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THE IRANIAN CRISIS: WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR REGIONAL STABILITY?
ZAUR SHIRIYEV
Today's Zaman
March 21 2012
Turkey
With the prospect of an Israeli and/or American attack on Iran's
nuclear facilities, there is growing curiosity about how this
increasingly tense dynamic will play out in Iran's neighboring
countries. While Iran has been engaged in a hot spy-versus-spy war
for years, now the temperature is rising and threatening to spread
to the Caucasus.
The government in Baku seemed remarkably unperturbed by the events
that have brought us ever closer to a possible Israeli/US attack
on Iran- until war loomed on the horizon. For many years Baku has
been able to maintain this complex balance of bilateral relations,
working with Iran whilst also cooperating closely with the US. But
with the crisis coming to a head, it is unclear whether this balance
is tenable. In fact, it poses a serious challenge to Azerbaijani
foreign policy. Furthermore, Azerbaijan's temporary membership on the
UN Security Council was a diplomatic victory, but it also puts the
country in a difficult position, as the situation in Iran is likely
to come before the Security Council again within the next two years:
Baku will be forced to choose between further alienating Tehran or
standing against the wider international community.
To this end, there are two interrelated arguments supporting this
perceived lack of reason.
Firstly, in the context of the emerging instability, Baku has found
itself the site of a proxy war; Iran has sought to target Israel
on Azerbaijani territory, and Israel has tried to prevent it from
doing so. According to Azerbaijani security services, Iran has been
sponsoring terrorist attacks on US, Western and Israel embassies and
elements of the civilian Jewish community in Baku. News reports
identified a rabbi as one of the planned targets. Last week,
Azerbaijani security services arrested 22 people allegedly hired
by Iran to carry out terrorist attacks against the US and Israeli
embassies as well as Western-linked groups and companies. This latest
thwarted attempt is by no means without precedent: on Jan. 24, local
security forces foiled a two-man terrorist cell that was planning
attacks against the country's prominent Jews. The local experts have
indicated that Iran has been trying to build an extensive spy network
in Azerbaijan.
Increasingly, Iran is being portrayed as an irrational actor with
potential Islamic influence by Azerbaijan's secular government,
the public and commentators of different political leanings. Iran
provides financial and ideological support to fundamentalist groups
in Azerbaijan, as well as to the media -- for example, Iranian "Sahar
TV," which broadcasts in Azerbaijani is often critical of the secular
regime in Baku, seeking to spread Islamic Revolution ideas to Muslim
people. In addition to the traditional media, Iran employs hackers,
who have defaced the websites of several Azeri state agencies over
last few months, posting "enemies of Islam" slogans across homepages.
Though Tehran denies any link to such activities, few in Azerbaijan
are convinced of their sincerity. In the last visit of the Azerbaijani
defense minister to Iran, the Azerbaijani delegation encountered an
act of disrespect on the part of the Iranian authorities, who had
switched the order of colors on the Azerbaijani flag, which signals a
sign of distress or surrender. Furthermore, by turning the horizontal
tricolor of blue, red and green upside-down, green was placed at the
top, elevating Islamic over Turkic heritage.
Iran tries to portray the Azerbaijani government as anti-Islamic or
even "Zionist" as a means of distancing the more than 20 million
Azerbaijani people who are living in Iran. Tehran is seeking to
emphasize the importance of Islamic tradition in the identity of this
group, suggesting that this part of their identity is not reflected
by attitudes in Baku.
For Azerbaijan, a diplomatic solution to the problems with Iran
is essential; otherwise, it will simply lurch from one crisis to
the next. But the current developments indicate a high level of
unpredictability, and thus diplomatic means are losing ground. The
foreign ministers of Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkey met in Nakhchivan
on March 7, where they signed a mutual declaration that emphasized
good will for future cooperation.
But this sunny outlook has been clouded by news reports that
Azerbaijan has agreed to a $1.6 billion arms deal with Israel, likely
its largest ever single arms purchase. Iran sees this as an act of
anti-Iranian aggression, but it is Armenia, not Iran, that should be
worried. In light of this development, Azerbaijani Defense Minister
Safar Abiyev visited Iran last week and promised that "Azerbaijan will
not allow other countries to use its territory to launch an attack on
neighboring Iran." As mentioned above, by arresting the 22 people who
were planning terrorist attacks against the US and Israeli embassies,
a new crisis period in Iran-Azerbaijan relations has begun.
The question here is not whether or not a war will be launched against
Iran, or whether or not Azerbaijan will assist the West. There are
simply a set of facts that demonstrate a careful counter-balancing
act between the two parties, Azerbaijan and Iran.
Firstly, Azerbaijan has nothing to gain by attacking Iran or even by
cooperating with an Israeli or US military intervention. Moreover, it
is clear that targeted airstrikes against Iranian nuclear facilities
would create huge refugee flows into Azerbaijan, particularly as
few of Iran's nuclear facilities are located near Azerbaijan. The
Azerbaijan's public doesn't trust Iran, true -- but its fear isn't
about Iran's nuclear program, but rather of Iran's meddling in
Azerbaijan's internal affairs.
Secondly, Iran and Azerbaijan already cooperate on some level through
a deal in which Iran supplies natural gas to Azerbaijan's Nakhchivan
region, which is geographically isolated from Azerbaijan proper, in
exchange for a 15 percent commission on transit fees for natural gas
that is shipped from Azerbaijan through the 30-mile long Baku Astara
(BA) pipeline that travels through Iran. Any crisis with Iran would
damage the stability of Nakhchivan.
Thirdly, beyond its Islamic Revolutionary rhetoric, Iranian foreign
policy towards the neighborhood, especially towards Azerbaijan,
has been manifestly realistic. Thus, Tehran officially claims it is
neutral, but it supports the continuation of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict via its economic relations with Armenia, which runs counter
to Azerbaijani interests.
For now, though, events continue to cast a shadow over Iran-Azerbaijan
relations, and unfortunately, this negative spiral is on the verge
of getting out of hand.
From: Baghdasarian
ZAUR SHIRIYEV
Today's Zaman
March 21 2012
Turkey
With the prospect of an Israeli and/or American attack on Iran's
nuclear facilities, there is growing curiosity about how this
increasingly tense dynamic will play out in Iran's neighboring
countries. While Iran has been engaged in a hot spy-versus-spy war
for years, now the temperature is rising and threatening to spread
to the Caucasus.
The government in Baku seemed remarkably unperturbed by the events
that have brought us ever closer to a possible Israeli/US attack
on Iran- until war loomed on the horizon. For many years Baku has
been able to maintain this complex balance of bilateral relations,
working with Iran whilst also cooperating closely with the US. But
with the crisis coming to a head, it is unclear whether this balance
is tenable. In fact, it poses a serious challenge to Azerbaijani
foreign policy. Furthermore, Azerbaijan's temporary membership on the
UN Security Council was a diplomatic victory, but it also puts the
country in a difficult position, as the situation in Iran is likely
to come before the Security Council again within the next two years:
Baku will be forced to choose between further alienating Tehran or
standing against the wider international community.
To this end, there are two interrelated arguments supporting this
perceived lack of reason.
Firstly, in the context of the emerging instability, Baku has found
itself the site of a proxy war; Iran has sought to target Israel
on Azerbaijani territory, and Israel has tried to prevent it from
doing so. According to Azerbaijani security services, Iran has been
sponsoring terrorist attacks on US, Western and Israel embassies and
elements of the civilian Jewish community in Baku. News reports
identified a rabbi as one of the planned targets. Last week,
Azerbaijani security services arrested 22 people allegedly hired
by Iran to carry out terrorist attacks against the US and Israeli
embassies as well as Western-linked groups and companies. This latest
thwarted attempt is by no means without precedent: on Jan. 24, local
security forces foiled a two-man terrorist cell that was planning
attacks against the country's prominent Jews. The local experts have
indicated that Iran has been trying to build an extensive spy network
in Azerbaijan.
Increasingly, Iran is being portrayed as an irrational actor with
potential Islamic influence by Azerbaijan's secular government,
the public and commentators of different political leanings. Iran
provides financial and ideological support to fundamentalist groups
in Azerbaijan, as well as to the media -- for example, Iranian "Sahar
TV," which broadcasts in Azerbaijani is often critical of the secular
regime in Baku, seeking to spread Islamic Revolution ideas to Muslim
people. In addition to the traditional media, Iran employs hackers,
who have defaced the websites of several Azeri state agencies over
last few months, posting "enemies of Islam" slogans across homepages.
Though Tehran denies any link to such activities, few in Azerbaijan
are convinced of their sincerity. In the last visit of the Azerbaijani
defense minister to Iran, the Azerbaijani delegation encountered an
act of disrespect on the part of the Iranian authorities, who had
switched the order of colors on the Azerbaijani flag, which signals a
sign of distress or surrender. Furthermore, by turning the horizontal
tricolor of blue, red and green upside-down, green was placed at the
top, elevating Islamic over Turkic heritage.
Iran tries to portray the Azerbaijani government as anti-Islamic or
even "Zionist" as a means of distancing the more than 20 million
Azerbaijani people who are living in Iran. Tehran is seeking to
emphasize the importance of Islamic tradition in the identity of this
group, suggesting that this part of their identity is not reflected
by attitudes in Baku.
For Azerbaijan, a diplomatic solution to the problems with Iran
is essential; otherwise, it will simply lurch from one crisis to
the next. But the current developments indicate a high level of
unpredictability, and thus diplomatic means are losing ground. The
foreign ministers of Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkey met in Nakhchivan
on March 7, where they signed a mutual declaration that emphasized
good will for future cooperation.
But this sunny outlook has been clouded by news reports that
Azerbaijan has agreed to a $1.6 billion arms deal with Israel, likely
its largest ever single arms purchase. Iran sees this as an act of
anti-Iranian aggression, but it is Armenia, not Iran, that should be
worried. In light of this development, Azerbaijani Defense Minister
Safar Abiyev visited Iran last week and promised that "Azerbaijan will
not allow other countries to use its territory to launch an attack on
neighboring Iran." As mentioned above, by arresting the 22 people who
were planning terrorist attacks against the US and Israeli embassies,
a new crisis period in Iran-Azerbaijan relations has begun.
The question here is not whether or not a war will be launched against
Iran, or whether or not Azerbaijan will assist the West. There are
simply a set of facts that demonstrate a careful counter-balancing
act between the two parties, Azerbaijan and Iran.
Firstly, Azerbaijan has nothing to gain by attacking Iran or even by
cooperating with an Israeli or US military intervention. Moreover, it
is clear that targeted airstrikes against Iranian nuclear facilities
would create huge refugee flows into Azerbaijan, particularly as
few of Iran's nuclear facilities are located near Azerbaijan. The
Azerbaijan's public doesn't trust Iran, true -- but its fear isn't
about Iran's nuclear program, but rather of Iran's meddling in
Azerbaijan's internal affairs.
Secondly, Iran and Azerbaijan already cooperate on some level through
a deal in which Iran supplies natural gas to Azerbaijan's Nakhchivan
region, which is geographically isolated from Azerbaijan proper, in
exchange for a 15 percent commission on transit fees for natural gas
that is shipped from Azerbaijan through the 30-mile long Baku Astara
(BA) pipeline that travels through Iran. Any crisis with Iran would
damage the stability of Nakhchivan.
Thirdly, beyond its Islamic Revolutionary rhetoric, Iranian foreign
policy towards the neighborhood, especially towards Azerbaijan,
has been manifestly realistic. Thus, Tehran officially claims it is
neutral, but it supports the continuation of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict via its economic relations with Armenia, which runs counter
to Azerbaijani interests.
For now, though, events continue to cast a shadow over Iran-Azerbaijan
relations, and unfortunately, this negative spiral is on the verge
of getting out of hand.
From: Baghdasarian