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Karabakh Knot: Myths and Realities
by Aram Avetisyan
March 10, 2012
2011 became another year of wasted opportunities, and failure to
finding a fair and legitimate settlement to the Karabakh conflict. The
unresolved conflict continues to undermine the security and stability
in the whole South Caucasus region and beyond. Unfortunately, various
obstacles still impede a tangible progress.
After theSoviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Karabakh conflict has
escalated into one of the most complicated international
disputes.Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh, and Armenia - the co-signers of
the 1994 ceasefire - were actively involved in the negotiation process
to find a workable solution to this problem. However, since 1998,
Azerbaijan has been rejecting any further contacts with Nagorno
Karabakh. Baku's policy hasn't changed ever since, and continues to
create additional, artificial obstacles in the settlement process.
Azerbaijan's efforts are clear. They are aimed at portraying the
conflict as a territorial dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Misinterpretation of international documents, particularly the U.N.
Security Council resolutions, is another measure Baku undertakes to
mislead the international community. Azerbaijan often refers to four
UN resolutions adopted in April-November 1993 at the height of armed
hostilities to claim that Armenia `has occupied Azerbaijan's
territory'. In reality, none of those U.N. Security Council documents
has ever mentioned Armenia as `aggressor' or `occupier'.[1] For
instance, U.N. Security Council Resolution 822, adopted in 1993,
stated that armed hostilities were taking place between Azerbaijan and
`local Armenian forces' in Nagorno Karabakh, which distinguished
Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh as immediate parties to the
conflict.[2]
Prior to the obligation to withdraw the forces, the resolutions of the
Security Council demanded `immediate cessation of hostility and
hostile acts with a view to establishing a durable cease-fire'.[3]
This principal provision, along with a few others, was consistently
violated by Azerbaijan due to its general aggressive stance, including
permanent infringements of the cease fire agreement.[4] Azerbaijan,
which has repeatedly undermined the international peacekeeping
efforts, and pursued aggressive military policy towards Artsakh,
remains responsible for the resolutions' non-implementation. Another
example is U.N. Security Council Resolution 874, adopted later in
1993, which called for `reciprocal and urgent steps', such as
`withdrawal of forces and removal of blockade basing on the CSCE Minsk
Group's `Adjusted timetable'.[5] Unlike the Armenian sides, Baku has
rejected all the proposals and timetables, and continues its blockade
of Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh up until now.
Moreover, Armenia continues fulfilling its international obligation - to
facilitate what the resolution called `acceptance by this party
(Nagorno Karabakh) of the proposals of the Minsk Group of the CSCE
(antecedent of the OSCE)'.[6] Accusations that the Armenian sides
failed to implement the UNSC resolutions are groundless. Misleading
the international community is `typical' of Baku's efforts to distort
the essence of the Karabakh conflict.
Unlike conflicts around South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Kosovo,
Transdniestria or elsewhere, the Karabakh conflict remains the only
dispute that lacks direct contacts between the immediate
internationally-recognized conflicting sides - Azerbaijan and Artsakh.
This fact raises additional doubts in sincerity of Azeri high ranking
officials when they persuade the international community of the
country's willingness to have the conflict settled. It is worth
mentioning that, in at least ten cases, Baku and Stepanakert were able
to reach mutual agreements through direct contacts, even without
Yerevan's participation.[7]
Maintaining contacts between the conflicting sides is the minimal and
crucial requirement for any effective settlement process. Azerbaijan's
refusal to resume negotiations with Nagorno-Karabakh contradicts not
only the stance of the international mediators and community, but also
contravenes to the country's own commitments.
Artsakh's status of the conflicting side has been documented in
various international records, particularly in the OSCE documents, and
other agreements co-signed by Azerbaijan. Starting from 1993, after
realizing the impossibility of conquering Artsakh by force, then
President of Azerbaijan, later claimed as the `father of nation',
Heydar Aliyev (father of the incumbent Azeri leader Ilham),
intensified contacts with the NKR authorities, and delegated several
officials to negotiate an armistice. In May of 1994, a trilateral
cease-fire agreement was signed between Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh,
and Armenia, which remains in force until now.[8] The OSCE Minsk
group - the main vehicle for the negotiations, has also recognized this
agreement by periodically calling on the conflicting parties to
`cooperate to implement and observe fully the 1994 ceasefire'.[9]
Moreover, on July 27, 1994, the defense ministers of Armeniaand
Azerbaijan, and the commander of the NKR Defense Army have co-signed
another cease-fire agreement to provide legitimacy to the accord
worked out earlier in May.[10] In addition, the final document of the
1994 OSCE Summit in Budapest, Hungary, refers to all the parties of
the conflict basing on the abovementioned July 27, 1994,
agreement.[11]
In 1995, the OSCE has re-confirmed its decisions regarding `the status
of the parties, i.e. the participation of the two State parties to the
conflict, and of the other conflicting party (Nagorno-Karabakh) in the
whole negotiation process, including in the Minsk Conference',[12]
which reserved a seat for Artsakh representatives at the Minsk process
negotiating table. Based on those documents, the OSCE Minsk Group
continues mediation efforts between Yerevan, Baku, and Stepanakert by
regular visits to all the three capitals, and meetings with officials.
It is clear that, by rejecting direct negotiations with Artsakh,
Azerbaijan artificially postpones the final settlement of the
conflict. Unlike Nagorno Karabakh, which has repeatedly reiterated its
readiness to resume direct negotiations with Azerbaijan,[13]Baku
still prefers to reject the reality, and continues a policy that
embezzles international resources, both political and financial.
Notes
[1] See UN Security resolutions 822,853, 874 and 884
[2]UN Security Council, April 30, 1993, Resolution 822: See:
http://xocali.net/EN/Frame/resolutions-text.html
[3] Ibid
[4] `Ambassador Vladimir Kazimirov's letter to Mr. David Atkinson, a
member of the Council of Europe',
Moscow, December 3, 2004:http://vn.kazimirov.ru/k101eng.htm
[5] UN Security Council, October 14, 1993, Resolution 874: See
http://xocali.net/EN/Frame/resolutions-text.html
[6] UN Security Council, July 29, 1993, Resolution 853: See
http://xocali.net/EN/Frame/resolutions-text.html#2
[7] Vladimir Kazimirov: `Looking for a Way Out of the Karabakh
Impasse' November 9, 2004, see:
http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_3881
[8] The Bishkek protocol, See: http://nkrusa.org/nk_conflict/documents.shtml#two
[9] OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs Statement, June 9, 2011, See:
http://www.osce.org/mg/78589
[10] Human Rights Watch, See:
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/AZER%20Conflict%20in%20N-K%20Dec94.pdf
[11] http://www.osce.org/mc/39554
[12] http://www.osce.org/documents/16260
[13] http://nkrusa.org/nk_conflict/interviews.php?id=12
Aram Avetisyan holds Master degree in Public Policy from George Mason
University. He is a former fellow of Kennan Institute of Woodrow
Wilson International Center, Washington DC. Avetisyan also contributes
to the work of the Washington-based Americans for Artsakh NGO. He is
interested in public policy, governance and conflict resolution. Aram
Avetisyan serves as Counselor at the Office of the Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic in the United States (Washington DC). Read more articles by
Aram Avetisyan.
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2012/03/10/karabakh-knot-myths-and-realities/
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
by Aram Avetisyan
March 10, 2012
2011 became another year of wasted opportunities, and failure to
finding a fair and legitimate settlement to the Karabakh conflict. The
unresolved conflict continues to undermine the security and stability
in the whole South Caucasus region and beyond. Unfortunately, various
obstacles still impede a tangible progress.
After theSoviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Karabakh conflict has
escalated into one of the most complicated international
disputes.Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh, and Armenia - the co-signers of
the 1994 ceasefire - were actively involved in the negotiation process
to find a workable solution to this problem. However, since 1998,
Azerbaijan has been rejecting any further contacts with Nagorno
Karabakh. Baku's policy hasn't changed ever since, and continues to
create additional, artificial obstacles in the settlement process.
Azerbaijan's efforts are clear. They are aimed at portraying the
conflict as a territorial dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Misinterpretation of international documents, particularly the U.N.
Security Council resolutions, is another measure Baku undertakes to
mislead the international community. Azerbaijan often refers to four
UN resolutions adopted in April-November 1993 at the height of armed
hostilities to claim that Armenia `has occupied Azerbaijan's
territory'. In reality, none of those U.N. Security Council documents
has ever mentioned Armenia as `aggressor' or `occupier'.[1] For
instance, U.N. Security Council Resolution 822, adopted in 1993,
stated that armed hostilities were taking place between Azerbaijan and
`local Armenian forces' in Nagorno Karabakh, which distinguished
Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh as immediate parties to the
conflict.[2]
Prior to the obligation to withdraw the forces, the resolutions of the
Security Council demanded `immediate cessation of hostility and
hostile acts with a view to establishing a durable cease-fire'.[3]
This principal provision, along with a few others, was consistently
violated by Azerbaijan due to its general aggressive stance, including
permanent infringements of the cease fire agreement.[4] Azerbaijan,
which has repeatedly undermined the international peacekeeping
efforts, and pursued aggressive military policy towards Artsakh,
remains responsible for the resolutions' non-implementation. Another
example is U.N. Security Council Resolution 874, adopted later in
1993, which called for `reciprocal and urgent steps', such as
`withdrawal of forces and removal of blockade basing on the CSCE Minsk
Group's `Adjusted timetable'.[5] Unlike the Armenian sides, Baku has
rejected all the proposals and timetables, and continues its blockade
of Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh up until now.
Moreover, Armenia continues fulfilling its international obligation - to
facilitate what the resolution called `acceptance by this party
(Nagorno Karabakh) of the proposals of the Minsk Group of the CSCE
(antecedent of the OSCE)'.[6] Accusations that the Armenian sides
failed to implement the UNSC resolutions are groundless. Misleading
the international community is `typical' of Baku's efforts to distort
the essence of the Karabakh conflict.
Unlike conflicts around South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Kosovo,
Transdniestria or elsewhere, the Karabakh conflict remains the only
dispute that lacks direct contacts between the immediate
internationally-recognized conflicting sides - Azerbaijan and Artsakh.
This fact raises additional doubts in sincerity of Azeri high ranking
officials when they persuade the international community of the
country's willingness to have the conflict settled. It is worth
mentioning that, in at least ten cases, Baku and Stepanakert were able
to reach mutual agreements through direct contacts, even without
Yerevan's participation.[7]
Maintaining contacts between the conflicting sides is the minimal and
crucial requirement for any effective settlement process. Azerbaijan's
refusal to resume negotiations with Nagorno-Karabakh contradicts not
only the stance of the international mediators and community, but also
contravenes to the country's own commitments.
Artsakh's status of the conflicting side has been documented in
various international records, particularly in the OSCE documents, and
other agreements co-signed by Azerbaijan. Starting from 1993, after
realizing the impossibility of conquering Artsakh by force, then
President of Azerbaijan, later claimed as the `father of nation',
Heydar Aliyev (father of the incumbent Azeri leader Ilham),
intensified contacts with the NKR authorities, and delegated several
officials to negotiate an armistice. In May of 1994, a trilateral
cease-fire agreement was signed between Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh,
and Armenia, which remains in force until now.[8] The OSCE Minsk
group - the main vehicle for the negotiations, has also recognized this
agreement by periodically calling on the conflicting parties to
`cooperate to implement and observe fully the 1994 ceasefire'.[9]
Moreover, on July 27, 1994, the defense ministers of Armeniaand
Azerbaijan, and the commander of the NKR Defense Army have co-signed
another cease-fire agreement to provide legitimacy to the accord
worked out earlier in May.[10] In addition, the final document of the
1994 OSCE Summit in Budapest, Hungary, refers to all the parties of
the conflict basing on the abovementioned July 27, 1994,
agreement.[11]
In 1995, the OSCE has re-confirmed its decisions regarding `the status
of the parties, i.e. the participation of the two State parties to the
conflict, and of the other conflicting party (Nagorno-Karabakh) in the
whole negotiation process, including in the Minsk Conference',[12]
which reserved a seat for Artsakh representatives at the Minsk process
negotiating table. Based on those documents, the OSCE Minsk Group
continues mediation efforts between Yerevan, Baku, and Stepanakert by
regular visits to all the three capitals, and meetings with officials.
It is clear that, by rejecting direct negotiations with Artsakh,
Azerbaijan artificially postpones the final settlement of the
conflict. Unlike Nagorno Karabakh, which has repeatedly reiterated its
readiness to resume direct negotiations with Azerbaijan,[13]Baku
still prefers to reject the reality, and continues a policy that
embezzles international resources, both political and financial.
Notes
[1] See UN Security resolutions 822,853, 874 and 884
[2]UN Security Council, April 30, 1993, Resolution 822: See:
http://xocali.net/EN/Frame/resolutions-text.html
[3] Ibid
[4] `Ambassador Vladimir Kazimirov's letter to Mr. David Atkinson, a
member of the Council of Europe',
Moscow, December 3, 2004:http://vn.kazimirov.ru/k101eng.htm
[5] UN Security Council, October 14, 1993, Resolution 874: See
http://xocali.net/EN/Frame/resolutions-text.html
[6] UN Security Council, July 29, 1993, Resolution 853: See
http://xocali.net/EN/Frame/resolutions-text.html#2
[7] Vladimir Kazimirov: `Looking for a Way Out of the Karabakh
Impasse' November 9, 2004, see:
http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_3881
[8] The Bishkek protocol, See: http://nkrusa.org/nk_conflict/documents.shtml#two
[9] OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs Statement, June 9, 2011, See:
http://www.osce.org/mg/78589
[10] Human Rights Watch, See:
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/AZER%20Conflict%20in%20N-K%20Dec94.pdf
[11] http://www.osce.org/mc/39554
[12] http://www.osce.org/documents/16260
[13] http://nkrusa.org/nk_conflict/interviews.php?id=12
Aram Avetisyan holds Master degree in Public Policy from George Mason
University. He is a former fellow of Kennan Institute of Woodrow
Wilson International Center, Washington DC. Avetisyan also contributes
to the work of the Washington-based Americans for Artsakh NGO. He is
interested in public policy, governance and conflict resolution. Aram
Avetisyan serves as Counselor at the Office of the Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic in the United States (Washington DC). Read more articles by
Aram Avetisyan.
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2012/03/10/karabakh-knot-myths-and-realities/
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress