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Sabine Freizer: New War Between Armenia and Azerbaijan Would Be Long
and Hard
[image: PDF]
BAKU. March 6, 2012: Turan News Agency interviewed Sabine Freizer, the
Director of the Europe Program of International Crisis Group (ICG),
discussing the possibility of the renewal of the active war between
Azerbaijan and Armenia.
ICG has just published a big report on the problems of the internally
displaced persons (IDP) in Azerbaijan. Can you briefly describe the main
problems of this category of people? What are the recommendations of your
organization to the government of Azerbaijan ?
The International Crisis Group published a report on 27 February
entitled Tackling
Azerbaijan's IDP Burden where we emphasized that the government has
significantly improved its care of this population of approximately 600,000
over the past five years. Though many still face precarious existences, the
state has been investing heavily in new housing and increasing benefits. In
a very poignant sign of change, the notorious railcar and tent camps have
closed.
At the same time even though the government has constructed new housing for
over 100,000 people some complain of poor construction and infrastructure,
lack of community participation in planning and limited access to land or
job opportunities in the new communities. IDPs should be more effectively
integrated into decision-making about housing, services, and other
community needs, as well as contingency planning for emergencies and
confidence-building measures (CBMs).
Azerbaijan's IDPs' ability to express their interests is limited by their
inability to elect municipal representatives. The some 40,000 from
Nagorno-Karabakh are in principle represented as a group by the Azerbaijani
Community of Nagorno-Karabakh Social Union, but its leadership is not fully
popularly elected, and the 560,000 displaced from the occupied districts
around Nagorno-Karabakh are not well represented. The political voice of
IDPs thus remains weak and the government should allow IDPs, while their
villages and towns remain occupied, to vote for municipal councils in their
places of temporary residence.
To protect IDPs and other civilians along the LoC, the Azerbaijan
authorities should also agree with the Armenian government and the de facto
authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh to an expanded interim OSCE monitoring
role, to an OSCE proposal to remove snipers from the LoC and to set up an
incident investigation mechanism, as well as to immediately cease military
exercises near the LoC and advancing trench positions
Several weeks ago the French Senate adopted a law on criminalization of
denying the Armenian genocide. This decision coincided with campaign or the
wave of protests in Azerbaijan with demand to exclude France from the OSCE
Minsk group. Do you think it is correct for France to be in a Minsk group,
insisting that Paris is impartial moderator in resolving the conflict? And
the second: do you believe that Azerbaijan can make serious steps to
exclude France from the Minsk group? Is it is interests of Baku if Paris is
excluded from the Minsk Group?
The French Constitutional Court has overturned the law on criminalization
of genocide denial and I am convinced that the passage of this law had much
more to do with internal French politics, and the presence of some 500,000
ethnic Armenians in France, than on the country's view of Turkey or
Armenia.
We are about to reach the 20th year anniversary of the Minsk Group and I
think that it is totally fair and appropriate to question whether this is
the best format through which to negotiation a solution to the conflict.
However I don't think that the law on the criminalization of the genocide
means that France is pro-Armenian and anti-Azerbaijani. Few in France would
ever link Baku to the tragic events of 1915. They may not even realize that
Azerbaijanis have any relations to Turkic populations. If anything this
would be a good time to remind Paris that Azerbaijan still has 600,000 IDPs
with no permanent solutions to their plight in sight.
I think that it will be very difficult to change the co-chairs of the Minsk
Group within the current OSCE format. Would with decide on such a change?
The OSCE chairperson in office, all Minsk Group members or all OSCE
participating states? In any event it is highly unlikely that a clear
consensus would be achieved and first and foremost European Union member
states should themselves support such a change, together with Baku and
Yerevan.
What is your assessment of combat readiness of Azeri and Armenian army?
Can Azerbaijan win if the war resumes?
A year ago International Crisis Group published a report called Armenia and
Azerbaijan Preventing War where we warned about the possibility of an
accidental work as both countries are engaged in an arms race, escalating
front-line clashes, vitriolic war rhetoric and there is a virtual breakdown
in the Minsk Group peace talks.
Some people think in Azerbaijan and Armenia that they can win a quick war.
But we demonstrated in our report that any war would be long and hard.
Azerbaijan's armed forces are estimated at nearly 95,000, Armenia's and
Nagorno-Karabakh's at around 70,000. The two sides' arsenals are
increasingly deadly, sophisticated and capable of sustaining a protracted
war. Both can hit large population centres, critical infrastructure and
communications.
For Azerbaijan, the main problem would be that Armenian forces have the
tactical advantage, as their forces control most of the high ground around
Nagorno-Karabakh. Any offensive beyond Fizuli and Jebrail would be
literally and figuratively an uphill battle over difficult mountain terrain
for Azerbaijan, requiring at least triple superiority in troops and arms.
What could be the role of the Great Powers in this case: Russia, US,
Turkey, Iran? Which one of them would support either side of the conflict
and why?
It is very possible that the regional powers would be dragged into the war
even though Russia and Turkey are very close strategic allies.
Armenia would likely try to secure Russian military involvement by invoking
CSTO mutual defence commitments, even if direct Russian military
participation would be far from
Guaranteed. Russia's Gyumri base agreement was modified in August 2010,
when an extension was signed, to include security guarantees against
general threats to Armenian security even if it does not fully clarify
Moscow's military obligation if war resumes over Nagorno-Karabakh.
On August 16, 2010, days before the upgraded Russian-Armenian military deal
was announced, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a strategic partnership and
mutual assistance agreement, stipulating they will support each other
`using all possibilities' in the case of a military attack or `aggression'
against the other. The agreement is not public so it is impossible to say
what would happen if there was a resumption of war but clearly there would
be much public support in Turkey for assistance to Azerbaijan.
I don't believe that the US or the EU would get directly involved. But a
resumption of hostilities would seriously undermine U.S. and EU energy
interests. Both seek to develop the Southern Caucasus as an alternative
source and transit route for energy imports to Europe. A full-scale war
would also threaten the Caucasus air corridor that accounts for nearly 70
per cent of all NATO's military transport flights to bases in Central Asia,
as well as the alternative overland supply route to Afghanistan via
Azerbaijan
Do you believe that Armenians and Azeris in principle can resolve the
conflict peacefully? If yes, why they couldn't do it in 20 years? If not
-
what is the main obstacles? What is the main reason which is blocking
efforts in adopting Basic principles of resolution of the conflict? Do you
believe that Baku can agree to a referendum in Karabakh?
I believe that Armenian and Azerbaijan can in resolve this conflict and the
Basic Principles offer an excellent blueprint to move forward. But clearly
there is a lack of trust between the sides, at all levels from the
Presidents to the average people. This makes an agreement on the Basic
Principles much more difficult because it calls for a long term process of
return, rehabilitation, and normalization, not an immediate solution to the
conflict. The sides need to trust that after a decade or two of slow but
steady progress they will be able to agree on the final status of NK. To
start this process they need much trust and confidence. It is not as though
the international community was just coming in and imposing a solution.
At this point, Armenia and Azerbaijan cannot agree on the future status of
Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenians of course want a clear perspective for an
independent Nagorno-Karabakh (in return for much of the surrounding
occupied territories), while Baku says that NK will remain part of the
Azerbaijan. The Basic Principles try to delay any decision on status, but
both sides constantly try to include something on status to secure their
position.
Azerbaijan has used different formulations suggesting that it can agree on
a vote on NK status. The problem is not the notion of a referendum or a
vote. The problem is in the details of what question will be asked, where
the vote will be held, who will vote, will a vote in NK have to be followed
up by one in Azerbaijan to be valid=85
What do you think about the proposal to establish a new format of
international moderators instead of the OSCE Minsk Group?
As I said earlier twenty years after the setting up of the Minsk Group it
is appropriate to ask whether it is effective. Clearly it needs to be more
transparent and do more to build up trust between the sides. Does it need
to be replaced all together by another mechanism? Perhaps. But who can
replace the biggest regional powers: Russia, the US and through France, the
EU? This question will also be the topic of a future Crisis Group report
(Turan).
and Hard
[image: PDF]
BAKU. March 6, 2012: Turan News Agency interviewed Sabine Freizer, the
Director of the Europe Program of International Crisis Group (ICG),
discussing the possibility of the renewal of the active war between
Azerbaijan and Armenia.
ICG has just published a big report on the problems of the internally
displaced persons (IDP) in Azerbaijan. Can you briefly describe the main
problems of this category of people? What are the recommendations of your
organization to the government of Azerbaijan ?
The International Crisis Group published a report on 27 February
entitled Tackling
Azerbaijan's IDP Burden where we emphasized that the government has
significantly improved its care of this population of approximately 600,000
over the past five years. Though many still face precarious existences, the
state has been investing heavily in new housing and increasing benefits. In
a very poignant sign of change, the notorious railcar and tent camps have
closed.
At the same time even though the government has constructed new housing for
over 100,000 people some complain of poor construction and infrastructure,
lack of community participation in planning and limited access to land or
job opportunities in the new communities. IDPs should be more effectively
integrated into decision-making about housing, services, and other
community needs, as well as contingency planning for emergencies and
confidence-building measures (CBMs).
Azerbaijan's IDPs' ability to express their interests is limited by their
inability to elect municipal representatives. The some 40,000 from
Nagorno-Karabakh are in principle represented as a group by the Azerbaijani
Community of Nagorno-Karabakh Social Union, but its leadership is not fully
popularly elected, and the 560,000 displaced from the occupied districts
around Nagorno-Karabakh are not well represented. The political voice of
IDPs thus remains weak and the government should allow IDPs, while their
villages and towns remain occupied, to vote for municipal councils in their
places of temporary residence.
To protect IDPs and other civilians along the LoC, the Azerbaijan
authorities should also agree with the Armenian government and the de facto
authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh to an expanded interim OSCE monitoring
role, to an OSCE proposal to remove snipers from the LoC and to set up an
incident investigation mechanism, as well as to immediately cease military
exercises near the LoC and advancing trench positions
Several weeks ago the French Senate adopted a law on criminalization of
denying the Armenian genocide. This decision coincided with campaign or the
wave of protests in Azerbaijan with demand to exclude France from the OSCE
Minsk group. Do you think it is correct for France to be in a Minsk group,
insisting that Paris is impartial moderator in resolving the conflict? And
the second: do you believe that Azerbaijan can make serious steps to
exclude France from the Minsk group? Is it is interests of Baku if Paris is
excluded from the Minsk Group?
The French Constitutional Court has overturned the law on criminalization
of genocide denial and I am convinced that the passage of this law had much
more to do with internal French politics, and the presence of some 500,000
ethnic Armenians in France, than on the country's view of Turkey or
Armenia.
We are about to reach the 20th year anniversary of the Minsk Group and I
think that it is totally fair and appropriate to question whether this is
the best format through which to negotiation a solution to the conflict.
However I don't think that the law on the criminalization of the genocide
means that France is pro-Armenian and anti-Azerbaijani. Few in France would
ever link Baku to the tragic events of 1915. They may not even realize that
Azerbaijanis have any relations to Turkic populations. If anything this
would be a good time to remind Paris that Azerbaijan still has 600,000 IDPs
with no permanent solutions to their plight in sight.
I think that it will be very difficult to change the co-chairs of the Minsk
Group within the current OSCE format. Would with decide on such a change?
The OSCE chairperson in office, all Minsk Group members or all OSCE
participating states? In any event it is highly unlikely that a clear
consensus would be achieved and first and foremost European Union member
states should themselves support such a change, together with Baku and
Yerevan.
What is your assessment of combat readiness of Azeri and Armenian army?
Can Azerbaijan win if the war resumes?
A year ago International Crisis Group published a report called Armenia and
Azerbaijan Preventing War where we warned about the possibility of an
accidental work as both countries are engaged in an arms race, escalating
front-line clashes, vitriolic war rhetoric and there is a virtual breakdown
in the Minsk Group peace talks.
Some people think in Azerbaijan and Armenia that they can win a quick war.
But we demonstrated in our report that any war would be long and hard.
Azerbaijan's armed forces are estimated at nearly 95,000, Armenia's and
Nagorno-Karabakh's at around 70,000. The two sides' arsenals are
increasingly deadly, sophisticated and capable of sustaining a protracted
war. Both can hit large population centres, critical infrastructure and
communications.
For Azerbaijan, the main problem would be that Armenian forces have the
tactical advantage, as their forces control most of the high ground around
Nagorno-Karabakh. Any offensive beyond Fizuli and Jebrail would be
literally and figuratively an uphill battle over difficult mountain terrain
for Azerbaijan, requiring at least triple superiority in troops and arms.
What could be the role of the Great Powers in this case: Russia, US,
Turkey, Iran? Which one of them would support either side of the conflict
and why?
It is very possible that the regional powers would be dragged into the war
even though Russia and Turkey are very close strategic allies.
Armenia would likely try to secure Russian military involvement by invoking
CSTO mutual defence commitments, even if direct Russian military
participation would be far from
Guaranteed. Russia's Gyumri base agreement was modified in August 2010,
when an extension was signed, to include security guarantees against
general threats to Armenian security even if it does not fully clarify
Moscow's military obligation if war resumes over Nagorno-Karabakh.
On August 16, 2010, days before the upgraded Russian-Armenian military deal
was announced, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a strategic partnership and
mutual assistance agreement, stipulating they will support each other
`using all possibilities' in the case of a military attack or `aggression'
against the other. The agreement is not public so it is impossible to say
what would happen if there was a resumption of war but clearly there would
be much public support in Turkey for assistance to Azerbaijan.
I don't believe that the US or the EU would get directly involved. But a
resumption of hostilities would seriously undermine U.S. and EU energy
interests. Both seek to develop the Southern Caucasus as an alternative
source and transit route for energy imports to Europe. A full-scale war
would also threaten the Caucasus air corridor that accounts for nearly 70
per cent of all NATO's military transport flights to bases in Central Asia,
as well as the alternative overland supply route to Afghanistan via
Azerbaijan
Do you believe that Armenians and Azeris in principle can resolve the
conflict peacefully? If yes, why they couldn't do it in 20 years? If not
-
what is the main obstacles? What is the main reason which is blocking
efforts in adopting Basic principles of resolution of the conflict? Do you
believe that Baku can agree to a referendum in Karabakh?
I believe that Armenian and Azerbaijan can in resolve this conflict and the
Basic Principles offer an excellent blueprint to move forward. But clearly
there is a lack of trust between the sides, at all levels from the
Presidents to the average people. This makes an agreement on the Basic
Principles much more difficult because it calls for a long term process of
return, rehabilitation, and normalization, not an immediate solution to the
conflict. The sides need to trust that after a decade or two of slow but
steady progress they will be able to agree on the final status of NK. To
start this process they need much trust and confidence. It is not as though
the international community was just coming in and imposing a solution.
At this point, Armenia and Azerbaijan cannot agree on the future status of
Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenians of course want a clear perspective for an
independent Nagorno-Karabakh (in return for much of the surrounding
occupied territories), while Baku says that NK will remain part of the
Azerbaijan. The Basic Principles try to delay any decision on status, but
both sides constantly try to include something on status to secure their
position.
Azerbaijan has used different formulations suggesting that it can agree on
a vote on NK status. The problem is not the notion of a referendum or a
vote. The problem is in the details of what question will be asked, where
the vote will be held, who will vote, will a vote in NK have to be followed
up by one in Azerbaijan to be valid=85
What do you think about the proposal to establish a new format of
international moderators instead of the OSCE Minsk Group?
As I said earlier twenty years after the setting up of the Minsk Group it
is appropriate to ask whether it is effective. Clearly it needs to be more
transparent and do more to build up trust between the sides. Does it need
to be replaced all together by another mechanism? Perhaps. But who can
replace the biggest regional powers: Russia, the US and through France, the
EU? This question will also be the topic of a future Crisis Group report
(Turan).