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Politkom.ru , Russia
June 20 2012
Unrecognized Expression of Will
by Sergey Markedonov, political analyst and Candidate of Historical Sciences
The presidential election campaign starts 20 June in the unrecognized
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). It will last through 17 July, and two
days after that there will be a vote for the candidates on offer. As
of today the Central Electoral Commission has registered four
contenders for the post of president. They are the republic's
incumbent head Bako Sahakyan (he has held the post since 2007); former
Deputy Defence Minister Vitali Balasanyan; Arkadi Sogomonyan, provost
of the Armenian Agrarian University's Stepanakert branch; and
unemployed pensioner Valeri Khachatryan. All candidates position
themselves as unaffiliated to any party. But there are nuances
here....
The three parties which have parliamentary factions (the "Democratic
Party of Artsakh," "Free Motherland," and "Dashnaktsutyun," Armenia's
oldest political force) have expressed themselves in support of Bako
Sahakyan. In May of this year he was also supported by the Communist
Party, which is not represented in parliament. An interesting
collision has also arisen in relations between Dashnaktsutyun and
Vitali Balasanyan, who is seen by many politicians and experts as the
main rival to the unrecognized republic's incumbent president. This
contender was for many years a member of the Dashnak faction. It was
with the Dashnaktsutyun party that Balasanyan came into parliament at
the 2005 elections (at the time the party was part of the
"Movement-88" bloc, which is not represented in the present
convocation of the NKR's supreme representative body). Moreover, at
the parliamentary elections in May 2010, the relative success of the
Dashnaks (although it eventually came third, the party got 20.2 per
cent of the votes) was largely secured thanks to Balasanyan's
campaign. However, even before the start of the new presidential
campaign, his faction associates have decided to support not him but
the "single candidate" - the republic's incumbent head Bako Sahakyan.
As a result cooperation between the Dashnaks and Balasanyan has been
suspended. However, in unrecognized formations, the "party factor"
should not be exaggerated. According to various assessments, 1-2 per
cent of the NKR population belongs to various parties. And often
people living in a republic of disputed status and in an atmosphere of
unresolved ethnopolitical conflict vote not for bright political
labels but for specific individuals with whom they link hopes for
changes. In this connection we may recall the story of the election of
the mayor of the NKR capital, Stepanakert, in 2004, when the
opposition contender won despite the republican authorities'
administrative will.
What role might the forthcoming campaign play, both in domestic
political dynamics in the unrecognized republic itself and in the
process of resolving the long-standing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?
First, elections in the NKR, particularly in the context of the
formation of a new status quo in the greater Caucasus since the August
2008 events, differ substantially from similar procedures in Abkhazia,
South Ossetia, and the Dniester Moldavian Republic. In contrast to the
first two of these formations, Russia does not recognize election
results in Nagorno-Karabakh. From the formal legal viewpoint, Moscow
does not recognize the Dniester Region's statehood either. But here
there are nuances. Russian diplomacy views the Dniester Moldavian
Republic as a side in the conflict with the internationally recognized
Republic of Moldova, and contacts between Dniester Region officials
and Russian Federation representatives are not particularly concealed.
Moreover, like Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Dniester Moldavian
Republic has its own official "curator" on the Russian side. He is
Dmitriy Rogozin (the corresponding representative for Abkhazia is
Kuban Governor Aleksandr Tkachev and for South Ossetia it is North
Ossetian head Taymuraz Mamsurov). There is nothing similar in the
situation with regard to the NKR. It is entirely predictable that on
19 July, or a day after the vote, representatives of the Russian
Federation Foreign Ministry will announce that they do not recognize
the results of the "unrecognized vote" and that they support
Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.
Second, despite all the complexities described above, there is an
interesting paradox in the Nagorno-Karabakh elections. Without having
even partial recognition, they attract a far larger number of
activists from the NGOs and media of Western countries. These include
some that are quite well known. Thus, at the previous NKR presidential
elections in 2007, six representatives of the famous US organization
Public International Law and Policy Group were present. This structure
was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005. It has many years'
experience of work (including observing elections in post-conflict
societies, including Kosovo). The reasons why the NKR is so popular
have their roots in the "perestroyka" years, when the Nagorno-Karabakh
movement positioned its struggle as opposition to Soviet communism and
"Stalin's nationalities policy." It is clear that in reality the
situation was not that simple and unequivocal. But modern Western
society reacts to familiar key symbols. Meanwhile, since a fragile
truce was achieved in May 1994, the NKR has done quite a lot to turn
the "democratic tool" into a serious ideological and political weapon.
The unrecognized republic has succeeded in moving from the "manual
control" of the time of the military conflict, when all power and
mobilization resources were concentrated in the hands of the State
Defence Committee, and also in overcoming the challenge from the field
commanders in the early 2000s. In the entire time the NKR has existed
(it was proclaimed in September 1991), it has had three successive
presidents, Robert Kocharyan, Arkadi Gukasyan, and Bako Sahakyan
(Artur Lazarian was the republic's first leader, but he was chairman
of the Supreme Council) and several parliaments (the last was elected
two years ago). It should also be noted that official Baku sees the
territory of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and the
seven rayons around it as occupied. But in contrast to Georgia, no
laws have been adopted here strictly regulating the behaviour of
foreigners who are not official representatives of their states but
are visiting the unrecognized republic for various purposes. Official
Azerbaijan's reaction to these visits is, naturally, negative, but
specific actions against persons visiting the NKR are individual, in
contrast to Georgia's "universalist" approaches.
Third, the election campaign in the NKR is taking place against the
background of an increase in military clashes in the
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict zone. They did not abate even during the
US Secretary of State's visit to the greater Caucasus. A similar
accompaniment in Abkhazia and South Ossetia since 2008 is already
impossible, although even there they do not manage without minor
incidents. The Dniester Region is the "coolest" of the post-Soviet
trouble spots. And the state of "military alarm" cannot fail to have
the most direct influence on the course of the elections, which some
Nagorno-Karabakh journalists have rushed to call "elections without
choices." Indeed, compared with previous years, the NKR political
elites are demonstrating far greater unanimity. Here there is also
support for the incumbent president from all parliamentary factions,
trade unions, and civil structures. Under the difficult geopolitical
conditions, there is not much scope for broad domestic political
competition. The NKR is not discovering any kind of know-how here.
South Ossetia followed a similar scenario in 2004-2006, supporting
Eduard Kokoiti with Central Asian and Belarusian results. But the
Georgian threat only had to subside for the South Ossetian president's
"popularity" to melt rapidly away. Probably the reduction of the risks
of a new war in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict zone would make the
process of the elections in the NKR more intriguing and not hard to
predict [as published]. But even today Valeri Balasanyan's
participation could make the campaign something more than a contest
between one heavyweight (Bako Sahakyan) and a few bit-part players.
Here (again we should bear in mind the mounting instability around
Nagorno-Karabakh) the rhetoric of the main opponent to the NKR leader
will most likely be far tougher with regard to those subjects which
concern security, defence, foreign policy, and the negotiating
process. Especially as throughout 2004-05 Balasanyan headed the "Union
of Veterans of the Artsakh War." Today he is criticizing quite
severely the "Updated Madrid Principles" and the deployment of
peacekeeping forces in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict zone. True,
the NKR is not a participant in the negotiations to settle the
ethnopolitical conflict, in contrast to the Dniester Moldavian
Republic, which has been involved in the negotiations with Chisinau,
and Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are taking part in the Geneva
consultations. But that certainly does not mean that this position is
not being taken into account by anyone. That applies particularly to
Yerevan, which is the Armenian side's sole representative at the
talks. And Balasanyan has also spoken clearly and unambiguously on
several occasions about raising the responsibility of "greater
Armenia" to the NKR. In this connection the incumbent president will
be faced with the difficult task of presenting his position as "an
exemplary patriotic one."
Thus questions of security and geopolitical survival will become the
most important topic of the election campaign. I think that on this
occasion they will substantially crowd out topics relating to
democracy and political competition as such. However that may be, the
very fact that elections are being held in the NKR should compel key
international players to ponder what to do with the results of the
next "unrecognized vote." Can they confine themselves merely to
ignoring them?
[translated from Russian]
June 20 2012
Unrecognized Expression of Will
by Sergey Markedonov, political analyst and Candidate of Historical Sciences
The presidential election campaign starts 20 June in the unrecognized
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). It will last through 17 July, and two
days after that there will be a vote for the candidates on offer. As
of today the Central Electoral Commission has registered four
contenders for the post of president. They are the republic's
incumbent head Bako Sahakyan (he has held the post since 2007); former
Deputy Defence Minister Vitali Balasanyan; Arkadi Sogomonyan, provost
of the Armenian Agrarian University's Stepanakert branch; and
unemployed pensioner Valeri Khachatryan. All candidates position
themselves as unaffiliated to any party. But there are nuances
here....
The three parties which have parliamentary factions (the "Democratic
Party of Artsakh," "Free Motherland," and "Dashnaktsutyun," Armenia's
oldest political force) have expressed themselves in support of Bako
Sahakyan. In May of this year he was also supported by the Communist
Party, which is not represented in parliament. An interesting
collision has also arisen in relations between Dashnaktsutyun and
Vitali Balasanyan, who is seen by many politicians and experts as the
main rival to the unrecognized republic's incumbent president. This
contender was for many years a member of the Dashnak faction. It was
with the Dashnaktsutyun party that Balasanyan came into parliament at
the 2005 elections (at the time the party was part of the
"Movement-88" bloc, which is not represented in the present
convocation of the NKR's supreme representative body). Moreover, at
the parliamentary elections in May 2010, the relative success of the
Dashnaks (although it eventually came third, the party got 20.2 per
cent of the votes) was largely secured thanks to Balasanyan's
campaign. However, even before the start of the new presidential
campaign, his faction associates have decided to support not him but
the "single candidate" - the republic's incumbent head Bako Sahakyan.
As a result cooperation between the Dashnaks and Balasanyan has been
suspended. However, in unrecognized formations, the "party factor"
should not be exaggerated. According to various assessments, 1-2 per
cent of the NKR population belongs to various parties. And often
people living in a republic of disputed status and in an atmosphere of
unresolved ethnopolitical conflict vote not for bright political
labels but for specific individuals with whom they link hopes for
changes. In this connection we may recall the story of the election of
the mayor of the NKR capital, Stepanakert, in 2004, when the
opposition contender won despite the republican authorities'
administrative will.
What role might the forthcoming campaign play, both in domestic
political dynamics in the unrecognized republic itself and in the
process of resolving the long-standing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?
First, elections in the NKR, particularly in the context of the
formation of a new status quo in the greater Caucasus since the August
2008 events, differ substantially from similar procedures in Abkhazia,
South Ossetia, and the Dniester Moldavian Republic. In contrast to the
first two of these formations, Russia does not recognize election
results in Nagorno-Karabakh. From the formal legal viewpoint, Moscow
does not recognize the Dniester Region's statehood either. But here
there are nuances. Russian diplomacy views the Dniester Moldavian
Republic as a side in the conflict with the internationally recognized
Republic of Moldova, and contacts between Dniester Region officials
and Russian Federation representatives are not particularly concealed.
Moreover, like Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Dniester Moldavian
Republic has its own official "curator" on the Russian side. He is
Dmitriy Rogozin (the corresponding representative for Abkhazia is
Kuban Governor Aleksandr Tkachev and for South Ossetia it is North
Ossetian head Taymuraz Mamsurov). There is nothing similar in the
situation with regard to the NKR. It is entirely predictable that on
19 July, or a day after the vote, representatives of the Russian
Federation Foreign Ministry will announce that they do not recognize
the results of the "unrecognized vote" and that they support
Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.
Second, despite all the complexities described above, there is an
interesting paradox in the Nagorno-Karabakh elections. Without having
even partial recognition, they attract a far larger number of
activists from the NGOs and media of Western countries. These include
some that are quite well known. Thus, at the previous NKR presidential
elections in 2007, six representatives of the famous US organization
Public International Law and Policy Group were present. This structure
was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005. It has many years'
experience of work (including observing elections in post-conflict
societies, including Kosovo). The reasons why the NKR is so popular
have their roots in the "perestroyka" years, when the Nagorno-Karabakh
movement positioned its struggle as opposition to Soviet communism and
"Stalin's nationalities policy." It is clear that in reality the
situation was not that simple and unequivocal. But modern Western
society reacts to familiar key symbols. Meanwhile, since a fragile
truce was achieved in May 1994, the NKR has done quite a lot to turn
the "democratic tool" into a serious ideological and political weapon.
The unrecognized republic has succeeded in moving from the "manual
control" of the time of the military conflict, when all power and
mobilization resources were concentrated in the hands of the State
Defence Committee, and also in overcoming the challenge from the field
commanders in the early 2000s. In the entire time the NKR has existed
(it was proclaimed in September 1991), it has had three successive
presidents, Robert Kocharyan, Arkadi Gukasyan, and Bako Sahakyan
(Artur Lazarian was the republic's first leader, but he was chairman
of the Supreme Council) and several parliaments (the last was elected
two years ago). It should also be noted that official Baku sees the
territory of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and the
seven rayons around it as occupied. But in contrast to Georgia, no
laws have been adopted here strictly regulating the behaviour of
foreigners who are not official representatives of their states but
are visiting the unrecognized republic for various purposes. Official
Azerbaijan's reaction to these visits is, naturally, negative, but
specific actions against persons visiting the NKR are individual, in
contrast to Georgia's "universalist" approaches.
Third, the election campaign in the NKR is taking place against the
background of an increase in military clashes in the
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict zone. They did not abate even during the
US Secretary of State's visit to the greater Caucasus. A similar
accompaniment in Abkhazia and South Ossetia since 2008 is already
impossible, although even there they do not manage without minor
incidents. The Dniester Region is the "coolest" of the post-Soviet
trouble spots. And the state of "military alarm" cannot fail to have
the most direct influence on the course of the elections, which some
Nagorno-Karabakh journalists have rushed to call "elections without
choices." Indeed, compared with previous years, the NKR political
elites are demonstrating far greater unanimity. Here there is also
support for the incumbent president from all parliamentary factions,
trade unions, and civil structures. Under the difficult geopolitical
conditions, there is not much scope for broad domestic political
competition. The NKR is not discovering any kind of know-how here.
South Ossetia followed a similar scenario in 2004-2006, supporting
Eduard Kokoiti with Central Asian and Belarusian results. But the
Georgian threat only had to subside for the South Ossetian president's
"popularity" to melt rapidly away. Probably the reduction of the risks
of a new war in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict zone would make the
process of the elections in the NKR more intriguing and not hard to
predict [as published]. But even today Valeri Balasanyan's
participation could make the campaign something more than a contest
between one heavyweight (Bako Sahakyan) and a few bit-part players.
Here (again we should bear in mind the mounting instability around
Nagorno-Karabakh) the rhetoric of the main opponent to the NKR leader
will most likely be far tougher with regard to those subjects which
concern security, defence, foreign policy, and the negotiating
process. Especially as throughout 2004-05 Balasanyan headed the "Union
of Veterans of the Artsakh War." Today he is criticizing quite
severely the "Updated Madrid Principles" and the deployment of
peacekeeping forces in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict zone. True,
the NKR is not a participant in the negotiations to settle the
ethnopolitical conflict, in contrast to the Dniester Moldavian
Republic, which has been involved in the negotiations with Chisinau,
and Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are taking part in the Geneva
consultations. But that certainly does not mean that this position is
not being taken into account by anyone. That applies particularly to
Yerevan, which is the Armenian side's sole representative at the
talks. And Balasanyan has also spoken clearly and unambiguously on
several occasions about raising the responsibility of "greater
Armenia" to the NKR. In this connection the incumbent president will
be faced with the difficult task of presenting his position as "an
exemplary patriotic one."
Thus questions of security and geopolitical survival will become the
most important topic of the election campaign. I think that on this
occasion they will substantially crowd out topics relating to
democracy and political competition as such. However that may be, the
very fact that elections are being held in the NKR should compel key
international players to ponder what to do with the results of the
next "unrecognized vote." Can they confine themselves merely to
ignoring them?
[translated from Russian]