
the one positive dynamic that could be introduced would be opening
Turkey's border with Armenia so that relations would normalize in
order to break Russia's domination," she said. "It might also break
stereotypes and introduce a positive dynamic into Armenia-Azerbaijan
relations."
Theoretically many analysts agree, but Goksel also noted that the
opposite could be argued as well. "Azerbaijan's perspective that it
is in its interest for the Armenia-Turkey border to remain closed and
there is the view in Baku that Armenia will harden its position on the
Karabakh issue if the border is opened," she explained. "A theoretical
argument can also be made that a rift between Baku and Ankara can only
give more power to Russia in the neighborhood while others argue that
even if Turkey does open the border, Russia's leverage in Armenia is
not going to decrease."
Another big challenge for Turkey will be 2015, stated Goksel, noting
that it would be the 100th anniversary of the Genocide, a term that
nearly all participants except for the active Turkish Ambassador in
Tbilisi used. "Here the question is what will Turkey do?" she said.
"There will be significant pressure to do something, but it's very
important that Turkey starts thinking about this now if it wants to
play an important role in the region. It's also important that it
doesn't react emotionally, but in a rational way that looks forward
to the next 100 years of regional stability and cooperation."
The International Crisis Group's Sabine Freizer agreed. "If the
Armenian-Turkish process was undertaken half-heartedly and only
for international reasons then Turkey is going to have a problem
in 2015," she said before turning her attention to Karabakh. "The
main miscalculation [with the protocols] was that there were two
processes going on in parallel, and that while there was progress
on Armenia-Turkey there was the sense that this was also true in the
Nagorno Karabakh talks. Unfortunately that was not the case."'
Graphic via Caucasus Resource Research Centers (CRRC) Caucasus
Barometer 2011
Graphic via Caucasus Resource Research Centers (CRRC) Caucasus
Barometer 2011
Graphic via Caucasus Resource Research Centers (CRRC) Caucasus
Barometer 2011
Nevertheless, she noted, there is still some engagement between
Armenia and Turkey which should continue regardless of the conflict
with Azerbaijan. "There has been discussion about energy deals between
Armenia and Eastern Turkey and that should go forward, and there are
already some small steps. For example, Turkey is allowing Armenian
trucks into its territory, it provides visas to Armenian citizens,
and there are direct flights to and from Yerevan. Turkey hasn't shut
off completely, but there's also the need to look to the future."
Others such as Pascal Heyman from the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Conflict Prevention Center suggested that
Turkey could promote more Track II diplomacy initiatives, including
those for Georgians, Abkhazians, and Ossetians.
"Confidence building measures in the case of the Armenia-Azerbaijan
conflict have been difficult to achieve agreement on, however, and
when they are accepted they largely remain unimplemented.
People-to-People contacts, such as those between journalists, have
also been difficult to arrange, "he said.
All the speakers, however, noted the urgency of the matter. "Ankara
prefers to stabilize the situation hoping it won't get out of hand
while waiting for a better time," said Peter Semneby, Former EU
Special Representative for the South Caucasus. "This position is
a dangerous one, if understandable, because it could mean tensions
will build up under the surface and be more difficult to address in
the future before becoming as uncontrollable as in 2008. There is an
arms race which rapidly lowers the threshold for the use of violence
and force if nothing is done."
Graphic via Caucasus Resource Research Centers (CRRC) Caucasus
Barometer 2011
The Role of Civil Society
Moderator Kenneth Yalowitz, a retired U.S. Ambassador to Georgia
and Belarus, introduced the third and final panel, noting that the
involvement of NGOs and other non-State actors will be crucial.
"There are no such things as frozen conflicts and the situation is
not stable as shown in August 2008 with the war between Russia and
Georgia," he said. "The situation in terms of Nagorno Karabakh is
unstable and could again turn into hostilities so there is much work
to do in terms of ongoing negotiations and state-to-state relations."
Unfortunately, Yalowitz noted, data from the Caucasus Resource
Research Centers (CRRC) shows that the level of trust in NGOs, as
well as an understanding of what civil society actually does, is at a
very low level across the entire region. In the context of Karabakh,
EPF's Vazgen Karapetyan offered an insight as to why. "There are some
justifiable reasons why NGOs remain low key, but there are also some
less than justifiable ones such as competition for resources on the
local level so as not to lose 'business' and also because donors do
not demand a serious impact," he explained.
Negative stereotypes and hate speech, mainly from governments as well
as the media, are therefore not challenged and the impact of civil
society in mainstream society is limited as a result. Another reason
is that a lack of coordination domestically, as well as cross-border,
combined with the heightened official policy of constructing the "image
of the enemy" raises suspicion among citizens towards confidence
building and peace building initiatives. "That's a more than less
legitimate reason for low awareness," he concluded.
Craig Oliphant, formerly with the United Kingdom's Foreign and
Commonwealth Office and now with the NGO Saferworld added some
other reasons. "Frustrations and grievances in the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict not only remain, but have actually worsened and increased,"
he said. "Baku looks at Track II diplomacy and the involvement of NGOs
with skepticism, considering that confidence building measures should
not be seen as some kind of 'reward' for Armenia in the absence of
any actual resolution. As a psychological problem, that's a particular
challenge for NGOs."
Even so, noted Oliphant, Turkey has shown itself to be an ideal
host country for numerous cross-border civil society initiatives for
participants from the South Caucasus. But, with many believing that
Turkey is hesitant in encroaching upon Russia's perceived sphere of
influence even if it does show an interest in engaging Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, and with Armenia-Turkey relations and the Karabakh
peace process in deadlock, it seems unlikely that Ankara will be able
to assume a more pro-active role in the region any time soon.
Nevertheless, with many considering that Ankara's priorities
and interests in the region are almost identical to those of the
European Union's, the debate and discussion will no doubt continue,
and especially in the context of its approach to Armenia. "However,"
remarked George Khutsishvili, director of the Tbilisi-based
International Center on Conflict and Negotiation (ICCN), in the remarks
from the floor that followed, "there are more questions than answers
about what its role should be."
One of two closed border gates separating Armenia and Turkey. One
is close to Gyumri while this one is situated in Margara, Armenia ©
Onnik Krikorian
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Onnik Krikorian
http://araratmagazine.org/2012/07/turkeys-south-caucasus-agenda/
July 17th, 2012
Onnik Krikorian is a journalist, photojournalist and blogger based
in Yerevan, Armenia. He is also the Caucasus Regional Editor for
Global Voices Online and posts for the London-based Frontline Club,
His project on overcoming negative stereotypes in the South Caucasus
is available online at http://www.oneworld.am/diversity.
See more articles by Onnik Krikorian
Strategically situated as a major conduit for vital energy resources,
the South Caucasus has long been an area for competing regional and
geopolitical interests. But while competition between Russia and the
United States has preoccupied many analysts since 1991 when the three
countries making up the region declared their independence from the
former Soviet Union, some consider that Turkey could also play an
important role in the Caucasus. Despite its well-known problems with
Armenia, this is particularly true since tensions between Russia and
Georgia culminated in the August 2008 war.
At the beginning of March therefore, an international conference
held in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, brought together analysts,
diplomats and decision makers from Turkey, the South Caucasus, and
international bodies to discuss Ankara's perceived and potential agenda
in the region. Organized by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies
Foundation (TESEV) and the Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF),
the question posed was what role could Turkey play in stabilizing
the South Caucasus and how could civil society contribute to peace
building despite low levels of civic engagement?
Despite an initiative to launch a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation
Platform in 2008 and attempts the following year to establish
diplomatic relations with Armenia and open the border closed in
1993, participants considered that Turkey is punching well below its
weight. TESEV Foreign Policy Program's Aybars Gorgulu explained why.
"The South Caucasus is little discussed or known in Turkey while
successive governments neglected the region for too long," he said.
"When the Soviet Union collapsed, Armenia and Georgia were not in
Turkey's list of priorities. Instead, an opportunity was seen in
the Turkic world, and financial and political resources were used to
create a sphere of influence there. Relations with Azerbaijan also
became the backbone of Turkey's foreign policy towards the region,
largely driven by identity and kinship type factors, which some argue
limited its success."
Indeed, noted Gorgulu, Turkey's good relations with Azerbaijan and the
solidarity between the two countries complicated Turkey's relationship
with Armenia. "Both already had serious disagreements such as border
recognition and the [1915] Genocide, but Turkey's unconditional
support for Azerbaijan [in the conflict with Armenia over Karabakh]
became another source of conflict," he noted.
"Turkey's policy in the early 1990s was based on a romantic and
idealized notion more defined by a gap between expectation and actual
capability."
On the other hand, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Turkey made a
distinction in its foreign policy between the Caucasus and Central
Asia. "It started to adopt a more constructive and comprehensive
foreign policy strategy," Gorgulu argued. "So, in that sense,
Turkey can be considered a latecomer to the region. The energy card
was highly important for Turkey as a hub for the transportation of
Caspian oil and gas to the West, and so, like Azerbaijan, Georgia
also became an important country, especially after the construction
of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline."
Nevertheless, he continued, Armenia was always the missing piece in the
puzzle. "Relations with Azerbaijan are still the backbone of Turkey's
policy towards the region and even though the 'One Nation-Two States'
motto does not really reflect the political reality," he stressed,
"it is still reflected in official rhetoric and solidarity between
Turkish and Azerbaijan state elites remains strong while there is
domestic support as well."
As for Armenia, after the much publicized "football diplomacy"
initiative, expectations were raised for normalization, but the
situation is now deadlocked with no breakthrough likely in the near
future. And while civil society in Turkey is developing, there still
remains little interest in the South Caucasus on both the state and
NGO level. Even so, there has been significant progress in terms
of dialogue between Armenian and Turkish NGOs, and in the absence
of official relations, Gorgulu argued, it is the responsibility of
civil society to continue with this process.
Photo: Russian Military Road Block, Gori, Georgia, August 2008. The
conflict between Russia and Georgia is seen as the main stimulus behind
Turkey's initiative to engage with the South Caucasus © Onnik Krikorian
The Official View from Turkey
A Georgian priest comforts a resident of Gori during the Russian
military occupation of the town in August 2008. The conflict between
Russia and Georgia is seen as the main stimulus behind Turkey's
initiative to engage with the South Caucasus © Onnik Krikorian
Not surprisingly, the official line from Levent Murat Burhan, the
Turkish Ambassador to Georgia, focused mainly on the problems in
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Karabakh. "Situated at the crossroads of
East and West as well as North and South, and home to a multitude of
different ethnicities, languages and religions, the South Caucasus
is one of the most challenging in the global political landscape,"
he said. "Its huge potential has not been fully realized because
of conflict and shortcomings in terms of political, economic, and
social development."
The August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia demonstrated the
danger posed by persisting protracted conflicts and why the present
status quo is neither desirable nor sustainable in the long term,
Burhan argued. As such, he concluded, the region is a priority in
Turkish foreign policy.
Burhan provided examples of this Turkish approach in terms of
supporting security and stability and creating a climate of regional
cooperation. Initially supported officially in Yerevan as well as by
the international community, even if controversial for many in the
Diaspora, Turkey in particular remains committed to the normalization
process with Armenia, he stated, believing that the two protocols
signed in Zurich at the end of October 2009 represented a unique
historical opportunity to establish peace and stability in the South
Caucasus.
Nevertheless, he added, Turkey considers that the normalization process
with Armenia and resolution of the Karabakh conflict are connected
and that they therefore affect each other. "With the stalemate [over
the disputed territory] also negatively affecting regional dynamics,
and even though the Turkey-Armenia and the Armenia-Azerbaijan tracks
are to be negotiated separately, there is a relation between the two,"
he said. "A positive move in one will help facilitate progress in
the other."
"A more general example, related to this, is that we believe the
unsolved conflicts in the South Caucasus are the main obstacles
to peace and stability in the region," he continued. "Therefore,
immediately following the Georgian-Russian conflict in August 2008
we introduced an initiative to bring together regional Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) members. The Caucasus
Stability and Cooperation Platform initiative was launched after the
outbreak of hostilities and we believe it is the right mechanism to
address all regional problems."
The Armenian Perspective
Naturally, the Armenian position presented by former Turkish Armenian
Reconciliation Commission (TARC) member and Yerevan State University
Professor David Hovannisyan was more critical. "Bilateral relations
should simply be that," he countered. "They aren't multilateral,
so when the Turkish government decided to make linkages between the
Armenia-Turkish normalization process and the conflict between Armenia
and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh it wasn't fair or helpful in
creating a more positive environment for further dialogue."
Hovannisyan also said that he considered the proposal of a Caucasus
Stability and Cooperation platform was naive. "Considered seriously,
the initiative was a good one but it was also completely idealistic
and unrealistic," he explained. "Even if the Turkish initiative did
reduce tensions in the region during and after the August 2008 war,
it couldn't become a new process. There is instead the need for
trust, new open-minded elites, new governments, and a real process
of democratization in all the countries in the region."
In combination with involvement in the European Union's Eastern
Partnership, Turkey's role could be more active, but ultimately it
is limited in terms of Armenian-Turkish relations, Hovannisyan
continued. "There are normal diplomatic procedures for the
establishment of diplomatic relations so why did Armenia and Turkey
begin to discuss the text of the protocols? It was from our point
of view genocide so if we really want to create a real process of
reconciliation between two nations there also needs to be an apology."
Flanked by an Armenian security detail, the car carrying Turkish
President Abdullah Gul drives from Zvartnots Airport to Downtown
Yerevan less than one month after the August 2008 war between Georgia
and Russia © Onnik Krikorian
Challenging the Status Quo in the South Caucasus
Chaired by Guenther Baechler, the Swiss Ambassador to Georgia, the
first of three panels examined the current role of Turkey in the South
Caucasus and how that should develop in the future. The panel addressed
whether Turkey is living up to its potential and whether there is a
systematic approach in terms of any strategy for the future. Was the
absence of reference to Russia and Iran in the Turkish Ambassador's
address diplomatic courtesy in order not to address competitors in
the region?
Temel Iskit, a retired Turkish Ambassador, considered these important
questions that had to be answered. Iskit also thought that while the
Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform was a positive initiative
on the part of Turkey, its timing was not helpful. "Turkey was not
seen as an objective player in the region," he said. "It was, and
still is, considered to be closer to Azerbaijan than Armenia. Even
so, the initiative was welcomed by Armenia and not Azerbaijan and
Georgia because it was the first time Ankara initially approached
Yerevan without preconditions."
Armenia was eager to participate in the initiative, he explained,
and even if this didn't happen, one by-product was the resulting
approach towards Armenia in the form of a road map, enhanced by
"football diplomacy," before the ill-fated signing of two protocols
to normalize relations. "Even if Turkey hoped normalization might
also contribute to resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict it
was not perceived as such by Azerbaijan. Perceptions therefore need
to be changed in all three countries," Iskit said.
"There are two tracks, Armenia-Turkey and Armenia-Azerbaijan,
but unfortunately at some point they start to converge. In Turkey,
people's sympathies are with Azerbaijan so this creates political
pressure on the government even if there is has been a change in
terms of the country's attitude to Armenia and even the Genocide. Of
course, it is slow to change, but over time both Armenia and Turkey
will fully understand they share a common history. This is a long-term
transformation and civil society is already playing a role in this."
The View from Azerbaijan
Avaz Hasanov, Director of Society for Humanitarian Research in Baku
says the Azerbaijani government as well as domestic society fully
supports Turkey's desire to resolve the Karabakh conflict while
rapprochement is also in the interest of the US, EU, and partly Russia
too. "Since the normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey
will build peace and stability in the South Caucasus, integration into
Europe will naturally increase as well," Hasanov opined. "Georgia is
more active here, but Euro-integration will promote democratization
and realization of peace in the region."
Nevertheless, he added, energy and communication projects involving
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey but excluding Armenia do not help
realize this goal.
"Azerbaijan considers the economic blockade [of Armenia] as the main
tool to push for a favorable resolution of the Karabakh conflict,"
Hasanov argued. "So, the support of Turkey in terms of normalizing
relations can also help overcome the myths and stereotypes prevalent in
Armenian and Azerbaijani societies. [...] Unfortunately, however, much
of civil society instead helps maintains the status quo by mirroring
public opinion in its resistance to compromise for the sake of peace
as well as the region's future. There is also no political will."
Relics of War, Karabakh © Onnik Krikorian
The International Community's Perspective
"Turkey could potentially become a key actor in the South Caucasus,
but why does Turkey not occupy that role in reality?" asked moderator
Dieter Boden, a German diplomat and former Special Representative of
the UN Secretary General on the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict and previously
head of the OSCE Special Mission to Georgia.
"Turkey has articulated itself as a central country in quite a few
places, but relatively speaking this has been felt less strongly in
the Caucasus," Nigar Goksel responded. "One reason for this could be
that Turkey is cautious about stepping on Russia's toes."
Goksel, a Senior Analyst and Caucasus Coordinator with the European
Stability Initiative (ESI), also believed that unrealistic expectations
were set in attempts to improve relations with Armenia.
"Many in the West believed that with so many stalemates in the region
the one positive dynamic that could be introduced would be opening
Turkey's border with Armenia so that relations would normalize in
order to break Russia's domination," she said. "It might also break
stereotypes and introduce a positive dynamic into Armenia-Azerbaijan
relations."
Theoretically many analysts agree, but Goksel also noted that the
opposite could be argued as well. "Azerbaijan's perspective that it
is in its interest for the Armenia-Turkey border to remain closed and
there is the view in Baku that Armenia will harden its position on the
Karabakh issue if the border is opened," she explained. "A theoretical
argument can also be made that a rift between Baku and Ankara can only
give more power to Russia in the neighborhood while others argue that
even if Turkey does open the border, Russia's leverage in Armenia is
not going to decrease."
Another big challenge for Turkey will be 2015, stated Goksel, noting
that it would be the 100th anniversary of the Genocide, a term that
nearly all participants except for the active Turkish Ambassador in
Tbilisi used. "Here the question is what will Turkey do?" she said.
"There will be significant pressure to do something, but it's very
important that Turkey starts thinking about this now if it wants to
play an important role in the region. It's also important that it
doesn't react emotionally, but in a rational way that looks forward
to the next 100 years of regional stability and cooperation."
The International Crisis Group's Sabine Freizer agreed. "If the
Armenian-Turkish process was undertaken half-heartedly and only
for international reasons then Turkey is going to have a problem
in 2015," she said before turning her attention to Karabakh. "The
main miscalculation [with the protocols] was that there were two
processes going on in parallel, and that while there was progress
on Armenia-Turkey there was the sense that this was also true in the
Nagorno Karabakh talks. Unfortunately that was not the case."'
Graphic via Caucasus Resource Research Centers (CRRC) Caucasus
Barometer 2011
Graphic via Caucasus Resource Research Centers (CRRC) Caucasus
Barometer 2011
Graphic via Caucasus Resource Research Centers (CRRC) Caucasus
Barometer 2011
Nevertheless, she noted, there is still some engagement between
Armenia and Turkey which should continue regardless of the conflict
with Azerbaijan. "There has been discussion about energy deals between
Armenia and Eastern Turkey and that should go forward, and there are
already some small steps. For example, Turkey is allowing Armenian
trucks into its territory, it provides visas to Armenian citizens,
and there are direct flights to and from Yerevan. Turkey hasn't shut
off completely, but there's also the need to look to the future."
Others such as Pascal Heyman from the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Conflict Prevention Center suggested that
Turkey could promote more Track II diplomacy initiatives, including
those for Georgians, Abkhazians, and Ossetians.
"Confidence building measures in the case of the Armenia-Azerbaijan
conflict have been difficult to achieve agreement on, however, and
when they are accepted they largely remain unimplemented.
People-to-People contacts, such as those between journalists, have
also been difficult to arrange, "he said.
All the speakers, however, noted the urgency of the matter. "Ankara
prefers to stabilize the situation hoping it won't get out of hand
while waiting for a better time," said Peter Semneby, Former EU
Special Representative for the South Caucasus. "This position is
a dangerous one, if understandable, because it could mean tensions
will build up under the surface and be more difficult to address in
the future before becoming as uncontrollable as in 2008. There is an
arms race which rapidly lowers the threshold for the use of violence
and force if nothing is done."
Graphic via Caucasus Resource Research Centers (CRRC) Caucasus
Barometer 2011
The Role of Civil Society
Moderator Kenneth Yalowitz, a retired U.S. Ambassador to Georgia
and Belarus, introduced the third and final panel, noting that the
involvement of NGOs and other non-State actors will be crucial.
"There are no such things as frozen conflicts and the situation is
not stable as shown in August 2008 with the war between Russia and
Georgia," he said. "The situation in terms of Nagorno Karabakh is
unstable and could again turn into hostilities so there is much work
to do in terms of ongoing negotiations and state-to-state relations."
Unfortunately, Yalowitz noted, data from the Caucasus Resource
Research Centers (CRRC) shows that the level of trust in NGOs, as
well as an understanding of what civil society actually does, is at a
very low level across the entire region. In the context of Karabakh,
EPF's Vazgen Karapetyan offered an insight as to why. "There are some
justifiable reasons why NGOs remain low key, but there are also some
less than justifiable ones such as competition for resources on the
local level so as not to lose 'business' and also because donors do
not demand a serious impact," he explained.
Negative stereotypes and hate speech, mainly from governments as well
as the media, are therefore not challenged and the impact of civil
society in mainstream society is limited as a result. Another reason
is that a lack of coordination domestically, as well as cross-border,
combined with the heightened official policy of constructing the "image
of the enemy" raises suspicion among citizens towards confidence
building and peace building initiatives. "That's a more than less
legitimate reason for low awareness," he concluded.
Craig Oliphant, formerly with the United Kingdom's Foreign and
Commonwealth Office and now with the NGO Saferworld added some
other reasons. "Frustrations and grievances in the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict not only remain, but have actually worsened and increased,"
he said. "Baku looks at Track II diplomacy and the involvement of NGOs
with skepticism, considering that confidence building measures should
not be seen as some kind of 'reward' for Armenia in the absence of
any actual resolution. As a psychological problem, that's a particular
challenge for NGOs."
Even so, noted Oliphant, Turkey has shown itself to be an ideal
host country for numerous cross-border civil society initiatives for
participants from the South Caucasus. But, with many believing that
Turkey is hesitant in encroaching upon Russia's perceived sphere of
influence even if it does show an interest in engaging Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, and with Armenia-Turkey relations and the Karabakh
peace process in deadlock, it seems unlikely that Ankara will be able
to assume a more pro-active role in the region any time soon.
Nevertheless, with many considering that Ankara's priorities
and interests in the region are almost identical to those of the
European Union's, the debate and discussion will no doubt continue,
and especially in the context of its approach to Armenia. "However,"
remarked George Khutsishvili, director of the Tbilisi-based
International Center on Conflict and Negotiation (ICCN), in the remarks
from the floor that followed, "there are more questions than answers
about what its role should be."
One of two closed border gates separating Armenia and Turkey. One
is close to Gyumri while this one is situated in Margara, Armenia ©
Onnik Krikorian
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress