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RUSSIA PUSHES FOR EURASIAN INTEGRATION ACROSS FORMER SOVIET STATES
Cihan News Agency (CNA)
July 25, 2012 Wednesday
Turkey
ISTANBUL (CIHAN)- Vladimir Putin's "return" to the Russian presidency
has been accompanied by a worldwide debate about Russia's foreign
policy priorities, and in particular the Eurasian Union.
One of Putin's first moves was to sign an "Executive Order On Measures
to Implement the Russian Federation Foreign Policy," which stresses
the importance of the so-called Eurasian Union. In this respect, many
have been wondering about the reactions of post-Soviet countries to
this initiative and what tools Russia will deploy to put pressure on
those governments.
However, with regard to the implementation of the Eurasian Union idea,
debates started at the end of 2011 across the post-Soviet region,
where it quickly became that the initiative enjoyed greater popularity
in Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan, where President Nursultan
Nazarbayev had even championed a similar idea before Putin. However,
the idea appealed less to the countries of the South Caucasus.
This brand of economic integration is less attractive in the
South Caucasus, where Russia's political and cultural hold is
getting weaker: ethnic Russians make up less than 2 percent of the
population in each regional country; Russian education is increasingly
less attractive with both Azerbaijan and Georgia implementing state
education programs to support overseas education in the US and European
universities. Russian as the "lingua franca" is weaker than in Central
Asia. This reminds Russia that a new generation of thinkers in this
region is increasingly westernized in terms of cultural and educational
affiliation, and this could be the "long goodbye" in the sense of
Russia's influence in the region. In political terms, Georgia sees the
Eurasian Union as a reunion of the Soviet Union, and due the political
stalemate, official Tbilisi's refusal to participate is understandable.
This can be observed in Azerbaijan more openly, but while the political
and social elite have little confidence in this initiative, it is
still the case that no one wants to anger Moscow. In Azerbaijan, the
official discourse is balanced; the authorities have said clearly
they are currently not interested in a customs union or the notion
of a Eurasian Union, not seeing any benefits for their country. At
the same time, they also want to avoid taking any action that might
damage bilateral relations with Russia -- a case in which diplomatic
strategies require careful scrutiny.
Armenia is heavily dependent on Russia in economic and military
terms and sometimes even politically. However, there is no eagerness
to respond at this stage. Broadly speaking, there are two camps:
the political elite, who want less dependence on Moscow and more
integration with Europe and who oppose the idea, and the ruling elite,
who acknowledge their dependence on Russia but don't want to lose their
financial aid from the European Union and who are moderately against
the proposal. In general, the Armenian reading of Moscow's integration
projects remains centered on the geopolitical issues (the resolution
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, relations with the EU), rather than
on the need for any kind of supranational Eurasian integration.
>From Russia's standpoint, Azerbaijan and Armenia are crucial for the
Eurasian integration project. Moscow is applying different types
of pressure in each country, and visits by high-ranking Russian
officials to Azerbaijan and Armenia in mid-July indicate that Moscow
is taking advantage of the international focus on the Middle East,
and has started diplomatic maneuvers.
In Armenia, Russian Federation Council Chairwoman Valentina Matviyenko
met on July 11 with the chairman of the National Assembly of Armenia,
Ovik Abramyan, and urged Yerevan to join the free trade agreement,
which, according to Matviyenko, "creates conditions for invigorated
trade and economic cooperation." But even the Armenian leadership
has said that Yerevan has no plans to join a customs union with
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. However, in the run-up to the 2013
presidential elections, Russian-backed politicians in Yerevan are
supporting Putin's idea, which poses a challenge to the current
government. The Prosperous Armenia Party welcomed the initiative, and
Tigran Urikhanyan, party spokesman, argued that Armenia is already
part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and has close
economic ties with other ex-Soviet states that can serve as a basis
for Armenian membership of the union.
In the case of Azerbaijan, Russia's attitude is slightly different. A
few weeks in advance of the visit by Speaker of the State Duma Sergey
Narishkin to Azerbaijan on July 8-9, the Federal National-Cultural
Autonomy of Lezgins held its first conference at Moscow's President
Hotel. The political importance of this event was reflected in
the hotel's ownership; it belongs to the Russian presidential
administration and several Russian officials attended the meeting.
This suggests that Russia has renewed interest in provoking separatism
among ethnic minorities. The Lezgin ethnic group lives near the
Azerbaijan-Russia border. Back in 1990s and early 2000s, the Lezgin
separatist movement Sadval, responsible for a number of terrorist
strikes in Azerbaijan, had unofficial support from some forces in
Russia. Regardless, to this day Armenia has played a leading role in
keeping the "ethnic minorities in Azerbaijan" issue alive by financing
and hosting conferences and other initiatives with participation of
representatives of similar separatist organizations. In this context,
if an event that legitimizes nationalist movements is hosted in
Moscow, in a hotel owned by the Presidential Office and attended
by high-ranking officials, this is more than a conference. It's a
message and a form of pressure directed at Azerbaijan.
At this juncture, the countries in favor of the Eurasian Union seem
to hold such positions mainly because the current political and
economic deadlock gives them no other choice. Other countries have
challenged this integrative strategy not because of Moscow's lack of
legitimate capacity to generate an integrationist dynamic, but rather
because there are questions over its ability to do so. The low level
of trust in the Kremlin's role and capabilities is a key element of
the prevailing skepticism about Moscow's integration project in the
South Caucasus.
Cihan News Agency (CNA)
July 25, 2012 Wednesday
Turkey
ISTANBUL (CIHAN)- Vladimir Putin's "return" to the Russian presidency
has been accompanied by a worldwide debate about Russia's foreign
policy priorities, and in particular the Eurasian Union.
One of Putin's first moves was to sign an "Executive Order On Measures
to Implement the Russian Federation Foreign Policy," which stresses
the importance of the so-called Eurasian Union. In this respect, many
have been wondering about the reactions of post-Soviet countries to
this initiative and what tools Russia will deploy to put pressure on
those governments.
However, with regard to the implementation of the Eurasian Union idea,
debates started at the end of 2011 across the post-Soviet region,
where it quickly became that the initiative enjoyed greater popularity
in Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan, where President Nursultan
Nazarbayev had even championed a similar idea before Putin. However,
the idea appealed less to the countries of the South Caucasus.
This brand of economic integration is less attractive in the
South Caucasus, where Russia's political and cultural hold is
getting weaker: ethnic Russians make up less than 2 percent of the
population in each regional country; Russian education is increasingly
less attractive with both Azerbaijan and Georgia implementing state
education programs to support overseas education in the US and European
universities. Russian as the "lingua franca" is weaker than in Central
Asia. This reminds Russia that a new generation of thinkers in this
region is increasingly westernized in terms of cultural and educational
affiliation, and this could be the "long goodbye" in the sense of
Russia's influence in the region. In political terms, Georgia sees the
Eurasian Union as a reunion of the Soviet Union, and due the political
stalemate, official Tbilisi's refusal to participate is understandable.
This can be observed in Azerbaijan more openly, but while the political
and social elite have little confidence in this initiative, it is
still the case that no one wants to anger Moscow. In Azerbaijan, the
official discourse is balanced; the authorities have said clearly
they are currently not interested in a customs union or the notion
of a Eurasian Union, not seeing any benefits for their country. At
the same time, they also want to avoid taking any action that might
damage bilateral relations with Russia -- a case in which diplomatic
strategies require careful scrutiny.
Armenia is heavily dependent on Russia in economic and military
terms and sometimes even politically. However, there is no eagerness
to respond at this stage. Broadly speaking, there are two camps:
the political elite, who want less dependence on Moscow and more
integration with Europe and who oppose the idea, and the ruling elite,
who acknowledge their dependence on Russia but don't want to lose their
financial aid from the European Union and who are moderately against
the proposal. In general, the Armenian reading of Moscow's integration
projects remains centered on the geopolitical issues (the resolution
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, relations with the EU), rather than
on the need for any kind of supranational Eurasian integration.
>From Russia's standpoint, Azerbaijan and Armenia are crucial for the
Eurasian integration project. Moscow is applying different types
of pressure in each country, and visits by high-ranking Russian
officials to Azerbaijan and Armenia in mid-July indicate that Moscow
is taking advantage of the international focus on the Middle East,
and has started diplomatic maneuvers.
In Armenia, Russian Federation Council Chairwoman Valentina Matviyenko
met on July 11 with the chairman of the National Assembly of Armenia,
Ovik Abramyan, and urged Yerevan to join the free trade agreement,
which, according to Matviyenko, "creates conditions for invigorated
trade and economic cooperation." But even the Armenian leadership
has said that Yerevan has no plans to join a customs union with
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. However, in the run-up to the 2013
presidential elections, Russian-backed politicians in Yerevan are
supporting Putin's idea, which poses a challenge to the current
government. The Prosperous Armenia Party welcomed the initiative, and
Tigran Urikhanyan, party spokesman, argued that Armenia is already
part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and has close
economic ties with other ex-Soviet states that can serve as a basis
for Armenian membership of the union.
In the case of Azerbaijan, Russia's attitude is slightly different. A
few weeks in advance of the visit by Speaker of the State Duma Sergey
Narishkin to Azerbaijan on July 8-9, the Federal National-Cultural
Autonomy of Lezgins held its first conference at Moscow's President
Hotel. The political importance of this event was reflected in
the hotel's ownership; it belongs to the Russian presidential
administration and several Russian officials attended the meeting.
This suggests that Russia has renewed interest in provoking separatism
among ethnic minorities. The Lezgin ethnic group lives near the
Azerbaijan-Russia border. Back in 1990s and early 2000s, the Lezgin
separatist movement Sadval, responsible for a number of terrorist
strikes in Azerbaijan, had unofficial support from some forces in
Russia. Regardless, to this day Armenia has played a leading role in
keeping the "ethnic minorities in Azerbaijan" issue alive by financing
and hosting conferences and other initiatives with participation of
representatives of similar separatist organizations. In this context,
if an event that legitimizes nationalist movements is hosted in
Moscow, in a hotel owned by the Presidential Office and attended
by high-ranking officials, this is more than a conference. It's a
message and a form of pressure directed at Azerbaijan.
At this juncture, the countries in favor of the Eurasian Union seem
to hold such positions mainly because the current political and
economic deadlock gives them no other choice. Other countries have
challenged this integrative strategy not because of Moscow's lack of
legitimate capacity to generate an integrationist dynamic, but rather
because there are questions over its ability to do so. The low level
of trust in the Kremlin's role and capabilities is a key element of
the prevailing skepticism about Moscow's integration project in the
South Caucasus.