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The Cold War Between Turkey And Iran - Analysis

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  • The Cold War Between Turkey And Iran - Analysis

    The Cold War Between Turkey And Iran - Analysis


    By: Published by the Foreign Policy Research
    Institute

    June 21, 2012
    By Can Kasapoglu

    With American clout in the Middle East on the decline, the historic power
    struggle between Turkey and Iran has intensified, each attempting to fill
    the vacuum in the region by expanding its influence. Syria and Iraq have
    become the battlefields between Turkey and Iran. In Syria, a proxy war is
    underway, with Iran supplying weapons to its Alawite client and Turkey
    actively arming the opposition. In Iraq, Turkey and Iran vie for political
    influence along Sunni-Shiite fault lines. In neither arena is Turkey seen
    as the regional leader it aspires to be.
    NEO-OTTOMANS VS. PERSIANS ON A MIDDLE EAST CHESSBOARD
    [image: Iran - Turkey Relations]

    Iran - Turkey Relations

    The US withdrawal from Iraq, and its corresponding decline in regional
    influence, has left a power vacuum in the Middle East. Two historic rivals,
    Turkey and Iran, have stepped into the fray; each hoping to extend its
    influence at the expense of the other. With Syria and Iraq serving as the
    battlefields, the lines of battle have been drawn mostly along Sunni-Shiite
    sectarian divisions.
    In Syria, where the Sunni majority is struggling to overthrow the Alawite
    Assad regime, Turkish-Iranian differences can have dire consequences for
    Arab lives. A proxy war has effectively developed, with the Iranians
    supplying weapons to their Alawite clients and Turkey actively arming the
    opposition.

    The victims of the recent massacre in Houla, who numbered more than 100,
    half of whom were children, served as pawns in the regional game between
    the ancient rivals. Tehran sided with the Assad regime in claiming that the
    murders were perpetrated by terrorists and foreign forces. Whereas Ankara
    demanded that Syria withdraw its diplomats from Turkey within 72 hours. The
    Turkish foreign ministry also threatened to take further `measures' if
    such
    crimes against humanity continued in Syria.

    In contrast with the Syrian scenes of carnage, the Turkish-Iranian showdown
    in Iraq includes less bloodshed and more political maneuvering. Ankara and
    Tehran each has its favored political groups and personalities. The pro-
    Iran Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and the pro-Turkish Sunni Vice
    President Tarek Hashimi each serves as a respective `man in Baghdad.'

    Under pressure from the Iran-aligned Maliki, an arrest warrant was issued
    for Hashimi on charges of running death squads against Iraqi Shiites.
    Interpol subsequently issued its own arrest warrant for Hashimi. However,
    the erstwhile vice prime minister has found refuge in Turkey, and Ankara
    has made clear that it is not about to hand over its man in Baghdad.

    Clearly, a Cold War has developed between Turkey and Iran in the Middle
    East. While so far tensions have remained relatively stable, there is a
    real possibility of things heating up.
    SYRIA: THE PROXY WAR

    In Syria, the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad is coming under increasing
    pressure from an expanding insurgency. Ankara has offered sanction and
    armed and moral support to the opposition.

    Turkey's Hatay province has become the headquarters of the Free Syrian
    Army, while the Friends of Syria, which is critical of Assad held a meeting
    in Istanbul on April 1, 2012.

    Turkey's Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, has told the Turkish Parliament
    that Damascus has the blood of innocents on its hands, and that Turkey
    `would not offer its hand to such a regime unless it cleans itself up.'

    In contrast, Iran continues to support the Baathist regime politically and
    militarily. Iran even acknowledges that its Quds Forces, the arm of the
    Revolutionary Guards tasked with overseas operations, has conducted
    operations in Syria. Ismail Gha'ani, the deputy head of the Quds force, has
    claimedthat,
    `Before our presence in Syria, too many people were killed by the
    opposition but with the physical and non- physical presence of the Islamic
    republic, big massacres in Syria were prevented.'

    There is also reason to believe that Iran's Lebanese ally, Hezbollah, has
    played a supportive role in the bloody crackdown.
    Syria has become the test field of Ankara's and Tehran's proxy war
    capabilities. Iran is much more experienced in waging proxy wars in a wide
    array of areas, ranging from Afghanistan to Lebanese Hezbollah and
    Palestinian radical Muslims. However, as atrocities similar to the Houla
    massacre continue to mount, there is increasing risk that the low intensity
    conflict could provoke a military intervention.

    The scenario of an intervention would be a game changer. Currently, Iran
    can leverage its superior experience in proxy warfare. However, Turkey
    holds the advantage with regard to conventional warfare capacity. Thus,
    Iran can have the upper hand as long as the Syrian crisis does not force a
    military intervention by the West and/or Turkey.
    IRAQ: THE POLITICAL CONTEST

    Ever since the American departure from Iraq, Turkey and Iran have each
    tried to use their weight to affect the political makeup of the country and
    extend their influence. The competition first surfaced in the parliamentary
    elections of 2010 when Ankara supported the relatively secular and Sunni
    dominated Iraqiya party, which included Hashimi's Renewal List. Tehran on
    the other hand, stood behind the State of Law Coalition, which included
    Maliki's Islamic Da'awa Party, and other Shiite Islamist groups which
    gathered under the National Iraqi Alliance bloc.

    Although the Sunni Iraqiya garnered two seats more than the State of Law
    Coalition in the elections, Maliki managed to keep his position as prime
    minister by consolidating his power with the more radical, pro-Iran Shiite
    groups of the National Iraqi Alliance, including the Sadrists and Supreme
    Iraqi Islamic Council. Maliki has gradually seized greater personal control
    over the country by simultaneously retaining multiple critical posts, such
    as acting interior minister, defense minister and national security affairs
    minister.

    It was under these circumstances that the pro-Ankara Vice President Hashimi
    was forced to flee the country. Hashimi first took refuge with the regional
    government of Northern Iraq, and then travelled to the Sunni Gulf states
    before settling in Turkey.
    In Iraq, the regional Sunni-Shiite fault lines are clearly visible. Baghdad
    has aligned itself with Iran in support of the Alawite regime in Syria. It
    has blocked an attempt by the Arab League to adopt a harsh resolution
    against Assad's crackdown.

    The formation of a Shiite bloc has corresponded with a Turkish-Iraqi
    divergence, which peaked in April 2012, when Maliki labeled Turkey `a
    hostile state.' This statement was made in response to Prime Minister
    Erdogan's accusation against the Maliki administration of fomenting
    sectarian tensions in Iraq.

    Ankara responded to the Shiite bloc by deepening its ties with Sunnis and
    with Kurds in northern Iraq, in addition to hosting Tarek Hashimi in
    Istanbul.

    Turkish-Iraqi, and sectarian, tensions have simmered to the point that they
    have been manifest on the street. On May 19 there were anti-Turkey
    demonstrations and a burning of the Turkish flag in Basra, a Shiite
    province. These acts infuriated the Turkish public.
    TURKISH REGIONAL LEADERSHIP?

    Adherents of the Turkish foreign policy doctrine, the so-called Davutoglu
    Doctrine, wish to see Turkey as the rising star of the region; as the
    leader of a regional `spring.' Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu has
    declared that, `Turkey will lead the change in the Middle East as its
    master and servant.'

    However, in Syria and Iraq the `Arab Spring' has turned into the sectarian
    winter of the Islamic world, with Turkey as a problematic protagonist, not
    a leader. Early on, Davutoglu promoted a 'zero problems with neighbors'
    foreign policy, which aimed to enhance Turkey's power in the historical
    Ottoman territories and promote integration for making national borders
    meaningless -all in an attempt to restore Turkish (Ottoman) regional
    hegemony. Yet Turkey's involvement in Shiite-Sunni conflicts renders this
    doctrine an unattainable utopia. None of the local players see Turkey as
    the regional leader it aspires to be.

    Author:
    Can Kasapoglu, who holds a Ph.D. from the Strategic Research Institute at
    the Turkish War College, is a visiting post-doctoral researcher at the
    Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. This essay is reprinted with
    permission from BESA Perspectives, No. 172, June 11, 2012, published by The
    Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.
    About the author:

    Published by the Foreign Policy Research
    Institute

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