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TURKEY IS THE ONLY CERTAINTY IN A REGION OF UNCERTAINTIES
Today's Zaman
June 19 2012
Turkey
With the Arab Spring fading under the "Egyptian Twilight," which
now seems overshadowed by the butchery taking place in Syria, what
the future holds for the entire Middle East region is essentially a
guessing game.
The process of change, which the Arab unrest had promised, has
now swung in favor of a tutelary regime after the deadly U-turn in
Cairo and may soon be very difficult to contain. It may lead to many
unexpected and feared consequences: bloodshed, a new wave of domestic
terror, an increasing al-Qaeda presence, radicalization of the Muslim
Brotherhood movements, an escalation of sympathy for Salafis, collapse
of local administrations and new militarist orders.
A tour d'horizon of the entire zone stretching from Maghreb to
Mashriq these days offers nothing but gloom. This was inevitable in
an off-the-record meeting in Switzerland about the Arab Spring --
a loose-ended and vivid brainstorming of sorts -- with high-level
experts in the field. The effects of the multi-polarity or the
so-called "emerging new order" are seen more clearly with the
additional element that the eastern Mediterranean along with Cyprus
are also at the center of seismic moves.
Paradoxically, the most puzzling player in the eyes of the analysts at
the meeting seems to be Turkey, I noted at the meeting. They chuckled
and shrugged, underestimating Turkey's intentions and global objectives
and somehow ignored its long-term impact on regional policies.
Their criticism of Turkey's regional foreign policy was loud but
narrow. It often focused on its failure in the deterrence of Syria and
what they saw as the negative impact of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan's words on the Muslim Brotherhood while he was in Egypt on the
essentiality of secularism in democracy. No, Turks were not regarded
as defining actors, nor were they taken as models in the Arab Spring
process, they argued. But they had no data to offer when challenged,
no surveys, no other base on which to build their arguments on.
Yet, all in all, two critical points made sense. The first was Ankara's
choice to emerge as the defender of Sunni-based interests much more
than any others, and the second had to do with the weakening effect
of Turkey's role as the player which carries weight and is at an equal
"distance" to all others in the region.
There were two points that might help to explain the perceptions I
mentioned so that they can be taken seriously. These are the issues for
Ankara as the choreographers of Turkey's foreign policy, and they will
need to revisit the "Davutoglu doctrine" for necessary adjustments.
There were also some third voices in the two-day meeting that sounded
in agreement with the Davutoglu doctrine. In a broader perspective,
it looks like this: The US, plagued by intervention fatigue in foreign
lands, is not at all interested in a repeat of the Libya situation in
Syria, at least not until after the elections. Depending on whether
Barack Obama or Mitt Romney is elected, this could change as early
as next year. Meanwhile, Russia is keen to reassert its Cold War-like
presence in the region, not only through Syria, but also Cyprus.
Nobody really knows how Romney would deal with Iran, if elected. But
it is known that Benjamin Netanyahu is an old friend, and that will
play a key role in the decision-making process. A strong guess is
that he may choose Eric Edelman, a former US ambassador in Ankara,
in the post that deals with Turkey. Given how much negativity there
is in the Justice and Development Party (AKP) perception of Edelman,
this may prove to be a challenge in relations.
Recent Israel-Greece, Israel-Cyprus and Cyprus-Lebanon moves are also
points of serious concern for the US because it may easily drag Turkey
into a nasty military conflict in the eastern Mediterranean. Although
Washington resents the fact that Israel refuses to apologize for the
Mavi Marmara incident and finds that refusal infantile, it also finds
the escalation in Ankara's rhetoric regarding the eastern Mediterranean
immature and rather illegitimate.
The worst outcome of Turkey's aggressive discourse is the fact that
it managed to cement unity between the Armenian, Greek and Jewish
lobbies in Washington. How it will play out into the otherwise fine
Turkish-American relations after November is yet to be seen. Everybody
in the meeting agreed that the "Arab Twilight" and the region had
far too many unknowns. It increases dangers.
But there is one certainty, without which the process of the Arab
Spring cannot be managed in Turkey: Given the circumstances, Erdogan
and the AKP will rule Turkey for another decade, at least. This
will help with the long-term planning of matters related to the Arab
Spring. Therefore it is crucial that Israel take the mature step of
issuing an apology, accept that Turkey's stability is vital for its
interests, and at the end of the day be helpful in building a region
of stability. It is never too late.
Today's Zaman
June 19 2012
Turkey
With the Arab Spring fading under the "Egyptian Twilight," which
now seems overshadowed by the butchery taking place in Syria, what
the future holds for the entire Middle East region is essentially a
guessing game.
The process of change, which the Arab unrest had promised, has
now swung in favor of a tutelary regime after the deadly U-turn in
Cairo and may soon be very difficult to contain. It may lead to many
unexpected and feared consequences: bloodshed, a new wave of domestic
terror, an increasing al-Qaeda presence, radicalization of the Muslim
Brotherhood movements, an escalation of sympathy for Salafis, collapse
of local administrations and new militarist orders.
A tour d'horizon of the entire zone stretching from Maghreb to
Mashriq these days offers nothing but gloom. This was inevitable in
an off-the-record meeting in Switzerland about the Arab Spring --
a loose-ended and vivid brainstorming of sorts -- with high-level
experts in the field. The effects of the multi-polarity or the
so-called "emerging new order" are seen more clearly with the
additional element that the eastern Mediterranean along with Cyprus
are also at the center of seismic moves.
Paradoxically, the most puzzling player in the eyes of the analysts at
the meeting seems to be Turkey, I noted at the meeting. They chuckled
and shrugged, underestimating Turkey's intentions and global objectives
and somehow ignored its long-term impact on regional policies.
Their criticism of Turkey's regional foreign policy was loud but
narrow. It often focused on its failure in the deterrence of Syria and
what they saw as the negative impact of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan's words on the Muslim Brotherhood while he was in Egypt on the
essentiality of secularism in democracy. No, Turks were not regarded
as defining actors, nor were they taken as models in the Arab Spring
process, they argued. But they had no data to offer when challenged,
no surveys, no other base on which to build their arguments on.
Yet, all in all, two critical points made sense. The first was Ankara's
choice to emerge as the defender of Sunni-based interests much more
than any others, and the second had to do with the weakening effect
of Turkey's role as the player which carries weight and is at an equal
"distance" to all others in the region.
There were two points that might help to explain the perceptions I
mentioned so that they can be taken seriously. These are the issues for
Ankara as the choreographers of Turkey's foreign policy, and they will
need to revisit the "Davutoglu doctrine" for necessary adjustments.
There were also some third voices in the two-day meeting that sounded
in agreement with the Davutoglu doctrine. In a broader perspective,
it looks like this: The US, plagued by intervention fatigue in foreign
lands, is not at all interested in a repeat of the Libya situation in
Syria, at least not until after the elections. Depending on whether
Barack Obama or Mitt Romney is elected, this could change as early
as next year. Meanwhile, Russia is keen to reassert its Cold War-like
presence in the region, not only through Syria, but also Cyprus.
Nobody really knows how Romney would deal with Iran, if elected. But
it is known that Benjamin Netanyahu is an old friend, and that will
play a key role in the decision-making process. A strong guess is
that he may choose Eric Edelman, a former US ambassador in Ankara,
in the post that deals with Turkey. Given how much negativity there
is in the Justice and Development Party (AKP) perception of Edelman,
this may prove to be a challenge in relations.
Recent Israel-Greece, Israel-Cyprus and Cyprus-Lebanon moves are also
points of serious concern for the US because it may easily drag Turkey
into a nasty military conflict in the eastern Mediterranean. Although
Washington resents the fact that Israel refuses to apologize for the
Mavi Marmara incident and finds that refusal infantile, it also finds
the escalation in Ankara's rhetoric regarding the eastern Mediterranean
immature and rather illegitimate.
The worst outcome of Turkey's aggressive discourse is the fact that
it managed to cement unity between the Armenian, Greek and Jewish
lobbies in Washington. How it will play out into the otherwise fine
Turkish-American relations after November is yet to be seen. Everybody
in the meeting agreed that the "Arab Twilight" and the region had
far too many unknowns. It increases dangers.
But there is one certainty, without which the process of the Arab
Spring cannot be managed in Turkey: Given the circumstances, Erdogan
and the AKP will rule Turkey for another decade, at least. This
will help with the long-term planning of matters related to the Arab
Spring. Therefore it is crucial that Israel take the mature step of
issuing an apology, accept that Turkey's stability is vital for its
interests, and at the end of the day be helpful in building a region
of stability. It is never too late.