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TURKEY AND GREATER AZERBAIJAN: A CARD TO PLAY?
http://www.gmfus.org/archives/turkey-and-greater-azerbaijan-a-card-to-play/
July 24 2012
THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES.
On the surface, Turkey's relations with the countries of the South
Caucasus seem clear enough. Its relations with Azerbaijan are
excellent, and the two work in partnership on many issues. Georgia
maintains a close relationship with Turkey, and the two share a busy
border marked by prolific and growing trade.
Only Armenia remains a problem mostly because of the conflict over
Nagorno-Karabakh.
The political, economic, and cultural relations between Turkey
and Azerbaijan have flourished for the last two decades. When five
independent Turkic states emerged from the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, Turkey immediately recognized all of them.
Among these, the closest geographically and linguistically was
Azerbaijan.
It seems quaint now, but when Turkish diplomats first visited Baku,
many returned with the impression that the Azerbaijanis were speaking
"broken Turkish." Despite ethnic and cultural proximity, ignorance
of the Turkic peoples trapped in the USSR ran deep in Turkish society.
Time and circumstances have changed this reality. Today, when the
president of Azerbaijan visits Ankara, or when Turkey's prime minister
visits Baku, assertions that Turkey and Azerbaijan are really "one
nation with two different states" are commonplace. Is this just
rhetoric or is there something behind it? Turkish policy toward
Azerbaijan is not just about promoting business and trade, which,
though successful, are nowhere near the levels Turkey enjoys with, say,
Russia or Germany. Beyond the growing commercial relationship, Turkey
is trying simultaneously to promote broad-based cultural cooperation
that draws these Turkic peoples closer. It seems keenly aware that
buying from or distributing energy for these countries will not by
itself create strong political partnerships. This is where ethnic,
cultural, and linguistic kinship provide a special lift, facilitating
discussions of political and diplomatic issues well beyond energy
and business.
The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh represents a singular challenge
for Turkish policy toward the South Caucasus. An escalation of this
conflict could impede or derail Turkey's carefully orchestrated
approach to the post-Soviet Turkic world. The ceasefire agreement
signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia 17 years ago is wearing thin,
and there is no permanent solution in sight. Both sides advance
stubborn arguments, and both are building their military power. In
Baku, particularly, voices demanding a military solution are growing
louder. Public opinion sampling in Azerbaijan consistently registers
Nagorno-Karabakh as the issue of most concern, with current polling
showing that concern reaching nearly 70 percent. One can assume with
some confidence that eventually Azerbaijan will have to act. If war
breaks out, Ankara will have little choice but to support Baku.
Failing in this, Turkey would lose its credibility not only among
Azeris, but among other Turkic peoples and republics.
Today, the Armenian republic has a population of less than 3 million.
More Armenians are living in diaspora than in Armenia: approximately
2.2 million in the Russian Federation, 1.4 million in the United
States, 450,000 in France, and smaller concentrations elsewhere.
Azerbaijan has approximately 9.5 million inhabitants, of whom 90
percent are ethnically Azeris. This large imbalance means that Armenia
will be at a deep disadvantage without receiving foreign support.
Russia may be eager to interfere in such conflict, as it did in
Georgia, with the expectation of subduing Azerbaijan to gain a stronger
hand in the region's energy competition.
But this could not be done easily, and it would risk a larger
conflict with Iran, or more precisely, with that part of Iran that is
predominantly Azeri. Iran's Azeri population is large and restive. The
Treaty of Turkmenchai, which established the border between Iran and
Tsarist Russia 184 years ago, remains in force, but it was severely
threatened in September 1941 when the Soviet army intervened in Iran,
prompting Iranian Azerbaijanis to seek independence.
The Azerbaijan National Assembly was convened in December 1945, and
its authority lasted until December 1946, collapsing after Soviet
troops departed northern Iran in May of that year. But the experience
with independence from Persian Iran has lingered and festered.
Azerbaijanis are the largest minority in today's Iran. There are many
estimates of the size of Iran's population, the highest of which
is 78 million, with Persians (Farsispeakers) making up 61 percent,
and Azerbaijanis 16 percent of the total. There are therefore close
to 14 million Azeris in Iran, and their territory is contiguous to
independent Azerbaijan. Other estimates place the population of Iran
at 75 million, with Iranian Azeris at 24 percent. This would mean a
combined population of Azeris of close to 28 million. If one adds to
these Azeris dispersed in Russia, Iraq, Turkey, and Georgia, a total
population of near 30 million Azeris would not be implausible.
But here the analytical task becomes murky. The Azeris in Azerbaijan
and those in Iran are ethnically the same people, but are they the
same nation? The two parts of Greater Azerbaijan have been separated
from one another for several hundred years. The ties that bind the two
Azeri communities may not be as strong as the differences that divide
them. Azeris in the contemporary independent Azerbaijan republic
lived first under Tsarist then Soviet rule. Not surprisingly, its
inhabitants are more secular then their cousins in Iran. Unlike in
independent Azerbaijan, Shiite identity is very important factor in
Iran; indeed it may be the most important "glue" holding together the
Iranian state. The religious factor and the promotion of the Persian
language among Iranian Azeris have assimilated some minorities into
the Persian milieu. This has led some Iranian scholars to claim the
Azeris are not really a Turkic people at all, that Azeri nationalism
is really Iranian nationalism; just because some speak a different
dialect, the argument goes, does not make them ethnic. (According to
one recent inquiry 16.2 percent of Azeri children are said to know
only Farsi, 13.5 percent are fluent in Farsi and know some Turkish,
and 40 percent are fluent in both languages. In the family, 52 percent
of parents speak Turkish, 41.8 Farsi, and 5.6 both languages.)
The most part, Iran does not discriminate against ethnic Azeris. They
can hold high official positions, and their political and economic
elite have long been well integrated. The best example is Ayatollah
Seyed Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of Iran (Vali-e faqih), whose
father was an Azeri. He speaks broken Azeri but shows no interest in
Azeri preferences or predispositions beyond this.
Nonetheless, Azeri assertiveness has grown in recent years. In the
spring of 1998, a group of leading Azeri intellectuals appealed to
Ayatollah Seyyed Ahmad Khatami, who was at that time the Supreme
Leader, calling for expanded rights, especially in the cultural and
language spheres. Iranian leaders dug in, arguing that once the state
retreats on language rights, then minorities would demand to have
their own flags, their own police forces, own currencies, and that
eventually they would refuse to pay taxes to central government.
In May 2006, violent demonstrations broke out in a number of
northwest cities after a cartoon published in a staterun newspaper
compared Azeris to cockroaches. In May 2007, hundreds of Iranian
Azerbaijani were arrested for demanding that they should be allowed
to be educated in their own language. In reality, clause 15 of the
Iranian Constitution allows bilingual education, but it has never
been observed. In one of the latest incidents, in September 2011,
the people of the capital of the northwest province of Ardabil, and
the Azeri region, protested the degradation of Orumieh Lake. Some 35
dams had been built on 21 rivers that feed the lake.
The region was affected severely. Fourteen Azeri activists were
detained after this protest.
A similar protest was also organized in Istanbul. Iranian authorities
show no sympathy to any demonstration of an ethnic color. Among
other precautions, authorities forcefully remove satellite dishes
from homes, which many Azeris employ to watch Turkish television
broadcasts. Turkish and the Turkic language used by Azeris are very
close, allowing someone from Istanbul to communicate easily in
Teheran. Turkish and Azerbaijan flags increasingly are displayed
at football matches, and many young Azeris have taken to calling
themselves "Turks" in solidarity with youngsters in Turkey and
independent Azerbaijan.
Iran cannot take its Azeri population for granted, but neither does
it appear to be an imminent threat to the state.
When in 1992, Azeri President Abulfayz Elchibey, a former political
prisoner known for his pro-Turkish nationalism, called for the creation
of a Greater Azerbaijan, Iranian Azeris received this call coolly,
perhaps because they doubted Elchibey's seriousness. Somewhat later,
Azerbaijan's former Interior Minister Iskandar Hamitov mused that
"Iran cannot attack Azerbaijan. If so, it will end with the creation
of New Azerbaijan with its 40 million inhabitants." These sentiments
make for good sound bites, but there is little evidence to support
the exaggerated claims that the two parts of Azerbaijan could easily
coalesce. The "Azeri factor" is certain to remain an influence on
Turkey's relations with Iran, but this does not mean that Turkey has an
"Azerbaijan card" to play to enhance its political leverage.
Cooler heads understand that encouraging ethnic separatism in Iran
could easily stimulate a wave of Iranian nationalism. Yet Turkey's
strengthening ties to independent Azerbaijan cannot be totally
discounted as an accelerant of the flame of ethnic kinship that burns
just beneath the surface on both sides of the Iran-Azerbaijan divide.
Prof. Dr. Nadir Devlet teaches at the International Relations
Department of Istanbul Commerce University. He concentrates on 20th
and 21st century political, social, cultural, economic situations,
and security issues for Turkic peoples. He has also taught at Marmara
(1984- 2001), Columbia (1989-1990), Wisconsin-Madison (1996-1997),
and Yeditepe (2001-2007) universities. He has more than 20 published
books in Turkish, Tatar, and English as well as some 200 articles in
Turkish, Tatar, English, and Russian.
From: Baghdasarian
http://www.gmfus.org/archives/turkey-and-greater-azerbaijan-a-card-to-play/
July 24 2012
THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES.
On the surface, Turkey's relations with the countries of the South
Caucasus seem clear enough. Its relations with Azerbaijan are
excellent, and the two work in partnership on many issues. Georgia
maintains a close relationship with Turkey, and the two share a busy
border marked by prolific and growing trade.
Only Armenia remains a problem mostly because of the conflict over
Nagorno-Karabakh.
The political, economic, and cultural relations between Turkey
and Azerbaijan have flourished for the last two decades. When five
independent Turkic states emerged from the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, Turkey immediately recognized all of them.
Among these, the closest geographically and linguistically was
Azerbaijan.
It seems quaint now, but when Turkish diplomats first visited Baku,
many returned with the impression that the Azerbaijanis were speaking
"broken Turkish." Despite ethnic and cultural proximity, ignorance
of the Turkic peoples trapped in the USSR ran deep in Turkish society.
Time and circumstances have changed this reality. Today, when the
president of Azerbaijan visits Ankara, or when Turkey's prime minister
visits Baku, assertions that Turkey and Azerbaijan are really "one
nation with two different states" are commonplace. Is this just
rhetoric or is there something behind it? Turkish policy toward
Azerbaijan is not just about promoting business and trade, which,
though successful, are nowhere near the levels Turkey enjoys with, say,
Russia or Germany. Beyond the growing commercial relationship, Turkey
is trying simultaneously to promote broad-based cultural cooperation
that draws these Turkic peoples closer. It seems keenly aware that
buying from or distributing energy for these countries will not by
itself create strong political partnerships. This is where ethnic,
cultural, and linguistic kinship provide a special lift, facilitating
discussions of political and diplomatic issues well beyond energy
and business.
The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh represents a singular challenge
for Turkish policy toward the South Caucasus. An escalation of this
conflict could impede or derail Turkey's carefully orchestrated
approach to the post-Soviet Turkic world. The ceasefire agreement
signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia 17 years ago is wearing thin,
and there is no permanent solution in sight. Both sides advance
stubborn arguments, and both are building their military power. In
Baku, particularly, voices demanding a military solution are growing
louder. Public opinion sampling in Azerbaijan consistently registers
Nagorno-Karabakh as the issue of most concern, with current polling
showing that concern reaching nearly 70 percent. One can assume with
some confidence that eventually Azerbaijan will have to act. If war
breaks out, Ankara will have little choice but to support Baku.
Failing in this, Turkey would lose its credibility not only among
Azeris, but among other Turkic peoples and republics.
Today, the Armenian republic has a population of less than 3 million.
More Armenians are living in diaspora than in Armenia: approximately
2.2 million in the Russian Federation, 1.4 million in the United
States, 450,000 in France, and smaller concentrations elsewhere.
Azerbaijan has approximately 9.5 million inhabitants, of whom 90
percent are ethnically Azeris. This large imbalance means that Armenia
will be at a deep disadvantage without receiving foreign support.
Russia may be eager to interfere in such conflict, as it did in
Georgia, with the expectation of subduing Azerbaijan to gain a stronger
hand in the region's energy competition.
But this could not be done easily, and it would risk a larger
conflict with Iran, or more precisely, with that part of Iran that is
predominantly Azeri. Iran's Azeri population is large and restive. The
Treaty of Turkmenchai, which established the border between Iran and
Tsarist Russia 184 years ago, remains in force, but it was severely
threatened in September 1941 when the Soviet army intervened in Iran,
prompting Iranian Azerbaijanis to seek independence.
The Azerbaijan National Assembly was convened in December 1945, and
its authority lasted until December 1946, collapsing after Soviet
troops departed northern Iran in May of that year. But the experience
with independence from Persian Iran has lingered and festered.
Azerbaijanis are the largest minority in today's Iran. There are many
estimates of the size of Iran's population, the highest of which
is 78 million, with Persians (Farsispeakers) making up 61 percent,
and Azerbaijanis 16 percent of the total. There are therefore close
to 14 million Azeris in Iran, and their territory is contiguous to
independent Azerbaijan. Other estimates place the population of Iran
at 75 million, with Iranian Azeris at 24 percent. This would mean a
combined population of Azeris of close to 28 million. If one adds to
these Azeris dispersed in Russia, Iraq, Turkey, and Georgia, a total
population of near 30 million Azeris would not be implausible.
But here the analytical task becomes murky. The Azeris in Azerbaijan
and those in Iran are ethnically the same people, but are they the
same nation? The two parts of Greater Azerbaijan have been separated
from one another for several hundred years. The ties that bind the two
Azeri communities may not be as strong as the differences that divide
them. Azeris in the contemporary independent Azerbaijan republic
lived first under Tsarist then Soviet rule. Not surprisingly, its
inhabitants are more secular then their cousins in Iran. Unlike in
independent Azerbaijan, Shiite identity is very important factor in
Iran; indeed it may be the most important "glue" holding together the
Iranian state. The religious factor and the promotion of the Persian
language among Iranian Azeris have assimilated some minorities into
the Persian milieu. This has led some Iranian scholars to claim the
Azeris are not really a Turkic people at all, that Azeri nationalism
is really Iranian nationalism; just because some speak a different
dialect, the argument goes, does not make them ethnic. (According to
one recent inquiry 16.2 percent of Azeri children are said to know
only Farsi, 13.5 percent are fluent in Farsi and know some Turkish,
and 40 percent are fluent in both languages. In the family, 52 percent
of parents speak Turkish, 41.8 Farsi, and 5.6 both languages.)
The most part, Iran does not discriminate against ethnic Azeris. They
can hold high official positions, and their political and economic
elite have long been well integrated. The best example is Ayatollah
Seyed Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of Iran (Vali-e faqih), whose
father was an Azeri. He speaks broken Azeri but shows no interest in
Azeri preferences or predispositions beyond this.
Nonetheless, Azeri assertiveness has grown in recent years. In the
spring of 1998, a group of leading Azeri intellectuals appealed to
Ayatollah Seyyed Ahmad Khatami, who was at that time the Supreme
Leader, calling for expanded rights, especially in the cultural and
language spheres. Iranian leaders dug in, arguing that once the state
retreats on language rights, then minorities would demand to have
their own flags, their own police forces, own currencies, and that
eventually they would refuse to pay taxes to central government.
In May 2006, violent demonstrations broke out in a number of
northwest cities after a cartoon published in a staterun newspaper
compared Azeris to cockroaches. In May 2007, hundreds of Iranian
Azerbaijani were arrested for demanding that they should be allowed
to be educated in their own language. In reality, clause 15 of the
Iranian Constitution allows bilingual education, but it has never
been observed. In one of the latest incidents, in September 2011,
the people of the capital of the northwest province of Ardabil, and
the Azeri region, protested the degradation of Orumieh Lake. Some 35
dams had been built on 21 rivers that feed the lake.
The region was affected severely. Fourteen Azeri activists were
detained after this protest.
A similar protest was also organized in Istanbul. Iranian authorities
show no sympathy to any demonstration of an ethnic color. Among
other precautions, authorities forcefully remove satellite dishes
from homes, which many Azeris employ to watch Turkish television
broadcasts. Turkish and the Turkic language used by Azeris are very
close, allowing someone from Istanbul to communicate easily in
Teheran. Turkish and Azerbaijan flags increasingly are displayed
at football matches, and many young Azeris have taken to calling
themselves "Turks" in solidarity with youngsters in Turkey and
independent Azerbaijan.
Iran cannot take its Azeri population for granted, but neither does
it appear to be an imminent threat to the state.
When in 1992, Azeri President Abulfayz Elchibey, a former political
prisoner known for his pro-Turkish nationalism, called for the creation
of a Greater Azerbaijan, Iranian Azeris received this call coolly,
perhaps because they doubted Elchibey's seriousness. Somewhat later,
Azerbaijan's former Interior Minister Iskandar Hamitov mused that
"Iran cannot attack Azerbaijan. If so, it will end with the creation
of New Azerbaijan with its 40 million inhabitants." These sentiments
make for good sound bites, but there is little evidence to support
the exaggerated claims that the two parts of Azerbaijan could easily
coalesce. The "Azeri factor" is certain to remain an influence on
Turkey's relations with Iran, but this does not mean that Turkey has an
"Azerbaijan card" to play to enhance its political leverage.
Cooler heads understand that encouraging ethnic separatism in Iran
could easily stimulate a wave of Iranian nationalism. Yet Turkey's
strengthening ties to independent Azerbaijan cannot be totally
discounted as an accelerant of the flame of ethnic kinship that burns
just beneath the surface on both sides of the Iran-Azerbaijan divide.
Prof. Dr. Nadir Devlet teaches at the International Relations
Department of Istanbul Commerce University. He concentrates on 20th
and 21st century political, social, cultural, economic situations,
and security issues for Turkic peoples. He has also taught at Marmara
(1984- 2001), Columbia (1989-1990), Wisconsin-Madison (1996-1997),
and Yeditepe (2001-2007) universities. He has more than 20 published
books in Turkish, Tatar, and English as well as some 200 articles in
Turkish, Tatar, English, and Russian.
From: Baghdasarian