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TURKEY INC.: RETHINKING THE MODEL'S REGIONAL ROLE
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2012/03/29/turkey-inc.-rethinking-turkey-s -regional-role/a5k9
March 29, 2012 Nora Fisher Onar
Turkey is often touted as an inspiration for the rest of the Middle
East--a characterization it accepts and pursues. In recent years,
Turkish policy makers have worked hard to establish "Turkey Inc.":
a model of a relatively free, stable, and increasingly prosperous
Muslim-majority country with great economic and foreign policy
leverage. But what does the Turkish experience actually represent
for the Arab Middle East? How convincing is Turkey, Inc.--and can it
really be emulated?
Perhaps the most attention has been paid to the free and fair rise
to power of its Justice and Development Party (AKP), which Islamist
movements in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Syria have heralded as a
symbol of Muslim majoritarian democracy--even explicitly referencing
it in the names and platforms of their own parties, movements, and
factions. To both domestic and international observers, this might
signal that, like the AKP in Turkey, Islamist parties elsewhere do
not seek to dismantle their states' secular framework--at least for
the time being.
But in spite of its appeal to both traditional Islamists and
"post-Islamists"--that is, those who fully reconcile their particular
politico-religious commitments with globalization--the Turkish
formula may not be replicable. Civil-military relations in Turkey
have undergone a double-sided transformation over recent decades. As
a consequence of the army's intermittent censure, political Islamists
had to moderate their demands and practices; simultaneously, the
army--accustomed to the barracks and aware that interference in
government hurt Turkey's international standing--increasingly relied
on civilian allies to pursue its agenda vis-a-vis the AKP. Eventually,
the military relinquished control of crucial institutions (like the
National Security Council), and the final showdown over control of
the presidency in 2007 was fought not with bullets and tanks, but
with web declarations, public rallies, and court cases. A similar
tipping point regarding civilian control of the state is hardly a
foregone conclusion in countries still under transition where national
militaries continue to exert a dominant presence in political life.
Other countries in the region also lack the trajectory of Turkey's
economic development--particularly, the export-driven rise of
the middle class experienced by religious constituencies across
the Anatolian periphery--something that has underpinned the AKP's
moderation, political success, and interregional presence.
Indeed, Turkey's recent economic trajectory is a central component
to its appeal in the Arab world.
Over the past decade, Turkey has tripled its GDP and--excluding a
dip to -4% real growth in 2009--has ridden out the global economic
crisis with relative equanimity. Commentators have argued that Turkey
may be part of a second tier of rising economic powers (alongside
South Korea, Mexico, and Indonesia) hot on the heels of the Big Four
(Brazil, Russia, India, and China). This holds two implications:
on a symbolic level, the Turkish experience (along with that of
Indonesia and Malaysia) has dramatically undermined theories of
Islam's incompatibility with modernization, especially in the arena
of economic governance. More tangibly, over the past decade Turkey
has actively sought partners for sustainable trade-driven growth in
a region long addled by the heady cocktail of oil wealth and chronic
underdevelopment. Although economic partnerships were in no way guided
by concerns for democratic governance--attested to by Turkey's once
cozy ties with authoritarian leaders--they also have had unintended
consequences with positive implications for political reform. For
example, the influx of cheaper, better quality Turkish goods in
Syrian markets may have undermined a backbone of the Assad regime:
its business cronies.
To understand the parameters of Turkey's role in the region, we
should also acknowledge the sensitivities that arise from the Ottoman
legacy. Some believe that Ankara seeks to reclaim its historical
leadership of the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans,
something that can rub interlocutors the wrong way. Hence, Turkish
foreign policy makers' reluctance to employ Ottomanist frames of
reference. But at the domestic social level, there remains a growing
receptiveness to self-depiction as the benign heir to the Ottoman
Empire. This is evident in the proliferation of cultural commodities
that employ Ottoman referents, such as the recent record-grossing
film Conquest 1453 about what western historiography calls the "fall"
of Constantinople. In the film, Mehmet the Conqueror--played by an
actor who bears a remarkable resemblance to a young Recep Tayyip
Erdogan--is shown to be a forceful and compassionate protector of
Muslims and Christians alike (though there is no mention of Jews). The
image of Turkey as a "big brother" to downtrodden Muslims in places
like Palestine, Nagorno-Karabagh, Kosovo, and Bosnia--characterizes an
emerging "neo-Ottomanist" national image that seems to drive Turkish
aspirations of regional leadership within the country and amplify
Erdogan's profile abroad. Whether this is a matter of hubris or of
capacity remains to be seen.
A final component that is crucial for evaluating Turkey's example
is that the country has yet to develop a framework for meaningful
multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian co-habitation. Mounting violence on the
part of militant Kurds and the state's heavy-handed response fuels
hostility between ordinary citizens. Recent court rulings suggest
that vigilante terror towards prominent members of the Armenian and
Alevi communities is permissible and will go unpunished.
Disturbing numbers of journalists, scholars, and students who
express critical views on these fronts are jailed. There is also
deep concern in constituencies which embrace secular lifestyles
that recent reforms in fields like education will yield an ever more
restricted society. Given the need to put its own house in order and
the fact that inter-communal tensions across the region are likely
to become worse before becoming better, Turkey's AKP must take very
seriously its mandate to write a new and inclusive constitution. In
the longer tem, Turkey must confront the standing challenge of the
region--learning to live together despite differences--a challenge
which is also Turkey's own.
At the end of the day, the export of Turkey Inc. needs stable and
predictable conditions in which trade and investment can thrive;
hence, the commitment to the "zero problems" policy that Turkey
employed with neighbors in its economic and foreign agendas over the
past decade. Due to last year's upheavals, however, this policy is
unsustainable. Once well-placed to broker a dialogue between Iran and
Israel, Turkey is now alienated from both as the two nemeses lock
horns in what Graham Allison has called the "Cuban missile crisis
in slow motion." Should this spill into war, the delicate balance in
Iraq may unravel into protracted sectarian and ethnic conflict, just
as Syria's brewing civil war may spill over into Lebanon. But even
without an Israeli-Iranian showdown and an intensified conflagration
in Iraq and Syria, the country's Kurdish question is, quite literally,
kindling awaiting a flame, as attested to by recent clashes during
Nevruz/Newroz celebrations. All of this suggests that Turkey's
aspirations to regional leadership are tactically dependent on
forestalling an Iranian-Israeli showdown--an end to which it should
leverage all its diminished diplomatic capital in the two countries
and in partnership with the United States.
Before the AKP and Arab Awakening, the received wisdom was that when
it came to Islam, democracy, and secularism, one could have any two
but never all three. Similarly, doubts have long been expressed as to
whether political and economic liberalism can thrive simultaneously
in a Muslim-majority setting. Taken together, it seems that if
the purveyors of Turkey Inc. can show that liberal economics goes
hand-in-hand with liberal democracy in a country governed by pious
Muslims, the Turkish model-in-progress may achieve fruition and offer
a timely example for the region.
Nora Fisher Onar is an assistant professor of International Relations
at BahceĆ~_ehir University in Istanbul. She is a Ronald D. Asmus
Policy Entrepreneur Fellow with the German Marshall Fund and is a
Visiting Fellow at the Centre for International Studies (CIS) at the
University of Oxford.
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2012/03/29/turkey-inc.-rethinking-turkey-s -regional-role/a5k9
March 29, 2012 Nora Fisher Onar
Turkey is often touted as an inspiration for the rest of the Middle
East--a characterization it accepts and pursues. In recent years,
Turkish policy makers have worked hard to establish "Turkey Inc.":
a model of a relatively free, stable, and increasingly prosperous
Muslim-majority country with great economic and foreign policy
leverage. But what does the Turkish experience actually represent
for the Arab Middle East? How convincing is Turkey, Inc.--and can it
really be emulated?
Perhaps the most attention has been paid to the free and fair rise
to power of its Justice and Development Party (AKP), which Islamist
movements in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Syria have heralded as a
symbol of Muslim majoritarian democracy--even explicitly referencing
it in the names and platforms of their own parties, movements, and
factions. To both domestic and international observers, this might
signal that, like the AKP in Turkey, Islamist parties elsewhere do
not seek to dismantle their states' secular framework--at least for
the time being.
But in spite of its appeal to both traditional Islamists and
"post-Islamists"--that is, those who fully reconcile their particular
politico-religious commitments with globalization--the Turkish
formula may not be replicable. Civil-military relations in Turkey
have undergone a double-sided transformation over recent decades. As
a consequence of the army's intermittent censure, political Islamists
had to moderate their demands and practices; simultaneously, the
army--accustomed to the barracks and aware that interference in
government hurt Turkey's international standing--increasingly relied
on civilian allies to pursue its agenda vis-a-vis the AKP. Eventually,
the military relinquished control of crucial institutions (like the
National Security Council), and the final showdown over control of
the presidency in 2007 was fought not with bullets and tanks, but
with web declarations, public rallies, and court cases. A similar
tipping point regarding civilian control of the state is hardly a
foregone conclusion in countries still under transition where national
militaries continue to exert a dominant presence in political life.
Other countries in the region also lack the trajectory of Turkey's
economic development--particularly, the export-driven rise of
the middle class experienced by religious constituencies across
the Anatolian periphery--something that has underpinned the AKP's
moderation, political success, and interregional presence.
Indeed, Turkey's recent economic trajectory is a central component
to its appeal in the Arab world.
Over the past decade, Turkey has tripled its GDP and--excluding a
dip to -4% real growth in 2009--has ridden out the global economic
crisis with relative equanimity. Commentators have argued that Turkey
may be part of a second tier of rising economic powers (alongside
South Korea, Mexico, and Indonesia) hot on the heels of the Big Four
(Brazil, Russia, India, and China). This holds two implications:
on a symbolic level, the Turkish experience (along with that of
Indonesia and Malaysia) has dramatically undermined theories of
Islam's incompatibility with modernization, especially in the arena
of economic governance. More tangibly, over the past decade Turkey
has actively sought partners for sustainable trade-driven growth in
a region long addled by the heady cocktail of oil wealth and chronic
underdevelopment. Although economic partnerships were in no way guided
by concerns for democratic governance--attested to by Turkey's once
cozy ties with authoritarian leaders--they also have had unintended
consequences with positive implications for political reform. For
example, the influx of cheaper, better quality Turkish goods in
Syrian markets may have undermined a backbone of the Assad regime:
its business cronies.
To understand the parameters of Turkey's role in the region, we
should also acknowledge the sensitivities that arise from the Ottoman
legacy. Some believe that Ankara seeks to reclaim its historical
leadership of the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans,
something that can rub interlocutors the wrong way. Hence, Turkish
foreign policy makers' reluctance to employ Ottomanist frames of
reference. But at the domestic social level, there remains a growing
receptiveness to self-depiction as the benign heir to the Ottoman
Empire. This is evident in the proliferation of cultural commodities
that employ Ottoman referents, such as the recent record-grossing
film Conquest 1453 about what western historiography calls the "fall"
of Constantinople. In the film, Mehmet the Conqueror--played by an
actor who bears a remarkable resemblance to a young Recep Tayyip
Erdogan--is shown to be a forceful and compassionate protector of
Muslims and Christians alike (though there is no mention of Jews). The
image of Turkey as a "big brother" to downtrodden Muslims in places
like Palestine, Nagorno-Karabagh, Kosovo, and Bosnia--characterizes an
emerging "neo-Ottomanist" national image that seems to drive Turkish
aspirations of regional leadership within the country and amplify
Erdogan's profile abroad. Whether this is a matter of hubris or of
capacity remains to be seen.
A final component that is crucial for evaluating Turkey's example
is that the country has yet to develop a framework for meaningful
multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian co-habitation. Mounting violence on the
part of militant Kurds and the state's heavy-handed response fuels
hostility between ordinary citizens. Recent court rulings suggest
that vigilante terror towards prominent members of the Armenian and
Alevi communities is permissible and will go unpunished.
Disturbing numbers of journalists, scholars, and students who
express critical views on these fronts are jailed. There is also
deep concern in constituencies which embrace secular lifestyles
that recent reforms in fields like education will yield an ever more
restricted society. Given the need to put its own house in order and
the fact that inter-communal tensions across the region are likely
to become worse before becoming better, Turkey's AKP must take very
seriously its mandate to write a new and inclusive constitution. In
the longer tem, Turkey must confront the standing challenge of the
region--learning to live together despite differences--a challenge
which is also Turkey's own.
At the end of the day, the export of Turkey Inc. needs stable and
predictable conditions in which trade and investment can thrive;
hence, the commitment to the "zero problems" policy that Turkey
employed with neighbors in its economic and foreign agendas over the
past decade. Due to last year's upheavals, however, this policy is
unsustainable. Once well-placed to broker a dialogue between Iran and
Israel, Turkey is now alienated from both as the two nemeses lock
horns in what Graham Allison has called the "Cuban missile crisis
in slow motion." Should this spill into war, the delicate balance in
Iraq may unravel into protracted sectarian and ethnic conflict, just
as Syria's brewing civil war may spill over into Lebanon. But even
without an Israeli-Iranian showdown and an intensified conflagration
in Iraq and Syria, the country's Kurdish question is, quite literally,
kindling awaiting a flame, as attested to by recent clashes during
Nevruz/Newroz celebrations. All of this suggests that Turkey's
aspirations to regional leadership are tactically dependent on
forestalling an Iranian-Israeli showdown--an end to which it should
leverage all its diminished diplomatic capital in the two countries
and in partnership with the United States.
Before the AKP and Arab Awakening, the received wisdom was that when
it came to Islam, democracy, and secularism, one could have any two
but never all three. Similarly, doubts have long been expressed as to
whether political and economic liberalism can thrive simultaneously
in a Muslim-majority setting. Taken together, it seems that if
the purveyors of Turkey Inc. can show that liberal economics goes
hand-in-hand with liberal democracy in a country governed by pious
Muslims, the Turkish model-in-progress may achieve fruition and offer
a timely example for the region.
Nora Fisher Onar is an assistant professor of International Relations
at BahceĆ~_ehir University in Istanbul. She is a Ronald D. Asmus
Policy Entrepreneur Fellow with the German Marshall Fund and is a
Visiting Fellow at the Centre for International Studies (CIS) at the
University of Oxford.