INCLUSIVE AND EXCLUSIVE FOREIGN POLICIES
Today's Zaman
July 25 2012
Turkey
I was in Paris at the beginning of the month to listen to Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu give a talk at the Institut Francais des
Relations Internationales (IFRI), a French think tank. The following
point he made drew my attention: "A Europe without Turkey would find
its cultural inclusiveness narrowed."
The minister spoke of how a Europe increasingly unable to live with its
Muslims is finding its cultural influence wane as its policies exclude
the cultures that are right next to it, while by contrast Turkey's
cultural influence only increases in concert with its inclusive
approach. The contradiction between the inclusiveness-exclusiveness
approaches is telling.
Though Turkey's diplomatic facilities may still be limited, its
frenzied activity is beyond doubt. There is unseen diplomatic traffic,
with new embassies being opened up all over the world, a new presence
in Africa and assistance to war-torn and abandoned Somalia.
Also, add in challenging initiatives such as the lifting of visa
restrictions for many countries, top-level positions in international
institutions and countless efforts to act as honest broker or
facilitator between hostile parties.
And then there is as well Turkish participation in international
military operations, taking counter-positions when necessary against
former allies, and not to mention the widespread regional economic
and cultural influence increasing in concert with diplomatic activity.
Pretty impressive!
This hyperactivity is valuable, but not always adequate. There remain
some strange and stubborn moves next to the commendable actions.
Perhaps one of the most distressing moves of late has been Turkey's
military cooperation with Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir, a global
persona non grata known for his massacres of Christians in the south
and Muslims in Darfur.
But I would like to underline a basic oxymoron of foreign policy
herein. It appears that while Turkey carries on with sparkling
foreign policy moves, it continues to live with countless internal and
external problems that contradict its foreign policy actions. These
internal problems are well known. All of them have turned, over time,
into foreign policy dossiers of their own.
First, it is because we are living in a world where problems have
become globalized. Second, for a century now, people suffering problems
in Turkey have been moving outside of the country with their problems,
and have developed counter-policies. This refers to all those groups
who have resettled in Europe, the Middle East and the US (non-Muslims,
Kurds), all those big and small issues related to them (Cyprus,
the Heybeliada/Halki Orthodox seminary, Western Thrace, Armenia,
etc.) and of course third parties directly or indirectly involved in
these issues (France, Russia, the US, etc.).
Previous governments ignored and overlooked these problems and their
consequences, taking advantage of the Cold War's "comfort" and happily
relying on the Western alliance. Today, just as visible and audible
as the activism and inclusiveness in foreign policy is, so are the
pending Turkish or Turkey-related problems. In fact, the situation
appears almost schizophrenic. A simple example: How is it that the
prime minister can pay a visit to the late Coptic Patriarch Shenouda
III of Alexandria in Cairo but manages to avoid paying an official
visit to the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I in Ä°stanbul. A wealth
of other contradictory situations abound these days.
It is just not possible that Davutoglu is not aware of this situation.
To the contrary, his comments to Ali Bayramoglu of the Yeni Å~^afak
daily regarding Armenians are clear proof of his awareness.
Regarding the centenary in 2015 of the widespread massacres that
wiped the Armenians out from Anatolia, the minister declares: "Who
they face is not a foreign minister saying that nothing happened in
1915." He then talks of three efforts at hand: the revival of the
Zurich Protocols, a dialogue with the diaspora and the approach of
"just memory" when it comes to 1915. "We are not the Germans," he says.
"Throughout our history, there has been no concept of ethnic carnage,
of ghettos. What's more, we too have experienced great pains during the
same period. There were also concerns, fears and losses experienced
by Muslims living in the Balkans and the Caucasus. ... There were
some events resulting from the paranoia that we would be expelled
from Anatolia as well. In the struggle to hold on to the land, some
mistakes, massacres and illegalities took place. But you cannot compare
this to Nazism, and you cannot describe us as a murderous race."
It might be so, but more is needed -- because searching out some sort
of "historic rationality" in the decision made by the Committee for
Union and Progress (CUP) to carry out the annihilation of Armenians
should not be the endeavor of those who carry an anti-Ä°ttihadist
agenda and who are busy designing the new Turkey. What they should
instead be concerned with is exposing those actors responsible
for these black stains as the main vein that nurtures yesterday's
Ä°ttihadism and today's Ä°ttihadist mindset.
From: A. Papazian
Today's Zaman
July 25 2012
Turkey
I was in Paris at the beginning of the month to listen to Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu give a talk at the Institut Francais des
Relations Internationales (IFRI), a French think tank. The following
point he made drew my attention: "A Europe without Turkey would find
its cultural inclusiveness narrowed."
The minister spoke of how a Europe increasingly unable to live with its
Muslims is finding its cultural influence wane as its policies exclude
the cultures that are right next to it, while by contrast Turkey's
cultural influence only increases in concert with its inclusive
approach. The contradiction between the inclusiveness-exclusiveness
approaches is telling.
Though Turkey's diplomatic facilities may still be limited, its
frenzied activity is beyond doubt. There is unseen diplomatic traffic,
with new embassies being opened up all over the world, a new presence
in Africa and assistance to war-torn and abandoned Somalia.
Also, add in challenging initiatives such as the lifting of visa
restrictions for many countries, top-level positions in international
institutions and countless efforts to act as honest broker or
facilitator between hostile parties.
And then there is as well Turkish participation in international
military operations, taking counter-positions when necessary against
former allies, and not to mention the widespread regional economic
and cultural influence increasing in concert with diplomatic activity.
Pretty impressive!
This hyperactivity is valuable, but not always adequate. There remain
some strange and stubborn moves next to the commendable actions.
Perhaps one of the most distressing moves of late has been Turkey's
military cooperation with Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir, a global
persona non grata known for his massacres of Christians in the south
and Muslims in Darfur.
But I would like to underline a basic oxymoron of foreign policy
herein. It appears that while Turkey carries on with sparkling
foreign policy moves, it continues to live with countless internal and
external problems that contradict its foreign policy actions. These
internal problems are well known. All of them have turned, over time,
into foreign policy dossiers of their own.
First, it is because we are living in a world where problems have
become globalized. Second, for a century now, people suffering problems
in Turkey have been moving outside of the country with their problems,
and have developed counter-policies. This refers to all those groups
who have resettled in Europe, the Middle East and the US (non-Muslims,
Kurds), all those big and small issues related to them (Cyprus,
the Heybeliada/Halki Orthodox seminary, Western Thrace, Armenia,
etc.) and of course third parties directly or indirectly involved in
these issues (France, Russia, the US, etc.).
Previous governments ignored and overlooked these problems and their
consequences, taking advantage of the Cold War's "comfort" and happily
relying on the Western alliance. Today, just as visible and audible
as the activism and inclusiveness in foreign policy is, so are the
pending Turkish or Turkey-related problems. In fact, the situation
appears almost schizophrenic. A simple example: How is it that the
prime minister can pay a visit to the late Coptic Patriarch Shenouda
III of Alexandria in Cairo but manages to avoid paying an official
visit to the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I in Ä°stanbul. A wealth
of other contradictory situations abound these days.
It is just not possible that Davutoglu is not aware of this situation.
To the contrary, his comments to Ali Bayramoglu of the Yeni Å~^afak
daily regarding Armenians are clear proof of his awareness.
Regarding the centenary in 2015 of the widespread massacres that
wiped the Armenians out from Anatolia, the minister declares: "Who
they face is not a foreign minister saying that nothing happened in
1915." He then talks of three efforts at hand: the revival of the
Zurich Protocols, a dialogue with the diaspora and the approach of
"just memory" when it comes to 1915. "We are not the Germans," he says.
"Throughout our history, there has been no concept of ethnic carnage,
of ghettos. What's more, we too have experienced great pains during the
same period. There were also concerns, fears and losses experienced
by Muslims living in the Balkans and the Caucasus. ... There were
some events resulting from the paranoia that we would be expelled
from Anatolia as well. In the struggle to hold on to the land, some
mistakes, massacres and illegalities took place. But you cannot compare
this to Nazism, and you cannot describe us as a murderous race."
It might be so, but more is needed -- because searching out some sort
of "historic rationality" in the decision made by the Committee for
Union and Progress (CUP) to carry out the annihilation of Armenians
should not be the endeavor of those who carry an anti-Ä°ttihadist
agenda and who are busy designing the new Turkey. What they should
instead be concerned with is exposing those actors responsible
for these black stains as the main vein that nurtures yesterday's
Ä°ttihadism and today's Ä°ttihadist mindset.
From: A. Papazian