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THE PERCEPTION OF NON-MUSLIMS: FROM RIGHTS OF THE 'GAVUR' TO PRESENT TIME
by Ahmet YıldÄ
Today's Zaman
March 5 2012
Turkey
The protest rally held at Ä°stanbul's Taksim Square to commemorate the
20th anniversary of the Khojaly massacre was marked by the discourse
of a racist, but considered marginal, group.
The slogan, amongst others chanted at the rally, which is most
pertinent for the content of this piece, was "You are all Armenians;
you are all sons of bitches!" This slogan, which established a link
between being Armenian and being a son of bitch, was a response to a
placard at the funeral of Hrant Dink which read, "We are all Armenians;
we are all Hrant." We have once more witnessed that nationalism means
you should be supportive of your fellow countrymen rather than of what
and who is right, and for this reason, justice cannot co-exist with
nationalism. While one would think that the religion and nationality
of those who have been victimized should not matter, we can say from
what we experienced last week that many people find both the religion
and nationality of the victims to be important.
The negative political discourse conveyed by nationalism deserves
closer attention because it demonstrates the relationship between
language and power. A review of the political discourse dominant
in different historical periods teaches a great deal about the
socio-political structure of power. The terms "Near East," "Middle
East" and "Far East" reflect the imperial British imagination.
Defining "İttihad-ı Islam" (Islamic Unity) as pan-Islamism seeks
to undermine the positive meaning of the term. Derogatory terms such
as "Zo zo," used in reference to Armenians, and "Lo Lo," used in
reference to Kurds, represent the approach of pro-Turkish and Kemalist
nationalism toward Armenians and Kurds. The relegation of the term
"jihad" to holy war meets the needs of Western opponents to Islam
toward the otherization and alienation of the followers of the belief.
You will notice some interesting points if you look at the
modernization process of the Ottoman state from this perspective. In
the aftermath of the Decree of Reforms, an important stage that
pointed to the end of the nation-state system, the use of some
traditional notions and discriminatory terms for other nations or
ethnic groups was restricted or completely banned in the public
sphere. These included "gavur," derived from the Arabic word "kafir"
(infidel), "poor subjects," and "cifut," derived from the Persian word
"juhood." The term cifut was used to refer to a state of complexity and
untidiness, but it was not yet used as a racist remark in the modern
system. The course of development of the term gavur was interesting.
Sultan Mahmud II's nickname
The nickname of Sultan Mahmud II, who forced the Muslim people to wear
fezzes and pants, was "gavur sultan." The term kafir literally meant
a person who covered the truth and an individual who denied Islam,
but it also meant merciless and stubborn. We see the manifestation
and reflection of this in the aftermath of the Second Constitutional
era in a work by Said Nursi, "Munazarat," authored in 1911, where
some questions about the constitutional monarchy were discussed with
Kurdish tribes.
"Question: Some Young Turks said: 'You should not call Christians
gavur because they are monotheists.' Why should we not call an
infidel kafir (infidel)? Answer: It is like you do not call a blind
man blind because it is torture. We should omit torture. Secondly,
kafir (infidel) has two meanings. First, the one which comes to mind
is atheist, and a man who denies the existence of Allah. We do not
have the right to use this term to describe people who are monotheists.
Secondly, it also means a person who denies our prophet and Islam. We
have the right to use the term with this meaning to describe them. And
they actually agree with it. However, because the former meaning
appears to have dominated, this term has been humiliating to these
people." For the members of Kurdish tribes, not being allowed to call
a proper gavur a gavur is not reconcilable with Kurdish patriotism
and Islamic glory.
Describing a gavur as a gavur
However, it should also be noted that the notion gavur did not
traditionally have a negative connotation. The relationship between
the Millet-i hakime (the maintainer of the nation) and the subject
nations in the system of nations relies on the principle of the
maintainer protecting its subjects. This was popularly known as the
right of the gavur. Under Islam, the violation of individual rights
is reparable only if the forgiveness of the victim is secured. It is
proper to do this while the victim is still alive. While it is possible
to gain the forgiveness of Muslims in the afterlife, the forgiveness
of a non-Muslim can only be secured in this world. A Muslim cannot
die without having settled his accounts with non-Muslims. For this
reason, the Muslim people have always been careful about protecting and
honoring the rights of non-Muslims. Blood feuds were a major problem
for Muslims alone; there were no blood feuds between Muslims and
non-Muslims because that would have meant a violation of the rights
of the gavur. One of the things that fathers asked their sons to do
as they were dying was to rid themselves of any burdens or obligations
associated with the breach of this right.
Therefore, the Islam-based hierarchical structure of the system of
nations is built upon justice that is rooted in obligation. One of
the reflections of this is that Muslims should be distinct from others.
The Tanzimat system, which introduced a law of citizenship to replace
this system, was criticized by people who were concerned that they
would not be able to call the gavur a gavur because, regardless
of whether one was Muslim, non-Muslim or a gavur, all people would
wear the same outfits; as a result, people would not be ostracized,
thereby removing any idea of supremacy from the public sphere. The
success of Tanzimat and reforms to remove the term gavur from the
official realm and public sphere has been limited. Being a gavur or
not was one of the social references during the period between the
Balkan Wars and the War of Independence that have been re-generated
within a nationalistic context.
During the transition from empire to nation state, equality remained
as an ideal. This time, the code of a dominant nation was reinvented
with reference to a centrifugal factor of Turkishness. The political
language and discourse of the Republican state has been reformed
based on the principle of national unity and respect for the state
associated with the ideal of equality, with no special privileges
granted to any group. The notions of nation, civilization, homeland,
state and subject, including those applicable to minorities, have
been redefined. The royal class remained in power through the new
holders of power, whereas minorities were described as Turks under
the constitution. As noted by Eric Jan Zurcher, the principle of
ideals replaced religion in the nationalistic sense, whereas the
notion of "knowledge" in the religious sense has been converted into
a positivist meaning.
The cosmopolitan and pluralist political language of the empire
introduced the term loyal nation (millet-i sadıka). In the first
quarter of the 19th century, all groups sought to create their own
state while, among the non-Muslim communities, only Armenians, who were
Christians, adopted the Ottoman as their own. Armenians were loyal to
the state and for this reason, Armenians were appointed to crucial
posts in the empire after the Greeks left. But when the Armenians
joined others in "a race to establish" their own state after the 1876
war, enmity and hostility emerged between Muslim Turks and the Kurds,
and Christian Armenians. The attempts by the Committee of Union and
Progress to resolve this problem by relying on extreme measures,
including deportation, introduced a fairly racist remark to our
political literature: Ermeni dölu (the offspring of an Armenian).
A generation of young people born to a large number of Armenian girls
and women through forced marriages or rapes were collectively referred
to as "Ermeni dölu" by the perpetrators of this process, too.
There is no need to explain that this term or description is
humiliating and ignores all humane values. The association between
being an Armenian and being a son of bitch, as well as the widespread
use of the term son of an Armenian, the use of Armenian identity
as a tool and the opportunity to humiliate others are indicative of
the decline of the nationalistic political discourse and language,
from once speaking of the rights of the gavur to discourse about
"Ermeni dölu."
The political horizon of nationalism is free of justice and fairness.
The defensive reflex of nationalism, which is to justify its
actions, negatively influences our approach toward the Armenian
issue and converts it into a matter of "life or death" where national
identity is concerned, and because of this, we sacrifice our humane
sensitivities to nationalistic reflexes. Those who fail to criticize
their own actions may consider themselves to be flawless. On a
collective level, nations, if they look at their past from the prism
of national pride and ego, would tend to exonerate themselves and
justify their actions. A nationalistic stance externalizes the aspects
and requirements of a humane stance. Turkey has to take its approach
toward the Armenian issue and Armenian people based on grounds of
justice and fairness and not that of partiality. If this is done,
we would be able to see our part in the cases of rapes, lootings
and treason, along with examples of fidelity, companionship and
mercy. In this case, while we consider our own mistakes, in addition
to the mistakes the Armenians committed, we would be concerned again
about the rights of the gavurs and make progress toward an emphatic
discourse rather than a language of conflict.
*Dr. Ahmet Yıldız is a political scientist.
From: Baghdasarian
by Ahmet YıldÄ
Today's Zaman
March 5 2012
Turkey
The protest rally held at Ä°stanbul's Taksim Square to commemorate the
20th anniversary of the Khojaly massacre was marked by the discourse
of a racist, but considered marginal, group.
The slogan, amongst others chanted at the rally, which is most
pertinent for the content of this piece, was "You are all Armenians;
you are all sons of bitches!" This slogan, which established a link
between being Armenian and being a son of bitch, was a response to a
placard at the funeral of Hrant Dink which read, "We are all Armenians;
we are all Hrant." We have once more witnessed that nationalism means
you should be supportive of your fellow countrymen rather than of what
and who is right, and for this reason, justice cannot co-exist with
nationalism. While one would think that the religion and nationality
of those who have been victimized should not matter, we can say from
what we experienced last week that many people find both the religion
and nationality of the victims to be important.
The negative political discourse conveyed by nationalism deserves
closer attention because it demonstrates the relationship between
language and power. A review of the political discourse dominant
in different historical periods teaches a great deal about the
socio-political structure of power. The terms "Near East," "Middle
East" and "Far East" reflect the imperial British imagination.
Defining "İttihad-ı Islam" (Islamic Unity) as pan-Islamism seeks
to undermine the positive meaning of the term. Derogatory terms such
as "Zo zo," used in reference to Armenians, and "Lo Lo," used in
reference to Kurds, represent the approach of pro-Turkish and Kemalist
nationalism toward Armenians and Kurds. The relegation of the term
"jihad" to holy war meets the needs of Western opponents to Islam
toward the otherization and alienation of the followers of the belief.
You will notice some interesting points if you look at the
modernization process of the Ottoman state from this perspective. In
the aftermath of the Decree of Reforms, an important stage that
pointed to the end of the nation-state system, the use of some
traditional notions and discriminatory terms for other nations or
ethnic groups was restricted or completely banned in the public
sphere. These included "gavur," derived from the Arabic word "kafir"
(infidel), "poor subjects," and "cifut," derived from the Persian word
"juhood." The term cifut was used to refer to a state of complexity and
untidiness, but it was not yet used as a racist remark in the modern
system. The course of development of the term gavur was interesting.
Sultan Mahmud II's nickname
The nickname of Sultan Mahmud II, who forced the Muslim people to wear
fezzes and pants, was "gavur sultan." The term kafir literally meant
a person who covered the truth and an individual who denied Islam,
but it also meant merciless and stubborn. We see the manifestation
and reflection of this in the aftermath of the Second Constitutional
era in a work by Said Nursi, "Munazarat," authored in 1911, where
some questions about the constitutional monarchy were discussed with
Kurdish tribes.
"Question: Some Young Turks said: 'You should not call Christians
gavur because they are monotheists.' Why should we not call an
infidel kafir (infidel)? Answer: It is like you do not call a blind
man blind because it is torture. We should omit torture. Secondly,
kafir (infidel) has two meanings. First, the one which comes to mind
is atheist, and a man who denies the existence of Allah. We do not
have the right to use this term to describe people who are monotheists.
Secondly, it also means a person who denies our prophet and Islam. We
have the right to use the term with this meaning to describe them. And
they actually agree with it. However, because the former meaning
appears to have dominated, this term has been humiliating to these
people." For the members of Kurdish tribes, not being allowed to call
a proper gavur a gavur is not reconcilable with Kurdish patriotism
and Islamic glory.
Describing a gavur as a gavur
However, it should also be noted that the notion gavur did not
traditionally have a negative connotation. The relationship between
the Millet-i hakime (the maintainer of the nation) and the subject
nations in the system of nations relies on the principle of the
maintainer protecting its subjects. This was popularly known as the
right of the gavur. Under Islam, the violation of individual rights
is reparable only if the forgiveness of the victim is secured. It is
proper to do this while the victim is still alive. While it is possible
to gain the forgiveness of Muslims in the afterlife, the forgiveness
of a non-Muslim can only be secured in this world. A Muslim cannot
die without having settled his accounts with non-Muslims. For this
reason, the Muslim people have always been careful about protecting and
honoring the rights of non-Muslims. Blood feuds were a major problem
for Muslims alone; there were no blood feuds between Muslims and
non-Muslims because that would have meant a violation of the rights
of the gavur. One of the things that fathers asked their sons to do
as they were dying was to rid themselves of any burdens or obligations
associated with the breach of this right.
Therefore, the Islam-based hierarchical structure of the system of
nations is built upon justice that is rooted in obligation. One of
the reflections of this is that Muslims should be distinct from others.
The Tanzimat system, which introduced a law of citizenship to replace
this system, was criticized by people who were concerned that they
would not be able to call the gavur a gavur because, regardless
of whether one was Muslim, non-Muslim or a gavur, all people would
wear the same outfits; as a result, people would not be ostracized,
thereby removing any idea of supremacy from the public sphere. The
success of Tanzimat and reforms to remove the term gavur from the
official realm and public sphere has been limited. Being a gavur or
not was one of the social references during the period between the
Balkan Wars and the War of Independence that have been re-generated
within a nationalistic context.
During the transition from empire to nation state, equality remained
as an ideal. This time, the code of a dominant nation was reinvented
with reference to a centrifugal factor of Turkishness. The political
language and discourse of the Republican state has been reformed
based on the principle of national unity and respect for the state
associated with the ideal of equality, with no special privileges
granted to any group. The notions of nation, civilization, homeland,
state and subject, including those applicable to minorities, have
been redefined. The royal class remained in power through the new
holders of power, whereas minorities were described as Turks under
the constitution. As noted by Eric Jan Zurcher, the principle of
ideals replaced religion in the nationalistic sense, whereas the
notion of "knowledge" in the religious sense has been converted into
a positivist meaning.
The cosmopolitan and pluralist political language of the empire
introduced the term loyal nation (millet-i sadıka). In the first
quarter of the 19th century, all groups sought to create their own
state while, among the non-Muslim communities, only Armenians, who were
Christians, adopted the Ottoman as their own. Armenians were loyal to
the state and for this reason, Armenians were appointed to crucial
posts in the empire after the Greeks left. But when the Armenians
joined others in "a race to establish" their own state after the 1876
war, enmity and hostility emerged between Muslim Turks and the Kurds,
and Christian Armenians. The attempts by the Committee of Union and
Progress to resolve this problem by relying on extreme measures,
including deportation, introduced a fairly racist remark to our
political literature: Ermeni dölu (the offspring of an Armenian).
A generation of young people born to a large number of Armenian girls
and women through forced marriages or rapes were collectively referred
to as "Ermeni dölu" by the perpetrators of this process, too.
There is no need to explain that this term or description is
humiliating and ignores all humane values. The association between
being an Armenian and being a son of bitch, as well as the widespread
use of the term son of an Armenian, the use of Armenian identity
as a tool and the opportunity to humiliate others are indicative of
the decline of the nationalistic political discourse and language,
from once speaking of the rights of the gavur to discourse about
"Ermeni dölu."
The political horizon of nationalism is free of justice and fairness.
The defensive reflex of nationalism, which is to justify its
actions, negatively influences our approach toward the Armenian
issue and converts it into a matter of "life or death" where national
identity is concerned, and because of this, we sacrifice our humane
sensitivities to nationalistic reflexes. Those who fail to criticize
their own actions may consider themselves to be flawless. On a
collective level, nations, if they look at their past from the prism
of national pride and ego, would tend to exonerate themselves and
justify their actions. A nationalistic stance externalizes the aspects
and requirements of a humane stance. Turkey has to take its approach
toward the Armenian issue and Armenian people based on grounds of
justice and fairness and not that of partiality. If this is done,
we would be able to see our part in the cases of rapes, lootings
and treason, along with examples of fidelity, companionship and
mercy. In this case, while we consider our own mistakes, in addition
to the mistakes the Armenians committed, we would be concerned again
about the rights of the gavurs and make progress toward an emphatic
discourse rather than a language of conflict.
*Dr. Ahmet Yıldız is a political scientist.
From: Baghdasarian