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AZERBAIJAN AND TURKEY TILT TOWARDS NEW `TRANS-ANATOLIAN' NATURAL GAS PIPELINE
By Robert M. Cutler (02/22/2012 issue of the CACI Analyst)
The Azerbaijani and Turkish governments have endorsed the construction
of a Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TAGP, also called TANAP after its
initials in Turkish) for carrying natural gas from deposits in the
Caspian Sea offshore to European customers. This new project is not
part of the European Union's Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) project, but
its advantages are such that, with the backing of Baku and Ankara,
knowledgeable observers estimate it to have moved quickly to the
`front of the pack' among competing Euro-Caspian natural gas pipeline
projects.
BACKGROUND: The idea of the Nabucco pipeline, from the Caspian Sea
basin to Central Europe with a design volume of 31 billion cubic
meters per year (bcm/y), was launched nearly a decade ago. At the time
it was paid only passing attention in the climate of opinion of the
European elites, who still regarded Russia as a principally European
country with which, after the fall of communism, warm political
relations could be re-established on the basis of centuries-old
cultural and diplomatic tradition. Two mid-winter gas cutoffs from
Russia during the last decade were required for European political
leaders to realize that Moscow's respect for supply contracts was
higher during the Soviet than the post-Soviet era. Also because of
internal bureaucratic lethargy in Brussels and domestic political
obstacles in certain of its member-states, notably Germany, the EU did
not endorse the Nabucco project until its Prague Summit in May 2009.
In the event, Nabucco was included as one of four projects within the
Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) framework announced at that time.
The SGC named as its sponsored routes the Nabucco pipeline, the
Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI, 10 bcm/y), Trans-Adriatic
Pipeline (TAP, across Greece then under the sea to Italy, 10 bcm/y
initial volume, hypothetically to be doubled later), and the White
Stream project (Georgia to Romania under the Black Sea, volume
starting as low as 8 bcm/y and eventually scaling up to at least 32
bcm/y). Many of the design details for the newly proposed TAGP remain
to be clarified, but in the first instance it is planned for 16 bcm/y,
of which 6 bcm/y would contractually go to Turkey. Its final design
volume was originally projected at 24 bcm/y, but this has now been
scaled up to 30 bcm/y, nearly the same as Nabucco.
At the start of October last year, the ITGI, Nabucco, and TAP projects
all submitted final bids to Azerbaijan for gas from the second-phase
development of the offshore Shah Deniz deposit. At the last minute, BP
(which operates the Shah Deniz consortium with a 25.9 percent share)
submitted a draft of an idea for a so-called South-East European
Pipeline (10 bcm across the Anatolian peninsula using existing
pipeline as much as possible and upgrading segments where necessary),
which it was announced would be taken into consideration despite its
not being a fleshed-out proposal. It was then announced that the
decision on which bid for Shah Deniz Two gas will be accepted,
originally due before the end of the year, would be postponed until
the first quarter of the present year, i.e. the end of March at the
latest. Nevertheless, the latest press reports are now suggesting a
further delay of one to two months beyond that.
IMPLICATIONS: SOCAR head Rovnag Abdullaev told the press as early as
the end of October that Azerbaijan and Turkey intended to construct
the TAGP, but the international energy community took note only in
mid-November after he repeated this at a high-profile conference. The
memorandum of understanding between the two sides was signed at the
end of December, with construction to finish by 2017, when gas from
the second-phase development of the offshore Shah Deniz deposit (`Shah
Deniz Two') is slated to become available.
The TAGP's construction is set to be funded by Azerbaijan and carried
out by the Azerbaijani state company SOCAR together with two Turkish
state firms, BOTAS and TPAO. The first estimate of the price tag is
US$ 5-6 billion but this is subject to modification as the route is
still to be laid definitively out. A range of US$ 7-9 billion has also
been mentioned, but that may be for the final rather than the initial
planned volume capacity. The price range will be better defined as
feasibility studies proceed and the planning process develops.
Until relatively recently, it was considered necessary to source gas
from Turkmenistan in order to achieve Nabucco's 31 bcm/y planned
capacity. Azerbaijan had repeatedly declared that it would not supply
more than 10 bcm/y from Shah Deniz Two for export to Europe through
Turkey, because it wanted to maintain its multiple customer base so as
not to become too dependent on any single one. Representatives of the
Nabucco project have declared their willingness to work with the TAGP
project, although they suggest the likelihood that `additional
guarantees' would be necessary from TAGP operators for including
natural gas from Turkmenistan arriving via the still to be agreed
Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) to Azerbaijan.
In light of recent further discoveries of large natural gas deposits
in Azerbaijan's Caspian Sea offshore, however, unofficial circles in
the country have begun to suggest that it could in the long run ramp
up to Nabucco's (or TAGP's) 30-31 bcm/y capacity. These new deposits
include the Absheron and Umid fields, each of which credibly holds a
minimum of 300-400 bcm of natural gas; the Nakhichevan and
Zafar-Mashal blocks, which together are estimated to hold 600 bcm; and
the Shafag-Asiman development, with a low-end estimate of 300 bcm. All
these are in addition to the Shah Deniz field, now estimated to
contain 1.2 trillion cubic meters of gas. The newly discovered fields
also hold important quantities of condensates.
The Norwegian firm Statoil holds a 42.5 percent stake in TAP as well
as a 25.9 percent share in the consortium developing Azerbaijan's
offshore Shah Deniz deposit, but this is no guarantee of the TAP's
eventual success. Azerbaijan will remain the owner of the 10 bcm/y
that will transit the TAGP to Europe in the first instance, and it is
just not clear that there will be sufficient demand for it in Italy,
where TAP makes eventual landfall. SOCAR is slated to fund 80 percent
of the construction cost and acquire the same proportion of ownership
of the pipeline. This would be enough for it to bargain with potential
gas suppliers, offering them a piece of the pipeline, while still
retaining for itself an absolute majority share.
CONCLUSIONS: Indeed, Azerbaijan is known to have a distinct sympathy
for the smaller countries in Southeastern Europe that especially
suffered from Russia's mid-winter cutoffs of natural gas to Europe via
Ukraine during the last decade. In this line are the trans-Black Sea
Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania Interconnector (AGRI) plan for liquefied
natural gas and the project to ship compressed natural gas from
Azerbaijan through Georgia across the Black Sea to Bulgaria (1-2
bcm/y), both of which, discussed at the international energy
conference in Batumi nearly two years ago, have moved to feasibility
studies.
There is an Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB) that is connecting
now to the already operating Interconnector Turkey-Greece component of
the ITGI. The IGB, initially projected for a volume of 1-3 bcm/y,
could be expanded later to 5 bcm/y if circumstances called for this.
There is no operational reason in principle why the 5 bcm/y could not
also be doubled to 10 bcm/y. Bulgaria already depends on Russia for 90
percent of its gas imports, and its participation in the South Stream
project would do nothing to decrease this. However, a small additional
number of relatively inexpensive reversible interconnectors in the
region such as the IGB (the already completed Arad-Szeged line from
Romania to Hungary) could implement a gas ring in Southeastern Europe
sourced from Azerbaijan.
Such interconnectors for a gas ring are quite easy to implement in
Southeast and Central Europe. If the EU cannot find a way to support
them (which it should, however, under its 2008 decision in favor of a
`supergrid' permitting its members to share electric power from
different sources), then the EBRD could do so through its established
cooperation with the secretariat of the Central European Initiative
(CEI) and the latter's associated Central European Chambers of
Commerce Initiative. Indeed, the CEI is already involved in five
EU-funded projects under the EBRD's aegis. One of this is a `transport
axis coordination' project in Southeastern Europe.
AUTHOR'S BIO: Robert M. Cutler is a senior research fellow in the
Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton
University, Canada.
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5720
###
IS AZERBAIJAN BECOMING AREA OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN IRAN AND ISRAEL?
By Emil Souleimanov (02/08/2012 issue of the CACI Analyst)
In January, Azerbaijani authorities made a series of announcements
stating they had revealed a plot by three Azerbaijani citizens to
assassinate leading members of Azerbaijan's Jewish community and a
prominent Israeli official. Of even higher significance were Baku's
allegations of Hezbollah and Iran being the masterminds of the
prepared assassinations. The circumstances around the event signify
Azerbaijan's increasingly difficult relationship with Iran and
highlight both the country's vulnerability to Iranian leverage and its
strategic significance as a conduit for intelligence and potential
military operations against Iran.
BACKGROUND: According to Azerbaijan's Ministry of National Security,
Rasim Aliyev and Ali Huseynov were captured along with automatic
weapons and explosives smuggled from Iran. They were preparing attacks
on the Israeli ambassador in Baku, Michael Lotem, and Rabbis Shneor
Segal and Mati Lewis, both working in Baku's largest synagogue and an
affiliated Jewish religious school. The third conspirator and likely
leader of the plot is identified as Balagardash Dadashov and has
allegedly been based in the Iranian city of Ardebil across the Araxes
River, hence out of reach of Azerbaijani authorities. The three men
are believed to be members of an Azerbaijani cell of Hezbollah, a
militant Shiite organization and Iran's `terror proxy' in the Middle
East. According to the Ministry of National Security, Aliyev,
Huseynov, and Dadashov were supplied with all necessary equipment to
carry out the operation and US$ 150,000 by Iranian intelligence
officers. According to some sources, the conspirators were also
instructed by Iranians to assassinate Gaby Ashkenazi, chief of the
Israeli defense forces, who was expected to visit the Azerbaijani
capital in a few months.
The Azerbaijani government has long sought to profile itself as a
leading partner of Israel in the post-Soviet space in general and the
South Caucasus in particular. Baku incessantly emphasizes the fact
that there have never been cases of anti-Judaism or anti-Semitism in
Azerbaijan and that the country's Jews have always been a thriving
community that has enjoyed trouble-free relations with the Azerbaijani
majority. Accordingly, local elites have traditionally stressed the
highly secular character of the Azerbaijani regime and society and its
general lack of religious fundamentalism, in contrast to its direct
neighbors to the north and south, in an attempt to display Azerbaijan
as a pro-Western, pro-American and to a certain extent also
pro-Israeli democracy, although with some local peculiarities when it
comes to the practical implications of that democracy. This is
attested by the fact that notwithstanding the recent - and significant
- deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations, Baku has made its best
effort to maintain a cordial relationship with Israel, improving
cooperation with the Jewish state in a wide range of areas. This is
perhaps the reason why the former chief of Israel's ministry of
defense and current Knesset member Binyamin Ben Eliezer has claimed
that `Azerbaijan-Israel relations are so reliable that they will not
be affected by the tensions with Turkey.'
IMPLICATIONS: Israel has recently intensified its activities in the
South Caucasus, a development that is conditioned by a number of
factors. First, the region is host to a relatively large Jewish
community which counts around 45,000 in Georgia and up to 40,000 in
Azerbaijan, where the number of citizens adhering to the Jewish
religion has tripled over the last fifteen years. Second, the region
has still not entirely realized its potential as an exporter of oil
and natural gas, as well as a transit hub that would link the Caspian
with global markets. Today, around one-sixth of Israel's oil inflow
comes from Azerbaijan. Last but not least, Israel's interest in the
region has increased in the context of the fiercely debated
possibility of an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities and the
necessity to safeguard overland access to the Islamic Republic. With
the considerable deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations in recent
years, Armenia's pro-Iranian stance, Turkmenistan's neutrality, and
the ongoing turmoil in both Iraq and Afghanistan, Azerbaijan has
attracted Israeli interest. While Baku's hypothetical consent to any
country that would launch an attack on Iran is under current
circumstances highly unrealistic given Azerbaijan's vulnerability to
an Iranian counterattack, this probability cannot be ruled out
completely. Most importantly, Azerbaijan's geographical location and
its interconnection with Iran's 20 million-strong Azerbaijani minority
might become instrumental for Israeli intelligence and secret
services.
Following the Azerbaijani authorities' allegations, a number of
observers both within and outside the country have interpreted them as
another effort by the Aliyev government to strengthen its ties with
Israel, securing support from both the Jewish state and the Jewish
Diaspora, and gaining sympathies from the U.S. and key Western nations
for the secular Azerbaijani state that has been at the forefront of
the civilized world's struggle against religious fanaticism, a popular
ethos that has been widely used by official Baku for at least a
decade.
Even though this viewpoint cannot be completely ruled out, some facts
indicate Tehran's involvement. Similar attempts have recently been
foiled in Thailand and Bulgaria, with a range of similarities in the
way the plots were organized. In all cases Israeli authorities have
voiced considerable concern over the planned attacks, causing some
observers to speculate that Mossad officers might have been involved
in foiling the planned assassinations in Baku. Indeed, this was not
the first attempt to assassinate Jewish - or Israeli - persons in
Azerbaijan as a similar case was foiled in 2008. After being convicted
to long sentences in Azerbaijan, the conspirators Ali Karaki and Ali
Najmeddin, both Lebanese Shiites affiliated with Hezbollah, and an
Iranian citizen were unexpectedly released and deported to Iran in
August 2010, following sustained pressure from Tehran.
It has recently become obvious that Iranian secret services are
intensifying their efforts to use the Shiite factor to destabilize
Azerbaijan from within. An overwhelming part of Azerbaijanis share the
Shiite faith and religion has become increasingly appealing to a
certain segment of the Azerbaijani population as a protest ideology to
what they consider the degradation of traditional values and
omnipotent corruption. The lack of a strong and widely supported
(secular) opposition party has also played a role in this shift. In
addition to ordinary believers, Tehran has reinforced its efforts to
win the minds of the Azerbaijani Shiite clergy particularly in the
peripheral areas, championing the rights of the `pro-headscarf party'
in the recent clashes following the criminalization of head scarves in
Azerbaijani educational institutions. Accordingly, the language used
by Iran-based Azerbaijani-language TV and broadcast services aired to
Azerbaijan has become more aggressive, contributing to increased
tensions between Azerbaijan's pro-secular and increasingly vocal and
violent pro-religious camps. Indicative of this was the murder in
November of the `Azerbaijani Salman Rushdie,' Rafik Taghi, a
well-known physician and publicist known for his influential articles
aimed against Islamic radicalism, as well as the Islamic regime in
Iran. A fatwa sanctioning Taghi's murder was issued in 2006 by the
Iranian ayatollah Mohammad Fazel Lankarani, which was de facto
approved of by Iranian authorities.
CONCLUSIONS: Whoever masterminded the recent events, they boosted
Baku's role as a secular Muslim bastion of pro-Western forces in the
turbulent region and further strengthened the crucial
Azerbaijan-Israeli axis. Lacking strong allies and in a situation of
latent conflict with at least two of its immediate neighbors, this is
a rather favorable development for Azerbaijan, which cannot afford a
one-off stand against Iran. For Iran, the world was reminded of an
anti-Jewish - and prospectively also anti-Western - Islamist network
operating in Azerbaijan that is capable of carrying out attacks on
Iran's enemies. In the current situation marked by the newly imposed
sanctions on oil exports from Iran by the U.S. and key EU states,
reducing Azerbaijan's potential as a stable energy supplier and
highlighting the existence of militant Islamist groups could help
minimize prospective plans to base a possible attack on Iran on
Azerbaijani soil. Azerbaijan's importance to Israel also increases, as
it is seen as a friendly country with a deeply contested relationship
with its southern neighbor - a fact that has increased in significance
following the recent deterioration of Jerusalem's relationship with
Ankara and consequent inability to use Turkish soil for the activities
of Israeli intelligence. Following the intensification of the
Israeli-Iranian rivalry, Azerbaijan's key geographical location and
the existence of a strong Azerbaijani minority with increasingly
active pro-separatist and anti-Iranian sentiments is regarded with
increasing interest in Israel and might turn the South Caucasian
country into an area of Israeli-Iranian confrontation.
AUTHOR'S BIO: Dr. Emil Souleimanov is assistant professor at the
Department of Russian and East European Studies, Charles University in
Prague, Czech Republic. He is the author of `An Endless War: The
Russian-Chechen Conflict in Perspective' (Peter Lang, 2007).
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5711
###
IRAN AND AZERBAIJAN CLASH OVER CYBER-ATTACKS AND ARRESTED TERRORISTS
By Mina Muradova (01/25/2012 issue of the CACI Analyst)
Iranian-Azerbaijani relations have not been smooth since Azerbaijan's
independence, and recently deteriorated even further after
cyber-attacks on the official sites of Azerbaijan's governmental
agencies and the disclosure of a terrorist group related to the
Iranian intelligence services. The two cases are closely related to
the fact that Azerbaijan is a key Muslim ally of Israel, considered a
sworn enemy by official Tehran.
The websites of several Azerbaijani state agencies were hacked on
January 16.A notice was placed on some of the sites accusing the
Azerbaijani authorities of `serving Jews' and on some a message was
placed stating `Hacked by AzerianCyberarmy.'
The websites that were hacked belong to president of Azerbaijan
(president.az), the Communications Ministry (rabita.az), the Interior
Ministry (din.gov.az, mia.gov.az), the Constitutional Court
(constcourt.gov.az), the official news agency Azertag, the Baku city
administration, some news portals that are close to the government
(including trend.az), the ruling Yeni Azerbaycan Party (yap.org.az)
and others.
YAP MP Aydin Mirzazade told Trend agency on January 16 that the
cyber-attack on Azerbaijan's state and government websites was not
just a technical provocation, but pursued `politically motivated'
purposes. `The cyber-attack is aimed at casting a shade on
Azerbaijan's growing international image. Some people are worried
about Azerbaijan's development, successes in domestic [affairs] and
foreign policy [because] it is turning into one of the prestigious
countries in the world,' he said.
The YAP website reported that it was attacked last month by hackers
based in Iran, according to IP numbers that were linked to the
cyber-attack. `The implementation of a full-scale attack from
different geographical places, the manner of the attacks and quick
distribution of e-mails to the media show that these actions were
deliberate,' said Elmir Velizade, Deputy Minister of Communications
and Information Technology, following the attack.
Communication Minister Ali Abbasov reported on January 21 that
cyber-attacks destroying government and news websites in Azerbaijan
mostly originated in Iran. `Twenty five sites suffered as a result of
the attack, but they were restored in about two hours,' Abbasov said.
`An investigation completed the day before revealed that 24 attacks
were carried out from Iran, and one from the Netherlands.' He noted
that the ministry had sent a letter to the Iranian side indicating the
exact addresses where the attack was launched from.
However, the minister expressed hope that Iran could have been used as
a transit country and that the attack could have been initiated from a
third country. `We believe that the state agencies of those countries
are not involved in this case,' Abbasov said.
Abbas Isgandari, a spokesman of Iran's Embassy in Azerbaijan said that
`Iran has nothing to do with hacker attacks on Azerbaijan's state and
public organizations' websites.' He added that such reports damage
Azerbaijani-Iranian relations.
In response to the Iranian cyber attacks, Azerbaijani hackers have
attacked over 20 Iranian websites including the websites of Iranian
state structures. This happened on the eve of January 20, the Day of
Black January, when Azerbaijanis commemorate those killed 20 years ago
by the Soviet Army for the sake of Azerbaijan's independence.
Azerbaijan's flag and the notice `20th January is not forgotten' were
posted on Iranian websites by hackers presenting themselves as
`Pirates' Crew.' They stated that these attacks were just the first
steps and that similar actions against Iranian websites would follow.
Moreover, Azerbaijan's National Security Ministry (MTN) distributed
official information saying that it had uncovered a terror group
plotting to assassinate two employees of a Jewish school in Baku.The
ministry said on January 19 that the group was planning terrorist acts
and had illegally acquired firearms, military supplies, and
explosives. It said the arms were secretly brought from Iran to
Azerbaijan and hidden along the 150th kilometer marker of the
Baku-Astara highway.
The APA news agency quoted the Ministry as saying that Azerbaijani
citizens Rasim Aliyev, Ali Huseynov, and Balaqardash Dadashov - the
latter living in Iran - coordinated the efforts to acquire firearms
and explosives. The MNS said Dadashov was in contact with Iranian
special service bodies and ordered the assassination of prominent
foreigners living in Baku. Dadashov allegedly promised Aliyev, his
brother-in-law, US$ 150,000 for this task. `After Rasim Aliyev agreed
to this proposal, Dadashov sent him photos of the people to be
assassinated, the layout of their homes, and pictures of their cars,'
the Ministry said in a statement. `Dadashov paid Aliyev a total of US$
9,300 for preparatory work.'
According to Israeli media, their plan was to attack two Israeli
Chabad emissaries, a rabbi and a teacher employed by the Jewish school
`Chabad Or Avner' in Baku.
`The Azerbaijani security forces acted covertly without alerting us,'
said Rabbi Shneor Segal, one of the two targets. `It was published
that they originally planned to attack `people who look Jewish and
hold foreign passports' near the school, but when the school guards
began suspecting them, they started monitoring the area where I live,'
he told Haaretz. Segal added that the second target was Rabbi Mati
Lewis. The Ministry has opened an investigation into the charges that
include plotting the assassination of a public figure, possession of
contraband, and illegal acquisition and transportation of firearms,
military supplies, and explosives.
Iranian MP Alaeddin Boroujerdi, chairman of the Majilis National
Security and Foreign Policy Committee, has said that the recent claim
that Iran had plotted to assassinate prominent foreigners in Baku is a
conspiracy fueled by the Zionist regime.Speaking to the Fars News
Agency on January 22, Boroujerdi said, `These known methods are old
and threadbare, used by (certain) countries' intelligence agencies
with the aim of creating a negative atmosphere in relations between
the two countries of Iran and Azerbaijan.' The senior lawmaker said
the Zionist regime has an active presence in Azerbaijan and `I believe
that the issue is a plot hatched by the Mossad and is a trap laid for
the Azerbaijani side in regard to the relations between Iran and
Azerbaijan.' He added that `conspiracies are being organized with the
aim of damaging Azerbaijan's relations with its neighboring
countries,' and promoting Iranophobia in the region.
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5707
###
OBAMA: U.S. TO STRENGTHEN DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH GEORGIA
By Maka Gurgenidze (02/08/2012 issue of the CACI Analyst)
Tbilisi hails U.S. President Barack Obama's position on enhanced
security cooperation with Georgia, while Moscow expresses principal
objections to a new stage of the U.S.-Georgia partnership.
Security cooperation and a free-trade agreement (FTA) between the two
countries became the main issues discussed during Georgian President
Mikheil Saakashvili's and President Obama's meeting in the White House
on January 30. The Georgian incumbent political elite as well as
opposition leaders praised the meeting and highlighted its special
significance on the 20th anniversary of U.S.-Georgia diplomatic
relations. In the Oval Office, the U.S. President made clear that the
general features of the strategic partnership between Washington and
Tbilisi would be retained and new steps taken to buttress the ongoing
institutional reform that will ensue an `enormous difference' for
present and future generations of Georgians. He also said that the
U.S. expects the Georgian parliamentary elections scheduled for this
year to be free and fair, leading to `the formal transfer of power
that ... will solidify many of these reforms that have already taken
place.' Further, Obama dubbed Georgia a `model of democracy and
transparency' setting a precedent for the whole region. He expressed
gratitude for Georgia's `extraordinary contributions' to the NATO-led
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and
assured Saakashvili that the White House will continue to support
Georgia's aspirations to become a member of NATO. `We will continue to
strengthen our defense cooperation, and there are a wide range of
areas where we are working together,' the U.S. president said.
In respect of deeper bilateral economic relations, Obama sketched out
the prospects of an FTA between the U.S. and Georgia, disclosing new
opportunities for American and Georgian business and creating a
`win-win' situation for both countries. He noted, however, that the
initiative is in need of tremendous preliminary work regarding
tariffs, quotas and other trade restrictions.
President Saakashvili thanked the Obama administration for the
possibility of an FTA that, in his words, would help the
`nation-building process,' and voiced his appreciation of U.S. support
for Georgia's aspiration to integrate with NATO. Nevertheless, he was
particularly satisfied with the agreement to move bilateral defense
cooperation `to a new level,' aiming to boost Georgia's self-defense
capabilities. The entire Georgian political spectrum, including the
most radical opposition leaders, assessed Saakashvili's U.S. trip
positively. The recently emerged tycoon politician Bidzina Ivanishvili
welcomed the president's productive talks, but warned that the
Georgian government should well understand the signals embedded in the
American leader's speech. He stated that the Georgian government
concealed the main emphasis of Obama's speech whereas the U.S.
president overtly referred to the importance of a legal transfer of
power in Georgia through democratic elections.
While Obama clearly underlined the importance of `free and fair'
elections, the most significant implication of the speech from a
Georgian perspective is that the Obama administration appears ready to
create a benevolent environment for enhanced trade and security
relations with Georgia.
In terms of economic support, the U.S. granted Georgia the status of a
beneficiary country of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in
2001. GSP allows a wide spectrum of Georgian products access to the
U.S. market but only a few of 3,400 eligible product types are being
exported. Therefore, the FTA might not automatically ensure a drastic
increase of Georgian export to U.S., but it will certainly reaffirm
the confidence of investors in the Georgian economy and will help the
country secure a preferable position in the neighborhood.
Even more palpable results can be identified in a security
perspective. According to the Georgian defense ministry, a new level
of cooperation between the two countries will go beyond the current
training of military servicemen for peacekeeping operations and will
enhance Georgia's defense capacities. Russia immediately reacted
strongly to the prospects of a more robust security partnership
between the U.S. and Georgia. Russia's Deputy Defense Minister,
Anatoly Antonov said to RIA Novosti on February 2 that Georgian
officials had simply replaced `arms sale' or `supply of arms' with
`elevating defense cooperation to a new stage.' If such a decision [on
any kind of arms supply] was taken, it will destabilize the situation
in the Caucasus,' he said. On the next day Saakashvili stressed that
`[the] decision has been made to move military cooperation [with the
U.S.] to an absolutely new level in order to focus on our
self-defense.'
Washington and Tbilisi signed the Charter on Strategic Partnership in
2009. At that time the deal was considered the beginning of a new
phase in the history of the U.S.-Georgia strategic partnership,
representing a framework for enhancing cooperation on a wide range of
areas including security and defense. However, the public remarks of
U.S. officials' over the past three years have demonstrated more focus
on educating the armed forces, sustaining a `brains before brawn'
approach. `Elevation to a new stage,' as the Georgian president has
designated it, more likely means a shift in this approach.
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5714
From: A. Papazian
By Robert M. Cutler (02/22/2012 issue of the CACI Analyst)
The Azerbaijani and Turkish governments have endorsed the construction
of a Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TAGP, also called TANAP after its
initials in Turkish) for carrying natural gas from deposits in the
Caspian Sea offshore to European customers. This new project is not
part of the European Union's Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) project, but
its advantages are such that, with the backing of Baku and Ankara,
knowledgeable observers estimate it to have moved quickly to the
`front of the pack' among competing Euro-Caspian natural gas pipeline
projects.
BACKGROUND: The idea of the Nabucco pipeline, from the Caspian Sea
basin to Central Europe with a design volume of 31 billion cubic
meters per year (bcm/y), was launched nearly a decade ago. At the time
it was paid only passing attention in the climate of opinion of the
European elites, who still regarded Russia as a principally European
country with which, after the fall of communism, warm political
relations could be re-established on the basis of centuries-old
cultural and diplomatic tradition. Two mid-winter gas cutoffs from
Russia during the last decade were required for European political
leaders to realize that Moscow's respect for supply contracts was
higher during the Soviet than the post-Soviet era. Also because of
internal bureaucratic lethargy in Brussels and domestic political
obstacles in certain of its member-states, notably Germany, the EU did
not endorse the Nabucco project until its Prague Summit in May 2009.
In the event, Nabucco was included as one of four projects within the
Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) framework announced at that time.
The SGC named as its sponsored routes the Nabucco pipeline, the
Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI, 10 bcm/y), Trans-Adriatic
Pipeline (TAP, across Greece then under the sea to Italy, 10 bcm/y
initial volume, hypothetically to be doubled later), and the White
Stream project (Georgia to Romania under the Black Sea, volume
starting as low as 8 bcm/y and eventually scaling up to at least 32
bcm/y). Many of the design details for the newly proposed TAGP remain
to be clarified, but in the first instance it is planned for 16 bcm/y,
of which 6 bcm/y would contractually go to Turkey. Its final design
volume was originally projected at 24 bcm/y, but this has now been
scaled up to 30 bcm/y, nearly the same as Nabucco.
At the start of October last year, the ITGI, Nabucco, and TAP projects
all submitted final bids to Azerbaijan for gas from the second-phase
development of the offshore Shah Deniz deposit. At the last minute, BP
(which operates the Shah Deniz consortium with a 25.9 percent share)
submitted a draft of an idea for a so-called South-East European
Pipeline (10 bcm across the Anatolian peninsula using existing
pipeline as much as possible and upgrading segments where necessary),
which it was announced would be taken into consideration despite its
not being a fleshed-out proposal. It was then announced that the
decision on which bid for Shah Deniz Two gas will be accepted,
originally due before the end of the year, would be postponed until
the first quarter of the present year, i.e. the end of March at the
latest. Nevertheless, the latest press reports are now suggesting a
further delay of one to two months beyond that.
IMPLICATIONS: SOCAR head Rovnag Abdullaev told the press as early as
the end of October that Azerbaijan and Turkey intended to construct
the TAGP, but the international energy community took note only in
mid-November after he repeated this at a high-profile conference. The
memorandum of understanding between the two sides was signed at the
end of December, with construction to finish by 2017, when gas from
the second-phase development of the offshore Shah Deniz deposit (`Shah
Deniz Two') is slated to become available.
The TAGP's construction is set to be funded by Azerbaijan and carried
out by the Azerbaijani state company SOCAR together with two Turkish
state firms, BOTAS and TPAO. The first estimate of the price tag is
US$ 5-6 billion but this is subject to modification as the route is
still to be laid definitively out. A range of US$ 7-9 billion has also
been mentioned, but that may be for the final rather than the initial
planned volume capacity. The price range will be better defined as
feasibility studies proceed and the planning process develops.
Until relatively recently, it was considered necessary to source gas
from Turkmenistan in order to achieve Nabucco's 31 bcm/y planned
capacity. Azerbaijan had repeatedly declared that it would not supply
more than 10 bcm/y from Shah Deniz Two for export to Europe through
Turkey, because it wanted to maintain its multiple customer base so as
not to become too dependent on any single one. Representatives of the
Nabucco project have declared their willingness to work with the TAGP
project, although they suggest the likelihood that `additional
guarantees' would be necessary from TAGP operators for including
natural gas from Turkmenistan arriving via the still to be agreed
Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) to Azerbaijan.
In light of recent further discoveries of large natural gas deposits
in Azerbaijan's Caspian Sea offshore, however, unofficial circles in
the country have begun to suggest that it could in the long run ramp
up to Nabucco's (or TAGP's) 30-31 bcm/y capacity. These new deposits
include the Absheron and Umid fields, each of which credibly holds a
minimum of 300-400 bcm of natural gas; the Nakhichevan and
Zafar-Mashal blocks, which together are estimated to hold 600 bcm; and
the Shafag-Asiman development, with a low-end estimate of 300 bcm. All
these are in addition to the Shah Deniz field, now estimated to
contain 1.2 trillion cubic meters of gas. The newly discovered fields
also hold important quantities of condensates.
The Norwegian firm Statoil holds a 42.5 percent stake in TAP as well
as a 25.9 percent share in the consortium developing Azerbaijan's
offshore Shah Deniz deposit, but this is no guarantee of the TAP's
eventual success. Azerbaijan will remain the owner of the 10 bcm/y
that will transit the TAGP to Europe in the first instance, and it is
just not clear that there will be sufficient demand for it in Italy,
where TAP makes eventual landfall. SOCAR is slated to fund 80 percent
of the construction cost and acquire the same proportion of ownership
of the pipeline. This would be enough for it to bargain with potential
gas suppliers, offering them a piece of the pipeline, while still
retaining for itself an absolute majority share.
CONCLUSIONS: Indeed, Azerbaijan is known to have a distinct sympathy
for the smaller countries in Southeastern Europe that especially
suffered from Russia's mid-winter cutoffs of natural gas to Europe via
Ukraine during the last decade. In this line are the trans-Black Sea
Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania Interconnector (AGRI) plan for liquefied
natural gas and the project to ship compressed natural gas from
Azerbaijan through Georgia across the Black Sea to Bulgaria (1-2
bcm/y), both of which, discussed at the international energy
conference in Batumi nearly two years ago, have moved to feasibility
studies.
There is an Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB) that is connecting
now to the already operating Interconnector Turkey-Greece component of
the ITGI. The IGB, initially projected for a volume of 1-3 bcm/y,
could be expanded later to 5 bcm/y if circumstances called for this.
There is no operational reason in principle why the 5 bcm/y could not
also be doubled to 10 bcm/y. Bulgaria already depends on Russia for 90
percent of its gas imports, and its participation in the South Stream
project would do nothing to decrease this. However, a small additional
number of relatively inexpensive reversible interconnectors in the
region such as the IGB (the already completed Arad-Szeged line from
Romania to Hungary) could implement a gas ring in Southeastern Europe
sourced from Azerbaijan.
Such interconnectors for a gas ring are quite easy to implement in
Southeast and Central Europe. If the EU cannot find a way to support
them (which it should, however, under its 2008 decision in favor of a
`supergrid' permitting its members to share electric power from
different sources), then the EBRD could do so through its established
cooperation with the secretariat of the Central European Initiative
(CEI) and the latter's associated Central European Chambers of
Commerce Initiative. Indeed, the CEI is already involved in five
EU-funded projects under the EBRD's aegis. One of this is a `transport
axis coordination' project in Southeastern Europe.
AUTHOR'S BIO: Robert M. Cutler is a senior research fellow in the
Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton
University, Canada.
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5720
###
IS AZERBAIJAN BECOMING AREA OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN IRAN AND ISRAEL?
By Emil Souleimanov (02/08/2012 issue of the CACI Analyst)
In January, Azerbaijani authorities made a series of announcements
stating they had revealed a plot by three Azerbaijani citizens to
assassinate leading members of Azerbaijan's Jewish community and a
prominent Israeli official. Of even higher significance were Baku's
allegations of Hezbollah and Iran being the masterminds of the
prepared assassinations. The circumstances around the event signify
Azerbaijan's increasingly difficult relationship with Iran and
highlight both the country's vulnerability to Iranian leverage and its
strategic significance as a conduit for intelligence and potential
military operations against Iran.
BACKGROUND: According to Azerbaijan's Ministry of National Security,
Rasim Aliyev and Ali Huseynov were captured along with automatic
weapons and explosives smuggled from Iran. They were preparing attacks
on the Israeli ambassador in Baku, Michael Lotem, and Rabbis Shneor
Segal and Mati Lewis, both working in Baku's largest synagogue and an
affiliated Jewish religious school. The third conspirator and likely
leader of the plot is identified as Balagardash Dadashov and has
allegedly been based in the Iranian city of Ardebil across the Araxes
River, hence out of reach of Azerbaijani authorities. The three men
are believed to be members of an Azerbaijani cell of Hezbollah, a
militant Shiite organization and Iran's `terror proxy' in the Middle
East. According to the Ministry of National Security, Aliyev,
Huseynov, and Dadashov were supplied with all necessary equipment to
carry out the operation and US$ 150,000 by Iranian intelligence
officers. According to some sources, the conspirators were also
instructed by Iranians to assassinate Gaby Ashkenazi, chief of the
Israeli defense forces, who was expected to visit the Azerbaijani
capital in a few months.
The Azerbaijani government has long sought to profile itself as a
leading partner of Israel in the post-Soviet space in general and the
South Caucasus in particular. Baku incessantly emphasizes the fact
that there have never been cases of anti-Judaism or anti-Semitism in
Azerbaijan and that the country's Jews have always been a thriving
community that has enjoyed trouble-free relations with the Azerbaijani
majority. Accordingly, local elites have traditionally stressed the
highly secular character of the Azerbaijani regime and society and its
general lack of religious fundamentalism, in contrast to its direct
neighbors to the north and south, in an attempt to display Azerbaijan
as a pro-Western, pro-American and to a certain extent also
pro-Israeli democracy, although with some local peculiarities when it
comes to the practical implications of that democracy. This is
attested by the fact that notwithstanding the recent - and significant
- deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations, Baku has made its best
effort to maintain a cordial relationship with Israel, improving
cooperation with the Jewish state in a wide range of areas. This is
perhaps the reason why the former chief of Israel's ministry of
defense and current Knesset member Binyamin Ben Eliezer has claimed
that `Azerbaijan-Israel relations are so reliable that they will not
be affected by the tensions with Turkey.'
IMPLICATIONS: Israel has recently intensified its activities in the
South Caucasus, a development that is conditioned by a number of
factors. First, the region is host to a relatively large Jewish
community which counts around 45,000 in Georgia and up to 40,000 in
Azerbaijan, where the number of citizens adhering to the Jewish
religion has tripled over the last fifteen years. Second, the region
has still not entirely realized its potential as an exporter of oil
and natural gas, as well as a transit hub that would link the Caspian
with global markets. Today, around one-sixth of Israel's oil inflow
comes from Azerbaijan. Last but not least, Israel's interest in the
region has increased in the context of the fiercely debated
possibility of an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities and the
necessity to safeguard overland access to the Islamic Republic. With
the considerable deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations in recent
years, Armenia's pro-Iranian stance, Turkmenistan's neutrality, and
the ongoing turmoil in both Iraq and Afghanistan, Azerbaijan has
attracted Israeli interest. While Baku's hypothetical consent to any
country that would launch an attack on Iran is under current
circumstances highly unrealistic given Azerbaijan's vulnerability to
an Iranian counterattack, this probability cannot be ruled out
completely. Most importantly, Azerbaijan's geographical location and
its interconnection with Iran's 20 million-strong Azerbaijani minority
might become instrumental for Israeli intelligence and secret
services.
Following the Azerbaijani authorities' allegations, a number of
observers both within and outside the country have interpreted them as
another effort by the Aliyev government to strengthen its ties with
Israel, securing support from both the Jewish state and the Jewish
Diaspora, and gaining sympathies from the U.S. and key Western nations
for the secular Azerbaijani state that has been at the forefront of
the civilized world's struggle against religious fanaticism, a popular
ethos that has been widely used by official Baku for at least a
decade.
Even though this viewpoint cannot be completely ruled out, some facts
indicate Tehran's involvement. Similar attempts have recently been
foiled in Thailand and Bulgaria, with a range of similarities in the
way the plots were organized. In all cases Israeli authorities have
voiced considerable concern over the planned attacks, causing some
observers to speculate that Mossad officers might have been involved
in foiling the planned assassinations in Baku. Indeed, this was not
the first attempt to assassinate Jewish - or Israeli - persons in
Azerbaijan as a similar case was foiled in 2008. After being convicted
to long sentences in Azerbaijan, the conspirators Ali Karaki and Ali
Najmeddin, both Lebanese Shiites affiliated with Hezbollah, and an
Iranian citizen were unexpectedly released and deported to Iran in
August 2010, following sustained pressure from Tehran.
It has recently become obvious that Iranian secret services are
intensifying their efforts to use the Shiite factor to destabilize
Azerbaijan from within. An overwhelming part of Azerbaijanis share the
Shiite faith and religion has become increasingly appealing to a
certain segment of the Azerbaijani population as a protest ideology to
what they consider the degradation of traditional values and
omnipotent corruption. The lack of a strong and widely supported
(secular) opposition party has also played a role in this shift. In
addition to ordinary believers, Tehran has reinforced its efforts to
win the minds of the Azerbaijani Shiite clergy particularly in the
peripheral areas, championing the rights of the `pro-headscarf party'
in the recent clashes following the criminalization of head scarves in
Azerbaijani educational institutions. Accordingly, the language used
by Iran-based Azerbaijani-language TV and broadcast services aired to
Azerbaijan has become more aggressive, contributing to increased
tensions between Azerbaijan's pro-secular and increasingly vocal and
violent pro-religious camps. Indicative of this was the murder in
November of the `Azerbaijani Salman Rushdie,' Rafik Taghi, a
well-known physician and publicist known for his influential articles
aimed against Islamic radicalism, as well as the Islamic regime in
Iran. A fatwa sanctioning Taghi's murder was issued in 2006 by the
Iranian ayatollah Mohammad Fazel Lankarani, which was de facto
approved of by Iranian authorities.
CONCLUSIONS: Whoever masterminded the recent events, they boosted
Baku's role as a secular Muslim bastion of pro-Western forces in the
turbulent region and further strengthened the crucial
Azerbaijan-Israeli axis. Lacking strong allies and in a situation of
latent conflict with at least two of its immediate neighbors, this is
a rather favorable development for Azerbaijan, which cannot afford a
one-off stand against Iran. For Iran, the world was reminded of an
anti-Jewish - and prospectively also anti-Western - Islamist network
operating in Azerbaijan that is capable of carrying out attacks on
Iran's enemies. In the current situation marked by the newly imposed
sanctions on oil exports from Iran by the U.S. and key EU states,
reducing Azerbaijan's potential as a stable energy supplier and
highlighting the existence of militant Islamist groups could help
minimize prospective plans to base a possible attack on Iran on
Azerbaijani soil. Azerbaijan's importance to Israel also increases, as
it is seen as a friendly country with a deeply contested relationship
with its southern neighbor - a fact that has increased in significance
following the recent deterioration of Jerusalem's relationship with
Ankara and consequent inability to use Turkish soil for the activities
of Israeli intelligence. Following the intensification of the
Israeli-Iranian rivalry, Azerbaijan's key geographical location and
the existence of a strong Azerbaijani minority with increasingly
active pro-separatist and anti-Iranian sentiments is regarded with
increasing interest in Israel and might turn the South Caucasian
country into an area of Israeli-Iranian confrontation.
AUTHOR'S BIO: Dr. Emil Souleimanov is assistant professor at the
Department of Russian and East European Studies, Charles University in
Prague, Czech Republic. He is the author of `An Endless War: The
Russian-Chechen Conflict in Perspective' (Peter Lang, 2007).
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5711
###
IRAN AND AZERBAIJAN CLASH OVER CYBER-ATTACKS AND ARRESTED TERRORISTS
By Mina Muradova (01/25/2012 issue of the CACI Analyst)
Iranian-Azerbaijani relations have not been smooth since Azerbaijan's
independence, and recently deteriorated even further after
cyber-attacks on the official sites of Azerbaijan's governmental
agencies and the disclosure of a terrorist group related to the
Iranian intelligence services. The two cases are closely related to
the fact that Azerbaijan is a key Muslim ally of Israel, considered a
sworn enemy by official Tehran.
The websites of several Azerbaijani state agencies were hacked on
January 16.A notice was placed on some of the sites accusing the
Azerbaijani authorities of `serving Jews' and on some a message was
placed stating `Hacked by AzerianCyberarmy.'
The websites that were hacked belong to president of Azerbaijan
(president.az), the Communications Ministry (rabita.az), the Interior
Ministry (din.gov.az, mia.gov.az), the Constitutional Court
(constcourt.gov.az), the official news agency Azertag, the Baku city
administration, some news portals that are close to the government
(including trend.az), the ruling Yeni Azerbaycan Party (yap.org.az)
and others.
YAP MP Aydin Mirzazade told Trend agency on January 16 that the
cyber-attack on Azerbaijan's state and government websites was not
just a technical provocation, but pursued `politically motivated'
purposes. `The cyber-attack is aimed at casting a shade on
Azerbaijan's growing international image. Some people are worried
about Azerbaijan's development, successes in domestic [affairs] and
foreign policy [because] it is turning into one of the prestigious
countries in the world,' he said.
The YAP website reported that it was attacked last month by hackers
based in Iran, according to IP numbers that were linked to the
cyber-attack. `The implementation of a full-scale attack from
different geographical places, the manner of the attacks and quick
distribution of e-mails to the media show that these actions were
deliberate,' said Elmir Velizade, Deputy Minister of Communications
and Information Technology, following the attack.
Communication Minister Ali Abbasov reported on January 21 that
cyber-attacks destroying government and news websites in Azerbaijan
mostly originated in Iran. `Twenty five sites suffered as a result of
the attack, but they were restored in about two hours,' Abbasov said.
`An investigation completed the day before revealed that 24 attacks
were carried out from Iran, and one from the Netherlands.' He noted
that the ministry had sent a letter to the Iranian side indicating the
exact addresses where the attack was launched from.
However, the minister expressed hope that Iran could have been used as
a transit country and that the attack could have been initiated from a
third country. `We believe that the state agencies of those countries
are not involved in this case,' Abbasov said.
Abbas Isgandari, a spokesman of Iran's Embassy in Azerbaijan said that
`Iran has nothing to do with hacker attacks on Azerbaijan's state and
public organizations' websites.' He added that such reports damage
Azerbaijani-Iranian relations.
In response to the Iranian cyber attacks, Azerbaijani hackers have
attacked over 20 Iranian websites including the websites of Iranian
state structures. This happened on the eve of January 20, the Day of
Black January, when Azerbaijanis commemorate those killed 20 years ago
by the Soviet Army for the sake of Azerbaijan's independence.
Azerbaijan's flag and the notice `20th January is not forgotten' were
posted on Iranian websites by hackers presenting themselves as
`Pirates' Crew.' They stated that these attacks were just the first
steps and that similar actions against Iranian websites would follow.
Moreover, Azerbaijan's National Security Ministry (MTN) distributed
official information saying that it had uncovered a terror group
plotting to assassinate two employees of a Jewish school in Baku.The
ministry said on January 19 that the group was planning terrorist acts
and had illegally acquired firearms, military supplies, and
explosives. It said the arms were secretly brought from Iran to
Azerbaijan and hidden along the 150th kilometer marker of the
Baku-Astara highway.
The APA news agency quoted the Ministry as saying that Azerbaijani
citizens Rasim Aliyev, Ali Huseynov, and Balaqardash Dadashov - the
latter living in Iran - coordinated the efforts to acquire firearms
and explosives. The MNS said Dadashov was in contact with Iranian
special service bodies and ordered the assassination of prominent
foreigners living in Baku. Dadashov allegedly promised Aliyev, his
brother-in-law, US$ 150,000 for this task. `After Rasim Aliyev agreed
to this proposal, Dadashov sent him photos of the people to be
assassinated, the layout of their homes, and pictures of their cars,'
the Ministry said in a statement. `Dadashov paid Aliyev a total of US$
9,300 for preparatory work.'
According to Israeli media, their plan was to attack two Israeli
Chabad emissaries, a rabbi and a teacher employed by the Jewish school
`Chabad Or Avner' in Baku.
`The Azerbaijani security forces acted covertly without alerting us,'
said Rabbi Shneor Segal, one of the two targets. `It was published
that they originally planned to attack `people who look Jewish and
hold foreign passports' near the school, but when the school guards
began suspecting them, they started monitoring the area where I live,'
he told Haaretz. Segal added that the second target was Rabbi Mati
Lewis. The Ministry has opened an investigation into the charges that
include plotting the assassination of a public figure, possession of
contraband, and illegal acquisition and transportation of firearms,
military supplies, and explosives.
Iranian MP Alaeddin Boroujerdi, chairman of the Majilis National
Security and Foreign Policy Committee, has said that the recent claim
that Iran had plotted to assassinate prominent foreigners in Baku is a
conspiracy fueled by the Zionist regime.Speaking to the Fars News
Agency on January 22, Boroujerdi said, `These known methods are old
and threadbare, used by (certain) countries' intelligence agencies
with the aim of creating a negative atmosphere in relations between
the two countries of Iran and Azerbaijan.' The senior lawmaker said
the Zionist regime has an active presence in Azerbaijan and `I believe
that the issue is a plot hatched by the Mossad and is a trap laid for
the Azerbaijani side in regard to the relations between Iran and
Azerbaijan.' He added that `conspiracies are being organized with the
aim of damaging Azerbaijan's relations with its neighboring
countries,' and promoting Iranophobia in the region.
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5707
###
OBAMA: U.S. TO STRENGTHEN DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH GEORGIA
By Maka Gurgenidze (02/08/2012 issue of the CACI Analyst)
Tbilisi hails U.S. President Barack Obama's position on enhanced
security cooperation with Georgia, while Moscow expresses principal
objections to a new stage of the U.S.-Georgia partnership.
Security cooperation and a free-trade agreement (FTA) between the two
countries became the main issues discussed during Georgian President
Mikheil Saakashvili's and President Obama's meeting in the White House
on January 30. The Georgian incumbent political elite as well as
opposition leaders praised the meeting and highlighted its special
significance on the 20th anniversary of U.S.-Georgia diplomatic
relations. In the Oval Office, the U.S. President made clear that the
general features of the strategic partnership between Washington and
Tbilisi would be retained and new steps taken to buttress the ongoing
institutional reform that will ensue an `enormous difference' for
present and future generations of Georgians. He also said that the
U.S. expects the Georgian parliamentary elections scheduled for this
year to be free and fair, leading to `the formal transfer of power
that ... will solidify many of these reforms that have already taken
place.' Further, Obama dubbed Georgia a `model of democracy and
transparency' setting a precedent for the whole region. He expressed
gratitude for Georgia's `extraordinary contributions' to the NATO-led
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and
assured Saakashvili that the White House will continue to support
Georgia's aspirations to become a member of NATO. `We will continue to
strengthen our defense cooperation, and there are a wide range of
areas where we are working together,' the U.S. president said.
In respect of deeper bilateral economic relations, Obama sketched out
the prospects of an FTA between the U.S. and Georgia, disclosing new
opportunities for American and Georgian business and creating a
`win-win' situation for both countries. He noted, however, that the
initiative is in need of tremendous preliminary work regarding
tariffs, quotas and other trade restrictions.
President Saakashvili thanked the Obama administration for the
possibility of an FTA that, in his words, would help the
`nation-building process,' and voiced his appreciation of U.S. support
for Georgia's aspiration to integrate with NATO. Nevertheless, he was
particularly satisfied with the agreement to move bilateral defense
cooperation `to a new level,' aiming to boost Georgia's self-defense
capabilities. The entire Georgian political spectrum, including the
most radical opposition leaders, assessed Saakashvili's U.S. trip
positively. The recently emerged tycoon politician Bidzina Ivanishvili
welcomed the president's productive talks, but warned that the
Georgian government should well understand the signals embedded in the
American leader's speech. He stated that the Georgian government
concealed the main emphasis of Obama's speech whereas the U.S.
president overtly referred to the importance of a legal transfer of
power in Georgia through democratic elections.
While Obama clearly underlined the importance of `free and fair'
elections, the most significant implication of the speech from a
Georgian perspective is that the Obama administration appears ready to
create a benevolent environment for enhanced trade and security
relations with Georgia.
In terms of economic support, the U.S. granted Georgia the status of a
beneficiary country of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in
2001. GSP allows a wide spectrum of Georgian products access to the
U.S. market but only a few of 3,400 eligible product types are being
exported. Therefore, the FTA might not automatically ensure a drastic
increase of Georgian export to U.S., but it will certainly reaffirm
the confidence of investors in the Georgian economy and will help the
country secure a preferable position in the neighborhood.
Even more palpable results can be identified in a security
perspective. According to the Georgian defense ministry, a new level
of cooperation between the two countries will go beyond the current
training of military servicemen for peacekeeping operations and will
enhance Georgia's defense capacities. Russia immediately reacted
strongly to the prospects of a more robust security partnership
between the U.S. and Georgia. Russia's Deputy Defense Minister,
Anatoly Antonov said to RIA Novosti on February 2 that Georgian
officials had simply replaced `arms sale' or `supply of arms' with
`elevating defense cooperation to a new stage.' If such a decision [on
any kind of arms supply] was taken, it will destabilize the situation
in the Caucasus,' he said. On the next day Saakashvili stressed that
`[the] decision has been made to move military cooperation [with the
U.S.] to an absolutely new level in order to focus on our
self-defense.'
Washington and Tbilisi signed the Charter on Strategic Partnership in
2009. At that time the deal was considered the beginning of a new
phase in the history of the U.S.-Georgia strategic partnership,
representing a framework for enhancing cooperation on a wide range of
areas including security and defense. However, the public remarks of
U.S. officials' over the past three years have demonstrated more focus
on educating the armed forces, sustaining a `brains before brawn'
approach. `Elevation to a new stage,' as the Georgian president has
designated it, more likely means a shift in this approach.
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5714
From: A. Papazian