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Facing up to illiberal democracy (and not just in Central Asia)
by Christopher Schwartz on
3/10/2012 · 1 comment
In the last two months, we've born witness to more incidents of illiberal
democracy or democracy's
`doubles' here
in Central Asia/Eurasia, from Kazakhstan's parliamentary elections
which many say was an experiment in pseudo-pluralism; to Turkmenistan's
surreal presidential election that has left those of us on the outside
(and, indeed, many of those on the inside) scratching their heads wondering
what it was all about to begin with; to Russia's intriguingly complex
and probably historical presidential poll
.
Still to come in the next few years are parliamentary elections in Armenia
and Tajikistan, and presidential elections in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Tajikistan, none of which are expected by Western observers to be free and
fair. The question I hear a lot from non-specialists is: *why are these
societies even bothering with the charade?* At the moment, this is the
shape of my answer:
Central Asian/Eurasian politics can be easily dismissed as tired Sovietisms
re-worked into cynical caricatures of the West. Unfortunately, as I get to
know this part of the world better, I'm increasingly not so convinced that
it's us Westerners who are being mocked; instead, what's happening to the
concept of liberal democracy here is actually very much part of a universal
phenomenon. Just ask any civil society activist and they'll tell you how
`liberal democracy' can and is frequently bastardized to mean `popular
legitimacy', and `popular legitimacy' is, in turn, bastardized to mean
`approval for the regime's policies'. The uncomfortable reality is that
this as true in the archetypal liberal democracy, the United States of
America, wherein elected officials routinely and conveniently distort
the widespread (albeit diminishing) voter apathy of the
countryto mask the
hijacking of policy-making by special interests, as it is true
in, say, Kazakhstan, whose consistently high voter
turnout(in
comparison to the USA), masks the authoritarian tendencies of the
dominant ruling party (all the more so if the turnout figures prove to be
false). In both cases, what we're really dealing with is
legitimacy-engineering, intended to buttress a constellation of elites and
their related pet institutions and industries by a transference of moral
authority from the grassroots to the top.
Make no mistake, the target of the legitimacy-engineering is primarily
internal: the grassroots itself (particularly the electorate), as well as
rivals for power (real or perceived). The electorate, thanks to a terrible
education and media system, simply don't know any better; the rivals,
having achieved a position of relative elitism to have access to more
information, *do* know better but catch the hint and respond accordingly
(i.e., silence and subterfuge). Insofar that the legitimacy-engineering has
an external orientation, this is a secondary, although not unimportant
goal, namely, to deflect criticism via the logic of national
self-determination. Indeed, democratic elections can accomplish what divine
right of kings or Marxist dialectical materialism never could, namely, to
give the impression of collective agreement with respect to a regime's
choices. And yes, in all of this I am talking as much about my homeland as
I am about the Central Asian/Eurasian states (I am probably sounding like a
very bitter expatriate right now). The benefactor of the
legitimacy-engineering is not as clear in the American context as in the
Central Asian/Eurasian one, but in both cases, it's really a system that's
receiving the moral authority, not just the man on top.
Yet, speaking of the men on top, just as presidents of the United States
can be prone to messianic depictions of themselves - either of the Terror
or Hope variety of eschatology - Central Asian/Eurasian presidents
notoriously have a penchant for the salvific. Besides the late Niyazov,
Karimov spring to mind, and in his own way, Bakiyev had a tinge of the
deliverer to his administration, as well, and Putin and Aliyev frequently
co-opt still-fresh memories of societal turmoil in their favor. Along these
lines, I actually have a begrudging respect for Nazarbayev: his golden
handprint in the Baiterek is actually not so much an expression of
megalomania as it is a statement of fact, namely, that he has left an
indelible mark upon his country, like it or not, for better and for worse.
That's more than I can say for all the `Change' that's happened in
the
United States since 2008 (at least in my cynical moments). But again, in
all cases, the target is internal, the goal still is and always is
legitimacy-engineering. The era of elections setting the course of a nation
rather than approving a pre-set path - if it ever existed - is fast
receding into the past here and in the West.
But then there's Turkmenistan. I think, unfortunately, *this* country is an
outlier. I've got a sinking feeling in my gut that it is increasingly
fruitless to seek any kind of rationality oriented toward the outside world
from the Turkmen president, even vis-à-vis his immediate neighbors, much
less the West. If there is any logic to his behavior, then it's most likely
in response to internal power dynamics, the nature of which are invisible
to the outside eye (although there are
clues).
But before we start thinking that this is still in keeping with the overall
trends in managed democracy, we should consider the thoughts of my
colleague Annasoltan, who has come to
fearthat
what we're really looking at in Turkmenistan is the possible mental
deterioration of Berdimuhammedov. The presidential election, then, may have
really been driven by the illogic of ego and insecurity: this time around,
the legitimacy-engineering was directed not at the grassroots, but by the
establishment toward the president himself.
Power-plays and madness are not mutually co-exclusive, of course, and in
fact the latter can sometimes be a pretty good tool in the former, just ask
Caligula. Moreover, determining how much of this exercise in megalomania
was the initiative of Berdimuhammedov and how much of it arose from the
overall regime, and for which purposes, could be enlightening. Until those
facts can come to the light of history, unfortunately, all the rest of us
can do is stand outside Turkmenistan's parallel universe and wonder about
its strange physics, a political physics in which the logic of liberalism
and democracy are twisted to reduce an entire society into instrumental
extensions of one single ego.
http://registan.net/index.php/2012/03/10/facing-up-to-illiberal-democracy-and-not-just-in-central-asia/comment-page-1/
From: Baghdasarian
by Christopher Schwartz on
3/10/2012 · 1 comment
In the last two months, we've born witness to more incidents of illiberal
democracy or democracy's
`doubles' here
in Central Asia/Eurasia, from Kazakhstan's parliamentary elections
which many say was an experiment in pseudo-pluralism; to Turkmenistan's
surreal presidential election that has left those of us on the outside
(and, indeed, many of those on the inside) scratching their heads wondering
what it was all about to begin with; to Russia's intriguingly complex
and probably historical presidential poll
.
Still to come in the next few years are parliamentary elections in Armenia
and Tajikistan, and presidential elections in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Tajikistan, none of which are expected by Western observers to be free and
fair. The question I hear a lot from non-specialists is: *why are these
societies even bothering with the charade?* At the moment, this is the
shape of my answer:
Central Asian/Eurasian politics can be easily dismissed as tired Sovietisms
re-worked into cynical caricatures of the West. Unfortunately, as I get to
know this part of the world better, I'm increasingly not so convinced that
it's us Westerners who are being mocked; instead, what's happening to the
concept of liberal democracy here is actually very much part of a universal
phenomenon. Just ask any civil society activist and they'll tell you how
`liberal democracy' can and is frequently bastardized to mean `popular
legitimacy', and `popular legitimacy' is, in turn, bastardized to mean
`approval for the regime's policies'. The uncomfortable reality is that
this as true in the archetypal liberal democracy, the United States of
America, wherein elected officials routinely and conveniently distort
the widespread (albeit diminishing) voter apathy of the
countryto mask the
hijacking of policy-making by special interests, as it is true
in, say, Kazakhstan, whose consistently high voter
turnout(in
comparison to the USA), masks the authoritarian tendencies of the
dominant ruling party (all the more so if the turnout figures prove to be
false). In both cases, what we're really dealing with is
legitimacy-engineering, intended to buttress a constellation of elites and
their related pet institutions and industries by a transference of moral
authority from the grassroots to the top.
Make no mistake, the target of the legitimacy-engineering is primarily
internal: the grassroots itself (particularly the electorate), as well as
rivals for power (real or perceived). The electorate, thanks to a terrible
education and media system, simply don't know any better; the rivals,
having achieved a position of relative elitism to have access to more
information, *do* know better but catch the hint and respond accordingly
(i.e., silence and subterfuge). Insofar that the legitimacy-engineering has
an external orientation, this is a secondary, although not unimportant
goal, namely, to deflect criticism via the logic of national
self-determination. Indeed, democratic elections can accomplish what divine
right of kings or Marxist dialectical materialism never could, namely, to
give the impression of collective agreement with respect to a regime's
choices. And yes, in all of this I am talking as much about my homeland as
I am about the Central Asian/Eurasian states (I am probably sounding like a
very bitter expatriate right now). The benefactor of the
legitimacy-engineering is not as clear in the American context as in the
Central Asian/Eurasian one, but in both cases, it's really a system that's
receiving the moral authority, not just the man on top.
Yet, speaking of the men on top, just as presidents of the United States
can be prone to messianic depictions of themselves - either of the Terror
or Hope variety of eschatology - Central Asian/Eurasian presidents
notoriously have a penchant for the salvific. Besides the late Niyazov,
Karimov spring to mind, and in his own way, Bakiyev had a tinge of the
deliverer to his administration, as well, and Putin and Aliyev frequently
co-opt still-fresh memories of societal turmoil in their favor. Along these
lines, I actually have a begrudging respect for Nazarbayev: his golden
handprint in the Baiterek is actually not so much an expression of
megalomania as it is a statement of fact, namely, that he has left an
indelible mark upon his country, like it or not, for better and for worse.
That's more than I can say for all the `Change' that's happened in
the
United States since 2008 (at least in my cynical moments). But again, in
all cases, the target is internal, the goal still is and always is
legitimacy-engineering. The era of elections setting the course of a nation
rather than approving a pre-set path - if it ever existed - is fast
receding into the past here and in the West.
But then there's Turkmenistan. I think, unfortunately, *this* country is an
outlier. I've got a sinking feeling in my gut that it is increasingly
fruitless to seek any kind of rationality oriented toward the outside world
from the Turkmen president, even vis-à-vis his immediate neighbors, much
less the West. If there is any logic to his behavior, then it's most likely
in response to internal power dynamics, the nature of which are invisible
to the outside eye (although there are
clues).
But before we start thinking that this is still in keeping with the overall
trends in managed democracy, we should consider the thoughts of my
colleague Annasoltan, who has come to
fearthat
what we're really looking at in Turkmenistan is the possible mental
deterioration of Berdimuhammedov. The presidential election, then, may have
really been driven by the illogic of ego and insecurity: this time around,
the legitimacy-engineering was directed not at the grassroots, but by the
establishment toward the president himself.
Power-plays and madness are not mutually co-exclusive, of course, and in
fact the latter can sometimes be a pretty good tool in the former, just ask
Caligula. Moreover, determining how much of this exercise in megalomania
was the initiative of Berdimuhammedov and how much of it arose from the
overall regime, and for which purposes, could be enlightening. Until those
facts can come to the light of history, unfortunately, all the rest of us
can do is stand outside Turkmenistan's parallel universe and wonder about
its strange physics, a political physics in which the logic of liberalism
and democracy are twisted to reduce an entire society into instrumental
extensions of one single ego.
http://registan.net/index.php/2012/03/10/facing-up-to-illiberal-democracy-and-not-just-in-central-asia/comment-page-1/
From: Baghdasarian