Tweet
ICG Published Report on Armenia
Story from Lragir.am News:
http://www.lragir.am/engsrc/politics26665.html
Published: 20:46:47 - 25/06/2012
The International Crisis Group Report Armenia: An Opportunity for
Statesmanship
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
After May's parliamentary elections, Armenia is preparing for a pivotal
presidential vote in 2013 that will determine whether it has shed a
nearly two-decade history of fraud-tainted elections and put in place
a government with the legitimacy needed to implement comprehensive
reform and resolve its problems with Azerbaijan.
President Serzh Sargsyan has a brief opportunity to demonstrate
statesmanship before he again faces the voters in what is likely to
be a competitive contest. Sargsyan has demonstrated some courage to
promote change, but like his predecessors, he has thus far failed
to deal effectively with serious economic and governance problems,
including the debilitating, albeit low-intensity, Nagorno-Karabakh
war. Another election perceived as seriously flawed would serve as
a further distraction from peace talks and severe economic problems.
The likely consequences would then be ever more citizens opting out
of democratic politics, including by emigration.
The genuinely competitive parliamentary election had some positive
signs. Media coverage during much of the campaign was more balanced,
and free assembly, expression and movement were largely respected.
The president's ruling Republican Party won a solid majority of seats,
but its former coalition partner, Prosperous Armenia - associated
with rich businessman and ex-president Robert Kocharyan - came in
a strong second. The Armenian National Congress (ANC), led by the
first post-independence president, Levon Ter-Petrossian, returned
to parliament after a more than ten-year absence. Nevertheless,
many old problems reappeared: abuse of administrative resources;
inflated voters lists; vote-buying; lack of sufficient redress for
election violations; and reports of multiple voting and pressure on
some voters. Reforms adopted after the violence that left ten dead
and 450 injured following the 2008 election that brought Sargsyan to
power were spottily implemented.
It is crucial that the February 2013 election in which Sargsyan will
seek a second term, becomes "the cleanest elections in Armenian
history", as the president had promised, not least because polls
show very low trust in nearly all government bodies and institutions,
including the presidency and parliament. The president initially took
some bold steps, most noteworthy attempting to normalise relations
with Turkey. A new class of under-40 technocrats, less influenced by
Soviet ways of decision-making, has risen through the ranks and is
widely seen as favouring a new style of government. But change has
been slow. Political courage is needed to overhaul a deeply entrenched
system in which big business and politics are intertwined in a manner
that is often at least opaque. This manifests itself most vividly
through the domination of much of the economy by a small group of
rich businessmen with government connections.
The political crisis after the 2008 post-election violence, as well
as the 2009 world economic crisis, shook Armenia. Weak political will
and the resistance of vested interests muted many of the long-overdue,
if timid, reforms the administration started. The economy consequently
remains undiversified, unhealthily reliant on remittances. Rates of
emigration and seasonal migration abroad are alarmingly high. There
have been few serious efforts to combat high-level corruption. The
executive branch still enjoys overwhelming, virtually unchecked
powers. The judicial system is perceived as neither independent nor
competent: the prosecutor dominates procedures, and mechanisms to
hold authorities accountable are largely ineffective.
Media freedom is inadequate. Outright harassment of journalists and
media outlets has decreased, but there is still a glaring lack of
diversity in television, from which an overwhelming majority of
Armenians get their information. No nationwide broadcasters are
regarded as fully independent.
Russia remains Armenia's key ally - both its main security
guarantor and biggest trading and investment partner. Because of
the war with Azerbaijan and frozen ties with Turkey, Yerevan has few
realistic alternatives to Moscow, though it has frequently sought a
"multi-vector" foreign policy and deeper ties with Euro-Atlantic
partners. The EU and U.S. are trying to increase their influence,
offering expertise and other aid to promote reforms, but they should
do more to keep the government accountable and encourage the building
of democratic institutions, especially if they want to be seen as
credible, even-handed critics throughout the region with elections
also due in Georgia and Azerbaijan in 2012-2013. Twenty years after
the breakup of the Soviet Union, peaceful democratic transitions of
power have yet to become the norm in the South Caucasus.
President Sargsyan and his government acknowledge many of the most
pressing problems, but numerous reforms exist only on paper or seem
deliberately designed with ineffective enforcement mechanisms. The
cautious, evolutionary approach to reforms provides at best weak
stability. The breakup of the Republican-Prosperous Armenia governing
coalition and a more competitive parliament may now provide the
stimulus the administration needs. Limping towards change, however,
would neither capitalise on Armenia's strengths nor be a good
presidential campaign strategy. The country needs a better future
than a stunted economy and dead-end conflicts with neighbours.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To further democratisation, economic growth and reform and make the
government better prepared to engage in difficult discussions with
Azerbaijan over resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
To the Government of Armenia:
1. Make deep governance and economic reforms a top priority to build
public trust in state institutions.
2.Address the shortcomings of the electoral process identified by
the International Election Observation (IEO) mission; improve, in
particular, voter lists and the complaints and appeals procedure;
and investigate and penalise abuses of the elections process by
state officials.
3. Continue to make the fight against corruption a state priority
by prosecuting officials involved in fraud.
4.Pass a new Criminal Procedure Code that strengthens the
independence of the judiciary, increases the role of the defence
and decreases the prosecutor general's powers; and improve the
effectiveness of the Administrative Court to hold officials
accountable.
5. Increase financial support for the office of the ombudsman,
especially its activities in the regions.
6.Establish civilian control and accountability of the police;
tackle corruption in the force; and consider establishing a ministry
to which the police would be subordinate.
7. Redouble efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with
Azerbaijan and maintain an open approach to resuming a dialogue
with Turkey.
To the U.S., EU and international organisations:
8. Offer technical and financial assistance to help the government
address voter registration problems, especially bloated voters lists,
which undermine public trust in elections.
9.Support aggressive judicial reform programs linked to the
setting of benchmarks for implementation of the "strategic action
plan 2012-2016" and passage of a new Criminal Procedure Code.
10. Increase funding to non-state actors to support re-form; and
hold the government accountable for any backsliding from progress
achieved during the 2012 parliamentary vote regarding media access
and freedom of assembly and expression.
Yerevan/Tbilisi/Istanbul/Brussels, 25 June 2012
Story from Lragir.am News:
http://www.lragir.am/engsrc/politics26665.html
Published: 20:46:47 - 25/06/2012
The International Crisis Group Report Armenia: An Opportunity for
Statesmanship
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
After May's parliamentary elections, Armenia is preparing for a pivotal
presidential vote in 2013 that will determine whether it has shed a
nearly two-decade history of fraud-tainted elections and put in place
a government with the legitimacy needed to implement comprehensive
reform and resolve its problems with Azerbaijan.
President Serzh Sargsyan has a brief opportunity to demonstrate
statesmanship before he again faces the voters in what is likely to
be a competitive contest. Sargsyan has demonstrated some courage to
promote change, but like his predecessors, he has thus far failed
to deal effectively with serious economic and governance problems,
including the debilitating, albeit low-intensity, Nagorno-Karabakh
war. Another election perceived as seriously flawed would serve as
a further distraction from peace talks and severe economic problems.
The likely consequences would then be ever more citizens opting out
of democratic politics, including by emigration.
The genuinely competitive parliamentary election had some positive
signs. Media coverage during much of the campaign was more balanced,
and free assembly, expression and movement were largely respected.
The president's ruling Republican Party won a solid majority of seats,
but its former coalition partner, Prosperous Armenia - associated
with rich businessman and ex-president Robert Kocharyan - came in
a strong second. The Armenian National Congress (ANC), led by the
first post-independence president, Levon Ter-Petrossian, returned
to parliament after a more than ten-year absence. Nevertheless,
many old problems reappeared: abuse of administrative resources;
inflated voters lists; vote-buying; lack of sufficient redress for
election violations; and reports of multiple voting and pressure on
some voters. Reforms adopted after the violence that left ten dead
and 450 injured following the 2008 election that brought Sargsyan to
power were spottily implemented.
It is crucial that the February 2013 election in which Sargsyan will
seek a second term, becomes "the cleanest elections in Armenian
history", as the president had promised, not least because polls
show very low trust in nearly all government bodies and institutions,
including the presidency and parliament. The president initially took
some bold steps, most noteworthy attempting to normalise relations
with Turkey. A new class of under-40 technocrats, less influenced by
Soviet ways of decision-making, has risen through the ranks and is
widely seen as favouring a new style of government. But change has
been slow. Political courage is needed to overhaul a deeply entrenched
system in which big business and politics are intertwined in a manner
that is often at least opaque. This manifests itself most vividly
through the domination of much of the economy by a small group of
rich businessmen with government connections.
The political crisis after the 2008 post-election violence, as well
as the 2009 world economic crisis, shook Armenia. Weak political will
and the resistance of vested interests muted many of the long-overdue,
if timid, reforms the administration started. The economy consequently
remains undiversified, unhealthily reliant on remittances. Rates of
emigration and seasonal migration abroad are alarmingly high. There
have been few serious efforts to combat high-level corruption. The
executive branch still enjoys overwhelming, virtually unchecked
powers. The judicial system is perceived as neither independent nor
competent: the prosecutor dominates procedures, and mechanisms to
hold authorities accountable are largely ineffective.
Media freedom is inadequate. Outright harassment of journalists and
media outlets has decreased, but there is still a glaring lack of
diversity in television, from which an overwhelming majority of
Armenians get their information. No nationwide broadcasters are
regarded as fully independent.
Russia remains Armenia's key ally - both its main security
guarantor and biggest trading and investment partner. Because of
the war with Azerbaijan and frozen ties with Turkey, Yerevan has few
realistic alternatives to Moscow, though it has frequently sought a
"multi-vector" foreign policy and deeper ties with Euro-Atlantic
partners. The EU and U.S. are trying to increase their influence,
offering expertise and other aid to promote reforms, but they should
do more to keep the government accountable and encourage the building
of democratic institutions, especially if they want to be seen as
credible, even-handed critics throughout the region with elections
also due in Georgia and Azerbaijan in 2012-2013. Twenty years after
the breakup of the Soviet Union, peaceful democratic transitions of
power have yet to become the norm in the South Caucasus.
President Sargsyan and his government acknowledge many of the most
pressing problems, but numerous reforms exist only on paper or seem
deliberately designed with ineffective enforcement mechanisms. The
cautious, evolutionary approach to reforms provides at best weak
stability. The breakup of the Republican-Prosperous Armenia governing
coalition and a more competitive parliament may now provide the
stimulus the administration needs. Limping towards change, however,
would neither capitalise on Armenia's strengths nor be a good
presidential campaign strategy. The country needs a better future
than a stunted economy and dead-end conflicts with neighbours.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To further democratisation, economic growth and reform and make the
government better prepared to engage in difficult discussions with
Azerbaijan over resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
To the Government of Armenia:
1. Make deep governance and economic reforms a top priority to build
public trust in state institutions.
2.Address the shortcomings of the electoral process identified by
the International Election Observation (IEO) mission; improve, in
particular, voter lists and the complaints and appeals procedure;
and investigate and penalise abuses of the elections process by
state officials.
3. Continue to make the fight against corruption a state priority
by prosecuting officials involved in fraud.
4.Pass a new Criminal Procedure Code that strengthens the
independence of the judiciary, increases the role of the defence
and decreases the prosecutor general's powers; and improve the
effectiveness of the Administrative Court to hold officials
accountable.
5. Increase financial support for the office of the ombudsman,
especially its activities in the regions.
6.Establish civilian control and accountability of the police;
tackle corruption in the force; and consider establishing a ministry
to which the police would be subordinate.
7. Redouble efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with
Azerbaijan and maintain an open approach to resuming a dialogue
with Turkey.
To the U.S., EU and international organisations:
8. Offer technical and financial assistance to help the government
address voter registration problems, especially bloated voters lists,
which undermine public trust in elections.
9.Support aggressive judicial reform programs linked to the
setting of benchmarks for implementation of the "strategic action
plan 2012-2016" and passage of a new Criminal Procedure Code.
10. Increase funding to non-state actors to support re-form; and
hold the government accountable for any backsliding from progress
achieved during the 2012 parliamentary vote regarding media access
and freedom of assembly and expression.
Yerevan/Tbilisi/Istanbul/Brussels, 25 June 2012