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LAURENCE BROERS: INCIDENTS ALONG LINE OF CONTACT IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH WILL NOT LEAD TO A FULLY-FLEDGED WAR
by Oksana Musaelyan
arminfo
Tuesday, June 26, 22:48
ArmInfo's interview with Laurence Broers, Conciliation Resources,
Caucasus Programme Projects Manager
Incidents on the Line of Contact in Nagorno Karabakh have been
increased recently. Do you think these are on spot problems or this
kind of incitement will consequently lead to a full-fledged new war?
Overall the number of incidents along the LOC and ceasefire violations
is less than it was several years ago. They are better recorded today
and attract more media attention than before, so there is a perception
of an overall deterioration. What is an emerging trend, however,
is the tactical deployment of ceasefire violations and incidents
as a lever to apply political pressure, disruption or distraction at
sensitive moments. Incidents appear to be more and more 'choreographed'
to coincide with key moments in domestic political politics and, for
example, visits of foreign dignitaries. But while these incidents
radicalise the populations and narrow the space for discussion of
non-violent solutions, there is no linear cause and effect relationship
between them and a fully-fledged war. Although unintended escalation
is always a risk, if a fully-fledged war happens it will have its
own dynamics and causes beyond the immediate reality of the LOC.
What do you think about a possibility of deployment of Russian military
force on the border line with Armenia and Azerbaijan as preventive
measures to restrain tension?
There is not a positive experience with the deployment of Russian
(peacekeeping) forces on the ground in other conflict situations in
the South Caucasus. If such forces were to be deployed it is hard
to see how Russia would be able to maintain a role as a mediator in
the Karabakh peace process. At the moment it is the conflict parties
who are responsible for the situation on the ground. Rather than
introducing an external element into the situation on the ground at
this stage, it would be preferable to introduce serious mechanisms
with the necessary mandates to jointly investigate incidents and
violations and to publicise their findings. This could serve to
introduce a sense of accountability for ceasefire violations, in
contrast to the current impunity.
There was a recommendation from the EU to provide unconditional access
for representatives of the EU to Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding
regions. Meanwhile, the Armenian Government claim they do put no
problems of access for the representatives of the EU. What kind of
obstacles does this recommendation imply?
The underlying issue is how and through what mechanisms to involve
the de facto authorities and the society in Nagorno-Karabakh in
the peace process. This is a long-standing problem that will not in
itself be resolved whether EU officials do or do not have access to the
territory. The obstacles relate to the ways in which such access would
be understood and portrayed in Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan. In
the end, however, Baku and Stepanakert will one day need to find an
appropriate mechanism to communicate with one another, likewise the de
facto authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh will one day need to confront
the legacy of Azeris displaced from Karabakh. Today these remain
conversations that are 'missing' from the Karabakh peace process;
we can only speculate on the long-term impact of these missing
conversations for the effectiveness of the peace process.
In another sentence of the recent report, the EU underlined that the
negotiations on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict within the Minsk Group
mentioned had no tangible results in 2011. Do you think the suggestion
opens an exceeding role in Karabakh process for the EU?
Any kind of expanded role for the EU in the Minsk Group is not going
to solve the problems confronting this process. France is discharging
its responsibilities as Minsk Group co-Chair country quite adequately.
The problems lie more with the readiness of the conflict parties to
engage with the proposals negotiated within the framework of the
Minsk Group. At the moment it seems that the conflict parties do
not feel that their interests are best served by investing in this
process. The EU is already contributing to the peace process through
its support of civil society initiatives.
Speaking about relations between NATO and Armenia, the President for
the second time refused to participate in the Summit in Chicago. How
much this reflects the state of relationship of the sides and the
perspective of their development?
If the relationship between the conflict parties is implied, then
clearly we have a worsening dynamic and little prospect for positive
development. Over the coming couple of years we will see a heavy
focus on internal political processes of renewing domestic political
mandates, which will give few opportunities for progressive steps
on Karabakh.
What do you think can be the role for the countries in the region in
the opposition between NATO and Russia to the issue of missile systems?
There are very serious lessons to be learnt from experiences elsewhere
in the South Caucasus in tying local conflicts to broader geopolitical
agendas. Importing NATO-Russia issues into local conflicts will
distract from the local dynamic and may even transform that dynamic
in ways that make peaceful resolution of conflict even less likely
than it is now.
by Oksana Musaelyan
arminfo
Tuesday, June 26, 22:48
ArmInfo's interview with Laurence Broers, Conciliation Resources,
Caucasus Programme Projects Manager
Incidents on the Line of Contact in Nagorno Karabakh have been
increased recently. Do you think these are on spot problems or this
kind of incitement will consequently lead to a full-fledged new war?
Overall the number of incidents along the LOC and ceasefire violations
is less than it was several years ago. They are better recorded today
and attract more media attention than before, so there is a perception
of an overall deterioration. What is an emerging trend, however,
is the tactical deployment of ceasefire violations and incidents
as a lever to apply political pressure, disruption or distraction at
sensitive moments. Incidents appear to be more and more 'choreographed'
to coincide with key moments in domestic political politics and, for
example, visits of foreign dignitaries. But while these incidents
radicalise the populations and narrow the space for discussion of
non-violent solutions, there is no linear cause and effect relationship
between them and a fully-fledged war. Although unintended escalation
is always a risk, if a fully-fledged war happens it will have its
own dynamics and causes beyond the immediate reality of the LOC.
What do you think about a possibility of deployment of Russian military
force on the border line with Armenia and Azerbaijan as preventive
measures to restrain tension?
There is not a positive experience with the deployment of Russian
(peacekeeping) forces on the ground in other conflict situations in
the South Caucasus. If such forces were to be deployed it is hard
to see how Russia would be able to maintain a role as a mediator in
the Karabakh peace process. At the moment it is the conflict parties
who are responsible for the situation on the ground. Rather than
introducing an external element into the situation on the ground at
this stage, it would be preferable to introduce serious mechanisms
with the necessary mandates to jointly investigate incidents and
violations and to publicise their findings. This could serve to
introduce a sense of accountability for ceasefire violations, in
contrast to the current impunity.
There was a recommendation from the EU to provide unconditional access
for representatives of the EU to Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding
regions. Meanwhile, the Armenian Government claim they do put no
problems of access for the representatives of the EU. What kind of
obstacles does this recommendation imply?
The underlying issue is how and through what mechanisms to involve
the de facto authorities and the society in Nagorno-Karabakh in
the peace process. This is a long-standing problem that will not in
itself be resolved whether EU officials do or do not have access to the
territory. The obstacles relate to the ways in which such access would
be understood and portrayed in Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan. In
the end, however, Baku and Stepanakert will one day need to find an
appropriate mechanism to communicate with one another, likewise the de
facto authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh will one day need to confront
the legacy of Azeris displaced from Karabakh. Today these remain
conversations that are 'missing' from the Karabakh peace process;
we can only speculate on the long-term impact of these missing
conversations for the effectiveness of the peace process.
In another sentence of the recent report, the EU underlined that the
negotiations on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict within the Minsk Group
mentioned had no tangible results in 2011. Do you think the suggestion
opens an exceeding role in Karabakh process for the EU?
Any kind of expanded role for the EU in the Minsk Group is not going
to solve the problems confronting this process. France is discharging
its responsibilities as Minsk Group co-Chair country quite adequately.
The problems lie more with the readiness of the conflict parties to
engage with the proposals negotiated within the framework of the
Minsk Group. At the moment it seems that the conflict parties do
not feel that their interests are best served by investing in this
process. The EU is already contributing to the peace process through
its support of civil society initiatives.
Speaking about relations between NATO and Armenia, the President for
the second time refused to participate in the Summit in Chicago. How
much this reflects the state of relationship of the sides and the
perspective of their development?
If the relationship between the conflict parties is implied, then
clearly we have a worsening dynamic and little prospect for positive
development. Over the coming couple of years we will see a heavy
focus on internal political processes of renewing domestic political
mandates, which will give few opportunities for progressive steps
on Karabakh.
What do you think can be the role for the countries in the region in
the opposition between NATO and Russia to the issue of missile systems?
There are very serious lessons to be learnt from experiences elsewhere
in the South Caucasus in tying local conflicts to broader geopolitical
agendas. Importing NATO-Russia issues into local conflicts will
distract from the local dynamic and may even transform that dynamic
in ways that make peaceful resolution of conflict even less likely
than it is now.