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THE PROBLEM WITH "ZERO PROBLEM NEIGHBORHOOD"
by Miguel Silva
Atlantic Sentinel
http://atlanticsentinel.com/2012/03/the-problem-with-zero-problem-neighborhood/
March 19 2012
While changes began in the foreign policy domain right from the onset
of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government, it was only
in his second term and after the nomination of Ahmet Davutoglu that
Turkey's foreign policy acquired a more "independent" flavor. Until
now, Davutoglu has been lauded for his "zero problem neighborhood"
vision but as things stand today, there seems to be little merit for
that praise.
Foreign affairs is one of those portfolios with peculiar pros and
cons: there can be plenty of popularity gains for a foreign minister,
who gets to socialize with international leaders and opinion makers,
but there is also the inherent uncertainty of securing results as
diplomacy depends on at least two interlocutors and the government
he belongs to is but one of them.
That said, it is one thing for a particular diplomatic initiative to
founder into political oblivion, it is another altogether to turn a
would be close ally into a soon to be mortal enemy as was the case
recently in Turkish-Syrian relations.
No one expected diplomats or politicians to predict the Arab spring
but when dealing with an authoritarian regime, a crackdown on a
potential uprising is a policy option implied in any dictator's job
description. Yet Turkey backtracked in its relations with Damascus.
Before Syria though there was Libya, where Turkey had also attempted
to improve relations.
Here Ankara secured several profitable contracts for Turkish companies
and Turkish diplomats hoped Libya would become--through the brother
leader's petrodollar sponsored political and charity ties below the
Sahara--Turkey's gateway to Africa.
Erdogan, the humanitarian who now lectures Bashar al-Assad and Benjamin
Netanyahu on human rights, had little compunction in accepting in
2010 the "Muammar Gaddafi Human Rights Award"--which he refused to
return even after the Libyan revolt.
Confronted with Libya's uprising, Turkey's diplomacy failed to react,
resigning itself to merely observing Western powers--from whom it had
sought equidistance--breed a rebellion that would destroy the regime
Turkey had so patiently cultivated
What could Ankara say? That Turkey had economic interests it wished
to safeguard? Surely not as Turkey was then an adamant proponent of
human rights after chastising Israel for its treatment of Palestinians
in the wake of the Gaza flotilla incident. It couldn't possibly now
adopt a pragmatic speech favoring a dictator who referred to his own
people as "rats."
There was also the attempt at multilateral diplomacy in the United
Nations Security Council earlier last year, where Turkey teamed up
with Brazil to promote an alternate compromise between Iran and the
West concerning the former's nuclear program.
This too failed and Turkey, whose diplomats were rumored to be seeking
to include Ankara in a potential Security Council permanent members
expansion, was humiliated on the international stage. Both Iran and
the West hardened their respective positions and ignored Turkey.
The very Iran that Davutoglu and Erdogan had wooed, by remaining
largely silent during the Green movement's protests against the
ayatollahs, by promoting bilateral trade while the West embargoed
and by engaging Islamist movements such as Hamas, rewarded Turkey's
"friendship" by supporting Syria's crackdown, in defiance of the
Turkish Government's appeals for reform, and by promoting in Iraq
a government headed by the ShÄ"'ah Nouri Al-Maliki against Ankara's
preferred Sunni candidate Ayad Allawi.
Maliki is another problem as Iraq has been publicly supportive of
Assad and was even touted to mediate between Syria and the West. Iraq,
a country until recently half occupied by American troops and Iranian
agents; a country just barely rebuilding its economic infrastructure,
is now apparently more influential in the Middle East than Turkey.
Still, the Middle East is a tough neighborhood and surely Ankara's
goodwill would have paid off in less tumultuous surroundings. If it
did though, it was not in Europe in spite of the fact that Davutoglu
has travelled extensively and worked tirelessly to bring to fruition
his new foreign policy vision.
Apart from the all but suspended--courtesy of France and
Germany--accession bid to the European Union, Ahmet Davutoglu enacted
a "football diplomacy" with Armenia to mend ties and ease tensions,
visited Greece offering to delay Turkey's pursuit of Greek debt as a
good faith gesture and developed links with the Russian defense and
energy industries.
Of course what was gained with Russia was disparaged when Turkey
decided to hold military exercises with China outside of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization's purview, sidelining Moscow, and more
recently by seeking to isolate Syria against Russia's wishes.
Relations with Armenia have gone nowhere largely because of the
same old obstacles which had prevented it before--the unwillingness
to recognize the Armenian genocide and Turkey's preference for its
fellow Turkic Azeris in any conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.
Finally, Greece has shown its appreciation for Turkish openings by
continuing to support Greek Cyprus in its political and energetic
disputes with Turkey and by moving quickly to sign mutual defense
guarantees with Israel following the Israeli-Turkish rift.
Bad blood between Tel Aviv and Ankara is also not entirely one sided
in blame. The Israeli commandos did lose their cool on board the Mavi
Marmara but Erdogan milked the media outrage over the flotilla deaths
as much as he could and moved quickly to identify Israel as a "regional
threat"--hardly the actions of an ally and far from the proper reaction
to what was always described as a "diplomatic incident."
One should, on the other hand, not assign the onus for strained
American-Turkish relations to the AKP Government. The United
States Congress' recognition of the Armenian genocide and the Bush
Administration's failure to curb the activities of Kurdish militants
in Iraqi Kurdistan were what caused the strain. But if anyone deserves
credit for repairing them, that someone is President Barack Obama,
who made Turkey a personal priority, not Prime Minister Erdogan.
When confronted by such principles as national interest and balance
of power being applied by its interlocutors, Turkey's "zero problem
neighborhood" doctrine has been found wanting. Time now for some
reflection on the part of Ankara's leadership and those who made
its case.
Miguel Nunes Silva is a Master's candidate at the College of Europe
in Bruges and a researcher with the geostrategic consultancy firm
Wikistrat. He has published with REvolve magazine and TransConflict .
He identifies with the political realist school of international
relations.
by Miguel Silva
Atlantic Sentinel
http://atlanticsentinel.com/2012/03/the-problem-with-zero-problem-neighborhood/
March 19 2012
While changes began in the foreign policy domain right from the onset
of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government, it was only
in his second term and after the nomination of Ahmet Davutoglu that
Turkey's foreign policy acquired a more "independent" flavor. Until
now, Davutoglu has been lauded for his "zero problem neighborhood"
vision but as things stand today, there seems to be little merit for
that praise.
Foreign affairs is one of those portfolios with peculiar pros and
cons: there can be plenty of popularity gains for a foreign minister,
who gets to socialize with international leaders and opinion makers,
but there is also the inherent uncertainty of securing results as
diplomacy depends on at least two interlocutors and the government
he belongs to is but one of them.
That said, it is one thing for a particular diplomatic initiative to
founder into political oblivion, it is another altogether to turn a
would be close ally into a soon to be mortal enemy as was the case
recently in Turkish-Syrian relations.
No one expected diplomats or politicians to predict the Arab spring
but when dealing with an authoritarian regime, a crackdown on a
potential uprising is a policy option implied in any dictator's job
description. Yet Turkey backtracked in its relations with Damascus.
Before Syria though there was Libya, where Turkey had also attempted
to improve relations.
Here Ankara secured several profitable contracts for Turkish companies
and Turkish diplomats hoped Libya would become--through the brother
leader's petrodollar sponsored political and charity ties below the
Sahara--Turkey's gateway to Africa.
Erdogan, the humanitarian who now lectures Bashar al-Assad and Benjamin
Netanyahu on human rights, had little compunction in accepting in
2010 the "Muammar Gaddafi Human Rights Award"--which he refused to
return even after the Libyan revolt.
Confronted with Libya's uprising, Turkey's diplomacy failed to react,
resigning itself to merely observing Western powers--from whom it had
sought equidistance--breed a rebellion that would destroy the regime
Turkey had so patiently cultivated
What could Ankara say? That Turkey had economic interests it wished
to safeguard? Surely not as Turkey was then an adamant proponent of
human rights after chastising Israel for its treatment of Palestinians
in the wake of the Gaza flotilla incident. It couldn't possibly now
adopt a pragmatic speech favoring a dictator who referred to his own
people as "rats."
There was also the attempt at multilateral diplomacy in the United
Nations Security Council earlier last year, where Turkey teamed up
with Brazil to promote an alternate compromise between Iran and the
West concerning the former's nuclear program.
This too failed and Turkey, whose diplomats were rumored to be seeking
to include Ankara in a potential Security Council permanent members
expansion, was humiliated on the international stage. Both Iran and
the West hardened their respective positions and ignored Turkey.
The very Iran that Davutoglu and Erdogan had wooed, by remaining
largely silent during the Green movement's protests against the
ayatollahs, by promoting bilateral trade while the West embargoed
and by engaging Islamist movements such as Hamas, rewarded Turkey's
"friendship" by supporting Syria's crackdown, in defiance of the
Turkish Government's appeals for reform, and by promoting in Iraq
a government headed by the ShÄ"'ah Nouri Al-Maliki against Ankara's
preferred Sunni candidate Ayad Allawi.
Maliki is another problem as Iraq has been publicly supportive of
Assad and was even touted to mediate between Syria and the West. Iraq,
a country until recently half occupied by American troops and Iranian
agents; a country just barely rebuilding its economic infrastructure,
is now apparently more influential in the Middle East than Turkey.
Still, the Middle East is a tough neighborhood and surely Ankara's
goodwill would have paid off in less tumultuous surroundings. If it
did though, it was not in Europe in spite of the fact that Davutoglu
has travelled extensively and worked tirelessly to bring to fruition
his new foreign policy vision.
Apart from the all but suspended--courtesy of France and
Germany--accession bid to the European Union, Ahmet Davutoglu enacted
a "football diplomacy" with Armenia to mend ties and ease tensions,
visited Greece offering to delay Turkey's pursuit of Greek debt as a
good faith gesture and developed links with the Russian defense and
energy industries.
Of course what was gained with Russia was disparaged when Turkey
decided to hold military exercises with China outside of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization's purview, sidelining Moscow, and more
recently by seeking to isolate Syria against Russia's wishes.
Relations with Armenia have gone nowhere largely because of the
same old obstacles which had prevented it before--the unwillingness
to recognize the Armenian genocide and Turkey's preference for its
fellow Turkic Azeris in any conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.
Finally, Greece has shown its appreciation for Turkish openings by
continuing to support Greek Cyprus in its political and energetic
disputes with Turkey and by moving quickly to sign mutual defense
guarantees with Israel following the Israeli-Turkish rift.
Bad blood between Tel Aviv and Ankara is also not entirely one sided
in blame. The Israeli commandos did lose their cool on board the Mavi
Marmara but Erdogan milked the media outrage over the flotilla deaths
as much as he could and moved quickly to identify Israel as a "regional
threat"--hardly the actions of an ally and far from the proper reaction
to what was always described as a "diplomatic incident."
One should, on the other hand, not assign the onus for strained
American-Turkish relations to the AKP Government. The United
States Congress' recognition of the Armenian genocide and the Bush
Administration's failure to curb the activities of Kurdish militants
in Iraqi Kurdistan were what caused the strain. But if anyone deserves
credit for repairing them, that someone is President Barack Obama,
who made Turkey a personal priority, not Prime Minister Erdogan.
When confronted by such principles as national interest and balance
of power being applied by its interlocutors, Turkey's "zero problem
neighborhood" doctrine has been found wanting. Time now for some
reflection on the part of Ankara's leadership and those who made
its case.
Miguel Nunes Silva is a Master's candidate at the College of Europe
in Bruges and a researcher with the geostrategic consultancy firm
Wikistrat. He has published with REvolve magazine and TransConflict .
He identifies with the political realist school of international
relations.