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RUSSIA HAS 'STRONGER' EFFECT ON KARABAKH CONFLICT THAN OTHERS
Laurence Broers
News.Az
Mon 19 March 2012
News.Az interviews Laurence Broers, Caucasus Programme Projects
Manager, Conciliation Resources.
What do you expect from Putin's policy towards Georgia, do you expect
any improvements in the Russia-Georgian relations?
Russian-Georgian relations will probably develop along lines shaped
more by internal developments - President Putin's return to centre
stage, seemingly weaker than before, and Saakashvili's handling of
political renewal, which seems unlikely to leave him stronger than
before. So there may be less space and confidence with which to
continue the current Russian-Georgian feud, in which all sides lose.
How may Putin's victory in the Presidential elections reflect on the
Karabakh settlement?
Dmitriy Medvedev staked a lot of personal prestige and effort on NK,
and it seems that some kind of window has closed, although what kind
of window it really was we don't know. With Vladimir Putin back in the
Russian presidency we can expect less of this personal commitment,
and more reliance perhaps on raw power politics. Putin's return in
a sense emphasizes the geopolitics, and geopoliticization, of the
Karabakh conflict.
This can have its positive outlook in terms of applying pressure on
Armenia and Azerbaijan to desist from war and move in the direction
of settlement. Overall, though, geopoliticization is dangerous as it
creates ambiguities over local and outside agendas. Developments in
Russia or in any of the other Minsk Group countries are less important
in the long term than developments at home.
Chairman of the socio-political department of the Azerbaijani
Presidential Administration Ali Hasanov said that the only power
that could bring a progress in the Karabakh conflict is Russia due
to its influence capacities on Armenia. How would you comment on that
opinion of the Azeri official?
It is undoubtedly true that Russia has more 'hard' influence over the
overall situation in the Karabakh conflict than any other external
power. And it is also true that outside coordination and pressure are
critical in attempts to move the process forward. Yet over the years
we have seen that even coordinated external action and more unilateral
attempts by Russia have not succeeded in securing fundamental change.
The only real powers that can genuinely influence this process
are Armenians and Azeris, both elites and societies. It is at these
levels and in these relationships that we should be working to achieve
progress in the settlement in the conflict, supported and encouraged
by outside actors.
There are many rumors about soon air strikes on Iran. How may this
scenario reflect on the South Caucasus? And may it cause new wars in
Georgia or Azerbaijan, as some experts predict?
It all depends on the scale of any conflict that might transpire. At
the very least, it would accentuate and strain the current
configurations of relationships and preferences with key actors -
Iran, Israel, the United States. Especially with regard to Iran's
roles and influence, Armenia and Azerbaijan have had quite different
perspectives in recent years. However, in the event of a more drawn
out, open-ended conflict in Iran, it will surely be in both Armenian
and Azerbaijani interests to minimize its impact. The existence of
protracted conflict and generalized insecurity in the North Caucasus
has had only a negative effect on the South Caucasus; conflict and
insecurity to the south of the region would create only another barrier
to the region's long-term prosperity, stability and integration.
From: Baghdasarian
Laurence Broers
News.Az
Mon 19 March 2012
News.Az interviews Laurence Broers, Caucasus Programme Projects
Manager, Conciliation Resources.
What do you expect from Putin's policy towards Georgia, do you expect
any improvements in the Russia-Georgian relations?
Russian-Georgian relations will probably develop along lines shaped
more by internal developments - President Putin's return to centre
stage, seemingly weaker than before, and Saakashvili's handling of
political renewal, which seems unlikely to leave him stronger than
before. So there may be less space and confidence with which to
continue the current Russian-Georgian feud, in which all sides lose.
How may Putin's victory in the Presidential elections reflect on the
Karabakh settlement?
Dmitriy Medvedev staked a lot of personal prestige and effort on NK,
and it seems that some kind of window has closed, although what kind
of window it really was we don't know. With Vladimir Putin back in the
Russian presidency we can expect less of this personal commitment,
and more reliance perhaps on raw power politics. Putin's return in
a sense emphasizes the geopolitics, and geopoliticization, of the
Karabakh conflict.
This can have its positive outlook in terms of applying pressure on
Armenia and Azerbaijan to desist from war and move in the direction
of settlement. Overall, though, geopoliticization is dangerous as it
creates ambiguities over local and outside agendas. Developments in
Russia or in any of the other Minsk Group countries are less important
in the long term than developments at home.
Chairman of the socio-political department of the Azerbaijani
Presidential Administration Ali Hasanov said that the only power
that could bring a progress in the Karabakh conflict is Russia due
to its influence capacities on Armenia. How would you comment on that
opinion of the Azeri official?
It is undoubtedly true that Russia has more 'hard' influence over the
overall situation in the Karabakh conflict than any other external
power. And it is also true that outside coordination and pressure are
critical in attempts to move the process forward. Yet over the years
we have seen that even coordinated external action and more unilateral
attempts by Russia have not succeeded in securing fundamental change.
The only real powers that can genuinely influence this process
are Armenians and Azeris, both elites and societies. It is at these
levels and in these relationships that we should be working to achieve
progress in the settlement in the conflict, supported and encouraged
by outside actors.
There are many rumors about soon air strikes on Iran. How may this
scenario reflect on the South Caucasus? And may it cause new wars in
Georgia or Azerbaijan, as some experts predict?
It all depends on the scale of any conflict that might transpire. At
the very least, it would accentuate and strain the current
configurations of relationships and preferences with key actors -
Iran, Israel, the United States. Especially with regard to Iran's
roles and influence, Armenia and Azerbaijan have had quite different
perspectives in recent years. However, in the event of a more drawn
out, open-ended conflict in Iran, it will surely be in both Armenian
and Azerbaijani interests to minimize its impact. The existence of
protracted conflict and generalized insecurity in the North Caucasus
has had only a negative effect on the South Caucasus; conflict and
insecurity to the south of the region would create only another barrier
to the region's long-term prosperity, stability and integration.
From: Baghdasarian