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  • Gayane Novikova: "It Is Obvious That Russia Is Not Interested In A C

    GAYANE NOVIKOVA: "IT IS OBVIOUS THAT RUSSIA IS NOT INTERESTED IN A CLEAR DEFINITION OF ITS POSITION ON THE NAGORNO KARABAKH CONFLICT"
    by David Stepanyan

    arminfo
    Wednesday, July 25, 07:49

    ArmInfo's interview with Gayane Novikova, Director of the Center for
    Strategic Analysis Spectrum, Visiting Researcher at the Davis Center
    for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University

    Dr. Novikova, several analysts, including the Azerbaijani, argue
    that only Russia is able to influence the parties to the Nagorno
    Karabakh conflict and to push forward its own option of the conflict
    resolution. In your opinion, should such a vision of the problem be
    considered as well-grounded?

    At a glance, the vision that Russia is the only state able to resolve
    the Nagorno Karabakh conflict has some reasons. Russia is a major
    actor in the South Caucasus. It considers this region as an area
    of its interests (I would like to remind you that there was even a
    saying "the area of privileged interests"); it has a certain leverage
    of influence upon internal and external developments in each of the
    states and the state entities of the region. It builds relationships
    with both Armenia and Azerbaijan exclusively pragmatically, on the
    basis of its strategic interests.

    I doubt that Russia has its special plan for resolution of the Nagorno
    Karabakh conflict. However, it is obvious that it is not interested
    in a clear definition and the introduction of its position on this
    issue, because otherwise it comes down on the side of either Armenia
    or Azerbaijan, thereby narrowing its strategic space. Taking into
    consideration the level of the Russian-Georgian relations, Russia
    cannot allow itself to have another "reluctant" neighbor as a result
    of a choice between the states involved in the above-mentioned
    Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Thus, Russia is in favor of the status
    quo established in the area of the conflict.

    Let me remind you that the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, as well
    as the Presidents of Russia, the USA, and France, have been issued
    several statements pointing out that the Nagorno Karabakh conflict
    can be - and should be - resolved only by its direct participants. In
    general, they are right.

    2. In your opinion, are Armenia and Azerbaijan able to stop
    the meaningless bloodshed along the borders without any external
    assistance? Or, maybe we should apply for help to the international
    community, taking into consideration that there is a threat that
    subversive acts will turn into a resumption of full-scale war?

    Most probably, subversive acts in the absence of the comprehensive
    peace agreement are unavoidable. The problem is that the number of
    these acts is increasing, and in parallel the number of victims from
    both sides is growing. The so-called international community has its
    own array of other problems, and the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh
    conflict is not among its priorities. Thus, the proverb "people in
    trouble are left to themselves" is applicable in the case of this
    conflict. Furthermore, to stop the bloodshed along the contact line
    there should be not only good will of the parties directly involved
    in the conflict, but also their recognition of the meaningless of
    this bloodshed.

    In the case of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict it has not happened
    because Azerbaijan must demonstrate its firm commitment to return
    the territories that are currently under the Armenian control at
    all costs. ôhat is, for Azerbaijan the tactic of provoking the two
    Armenian parties to the conflict to respond is not meaningless:
    on the one hand, Azerbaijani authorities stress the priority of the
    conflict resolution while simultaneously intensifying the militaristic
    mood in their society. On the other hand - when Armenia acts in
    response - they acquire an opportunity to blame our state for its
    "aggressive behavior." The Armenian side repeatedly has suggested,
    and still suggests, a withdrawal of the snipers from the contact
    line. However, Azerbaijan, in line with the above-mentioned approach,
    cannot take even this step - because it will be evaluated throughout
    the Azerbaijani society as a concession to Armenia and a reversal of
    the national goal. Moreover, Azerbaijan comprehends also a threat
    of a further escalation as a consequence of a tough response of
    the two Armenian state entities and the negative reaction of the
    international community.

    3. The military actions along the border with Armenia cannot give
    rise to a withdrawal of Armenian forces from the territories which
    Azerbaijan considers as its own. At a glance, Baku could not be
    interested in an escalation of tensions in the northern side of the
    Armenian-Azerbaijani state border - for the reason that it could be
    evaluated by Armenia as good reason to apply for help to the CSTO
    member-states, and to Russia in particular. Why, in your opinion,
    does Azerbaijan increase provocations in this direction, but not along
    the contact line between the Karabakhi and Azerbaijani military forces?

    I suppose that on the one hand Azerbaijan is probing the defense line
    of Armenia; on the other hand it is checking Russia's reaction - as the
    leading state in the CSTO - in the event of a possible large-scale
    military operation against Armenia. (I exclude any support for
    Armenia from the Central-Asian states and Kazakhstan; most probably
    they will stay neutral if military actions resume directly between
    Armenia and Azerbaijan.) As another factor I would mention the joint
    military maneuvers of the CSTO Collective Operational Reaction Forces
    (CORF) "Cooperation 2012." They will take place on Armenian soil in
    early September and will be focused upon the repulson of a possible
    military attack against Armenia. These maneuvers increase nervousness
    not only in Georgia, but in Azerbaijan, as well. The latter "warns"
    Armenia and demonstrates its operational readiness.

    4. In your opinion, is there any possibility that Moscow can repeat
    the August 8, 2008 scenario if the Nagorno Karabakh conflict develops
    into a full-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan?

    No, none. However, currently Russia focuses upon mechanisms to prevent
    escalation of the conflict that could have unpredictable consequences.

    First, it will be very difficult for Moscow to decide which of the
    parties to the conflict to support. Second, in the August war of 2008,
    it had two pretexts to intervention: the Russian peacekeepers in the
    area of the South Ossetian conflict, and the approximately 96-97%
    of the South Ossetia population holding Russian citizenship.

    5. Among the negotiation themes during the recent visit of Hillary
    Clinton to Armenia and Azerbaijan was the Nagorno Karabakh problem.

    The US Secretary of State mentioned also that there are some positive
    shifts occurred after the Paris meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani
    Ministers of Foreign Affairs. However, there have been no visible
    changes or shifts in regard to conflict resolution. What is the
    purpose of the American diplomacy in regard to this kind of statements?

    On the eve of the presidential elections and with growing internal
    tension in the USA, American diplomacy needs to demonstrate success in
    the foreign policy area safeguarding some stability in the overt and
    latent "hot spots." Turkey was in the focus of Mrs. Clinton's regional
    visit; the stopover in Yerevan and Baku was rather a PR-action to
    confirm Washington's interest in stability in the South Caucasus and
    to balance the Kremlin activity in this region.

    6. What trends can you mention in the current foreign policy of
    Armenia in regard in particular to the European integration and the
    integration to the Eurasian Union initiated by Vladimir Putin?

    Armenia faces the difficult task of preserving the essential balance
    in its foreign policy. The European and the Russian initiatives
    (the Free trade zone, and the Eurasian Union and Customs Union,
    respectively) have their pluses and minuses. European integration
    does not assume membership of our state in the European Union, which
    conducts soft power initiatives in the South Caucasus and is not
    ready to implement and support high cost economic projects. However,
    intensification of cooperation with the EU will enable Armenia to
    enlarge its political and economic opportunities and contribute to the
    further democratization of the country. It can play also an indirect
    role in the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.

    As for the Russian initiatives, let me remind you that Armenia's
    decision not to participate in the Customs Union with Russia,
    Kazakhstan, and Belarus fits fully with the desire to correct and
    balance, above all, the political priorities of Armenia. The level
    of bilateral relations between Armenia and these three states, all
    of which are members of the Customs Union, is very high, especially
    with Russia. And, finally, all have signed agreements on free trade
    areas in the CIS.

    Most probably, Russia will pressure Armenia hard, trying to involve
    it in these projects. To achieve this goal Russia will use not only
    its economic leverage (such as energy supplies), but also the factor
    of unresolved Nagorno Karabakh conflict, as well as the state of
    Armenian political forces in the 2013 presidential elections.


    From: Baghdasarian
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