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Russian troop deployments in the south
by J. E. Dyer
March 24, 2012
There are differing opinions about the exact nature of the reported
deployment of Russian troops to Syria. Some of the reporting appears
to be circular, and Business Insider has picked apart the original
language of a RIA Novosti report in Russian to conclude that the
`Russian troops' amount to no more than an anti-terrorism security
detachment for the Russian fleet tanker RFS Iman (a Black Sea-based
ship deployed for support to Russia's Horn of Africa antipiracy task
force).
It's hard to say: Iman by herself couldn't transport very many troops
into Syria (a detachment of infantry, maybe, if they were really
miserable, sleeping on deck and in passageways, during the few days'
transit), but Iman is an unlikely platform for transporting Russian
troops anyway. If Russia puts a substantial number of troops in
Syria, it's likely to be done via airlift.
And that said, I don't necessarily expect Russia to put big troop
formations in Syria. Russia doesn't want to fight the Syrian civil
war directly. Arming Assad and letting his troops do the work is
preferable. In the past week, Assad's army has ejected the rebel
forces from Idlib in the north, and the eastern city of Deir el-Zour;
Moscow probably is not alarmed that the Syrian army can't handle the
job.
Protecting Russian installations in Tartus, the Russian-operated port,
is a priority - and so is reinforcing the impression that Russia is
ready to defend Syria against a Western coalition. Seen in that
light, the most likely purposes of newly-arriving Russian military
detachments, other than protecting Tartus, are intelligence and air
defense. And except for man-portable systems, much of their equipment
would have to be transported separately anyway.
More troop movements in the Caucasus
But there is another report that the Russians have moved a huge number
of troops in the last week. According to media in the Caucasus, they
moved between 20,000 and 25,000 troops from Chechnya to Dagestan (both
autonomous republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States),
reportedly for `anti-terrorism' operations. (This movement comes in
the wake of special forces deployments to the central Caucasus
reported in January.)
That's one heck of a lot of troops for anti-terrorism operations.
There is no question that Dagestan has seen a spate of assassinations
and bombings in the last few months, but 20-25,000 troops represent
nearly half of the total Russian forces stationed in Chechnya.
(Recent comments on the troop footprint in Chechnya put it at about
60,000; see the Jamestown Foundation article from this past week on
the Dagestan deployment.) The 20-25,000 is a very large number,
particularly for anti-terrorism as opposed to conventional operations.
Even if the actual number is not that big, eyewitness reports suggest
a very large movement of troops and equipment. The `Rosbalt' website
- used often by analysts at the Jamestown Foundation - cites
statements from eyewitnesses in Dagestan that the military formation
on the move was over 10 kilometers long and comprised 150-200 `units,'
presumably troop transport vehicles. (Commercial satellite imagery of
the Russian base at Khankala suggests that this number of vehicles
represents most of those present on the parking aprons.) According
to the Dagestani reporting, Russian forces rolled into campgrounds in
the Karabudahkent District south of the capital of Makachkala, which
sits on the Caspian coast. Statements from locals also suggest that
the Russian troops will be quartered in school buildings. Reports
like this confirm that this is not a small-footprint deployment.
A look at geography yields some interesting revelations about the
deployment. There are two significant perspectives. One is general:
Dagestan lies on the west coast of the Caspian Sea; on Georgia's
eastern border; and on Azerbaijan's northern border.
Map [http://media.hotair.com/greenroom/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Dagestan-2.jpg]
Geographic factors in Dagestan
The other is specific: most of the terrorist incidents in Dagestan
over the past several months have occurred between Makhachkala and
Chechnya, or across the central `waist' of Dagestan. As seen on the
district map, however, the Russian troops have not deployed to that
area, but past it, to a southeast position in the coastal district of
Karabudahkent, and in the district immediately south of it, Sergokala.
The forests of Karabudahkent have been a perennial hiding place for
Islamist terrorists, and some Dagestani hunters were found
assassinated there in March. A homicide bomber also attacked a post
office in Karabudahkent on 6 March. But these are the most recent in
a long list of incidents, most of which have occurred to the northwest
of the deployment area. The size of the Russian deployment, and its
geographic objective, appear to be tailored for more than this one,
most recent security problem.
Russia is concerned, for example, about all three of the general
geographic factors. Moving the troops from Chechnya to the coast puts
them in a different position in relation to Georgia, and it's not
clear that the new position is less favorable than being in garrison
in Khankala. (In fact, it gives the Russians a second vector into
Georgia with a large formation - an option they had maintained for a
long time until late in 2011; see below.) Russian troops are closer
to Georgia in Chechnya, but some passages may be easier from Dagestan.
Vladimir Putin, in particular, has been assiduous about improving the
road approaches to Georgia in Dagestan.
In 2008, at the end of his last term, Putin inaugurated road
construction from Botlikh, Dagestan (see map), where Russia maintained
a mountain infantry brigade, to the Georgian border (this in spite of
the fact that Putin had ordered the border crossings between Dagestan
and Georgia closed in 2006). The Russians removed the infantry
brigade from Botlikh in 2011. Besides the new troop deployment to
Dagestan, however, 2012 has also seen a new allocation of funds for
road construction. There are already roads in Dagestan to the
Georgian border; Putin-ordered maintenance on the Dagestani side,
coupled with a massive troop deployment, cannot give Georgia a warm,
fuzzy feeling.
Russian analysts suggest that concerns about Azerbaijan may be
prompting the deployment as well. Both Georgia and Azerbaijan
represent roadblocks to Russian freedom of action on the southern
flank - the paths to Syria and Iran - and both lie between Russia and
Armenia, where Moscow maintains a military base with 5,000 troops, a
tank unit, and a squadron of MiG-29s. The military path through
Azerbaijan is well laid and ready, with a major highway, Route 29,
running from Dagestan into Azerbaijan near the coast.
The Russians also have a military radar facility in Azerbaijan, and
the lease is about to expire. Russian media claim that Baku is
demanding $300 million annually to renew the lease, far in excess of
the current amount (which is variously reflected as $7 million and $22
million). Azerbaijani media seem to have offered no specific
counter-claims, and may simply not know what negotiating figure is
correct.
At any rate, the US has a military cooperation agreement with
Azerbaijan, as does Israel. The last two scheduled joint exercises
involving the US and Azerbaijan have been cancelled by Baku, largely
due to unease about Russia's reaction, but the US has provided minor
military hardware to Azerbaijan, and a few days ago Azerbaijan and
NATO concluded an agreement to demine a large, Soviet-era military
training facility, an activity that will bring NATO personnel into the
country.
I don't think any of Azerbaijan, Georgia, or the Caspian Sea - the
most obvious geographic feature toward which the troops have been
moved - is by itself the chief concern in Moscow. Rather, the
potential convergence of events in Central Asia has prompted the
Russians to reevaluate their preparedness and the position of a major
troop formation.
Shifting factors, shifting posture in Central Asia
Iran is the not the only factor in this thinking, but she may be at
the top of the list. A Monday editorial in The Moscow Times
summarizes nicely the Russian perspective that Israel and the US are
colluding to establish positions in the Caucasus and Central Asia from
which to attack Iran. The editorialist says this:
Stratfor wrote in a recent report: `It is difficult to believe that
the United States and Israel are not coordinating their activities in
the Caucasus. ... It can be assumed that the United States has approved
the initiatives.' ...
Directly or indirectly, Russia and the United States have been
bumping up against each other in the Caucasus region where Russia is
resurgent.
The most recent `bump' would undoubtedly be exercise Agile Spirit,
conducted in March by a detachment of 350 US Marines and the Georgian
armed forces. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called the
exercise `provocative.' Russia and Iran are also annoyed that the
NATO missile defense radar in Turkey has become operational (Iran has
been especially assiduous in recording objections to the radar site;
e.g., here and here).
Moreover, an interesting emphasis in US military aid to the nations
surrounding the Caspian Sea has caught Russian attention. In the
875-page State Department document heralding the proposal, few
American readers were likely to run across the naval assistance to
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. But regional analysts were
paying attention, and highlighting the `concerted [US] effort to build
naval capacity in the Caspian.'
I wouldn't be surprised to hear American reactions along the lines of,
`What are we doing that for?' I suspect one of the reasons is simply
that naval assistance is one of the main things the Caspian nations
are requesting. Another is the interest of our European NATO allies
in bringing to fruition a trans-Caspian pipeline opposed by Russia and
Iran. With no declaration of strategic interest or specific US policy
to frame these actions, however, they can look like sneaking US
hardware into Russia's back yard. Why would we take this particular
approach to Caspian Sea security?
There is an aspect to this of US interests being effectively declared
for us by the priorities of our regional partners. We care very much
about the stability of Asia, the security of our Asian and European
allies, the resistance of Asia to Islamist terrorism, and about the
openness there to political liberalization, trade, and communication -
but none of these interests requires building up navies in the Caspian
Sea.
In any case, Russia is definitely concerned: the Russian armed forces
have deployed their newest coastal missile system to the Caspian Sea,
among other upgrades (see here, here, here, and here). I wrote in
January about a military exercise conducted by the Russian
Federation's Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in the
Caspian Sea in 2011, in which the `threat' was a Western consortium.
The 2012 CSTO exercise will be conducted for the first time in Armenia
(in September). The all-purpose `anti-terrorism' pretext is cited for
holding the exercise there, but it is more likely that Russia's
concern is simply to have the troops there. Visible demonstration of
the troops' activities will be another purpose, but declaring the
exercise will justify deployments that could start whenever Moscow
deems it necessary - and that, I think, is the principal
consideration.
What will Russia do?
It's a good question. In both Syria and the Caucasus/Central Asia, I
assess that Moscow's immediate purpose is to consolidate territory and
deter Western initiative (`Western' including Israel v. Iran). I
don't think the Russians want to fight, and it's not clear whether or
how they would fight if it came to that. I believe the position they
envision falling back to, if Western nations launch attacks on either
Syria or Iran, entails remaining able to supply their clients so that
Syrians or Iranians could keep the fight going. Moscow must also be
concerned about stabilizing the Caucasus in the event of an attack on
Iran, which is likely to serve as a goad to Islamist terrorism in the
region.
(In the case of an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear sites, Russian air
forces deployed to the Caucasus could conceivably attempt to warn off
Israeli strike aircraft operating in northern Iran.)
Meanwhile, affecting Western calculations with the threat of military
power increases Putin's stature for leading a `peacekeeping' coalition
- that is, an effort to avert or transition from outright conflict to
negotiations of some kind, with an international protection force
effectively under Russia's aegis. Seizing the reins of the foreign
intervention in Libya was beyond Russia's power last year, but with
respect to the Syria problem, Russia has not only put together a joint
posture with the Arab League but has backed Kofi Annan's `UN'
solution, and continues to block and shape Western multinational
proposals.
Under these conditions, NATO reliance on Russia for logistic support
to Afghanistan is an increasing vulnerability. Russia naturally wants
to retain her bargaining chip in this regard, but we need only look a
few months back to find the last Russian threat to close down the
`Northern Distribution Network,' as the logistic pipeline through
Russia is called. And with Russian troops redeployed pointedly around
the Caucasus, independent NATO partners like Azerbaijan and Georgia
will be less inclined to anger Moscow by offering us an alternative.
None of these problems is insurmountable, but they can only be
addressed to our advantage from the perspective of a clear focus on US
interests and a vigorously prosecuted strategy. `Leading from behind'
- merely lending our support to the plans of others, as in Libya -
will serve to increase our troubles.
Note on maps: To view both maps, see this article at The Optimistic
Conservative. Both maps are from the presentation `Land, Votes, and
Violence: Political Effects on the Insecurity of Property Rights over
Land in Dagestan,' by Yegor Lazarov.
J.E. Dyer's articles have appeared at The Green Room, Commentary's
`contentions,' Patheos, The Weekly Standard online, and her own blog,
The Optimistic Conservative.
From: A. Papazian
Russian troop deployments in the south
by J. E. Dyer
March 24, 2012
There are differing opinions about the exact nature of the reported
deployment of Russian troops to Syria. Some of the reporting appears
to be circular, and Business Insider has picked apart the original
language of a RIA Novosti report in Russian to conclude that the
`Russian troops' amount to no more than an anti-terrorism security
detachment for the Russian fleet tanker RFS Iman (a Black Sea-based
ship deployed for support to Russia's Horn of Africa antipiracy task
force).
It's hard to say: Iman by herself couldn't transport very many troops
into Syria (a detachment of infantry, maybe, if they were really
miserable, sleeping on deck and in passageways, during the few days'
transit), but Iman is an unlikely platform for transporting Russian
troops anyway. If Russia puts a substantial number of troops in
Syria, it's likely to be done via airlift.
And that said, I don't necessarily expect Russia to put big troop
formations in Syria. Russia doesn't want to fight the Syrian civil
war directly. Arming Assad and letting his troops do the work is
preferable. In the past week, Assad's army has ejected the rebel
forces from Idlib in the north, and the eastern city of Deir el-Zour;
Moscow probably is not alarmed that the Syrian army can't handle the
job.
Protecting Russian installations in Tartus, the Russian-operated port,
is a priority - and so is reinforcing the impression that Russia is
ready to defend Syria against a Western coalition. Seen in that
light, the most likely purposes of newly-arriving Russian military
detachments, other than protecting Tartus, are intelligence and air
defense. And except for man-portable systems, much of their equipment
would have to be transported separately anyway.
More troop movements in the Caucasus
But there is another report that the Russians have moved a huge number
of troops in the last week. According to media in the Caucasus, they
moved between 20,000 and 25,000 troops from Chechnya to Dagestan (both
autonomous republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States),
reportedly for `anti-terrorism' operations. (This movement comes in
the wake of special forces deployments to the central Caucasus
reported in January.)
That's one heck of a lot of troops for anti-terrorism operations.
There is no question that Dagestan has seen a spate of assassinations
and bombings in the last few months, but 20-25,000 troops represent
nearly half of the total Russian forces stationed in Chechnya.
(Recent comments on the troop footprint in Chechnya put it at about
60,000; see the Jamestown Foundation article from this past week on
the Dagestan deployment.) The 20-25,000 is a very large number,
particularly for anti-terrorism as opposed to conventional operations.
Even if the actual number is not that big, eyewitness reports suggest
a very large movement of troops and equipment. The `Rosbalt' website
- used often by analysts at the Jamestown Foundation - cites
statements from eyewitnesses in Dagestan that the military formation
on the move was over 10 kilometers long and comprised 150-200 `units,'
presumably troop transport vehicles. (Commercial satellite imagery of
the Russian base at Khankala suggests that this number of vehicles
represents most of those present on the parking aprons.) According
to the Dagestani reporting, Russian forces rolled into campgrounds in
the Karabudahkent District south of the capital of Makachkala, which
sits on the Caspian coast. Statements from locals also suggest that
the Russian troops will be quartered in school buildings. Reports
like this confirm that this is not a small-footprint deployment.
A look at geography yields some interesting revelations about the
deployment. There are two significant perspectives. One is general:
Dagestan lies on the west coast of the Caspian Sea; on Georgia's
eastern border; and on Azerbaijan's northern border.
Map [http://media.hotair.com/greenroom/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Dagestan-2.jpg]
Geographic factors in Dagestan
The other is specific: most of the terrorist incidents in Dagestan
over the past several months have occurred between Makhachkala and
Chechnya, or across the central `waist' of Dagestan. As seen on the
district map, however, the Russian troops have not deployed to that
area, but past it, to a southeast position in the coastal district of
Karabudahkent, and in the district immediately south of it, Sergokala.
The forests of Karabudahkent have been a perennial hiding place for
Islamist terrorists, and some Dagestani hunters were found
assassinated there in March. A homicide bomber also attacked a post
office in Karabudahkent on 6 March. But these are the most recent in
a long list of incidents, most of which have occurred to the northwest
of the deployment area. The size of the Russian deployment, and its
geographic objective, appear to be tailored for more than this one,
most recent security problem.
Russia is concerned, for example, about all three of the general
geographic factors. Moving the troops from Chechnya to the coast puts
them in a different position in relation to Georgia, and it's not
clear that the new position is less favorable than being in garrison
in Khankala. (In fact, it gives the Russians a second vector into
Georgia with a large formation - an option they had maintained for a
long time until late in 2011; see below.) Russian troops are closer
to Georgia in Chechnya, but some passages may be easier from Dagestan.
Vladimir Putin, in particular, has been assiduous about improving the
road approaches to Georgia in Dagestan.
In 2008, at the end of his last term, Putin inaugurated road
construction from Botlikh, Dagestan (see map), where Russia maintained
a mountain infantry brigade, to the Georgian border (this in spite of
the fact that Putin had ordered the border crossings between Dagestan
and Georgia closed in 2006). The Russians removed the infantry
brigade from Botlikh in 2011. Besides the new troop deployment to
Dagestan, however, 2012 has also seen a new allocation of funds for
road construction. There are already roads in Dagestan to the
Georgian border; Putin-ordered maintenance on the Dagestani side,
coupled with a massive troop deployment, cannot give Georgia a warm,
fuzzy feeling.
Russian analysts suggest that concerns about Azerbaijan may be
prompting the deployment as well. Both Georgia and Azerbaijan
represent roadblocks to Russian freedom of action on the southern
flank - the paths to Syria and Iran - and both lie between Russia and
Armenia, where Moscow maintains a military base with 5,000 troops, a
tank unit, and a squadron of MiG-29s. The military path through
Azerbaijan is well laid and ready, with a major highway, Route 29,
running from Dagestan into Azerbaijan near the coast.
The Russians also have a military radar facility in Azerbaijan, and
the lease is about to expire. Russian media claim that Baku is
demanding $300 million annually to renew the lease, far in excess of
the current amount (which is variously reflected as $7 million and $22
million). Azerbaijani media seem to have offered no specific
counter-claims, and may simply not know what negotiating figure is
correct.
At any rate, the US has a military cooperation agreement with
Azerbaijan, as does Israel. The last two scheduled joint exercises
involving the US and Azerbaijan have been cancelled by Baku, largely
due to unease about Russia's reaction, but the US has provided minor
military hardware to Azerbaijan, and a few days ago Azerbaijan and
NATO concluded an agreement to demine a large, Soviet-era military
training facility, an activity that will bring NATO personnel into the
country.
I don't think any of Azerbaijan, Georgia, or the Caspian Sea - the
most obvious geographic feature toward which the troops have been
moved - is by itself the chief concern in Moscow. Rather, the
potential convergence of events in Central Asia has prompted the
Russians to reevaluate their preparedness and the position of a major
troop formation.
Shifting factors, shifting posture in Central Asia
Iran is the not the only factor in this thinking, but she may be at
the top of the list. A Monday editorial in The Moscow Times
summarizes nicely the Russian perspective that Israel and the US are
colluding to establish positions in the Caucasus and Central Asia from
which to attack Iran. The editorialist says this:
Stratfor wrote in a recent report: `It is difficult to believe that
the United States and Israel are not coordinating their activities in
the Caucasus. ... It can be assumed that the United States has approved
the initiatives.' ...
Directly or indirectly, Russia and the United States have been
bumping up against each other in the Caucasus region where Russia is
resurgent.
The most recent `bump' would undoubtedly be exercise Agile Spirit,
conducted in March by a detachment of 350 US Marines and the Georgian
armed forces. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called the
exercise `provocative.' Russia and Iran are also annoyed that the
NATO missile defense radar in Turkey has become operational (Iran has
been especially assiduous in recording objections to the radar site;
e.g., here and here).
Moreover, an interesting emphasis in US military aid to the nations
surrounding the Caspian Sea has caught Russian attention. In the
875-page State Department document heralding the proposal, few
American readers were likely to run across the naval assistance to
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. But regional analysts were
paying attention, and highlighting the `concerted [US] effort to build
naval capacity in the Caspian.'
I wouldn't be surprised to hear American reactions along the lines of,
`What are we doing that for?' I suspect one of the reasons is simply
that naval assistance is one of the main things the Caspian nations
are requesting. Another is the interest of our European NATO allies
in bringing to fruition a trans-Caspian pipeline opposed by Russia and
Iran. With no declaration of strategic interest or specific US policy
to frame these actions, however, they can look like sneaking US
hardware into Russia's back yard. Why would we take this particular
approach to Caspian Sea security?
There is an aspect to this of US interests being effectively declared
for us by the priorities of our regional partners. We care very much
about the stability of Asia, the security of our Asian and European
allies, the resistance of Asia to Islamist terrorism, and about the
openness there to political liberalization, trade, and communication -
but none of these interests requires building up navies in the Caspian
Sea.
In any case, Russia is definitely concerned: the Russian armed forces
have deployed their newest coastal missile system to the Caspian Sea,
among other upgrades (see here, here, here, and here). I wrote in
January about a military exercise conducted by the Russian
Federation's Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in the
Caspian Sea in 2011, in which the `threat' was a Western consortium.
The 2012 CSTO exercise will be conducted for the first time in Armenia
(in September). The all-purpose `anti-terrorism' pretext is cited for
holding the exercise there, but it is more likely that Russia's
concern is simply to have the troops there. Visible demonstration of
the troops' activities will be another purpose, but declaring the
exercise will justify deployments that could start whenever Moscow
deems it necessary - and that, I think, is the principal
consideration.
What will Russia do?
It's a good question. In both Syria and the Caucasus/Central Asia, I
assess that Moscow's immediate purpose is to consolidate territory and
deter Western initiative (`Western' including Israel v. Iran). I
don't think the Russians want to fight, and it's not clear whether or
how they would fight if it came to that. I believe the position they
envision falling back to, if Western nations launch attacks on either
Syria or Iran, entails remaining able to supply their clients so that
Syrians or Iranians could keep the fight going. Moscow must also be
concerned about stabilizing the Caucasus in the event of an attack on
Iran, which is likely to serve as a goad to Islamist terrorism in the
region.
(In the case of an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear sites, Russian air
forces deployed to the Caucasus could conceivably attempt to warn off
Israeli strike aircraft operating in northern Iran.)
Meanwhile, affecting Western calculations with the threat of military
power increases Putin's stature for leading a `peacekeeping' coalition
- that is, an effort to avert or transition from outright conflict to
negotiations of some kind, with an international protection force
effectively under Russia's aegis. Seizing the reins of the foreign
intervention in Libya was beyond Russia's power last year, but with
respect to the Syria problem, Russia has not only put together a joint
posture with the Arab League but has backed Kofi Annan's `UN'
solution, and continues to block and shape Western multinational
proposals.
Under these conditions, NATO reliance on Russia for logistic support
to Afghanistan is an increasing vulnerability. Russia naturally wants
to retain her bargaining chip in this regard, but we need only look a
few months back to find the last Russian threat to close down the
`Northern Distribution Network,' as the logistic pipeline through
Russia is called. And with Russian troops redeployed pointedly around
the Caucasus, independent NATO partners like Azerbaijan and Georgia
will be less inclined to anger Moscow by offering us an alternative.
None of these problems is insurmountable, but they can only be
addressed to our advantage from the perspective of a clear focus on US
interests and a vigorously prosecuted strategy. `Leading from behind'
- merely lending our support to the plans of others, as in Libya -
will serve to increase our troubles.
Note on maps: To view both maps, see this article at The Optimistic
Conservative. Both maps are from the presentation `Land, Votes, and
Violence: Political Effects on the Insecurity of Property Rights over
Land in Dagestan,' by Yegor Lazarov.
J.E. Dyer's articles have appeared at The Green Room, Commentary's
`contentions,' Patheos, The Weekly Standard online, and her own blog,
The Optimistic Conservative.
From: A. Papazian