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IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Iran's naval drills. Archive
http://en.ria.ru/analysis/20120302/171695514.html
REUTERS/ Fars News/Hamed Jafarnejad22:29 02/03/2012Sergei Markedonov
for RIA Novosti
At a meeting with editors of leading Western newspapers Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin said Russia will do all it can to prevent war in Iran.
But is this war already inevitable?
This is the question on the minds of many in Russia and abroad. A
fresh outbreak of violence in the Middle East could destabilize the
South Caucasus and other post-Soviet regions. There is no such thing
as a foreign war.
On March 5, 2012, U.S. President Barack Obama is due to meet with
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The two leaders are expected
to focus on Iran's nuclear program and the geopolitical situation
in the Middle East. Where do they see eye to eye? Will they be able
to stop the Iranian crisis from developing into a military conflict,
or will they choose escalation? Of course, the answer to this question
does not depend solely on them.
Hell to pay
If politics were rational, it would be clear that nobody stands to
gain from an armed conflict between Iran and the United States or
between Iran and a coalition of states (including the United States
and Israel).
War would curtail the production of oil and gas and inflate prices.
This would deal a blow to the West, primarily Europe, which is already
going through hard times. Russia would also lose out in this scenario,
as the West would start saving, reducing fuel consumption and buying
less Russian hydrocarbons.
While the parallels are a bit artificial, but something similar
took place in the 1970s. The repercussions of that oil crisis and
the Soviet Union's collapse are still reverberating throughout many
parts of Eurasia.
Military action would also hurt China, whose prosperity is largely
based on the ability of the West to purchase the consumer goods China
produces, right down to the souvenirs from Washington, D.C. with a
"Made in China" label.
© RIA Novosti.
Unrest in the Arab countries
Israel stands to lose the most from a military conflict. It is still
reeling from the Arab Spring and the vague prospects of Egypt and
Libya's Islamization.
Today many Arab countries and Iran are competing in a proxy struggle
in Syria. Were Israel to attack Iran, this could help unify these
opponents against "global Zionism."
The odds of military action
Iran will not gain any benefits from armed conflict, either. Combative
rhetoric is all well and good, but in the event of war Iran's
infrastructure will be subject to massive strikes.
Onlookers might point out that during the long war with Iraq,
the Iranians grew accustomed to the privations and casualties. But
ordinary Iranians are hardly interested in going through this again.
Any war is an ordeal, and Iran will grow poorer without the ability
to export oil.
Regrettably, politics is not as rational as we would like it to be.
Iran is too sore a subject for the United States, which cannot get over
its failure in 1979. At that time it did not gain anything from the
economic sanctions against Iran, which continued to develop without
America and exert influence in the region. For Tehran, America is
still the Great Satan.
As a result, even a minor miscalculation by either side could result
in major consequences. There is not much hope that realists will gain
the upper hand on either side.
It is important to prepare for negative scenarios. At any rate,
nobody should hope for an easy blitzkrieg.
Russia may have to deal with an influx of refugees. It is enough to
imagine that Iran may strike Azerbaijan under the pretext of fighting
the Israeli-Azerbaijani military partnership and arms purchases by
Baku. Do not forget that Azerbaijan borders on Russia's Dagestan in
the north.
But even if this does not happen, Baku may try to exploit the situation
and speed up the military solution of the Nagorny Karabakh issue.
Avoiding war in Iran
Moscow will have to make a difficult choice given the competing groups
of influence among the Russian elite. After Russia's loss of influence
in Georgia, a strong link to Armenia or Azerbaijan is not exactly in
line with Russian interests in the South Caucasus.
Moscow stands to gain from positive contacts with both Yerevan and
Baku, seeking a compromise on the Nagorny Karabakh issue rather than
the victory of one side.
Thus, a war in Iran or around Iran will compel Russia to break all
statuses-quo and seek new configurations. This will complicate matters
for Russia and prevent it from resolving other no less important
domestic and foreign policy problems.
These problems will not subside after the presidential election. We
do not need an Iranian Spring, much less a whole year of Iran. Russia
may receive some short-term gains from higher oil prices but they
will not turn into a strategic success.
Regardless of how the Iranian card will be played in the
foreseeable future, Russia is facing urgent challenges - rapid
economic diversification, breaking its dependence on hydrocarbons,
and the consolidation of a smart economy and high-tech development
(not limited to Skolkovo).
It would be best if military action can be avoided in Iran. The
main goal for all players - above all Washington and Tehran - is to
diffuse the potential for armed conflict, turning it into a conflict
of interests without extremes, or perhaps even pragmatic interstate
relations. This is the only way to calm down the hotheads on both
sides and move toward a resolution of urgent issues instead of
escalating tensions.
Sergei Markedonov is a visiting fellow of the Center for Strategic
and International Studies in Washington, DC
The views expressed in this article are the author's and may not
necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
Iran's naval drills. Archive
http://en.ria.ru/analysis/20120302/171695514.html
REUTERS/ Fars News/Hamed Jafarnejad22:29 02/03/2012Sergei Markedonov
for RIA Novosti
At a meeting with editors of leading Western newspapers Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin said Russia will do all it can to prevent war in Iran.
But is this war already inevitable?
This is the question on the minds of many in Russia and abroad. A
fresh outbreak of violence in the Middle East could destabilize the
South Caucasus and other post-Soviet regions. There is no such thing
as a foreign war.
On March 5, 2012, U.S. President Barack Obama is due to meet with
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The two leaders are expected
to focus on Iran's nuclear program and the geopolitical situation
in the Middle East. Where do they see eye to eye? Will they be able
to stop the Iranian crisis from developing into a military conflict,
or will they choose escalation? Of course, the answer to this question
does not depend solely on them.
Hell to pay
If politics were rational, it would be clear that nobody stands to
gain from an armed conflict between Iran and the United States or
between Iran and a coalition of states (including the United States
and Israel).
War would curtail the production of oil and gas and inflate prices.
This would deal a blow to the West, primarily Europe, which is already
going through hard times. Russia would also lose out in this scenario,
as the West would start saving, reducing fuel consumption and buying
less Russian hydrocarbons.
While the parallels are a bit artificial, but something similar
took place in the 1970s. The repercussions of that oil crisis and
the Soviet Union's collapse are still reverberating throughout many
parts of Eurasia.
Military action would also hurt China, whose prosperity is largely
based on the ability of the West to purchase the consumer goods China
produces, right down to the souvenirs from Washington, D.C. with a
"Made in China" label.
© RIA Novosti.
Unrest in the Arab countries
Israel stands to lose the most from a military conflict. It is still
reeling from the Arab Spring and the vague prospects of Egypt and
Libya's Islamization.
Today many Arab countries and Iran are competing in a proxy struggle
in Syria. Were Israel to attack Iran, this could help unify these
opponents against "global Zionism."
The odds of military action
Iran will not gain any benefits from armed conflict, either. Combative
rhetoric is all well and good, but in the event of war Iran's
infrastructure will be subject to massive strikes.
Onlookers might point out that during the long war with Iraq,
the Iranians grew accustomed to the privations and casualties. But
ordinary Iranians are hardly interested in going through this again.
Any war is an ordeal, and Iran will grow poorer without the ability
to export oil.
Regrettably, politics is not as rational as we would like it to be.
Iran is too sore a subject for the United States, which cannot get over
its failure in 1979. At that time it did not gain anything from the
economic sanctions against Iran, which continued to develop without
America and exert influence in the region. For Tehran, America is
still the Great Satan.
As a result, even a minor miscalculation by either side could result
in major consequences. There is not much hope that realists will gain
the upper hand on either side.
It is important to prepare for negative scenarios. At any rate,
nobody should hope for an easy blitzkrieg.
Russia may have to deal with an influx of refugees. It is enough to
imagine that Iran may strike Azerbaijan under the pretext of fighting
the Israeli-Azerbaijani military partnership and arms purchases by
Baku. Do not forget that Azerbaijan borders on Russia's Dagestan in
the north.
But even if this does not happen, Baku may try to exploit the situation
and speed up the military solution of the Nagorny Karabakh issue.
Avoiding war in Iran
Moscow will have to make a difficult choice given the competing groups
of influence among the Russian elite. After Russia's loss of influence
in Georgia, a strong link to Armenia or Azerbaijan is not exactly in
line with Russian interests in the South Caucasus.
Moscow stands to gain from positive contacts with both Yerevan and
Baku, seeking a compromise on the Nagorny Karabakh issue rather than
the victory of one side.
Thus, a war in Iran or around Iran will compel Russia to break all
statuses-quo and seek new configurations. This will complicate matters
for Russia and prevent it from resolving other no less important
domestic and foreign policy problems.
These problems will not subside after the presidential election. We
do not need an Iranian Spring, much less a whole year of Iran. Russia
may receive some short-term gains from higher oil prices but they
will not turn into a strategic success.
Regardless of how the Iranian card will be played in the
foreseeable future, Russia is facing urgent challenges - rapid
economic diversification, breaking its dependence on hydrocarbons,
and the consolidation of a smart economy and high-tech development
(not limited to Skolkovo).
It would be best if military action can be avoided in Iran. The
main goal for all players - above all Washington and Tehran - is to
diffuse the potential for armed conflict, turning it into a conflict
of interests without extremes, or perhaps even pragmatic interstate
relations. This is the only way to calm down the hotheads on both
sides and move toward a resolution of urgent issues instead of
escalating tensions.
Sergei Markedonov is a visiting fellow of the Center for Strategic
and International Studies in Washington, DC
The views expressed in this article are the author's and may not
necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.