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IN ANTICIPATION OF A GATHERING STORM: AN ATTACK ON IRAN AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE SOUTH CAUCASUS
ARMENPRESS
MARCH 28, 2012
YEREVAN
YEREVAN, MARCH 28, ARMENPRESS: Vilen Khlgatyan, the Vice-Chairman
of the Political Developments Research Center (PDRC), Armenia in his
article analyses an American or Israeli attack against Iran and its
consequences for the South Caucasus, Armenpress reports.
In recent months, much has been written by various media outlets and
scholars on the potential ramifications of an American or Israeli
attack against Iran. However, much of the coverage has ignored the
consequences such an attack would bring about in the Caucasus, which
is the aim of this brief analysis. In line with this, two main issues
come to mind:
The first of which is the high likelihood of Iranian refugees fleeing
to Armenia and Azerbaijan, and their ability or lack thereof to support
the incoming refugees. Both nations have had experience with refugees
as a result of the Artsakh Liberation War, when hundreds of thousands
of people fled in both directions. Whereas Armenia had the will to
provide for the Armenian refugees but lacked the financial resources,
the situation was the opposite in Azerbaijan, where the regime still
continues to use the plight of the Azeri refugees as a bargaining
chip in mediations with Armenia and the OSCE Minsk Group.
Turning to the possibility of Iranian refugees coming to Armenia and
Azerbaijan, the likelihood is high since it is already quite easy for
Iranians to enter either country, and due to the relative stability
that the two nations enjoy compared to Iran's other neighbors,
with the possible exceptions of Turkey and Turkmenistan. It's hard
to predict how many refugees would arrive but even if the figure is
below 10,000, which is a conservative estimate that would still prove
more than what either state can handle given the economic situations
of both. This in turn provides a destabilizing effect on Armenia and
Azerbaijan as it would pose not only a humanitarian dilemma but also a
national security threat. The problem becomes incrementally worse if
the refugee number rises. Armenian officials will have to consider,
if they have not already, what steps to take to mitigate the negative
consequences, yet provide the much needed humanitarian assistance.
The second issue that a Western attack ag ainst Iran raises for
the Caucasus is the chance of the ceasefire between Artsakh/Armenia
and Azerbaijan breaking. For years now the dictator of Azerbaijan,
Ilham Aliyev, has spoken about the readiness of his regime to 'take
back' Artsakh in case negotiations fail. Helped by profits from the
Azeri oil and natural gas industry, both under state control, Aliyev
has boosted military spending to the tune of $4.4 billion in 2011,
more than six times the amount Armenia officially spends on its armed
forces. Perhaps strategists in Baku, seeing the status quo as working
in the favor of Yerevan and Stepanakert, will see the international
cover provided by a war in Iran as the perfect time to execute a
strike against Armenian forces in Artsakh and Armenia proper.
While some argue that Aliyev learned an important lesson from Georgia's
mistake in its attempt to take South Ossetia in August of 2008,
others have justifiably argued that to make the above assumption is
to simply assume that Aliyev is a rational actor, and that the years
of state sponsored anti-Armenian smear campaigns haven't brought
the Azeri masses to a boiling point. It should be noted that during
the Russian-Georgian war in the summer of 2008, Baku may have been
preparing for an attack against Artsakh/Armenia. Reports at the time,
including one from the American private security firm, Stratfor,
suggested that had the Georgian attack against South Ossetia succeeded
in its aim, Baku was planning on invading Artsakh. Also at the time,
there was chatter in Yerevan that Armenian forces had preemptively
attacked the Azeri military and in doing so had liberated several
thousand hectares of territory. During a press conference in 2009,
this was confirmed by Lieutenant General Movses Hakobyan. While the
General did not state exactly how much lands were liberated or where
these lands were located, according to sources, the two most likely
areas may have been Mardakert and Fizuli.
The two wild cards in this scenario are what, if any, promises have
been made to Azerbaijan by the West if the former allows its airspace
and/or land to be used, and whether Russia will come to the aid of
Armenia. The first is hard to tell since any such promises would be
kept very confidential, while the second is easier to predict based on
recent statements made by the Secretary General of the CSTO, Nikolay
Bordyuzha, who openly hinted that in case Armenia proper is attacked,
Russia will come to its aid.
Though it is still very difficult to predict when or if an attack
will take place against Iran, one thing remains certain, the law
of unintended consequences will mean that there will be surprises
in store for all parties involved, either directly or indirectly,
and the best course of action any government can follow is to have
multiple contingency plans in place.
From: Baghdasarian
ARMENPRESS
MARCH 28, 2012
YEREVAN
YEREVAN, MARCH 28, ARMENPRESS: Vilen Khlgatyan, the Vice-Chairman
of the Political Developments Research Center (PDRC), Armenia in his
article analyses an American or Israeli attack against Iran and its
consequences for the South Caucasus, Armenpress reports.
In recent months, much has been written by various media outlets and
scholars on the potential ramifications of an American or Israeli
attack against Iran. However, much of the coverage has ignored the
consequences such an attack would bring about in the Caucasus, which
is the aim of this brief analysis. In line with this, two main issues
come to mind:
The first of which is the high likelihood of Iranian refugees fleeing
to Armenia and Azerbaijan, and their ability or lack thereof to support
the incoming refugees. Both nations have had experience with refugees
as a result of the Artsakh Liberation War, when hundreds of thousands
of people fled in both directions. Whereas Armenia had the will to
provide for the Armenian refugees but lacked the financial resources,
the situation was the opposite in Azerbaijan, where the regime still
continues to use the plight of the Azeri refugees as a bargaining
chip in mediations with Armenia and the OSCE Minsk Group.
Turning to the possibility of Iranian refugees coming to Armenia and
Azerbaijan, the likelihood is high since it is already quite easy for
Iranians to enter either country, and due to the relative stability
that the two nations enjoy compared to Iran's other neighbors,
with the possible exceptions of Turkey and Turkmenistan. It's hard
to predict how many refugees would arrive but even if the figure is
below 10,000, which is a conservative estimate that would still prove
more than what either state can handle given the economic situations
of both. This in turn provides a destabilizing effect on Armenia and
Azerbaijan as it would pose not only a humanitarian dilemma but also a
national security threat. The problem becomes incrementally worse if
the refugee number rises. Armenian officials will have to consider,
if they have not already, what steps to take to mitigate the negative
consequences, yet provide the much needed humanitarian assistance.
The second issue that a Western attack ag ainst Iran raises for
the Caucasus is the chance of the ceasefire between Artsakh/Armenia
and Azerbaijan breaking. For years now the dictator of Azerbaijan,
Ilham Aliyev, has spoken about the readiness of his regime to 'take
back' Artsakh in case negotiations fail. Helped by profits from the
Azeri oil and natural gas industry, both under state control, Aliyev
has boosted military spending to the tune of $4.4 billion in 2011,
more than six times the amount Armenia officially spends on its armed
forces. Perhaps strategists in Baku, seeing the status quo as working
in the favor of Yerevan and Stepanakert, will see the international
cover provided by a war in Iran as the perfect time to execute a
strike against Armenian forces in Artsakh and Armenia proper.
While some argue that Aliyev learned an important lesson from Georgia's
mistake in its attempt to take South Ossetia in August of 2008,
others have justifiably argued that to make the above assumption is
to simply assume that Aliyev is a rational actor, and that the years
of state sponsored anti-Armenian smear campaigns haven't brought
the Azeri masses to a boiling point. It should be noted that during
the Russian-Georgian war in the summer of 2008, Baku may have been
preparing for an attack against Artsakh/Armenia. Reports at the time,
including one from the American private security firm, Stratfor,
suggested that had the Georgian attack against South Ossetia succeeded
in its aim, Baku was planning on invading Artsakh. Also at the time,
there was chatter in Yerevan that Armenian forces had preemptively
attacked the Azeri military and in doing so had liberated several
thousand hectares of territory. During a press conference in 2009,
this was confirmed by Lieutenant General Movses Hakobyan. While the
General did not state exactly how much lands were liberated or where
these lands were located, according to sources, the two most likely
areas may have been Mardakert and Fizuli.
The two wild cards in this scenario are what, if any, promises have
been made to Azerbaijan by the West if the former allows its airspace
and/or land to be used, and whether Russia will come to the aid of
Armenia. The first is hard to tell since any such promises would be
kept very confidential, while the second is easier to predict based on
recent statements made by the Secretary General of the CSTO, Nikolay
Bordyuzha, who openly hinted that in case Armenia proper is attacked,
Russia will come to its aid.
Though it is still very difficult to predict when or if an attack
will take place against Iran, one thing remains certain, the law
of unintended consequences will mean that there will be surprises
in store for all parties involved, either directly or indirectly,
and the best course of action any government can follow is to have
multiple contingency plans in place.
From: Baghdasarian