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The Cutting Edge
April 28 2012
Russo-Turkish Divergence: the Security Dimension
Younkyoo Kim and Stephen Blank April 27th 2012
GLORIA Center
Russo-Turkish relations encompass a multi-regional agenda from the
Balkans to Central Asia, including the Caucasus and the Middle East
and their bilateral energy relations. Much has been written about the
strategic convergence of Russo-Turkish relations and contributing
factors behind it. In contrast to Turkey's strained relations with its
traditional Western partners, Ankara's ties with Moscow have
noticeably strengthened in recent years. Turkey's reorientation
eastward in the past decade is attributable to three factors: the U.S.
invasion of Iraq, the derailment of Turkish accession talks to join
the EU, and Turkey's dependence on Russia for its natural gas imports.
Turkish and Russian interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus during
1992`2008 converged more than they differed. In 2009 and 2010, Turkish
officials and experts described their relations with Russia as being
the best ever and said that bilateral harmony featured prominently in
the past decade's international relations. Yet Russia and Turkey had
already begun to diverge after the Georgian war in August 2008. The
fighting between Russia and Georgia disrupted transportation, energy,
and other infrastructure networks in the region, adversely affecting
the interests of Turkey. In regard to Turkey's relations with Russia,
2011 was a difficult year, and 2012 has not been much better.
Developments since then across a host of issues give many reasons for
suggesting the rapid but uneven erosion of those ties. Because this
erosion is occurring unevenly, enmity will not replace amity
overnight. Previously, the only major questions that divided them
seemed to be Moscow's reluctance to brand the PKK (Kurdistan Workers'
Party) a terrorist organization and Russia's support for the Greek
Cypriots in their conflict with the Turkish-dominated state of the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Yet signs have multiplied
suggesting that this partnership is declining and that there are
mounting tensions over the Kurdish issue, Middle East, missile
defenses, Cyprus, and the Balkans. Furthermore, those difficulties
will likely increase.
Divergence
Russo-Turkish divergence reflects the renewed assertiveness of both
Russia and Turkey in precisely those areas of regional contestation
that had hitherto seemed to be in abeyance between them. Turkish
assertiveness, most notably in regard to Syria, Cyprus, and Israel,
has been very public and strong, even high-handed in some cases.
Arguably Ankara's assertiveness owes much to the perception that its
former policy of `zero problems with neighbors' policy is encountering
difficulties wherever one looks. This includes Russia, because the
neighbors are asserting their own prerogatives and interests regarding
democracy'or the lack of it'in Syria, energy in Cyprus, and a closed
CIS (Confederation of Independent States) bloc in Russia's case. Yet
this rising friction also has deeper roots stemming from the
self-confidence of both states' elites. Turkish leaders claim that
Turkey is now a major independent actor in its own right in all of its
various neighborhoods, and it should therefore assert its interests in
new ways'a view that strikingly resembles Moscow's similar
assertiveness, which has led to confrontations with Russia's
neighbors.
Indeed, in 2009, Foreign Minister Ahmet DavutoÄ?lu, the architect of
Turkish policy, observed that neither Washington nor Moscow could
establish order in the regions adjoining Turkey, therefore a new order
must be established in the Middle East, Balkans, and the Caucasus;
that Turkey wanted to play an active role in creating that order; that
foreign actors agree to this role; but that `not even half a status
quo had been established around Turkey so far.' Highlighting Turkey's
ambitions he even said that Turkey was the most influential country in
the Caucasus in every respect and that `we will move ahead by solving
any crisis that exists in our relations. Our mission is to establish
order.' He subsequently observed that `Istanbul will be a financial
center, positioning it as the main station for the global economic
network and transportation routes.' Still more recently, DavutoÄ?lu
launched a campaign by which anyone migrating abroad from Anatolia
would be considered part of the Turkish diaspora. Given Russia's
pretensions to these selfsame roles and tasks'even to the right of
intervening on behalf of its Russian diaspora and to the same status
claimed by Turkey as a `system-forming' power'and its overt efforts to
dominate the Caucasus, a clash with Turkey along several lines was
probably inevitable.
Thus this deterioration in Russo-Turkish relations owes as much to
Russia's assertiveness and willingness to make threats against the
West, including Turkey, as it does to Turkish assertiveness. Moscow
has threatened NATO members regarding missile defense and has
displayed several cases of gunboat diplomacy in the Mediterranean
(discussed below). It has also continually displayed its determination
to make the CIS into a closed Russian bloc'a trend that would put
Turkish and European energy supplies at the risk of excessive
dependence upon Moscow and thwart Ankara's ambitions in the Caucasus,
if not Central Asia. These recent moves not only suggest the dominance
of Vladimir Putin's more anti-Western attitude compared to that of
outgoing President Dmitry Medvedev, but they also show a decided
continuity in priorities regarding the insistence on a closed bloc in
the CIS, and a heightened willingness to resort to shows of force if
not its actual use to achieve its goals.
The creation of a Russian sphere of influence in the CIS has been
Moscow's priority policy since 1993 long before Putin. Medvedev
quickly reaffirmed it in 2008, when in the wake of the Russo-Georgian
war he announced that he would henceforth base his foreign policy on
five principles. These included among them that Russia has the right
to intervene in neighboring states to defend the honor and dignity of
its citizens and that it has privileged but undefined interests with
countries in its neighborhood. This then demonstrated that Russia not
only wants to revise borders or intervene in other countries, it also
demands a sphere of influence in Eurasia as a whole. Even without
DavutoÄ?lu's extravagant rhetoric and ambitions, Russian policy, in and
of itself, would have clashed sooner or later with Turkish interests.
Thus Russia too has much to answer for here.
Moscow's moves also suggest that the reset policy is coming to an end.
If this is indeed the case, it will likely lead to more East-West
tension in general, which Turkey will not be able to escape. Moscow
professes a continuing desire to negotiate disputed issues with the
United States and NATO, and will probably not attack President Obama
during a difficult election campaign (since Moscow believes a
Republican victory would lead to still worse outcomes). However, its
determination to counter the United States and NATO in the Middle East
and Eurasia and attacks on missile defenses show that once again
efforts at East-West rapprochement have foundered on regional security
issues in Eurasia, perhaps the most intractable item on the East-West
agenda.
The Middle East
Moscow and Ankara hold different opinions on the Kurdish issue. Moscow
continues to stall on recognizing the PKK as a terrorist group as
Turkey desires, while both the United States and EU recognize it as
such. Turkish intelligence reports that 80 percent of PKK weapons are
made in Russia, including sniper rifles, anti-tank mines, and rocket
launchers. Eighty-eight percent of mines and 85 percent of launchers
used by the PKK originate in Russia. This does not necessarily mean
that the PKK is buying weapons from Russia. Instead it could be
obtaining them through gray or black markets. Yet these facts still
put Moscow in an embarrassing position given Moscow's refusal to
recognize the PKK as a terrorist group.
>From Turkey's standpoint, Moscow's position compares unfavorably with
that of Washington and Brussels on recognizing the PKK as terrorists
and in assisting Turkey to deal with it. Indeed, the United States has
pledged its support for Turkey's stance on the PKK. Washington has
also provided some technological assistance to Turkey in dealing with
it, consisting of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
data'using assets like the Predator UAV, fixed-wing spy planes, and
satellites. Turkey has sought to buy six Predator and four armed
Reaper UAVs from the United States, but Congress has not authorized
the deal. Instead the U.S. announced in October 2011 its intention to
sell Turkey three new Super Cobra attack helicopters. Moreover,
Turkish commentators believe that absent some major crisis in
U.S.-Turkish relations in 2012, American support for Turkey on this
issue will continue.
Differences regarding the PKK, however, are a relatively small issue
in the Russo-Turkish agenda. Much more important are the issues
pertaining to Syria and missile defense against Iran. In the 1990s,
Turkey viewed the Russian-Iranian partnership as a counterweight to
Turkish influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia; in the early
2000s, Moscow showed signs of anxiety over the rapid improvement in
Turkish-Iranian contacts. Turkey was left a bitter impression that an
old friend of the West was turning away. It certainly looked as though
Turkey considered Iran a friend and Israel an enemy, although Turkish
officials vehemently denied these allegations.
Turkish-Iranian relations are changing. Here too one sees an erosion
of the congruence of outlooks that previously characterized
Russo-Turkish relations. Turkey's demands that Syrian President Bashar
al-Asad step down due to his violent repression of political protests
clashes with Russia's support for him and staunch opposition to any
foreign intervention in Syria. Arguably, the longer civil strife there
continues, the more pressures will build for overt Turkish
intervention. Indeed, by the end of 2011, not only was Turkey
providing sanctuary and material assistance to insurgents, but
DavutoÄ?lu was publicly discussing the possibility of intervention by
either the Arab League or Turkey'which he considers `members of the
family' and thus not really intervening external actors. Turkey had
also imposed its own sanctions on Syria.
If an intervention occurs, it is as likely as not to be associated
with or to be in the name of Europe and trigger further Russian ire.
Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolai Patrushev already
accuses NATO of planning such an intervention from Turkey and using
Turkish forces either to intervene directly in Syria or at least to
establish a buffer zone within it. They also claim that NATO, which
denies it, is discussing setting up a no fly zone in Syria that
recalls the pretext for intervention in Libya. In the larger context,
Turkey's converging posture with the West toward the Arab revolutions
is an important factor drawing Turkey, Europe, and the United States
closer together while distancing Turkey from Russia and Iran.
Moscow has reacted sharply to the perceived threat of NATO
intervention despite NATO's denials of that intention. Apart from
sending warships in November 2011 to defend Syrian waters against some
expected NATO `intervention,' Russia's military has also added to the
hysteria in Moscow about NATO intentions. In October 2011, Chief of
the General Staff General Nikolai Makarov told the army that the
events in North Africa and the Middle East were so unpredictable and
rapid in their development that nobody could foretell their future
impact upon states. Therefore the army must be prepared for a Libyan
or similar scenario. Escalating his rhetoric, Makarov then warned in
November 2011 that tensions in Russia's neighborhood were rising and
could even escalate to nuclear use: `The possibility of local armed
conflicts virtually along the entire perimeter of the border has grown
dramatically. I cannot rule out that, in certain circumstances, local
and regional armed conflicts cold grow into a large-scale war,
possibly even with nuclear weapons.'
Makarov further warned, `We have it all in the doctrine, all the
circumstances when the use of nuclear weapons is warranted.' For
Makarov, the cause for such wars in the CIS lies in NATO's advancement
to the CIS and Russia's borders. This is not a new position. As his
predecessor General Yuri Baluyevsky said in 2005, while Russia faced
no direct threat of aggression, `[given] the existence of nuclear
weapons, any localized armed conflict'let alone a regional
conflict'could lead the international community to the brink of a
global war.'
In January 2012, Moscow sent an armed ship through the NATO blockade
to Syria to show its defiance of NATO and provide ammunition to the
Syrian regime, if not also to the terrorists of Hizballah and Hamas,
which it regularly supports with Russian weapons through Syria.
Besides these forceful moves to deter NATO, Moscow has blocked UN
resolutions against Syria and attacked NATO for staging a `political
provocation' there. These actions, taken together, suggest that it
sees Washington and NATO'now visibly including Turkey'as particularly
prone to such interventionist unilateralism on behalf of democracy.
Therefore they must be strongly deterred by even unilateral and
forceful Russian action if necessary.
Thus to the degree that Turkey becomes a consistent advocate of
democracy in its neighborhood, its relations with Russia will suffer.
As one Turkish official put it:
Ankara came to a conclusion that as democracy is spreading around its
neighborhood, Turkey only benefits from it. Countries like Bulgaria,
Romania, and Georgia are testament(s) to this reality when we look at
the great relations Turkey is having with these countries compared
with the past. Just like the domino theory, we see democracy as an
unstoppable force of history and we arrived at its doorstep.
Meanwhile, Turkey is also contending with Iran, Syria's main regional
protector and ally in the Middle East, and Russia's partner there as
well. Just as Irano-Russian relations have improved due to their
congruent stands regarding Syria and the threat of NATO intervention,
Turkey's relations with Tehran and Moscow have worsened, and not only
over Syria. This erosion has occurred despite the fact that Turkey
opposes sanctions on Iranian oil and gas, which it buys. Turkey also
attempted in 2010 to propose an alternative UN draft resolution with
Brazil to mitigate the threat of sanctions on Iran and is proposing
the resumption of talks on Iran's nuclear program, which should be
held in Turkey.
Indeed, 30 percent of Turkey's oil comes from Iran and is among Iran's
top consumers of crude oil, obtaining just over 200,000 BPD. Not
surprisingly, then, Turkey has indicated that it will not be bound by
the newly proposed U.S. and European sanctions against Iranian oil.
Therefore, and also to avoid a Sunni-Shi'i split over Syria and Iraq
in the Middle East, Turkey has ample reasons to try to maintain its
relationship with Iran. Although ties with Tehran may have weakened,
Turkey still has enough credibility there to propose its territory as
the site of a new attempt to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the
issues surrounding Iranian nuclearization in talks with the United
States, Russia, the UK, France, Germany, and Iran. This initiative
again indicates its desire to stabilize its neighborhood and advance
Turkey's international standing as an `order creating' power.
Nevertheless the signs of decreasing amity with Tehran are visible and
increasing. Turkey already competes strongly with Iran over
Azerbaijan, which Iran is now openly threatening. Iran's ambassador to
Russia, Ali Akbar Salehi, recently expressed Iran's desire to be
Russia's dependable ally. A leading pro-Iranian Russian analyst,
Radzhab Safarov, Director of the Center for the Study of Modern Iran,
followed up by saying that `the rapprochement of Tehran and Moscow
will make it possible to hinder the shortsighted policy of Turkey,
which is installing American missile defenses.' This issue of missile
defenses, just like Syria, is already estranging Turkey from both
Russia and Iran.
Turkish officials and pundits have long worried about the threat of
proliferation in the Middle East and the threat posed by long-range
missiles in the hands of Turkey's neighbors. Turkish pundits like
Duygu Bazoglu Sezer were warning about the threat posed by
proliferation from Iran and Iraq by 1995. By 1998 she was writing
that:
In July 1998, Iran successfully tested the Shahab-3 medium-range
missile. Iranian officials described the test firing as a defensive
move aimed at creating a balance in the region, meaning specifically a
balance that would neutralize the American presence in the Gulf. The
demonstration of Iran's medium-range missile capability is certainly
not a welcome development from the perspective of Turkey, especially
in view of the fact that Iran is strongly suspected'despite strong
denials'of pursuing nuclear weapons capability. It is interesting
that, following the firing, Iran took pains to send a message
virtually to the whole world that none of its neighbors seemed
troubled by the successful testing of the missile.
The situation has worsened as Iran's arsenal has grown and the
presumption of its ambition to field nuclear weapons has grown along
with that arsenal. As Ian Lesser has observed, Iran's missile
capability makes it in an operational sense, if not necessarily a
political one, a Black Sea power. Indeed, Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov has repeatedly argued, `Iran deserves to be an equal
partner of all regional countries in the resolution of the problems of
the Near and Middle East.' He has also proposed a similar involvement
of Iran in Black Sea security issues.
Accordingly, the strategic consequences of Iran's missiles could
easily affect not just regional defense agendas but also energy flows
through and in the Black Sea littoral (particularly if someone strikes
at Iran to forestall its proliferation and Iran retaliates by playing
the energy card). Consequently, Turkish defense planners are highly
sensitive to the threat. In 2008, Turkey apparently decided to buy
Russian-made S-300 surface-to-air missiles from Ukraine and Belarus
for testing and training purposes `to simulate threats that may come
from countries with ex-Soviet systems in their inventories,' i.e.,
Iran and Syria. At that time, Turkey also announced plans to buy up to
$4 billion of long-range air and missile defense systems.
Last, in September 2011, Turkey agreed to host a U.S. radar as part of
the developing missile defense system in Europe. This decision will
clearly aggravate relations with Iran since Turkey formally feels that
Iran's nuclear weapons and missile programs are a threat and that
Ankara is willing to join with NATO, the United States, and even
Israel to counter it. Indeed, in November 2011, General Amir Ali
Hajizadeh, a senior commander in Iran's Revolutionary Guard, declared
that if Iran were attacked by the United States or Israel, its first
response would be to target elements of the NATO missile shield in
Turkey. Similarly, in December 2011, the Iranian media attacked
Turkey's secular Islamic system as an unsuitable example for countries
now engulfed in the Arab Spring.
Turkey may have made this decision because NATO warned that if it
bought Russian or Chinese air and missile defense systems that were
incompatible with NATO's systems, it would then operate without NATO's
intelligence on incoming ballistic missiles. Ankara also agreed that
the United States would share this system's data and intelligence
assessments with all allies, including Israel. According to U.S.
officials, this is `probably the biggest strategic decision between
the United States and Turkey in the past 15 or 20 years.' Yet it also
implicates Turkey in Russia's hostile response to these missile
defenses as announced by President Medvedev on November 23, 2011.
Medvedev announced the following decisions:
First, I am instructing the Defence Ministry to immediately put the
missile attack early warning radar station in Kaliningrad on combat
alert. Second, protective cover of Russia's strategic nuclear weapons
will be reinforced as a priority measure under the program to develop
our air and space defenses. Third, the new strategic ballistic
missiles commissioned by the Strategic Missile Forces and the Navy
will be equipped with advanced missile defense penetration systems and
new highly effective warheads. Fourth, I have instructed the Armed
Forces to draw up measures for disabling missile defense system data
and guidance systems if need be. These measures will be adequate,
effective, and low-cost. Fifth, if the above measures prove
insufficient, the Russian Federation will deploy modern offensive
weapon systems in the west and south of the country, ensuring our
ability to take out any part of the U.S. missile defense system in
Europe. One step in this process will be to deploy Iskander missiles
in Kaliningrad Region. Other measures to counter the European missile
defense system will be drawn up and implemented as necessary.
Furthermore, if the situation continues to develop not to Russia's
favor, we reserve the right to discontinue further disarmament and
arms control measures. Besides, given the intrinsic link between
strategic offensive and defensive arms, conditions for our withdrawal
from the New START Treaty could also arise, and this option is
enshrined in the treaty.
Thus Turkey and its allies will become targets of Russia's nuclear and
conventional missiles. Further, should a new European arms race
develop'though Russia sells military technology to Turkey and has a
substantial economic trade and reciprocal investment process with
it'Turkey will be targeted. Indeed, one of the Iskander-E missiles to
be deployed by Russia against the NATO missile shield will be deployed
in Krasnodar on the Black Sea coast. They can reach Turkey in four
minutes from launch. This will eliminate a major basis for the
rapprochement between Moscow and Ankara during the past decade. The
Russian Foreign Ministry even stated publicly that Medvedev's
countermeasures, cited above, were justified because of the placement
of a NATO missile defense radar in Turkey.
Insofar as Russian officials, and not only analysts, see Turkey as
striving to dominate the Middle East and Syria, which Moscow regards
as an ally, and to the extent that such an outcome jeopardizes
Moscow's naval base at Tartus, Russia, might come to see Turkey as a
rival in the Middle East. Turkey will also become'if it is not
already'the target of Iranian and Syrian missiles. This fact should
enhance the value of the missile defense system and continue to bind
Turkey to NATO and the United States.
Russia will now mount a threat against Turkey and its NATO allies,
thus undermining a major basis for the previous decade of partnership.
In the context of mounting frictions over all the issues outlined
here, Russia's reply on missile defenses, along with other
manifestations of Russian policy, almost inevitably means that a cycle
of recriminations and tension in Russo-Turkish relations will
intensify. This will lead Turkey to draw closer to its NATO allies and
to the United States than has been the case for many years. Indeed, in
December 2011, Turkey authorized the purchase of two F-35 Lightning II
Fighter aircrafts from the United States.
The Caucasus
Indeed, the Caucasus exemplifies those not so hidden antagonisms, and
bilateral tensions are now visible there too. The Azeri-Turkish
reconciliation, of which the energy deal is a part, precludes
normalization with Armenia, which still receives Russian military
assistance against the possibility of renewed fighting in
Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan told students in
July 2011, that future generations would and should undertake the task
of reclaiming what was once Western Armenia, historically part of the
medieval Armenian kingdom, but part of Turkey since the time of the
Ottoman Empire. Ankara's response was predictable. Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an immediately demanded an apology. Yet no such
response came nor is any forthcoming. Worse, Sargsyan admitted that
Armeno-Turkish relations were deadlocked and that clearly, no progress
was to be expected in that regard. Meanwhile, he still apparently
expects Turkey to `repent' without any preconditions, so relations
remain deadlocked.
This means that until Turkey delinks normalization with Armenia from
the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh, no progress will be possible. Yet
such delinking is ever more unlikely, especially in view of the
evidence presented here. Given Russian imperial designs on the
Caucasus as outlined here and in many other works, the U.S. position
that these issues should be delinked appears quixotic and unrealistic.
This is the case even if Washington correctly argues that the status
quo in Nagorno-Karabakh cannot last long and that this is an urgent
issue. Certainly the U.S. position will not bring about a negotiated
settlement given local realities.
For example, Armenian political scientist Arman Melikyan claims that
in earlier tripartite negotiations in 2011, Russia ostensibly
`brokered' Moscow to arrange for the surrender of liberated
territories, thereby ensuring its military presence in return and
establishing a network of military bases in Azerbaijan to prevent any
further cooperation between Azerbaijan and NATO. While Armenian
authorities reportedly accepted this plan, Baku refused to do so and
saved Armenia (which clearly wants to incorporate Nagorno-Karabakh)
from relinquishing the territory to it. Since recent Wikileaks
revelations show that Azerbaijan desires NATO's full cooperation and
says it would even consider membership in NATO if not for implied
Russian and Iranian opposition, its rejection of this transparent
neo-imperialist Russian ploy is hardly surprising.
Moreover, these revelations show the danger in leaving the initiative
in negotiating an end to the conflict in Russia's hands alone. Azeri
officials, such as Elchin Gusseynli of the Ministry of International
Affairs, have accused the OSCE of passivity and support for Armenia
rather than Azerbaijan's just position. Gusseynli rightly cited the
Armeno-Russian military collaboration, which underscores the conflict
and reflects Moscow's unrelenting desire to recover some of its lost
imperial heritage in the Caucasus. In response to Moscow and Yerevan,
Turkish Defense Minister Ismet Yilmaz said in Baku that Turkey was
ready to support and join with the Azeri army in defense production.
Both states have also signed an agreement on strategic cooperation and
formed a high advisory council. Thus, Azerbaijan decided to reject
Moscow's demand that it subordinate its defense and security policy to
Moscow.
Adding to Russia's discomfiture on this issue is the fact that the EU
has now registered its unhappiness with the stagnation of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. European Parliament member Kristian
Vigenin, upon returning from Yerevan, stated openly the parliament's
dissatisfaction with the failure of the OSCE Minsk Group process to
get anywhere and added that the parliament suggested replacing
France's delegate to the Minsk process with an EU representative, even
possibly the EU Commissioner for External Relations and Security
Policy, Catherine Ashton.
Although there has been no sign of this previously, Moscow also
apparently believes that Washington is trying to revive the Bush
administration's `Big Caucasus Project' to pull the Transcaucasus out
of Russia's orbit and somehow supplant Russia in the Karabakh process.
Turkey's realignment with Azerbaijan clearly ranges it opposite
Armenia and Russia, and if there are EU moves to join the process and
weaken Russia's position there, it is not unlikely that Turkey will be
on Baku's side against Yerevan and Moscow. In another irritation, a
Russian strike team of eight agents killed three Chechens in Istanbul
on September 16 execution-style in broad daylight. This obviously
irritated Turkish officials, not only because there are many
sympathizers with the Chechens and other North Caucasus insurgents in
Turkey but also because of the blatant disregard for Turkish
sovereignty.
Yet beyond these currents, there are even more tensions rising in the
Caucasus, mainly due to the increasingly strong Russian anxiety that a
U.S. or Israeli strike against Iran might spill over into this region,
if not Central Asia. According to Sergei Konovalov, Moscow is
receiving reports of a U.S.-backed Israeli (if not U.S. too) surprise
strike on Iran. When added to the civil war now germinating in Syria,
these reports have generated great concern in Moscow for the fate of
Russian troops in the Caucasus and Caspian basin. Thus Moscow has
launched military and diplomatic moves to forestall such a strike or
if that fails to be prepared to respond credibly to any threats
arising out of them. Indeed, these preparations began in 2010. During
October-November 2011, Moscow optimized the 102nd Military Base in
Armenia. Dependents were withdrawn to Russia, the garrison near
Yerevan was reduced, and subunits stationed there redeployed to Gyumri
nearer to the Turkish border. On December 1, 2011, Russian forces at
their bases in South Ossetia and Abkhazia were put on full combat
readiness. Russian land forces in Armenia are now essentially isolated
because Georgia has broken off the treaty allowing military transit
through its territory to this base in Armenia. This has led some
former commanders of this force to opine about having to launch
breakthrough operations to support this force in the event of a
conflict in Iran.
Meanwhile, the Black Sea Fleet is patrolling near Georgia, which could
side with the anti-Iran forces. A separate coastal missile division
with Bal-E (Bastion) coastal anti-ship missiles that have a range of
130 km was placed on permanent combat readiness. The missile launchers
of the Caspian Flotilla were redeployed from Astrakhan southwards to
Makhachkala and Kaspiysk to form a single ship grouping there. The
small artillery ship Volgodonsk will join the missile patrol ship
Tatarstan, the Flotilla's flagship, and the Dagestan missile ship. The
Tatarstan's missiles have a range of up to 200 km. An aircraft carrier
group of the Northern Fleet has departed for the Mediterranean led by
the aircraft cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov to call at Tartus. Given the
possibility of a war in Nagorno-Karabakh, which could break out in
conjunction with a conflict of Iran, the military commentator Col.
Vladimir Popov raised the possibility of a Russian operation to defend
Armenia against Turkey, a NATO member, a threat that led Russia in
1993 to warn Turkey that such an operation risked nuclear war.
Whatever else these military moves suggest, they certainly do not
suggest deepening amity with Turkey. Quite the opposite, they clearly
show continued suspicion of Turkish aims here, particularly in
conjunction with U.S./NATO intentions, which Moscow views so
negatively. Perhaps this is why Moscow arranged another summit with
Armenia and Azerbaijan on January 23-24, 2012. Finally these moves are
another example of the increasing resort to military threats in
Russia's relations with its neighbors, interlocutors, and partners.
Nor do such threats end at the former Soviet border. They have been
seen in Syria, and they also appeared directly in response to Turkish
actions in Cyprus.
The Cyprus Gas Conflict
New tension brewed between Turkey and Cyprus after Cyprus's and
Israel's enormous gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean in
2010-2011. Turkey's reaction to those finds was extremely negative.
Turkey was embroiled with a conflict, not only with Cyprus, its
European backers and Israel, but with Russia as well. During 2009 and
2010, Cyprus and Israel discovered enormous natural gas deposits off
their shores in the Mediterranean Sea. Then, in late 2011, Noble
Energy, the firm contracted by Cyprus to explore its waters for gas,
announced a discovery estimated at 5-8 trillion cubic feet of natural
gas there. This discovery could not have come at a better time for
Cyprus, which in 2011 endured a slippage in its fiscal ratings, was
shut out of international capital markets, was hit by a large
munitions blast, and was finally forced to accept a Russian bailout.
All told, the discoveries by both countries amount to 33 TCF of gas.
The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that the Levant Basin, where most
of these discoveries have occurred, may hold 122 TCF.
Yet these discoveries have also had some negative repercussions. They
have heightened tensions between the TRNC and the Greek-led Republic
of Cyprus. The discoveries offer Cyprus the prospect of becoming a
local economic powerhouse in contrast to the near disasters of 2011,
and of thus reducing Turkish leverage upon Cyprus's policies regarding
the Cypriot Turks and Cyprus's policies in general. Indeed, the gas
finds to date give Cyprus enough gas to meet its needs for an
estimated 150 years, fully satisfy its electricity generating needs
for 210 years, and provide it with billions of dollars of revenues
that will allow it to become a major exporter to Europe once pipelines
or tankers carrying LNG can be built. So it can also expect an influx
of much more foreign European capital to build those facilities and to
strengthen and diversify its sources of foreign investment. It is
likely that any pipeline will have to be built to connect with those
that now or soon will cross Turkey or that a liquefaction plant will
need to be built to process Cypriot and Israeli gas finds.
Not surprisingly, the TRNC government reacted coolly to the gas
discovery, and Turkey, which does not recognize the government of
Cyprus, even sent an exploration ship accompanied by warships and
fighter jets to the area after Noble started drilling. Turkey's
threats against Cyprus and Israel to their exploration and drilling
for gas in the Eastern Mediterranean also caused concern in Russia.
Moscow recently organrized a large loan to Cyprus to sustain it
against a crisis should Greece default, since so many Russian accounts
are held in Cyprus's banks. Cyprus then reinvested in Russia or
laundered the elite's money by cycling it out of Russia into the
global banking system.
Clearly Moscow cannot allow Cyprus to go under without incurring
serious domestic losses. Turkish threats therefore deeply disturb both
Cyprus and Russia. Once Turkey's navy openly threatened Cyprus for
signing an agreement with the Texas-based firm Noble Energy, which is
a partner with Israel in developing Israel's maritime gas fields,
Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly backed Cyprus's right to
develop its Mediterranean gas. Cyprus in turn labeled Moscow `a shield
against any threats by Turkey.' Furthermore, Russia dispatched an
aircraft carrier with fighter planes, and at last one submarine to
Cyprus as a show of support in another open example of gunboat
diplomacy.
Russia has already demonstrated its will and ability to check Turkey
in regard to Cyprus. That interest will only grow in the future,
because it is inconceivable that Moscow, which sees itself as Europe's
main gas supplier, will simply let Israel and Cyprus cut into its
sales with such massive impact and compete with it at no cost. This
does not mean the use of military force, but it does suggest that
Moscow will bring substantial pressure to bear on Cyprus, if not
Israel, to demand entrée into the gas business from their recent
discoveries. Not only does this make it harder for Turkey to coerce
Cyprus, it also has two negative implications for Turkey.
First, Russia's presence in this sector of the gas market would
enhance its leverage vis-Ã-vis Turkey in their bilateral energy
dealings and would limit Turkey's ability to posture as an energy hub
with the attendant benefits thereof. Second, geopoliticians and
geographers of all stripes have known that whoever controls Cyprus
possesses the means to threaten with serious damage Turkey's
Mediterranean ports. Given Russia's proclivities and that of its naval
commanders, who seek permanent anchorages and bases in the
Mediterranean and may be in trouble in Syria due to its civil war, to
seek such a facility at Cyprus may be tempting. This challenges
Turkish security and NATO planning as well. However, in conjunction
with the Turkish threats to Cyprus and Moscow's expected demand for a
major place in Cyprus's energy trade, it is a highly probable outcome
based on existing trends.
The Cyprus issue, considered in all its many dimensions, highlights
the fact that Turkey's zero problems with neighbors has run aground on
the shoals of these neighbors' competitive interests with those of
Turkey and with great power politics in the overall Mediterranean
basin. The Cyprus issue also shows the limits of Turkish power despite
the ambitious and even aggressive rhetoric emanating from Ankara. It
suggests the need for Turkey to find a modus vivendi with Cyprus, if
not Israel, as it did earlier with Russia. Some will say that it also
shows the need for arriving at such an outcome as well or continuing
to abide by the existing one with Moscow. Yet here, in fact, there was
such an agreement. Despite the recent energy agreements signed on
December 30, 2011, with Russia, Cyprus is merely one of many signs of
what is arguably a worsening trend in Turkey's relations with a Russia
that is as ambitious as Turkey and even more aggressive insofar as its
vital interests are involved.
The Cyprus energy conflict also serves as another reminder that energy
politics are inseparable from larger security considerations and
produce new issues and combinations that undermine the status quo. It
also shows the urgency of making progress on the tangled issue of
Cyprus's future and the relationships among its two ethno-religious
groups and of fully integrating Turkey into Europe. Turkey's exclusion
from the EU, in part a direct result of the Cyprus question, limits
the ability of both sides to live up to and maximize their potential
for enhancing security, democracy, and prosperity. As these events
show, the failure to overcome these obstacles always leaves open the
possibility of regression to heightened interstate conflict on Cyprus
and international strife in the Mediterranean.
These developments are part of a larger theme. For Turkey, the idea of
zero problems with neighbors while it serenely navigates along the
complex shoals of Mediterranean Europe, the Middle East, and the
Caucasus and gains leverage throughout these zones has proven
unsustainable. There are too many issues that preclude upholding this
posture while everyone else is pursuing their own national interests,
and Turkey cannot stop them. The failure of neighboring governments
like Syria, Russia, and Iran to heed Turkish interests or refrain from
threatening them clearly betokens the failure of Turkey's policy to
increase Turkey's standing and leverage among its neighbors. This is
especially the case when the issues involved are central to those
governments' economic and political objectives. This failure could
then translate as well into domestic opposition to a failed foreign
policy.
Therefore the failure of the `zero problems with neighbors' policy
could eventually lead to serious domestic political costs. Turkey's
recent foreign policy moves have estranged Israel, Syria, Cyprus,
Greece, Russia, and Iran, and have certainly caused major headaches
for U.S. policymakers trying to tamp down the angry rhetoric against
Israel, Turkey's erstwhile ally. Although Russian threats in the
Caucasus and bullying tactics regarding energy in Southeastern Europe
demonstrate Moscow's unregenerate neo-imperialism and traditional
outlook toward these areas, the fundamental concept of Turkish foreign
policy has also been weighed in the balance and been found wanting.
Not surprisingly Turkey is now in many cases, notably Cyprus and
Israel, lashing out and trying to assert itself in forceful rhetoric,
which, however, cannot be sustained by equally forceful deeds.
It remains to be seen how Ankara will extricate itself from its
largely self-made difficulties. Turkey possesses considerable assets
and strategic importance. Nonetheless, it has clearly overreached and
based its foreign policy on unwarranted and unsustainable
presuppositions. Since greater powers than Turkey have failed to
secure lasting influence in their Southeastern European and Middle
Eastern policies, Ankara should have realized that it could not
supplant them and thus should have aimed for more modest objectives.
Certainly Turkey alone cannot resist Russian encroachments in the
Caucasus and Europe, resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict, ensure good
governance in Syria, become a Eurasian energy hub, and uphold its
security against Iran all by itself.
Hopefully upon sober reflection Ankara will realize its need for
democratic friends and partners if not allies, as in the case of
missile defense. This might even mean a return in the direction of the
historic Kemalist orientation toward Europe, which has been so
antithetical to the AKP Party's ideology (though not necessarily all
of its practice). Indeed, by all accounts, despite the rupture with
Israel and its missteps in Cyprus, Turkey's relations with Washington
have been at a recent high. This is no doubt due to the Syria and Iran
issues. Although the quest for partnership within Europe has run
aground in the past, a carefully prepared and more targeted, even
modest, objective may be within reach. This would apply to energy
policy in particular as well as to missile defenses, and to Syria if
Ankara can draw the appropriate lessons from its current predicament.
One can only hope that Ankara will learn from these sobering and
disappointing experiences, lest it experience even more and possibly
greater rebuffs in the future.
Yet these events also have significant implications for Russia. One
sees an unremitting determination to extinguish the sovereignty of
Central Asian and European members of the CIS. Not only have Putin and
Medvedev pursued these policies against Turkmenistan, but Russia is
also shutting down Belarus' sovereignty by taking over its energy and
key economic sectors and attempting to do the same with Ukraine. It is
quite clear that it does not regard these states, or for that matter
the former members of the Warsaw Pact and Serbia, as truly sovereign.
Moreover, its representatives lose no opportunity to remind them of
their vulnerability and make demands that Moscow have an unlimited
right to intervene in their affairs. Indeed, Russian legislation
enacted under Medvedev gives the President the right to intervene
militarily in their affairs without any accountability to the Duma or
anyone else whatsoever.
In addition, Russia continues to see NATO and the United States as
powers that are intent on dismantling its pretensions to a
neo-imperial domination of Eurasia in the name of democracy and as
attempting to intimidate it by depriving it of its main military
trump, i.e., its ability to intimidate Europe with its nuclear and
conventional missiles. Thus it has demanded legally binding guarantees
that missile defenses will not threaten its nuclear arsenal, despite
scores of briefings and acceptance of the fact that these systems
cannot threaten Russia's nuclear weapons by Russian experts, but
refuses to suggest giving Europe such guarantees. It also clearly sees
itself under threat from these NATO policies. It believes these
policies will inevitably lead to a coercive NATO operation in the CIS
or Russia itself'either by actual force majeure or `information
warfare' to undermine Russia's imperial pretensions and political
system, without which it believes Russia would cease to exist as a
state or independent great power. Thus operations like those in Libya
or those it believes will take place in Syria potentially have direct
consequences for Russia. It will reply in the only language it knows,
i.e., military and other threats.
Russia's position, its insistence on a free hand at the expense of
every other state east of the Elbe, and its presupposition of conflict
with NATO all but ensure that the reset policy will run aground over
the issues of regional security in Eurasia. That denouement is clearly
in the wind as Moscow's statements on missile defense all but rule out
an improvement in relations with NATO at the May 2012 Chicago summit.
Turkey cannot escape the inevitable consequences of this outcome,
because so many of its vital interests are now threatened by Russia's
resort to gunboat diplomacy, military threats, and coercive energy
diplomacy. Here too, as in the Middle East, zero problems with
neighbors has foundered on the inevitable rocks of competing national
interests, including Russia. Yet Russia has also succumbed to the
temptation to define its interests as being a priori hostile to those
of its principal interlocutors. Turkey's democracy allows it the
opportunity to rethink its policy, liquidate over-extended positions,
and regain strength in what will hopefully be a revived Atlantic
alliance, concomitant advance in European integration and democracy in
the Middle East. Yet Russia has clearly opted'or is now opting
for'another round of self-imposed neo-imperial isolation that it
cannot sustain and which it can only defend by threats of force. While
it may not be too late for Turkey to repair its position with Israel,
Cyprus, and NATO, it appears that for Russia the die has already been
cast and not in favor of international reconciliation.
Younkyoo Kim, PhD (Purdue University) is an associate professor in the
Division of International Studies, Hanyang University, Seoul. Stephen
Blank, PhD (University of Chicago) is Professor of Russian National
Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army
War College. They wrote this article for the MERIA Journal, a
publication of the GLORIA Center, from where it is adapted.
http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=73149&pageid=13&pagename=Analysi s
From: A. Papazian
April 28 2012
Russo-Turkish Divergence: the Security Dimension
Younkyoo Kim and Stephen Blank April 27th 2012
GLORIA Center
Russo-Turkish relations encompass a multi-regional agenda from the
Balkans to Central Asia, including the Caucasus and the Middle East
and their bilateral energy relations. Much has been written about the
strategic convergence of Russo-Turkish relations and contributing
factors behind it. In contrast to Turkey's strained relations with its
traditional Western partners, Ankara's ties with Moscow have
noticeably strengthened in recent years. Turkey's reorientation
eastward in the past decade is attributable to three factors: the U.S.
invasion of Iraq, the derailment of Turkish accession talks to join
the EU, and Turkey's dependence on Russia for its natural gas imports.
Turkish and Russian interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus during
1992`2008 converged more than they differed. In 2009 and 2010, Turkish
officials and experts described their relations with Russia as being
the best ever and said that bilateral harmony featured prominently in
the past decade's international relations. Yet Russia and Turkey had
already begun to diverge after the Georgian war in August 2008. The
fighting between Russia and Georgia disrupted transportation, energy,
and other infrastructure networks in the region, adversely affecting
the interests of Turkey. In regard to Turkey's relations with Russia,
2011 was a difficult year, and 2012 has not been much better.
Developments since then across a host of issues give many reasons for
suggesting the rapid but uneven erosion of those ties. Because this
erosion is occurring unevenly, enmity will not replace amity
overnight. Previously, the only major questions that divided them
seemed to be Moscow's reluctance to brand the PKK (Kurdistan Workers'
Party) a terrorist organization and Russia's support for the Greek
Cypriots in their conflict with the Turkish-dominated state of the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Yet signs have multiplied
suggesting that this partnership is declining and that there are
mounting tensions over the Kurdish issue, Middle East, missile
defenses, Cyprus, and the Balkans. Furthermore, those difficulties
will likely increase.
Divergence
Russo-Turkish divergence reflects the renewed assertiveness of both
Russia and Turkey in precisely those areas of regional contestation
that had hitherto seemed to be in abeyance between them. Turkish
assertiveness, most notably in regard to Syria, Cyprus, and Israel,
has been very public and strong, even high-handed in some cases.
Arguably Ankara's assertiveness owes much to the perception that its
former policy of `zero problems with neighbors' policy is encountering
difficulties wherever one looks. This includes Russia, because the
neighbors are asserting their own prerogatives and interests regarding
democracy'or the lack of it'in Syria, energy in Cyprus, and a closed
CIS (Confederation of Independent States) bloc in Russia's case. Yet
this rising friction also has deeper roots stemming from the
self-confidence of both states' elites. Turkish leaders claim that
Turkey is now a major independent actor in its own right in all of its
various neighborhoods, and it should therefore assert its interests in
new ways'a view that strikingly resembles Moscow's similar
assertiveness, which has led to confrontations with Russia's
neighbors.
Indeed, in 2009, Foreign Minister Ahmet DavutoÄ?lu, the architect of
Turkish policy, observed that neither Washington nor Moscow could
establish order in the regions adjoining Turkey, therefore a new order
must be established in the Middle East, Balkans, and the Caucasus;
that Turkey wanted to play an active role in creating that order; that
foreign actors agree to this role; but that `not even half a status
quo had been established around Turkey so far.' Highlighting Turkey's
ambitions he even said that Turkey was the most influential country in
the Caucasus in every respect and that `we will move ahead by solving
any crisis that exists in our relations. Our mission is to establish
order.' He subsequently observed that `Istanbul will be a financial
center, positioning it as the main station for the global economic
network and transportation routes.' Still more recently, DavutoÄ?lu
launched a campaign by which anyone migrating abroad from Anatolia
would be considered part of the Turkish diaspora. Given Russia's
pretensions to these selfsame roles and tasks'even to the right of
intervening on behalf of its Russian diaspora and to the same status
claimed by Turkey as a `system-forming' power'and its overt efforts to
dominate the Caucasus, a clash with Turkey along several lines was
probably inevitable.
Thus this deterioration in Russo-Turkish relations owes as much to
Russia's assertiveness and willingness to make threats against the
West, including Turkey, as it does to Turkish assertiveness. Moscow
has threatened NATO members regarding missile defense and has
displayed several cases of gunboat diplomacy in the Mediterranean
(discussed below). It has also continually displayed its determination
to make the CIS into a closed Russian bloc'a trend that would put
Turkish and European energy supplies at the risk of excessive
dependence upon Moscow and thwart Ankara's ambitions in the Caucasus,
if not Central Asia. These recent moves not only suggest the dominance
of Vladimir Putin's more anti-Western attitude compared to that of
outgoing President Dmitry Medvedev, but they also show a decided
continuity in priorities regarding the insistence on a closed bloc in
the CIS, and a heightened willingness to resort to shows of force if
not its actual use to achieve its goals.
The creation of a Russian sphere of influence in the CIS has been
Moscow's priority policy since 1993 long before Putin. Medvedev
quickly reaffirmed it in 2008, when in the wake of the Russo-Georgian
war he announced that he would henceforth base his foreign policy on
five principles. These included among them that Russia has the right
to intervene in neighboring states to defend the honor and dignity of
its citizens and that it has privileged but undefined interests with
countries in its neighborhood. This then demonstrated that Russia not
only wants to revise borders or intervene in other countries, it also
demands a sphere of influence in Eurasia as a whole. Even without
DavutoÄ?lu's extravagant rhetoric and ambitions, Russian policy, in and
of itself, would have clashed sooner or later with Turkish interests.
Thus Russia too has much to answer for here.
Moscow's moves also suggest that the reset policy is coming to an end.
If this is indeed the case, it will likely lead to more East-West
tension in general, which Turkey will not be able to escape. Moscow
professes a continuing desire to negotiate disputed issues with the
United States and NATO, and will probably not attack President Obama
during a difficult election campaign (since Moscow believes a
Republican victory would lead to still worse outcomes). However, its
determination to counter the United States and NATO in the Middle East
and Eurasia and attacks on missile defenses show that once again
efforts at East-West rapprochement have foundered on regional security
issues in Eurasia, perhaps the most intractable item on the East-West
agenda.
The Middle East
Moscow and Ankara hold different opinions on the Kurdish issue. Moscow
continues to stall on recognizing the PKK as a terrorist group as
Turkey desires, while both the United States and EU recognize it as
such. Turkish intelligence reports that 80 percent of PKK weapons are
made in Russia, including sniper rifles, anti-tank mines, and rocket
launchers. Eighty-eight percent of mines and 85 percent of launchers
used by the PKK originate in Russia. This does not necessarily mean
that the PKK is buying weapons from Russia. Instead it could be
obtaining them through gray or black markets. Yet these facts still
put Moscow in an embarrassing position given Moscow's refusal to
recognize the PKK as a terrorist group.
>From Turkey's standpoint, Moscow's position compares unfavorably with
that of Washington and Brussels on recognizing the PKK as terrorists
and in assisting Turkey to deal with it. Indeed, the United States has
pledged its support for Turkey's stance on the PKK. Washington has
also provided some technological assistance to Turkey in dealing with
it, consisting of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
data'using assets like the Predator UAV, fixed-wing spy planes, and
satellites. Turkey has sought to buy six Predator and four armed
Reaper UAVs from the United States, but Congress has not authorized
the deal. Instead the U.S. announced in October 2011 its intention to
sell Turkey three new Super Cobra attack helicopters. Moreover,
Turkish commentators believe that absent some major crisis in
U.S.-Turkish relations in 2012, American support for Turkey on this
issue will continue.
Differences regarding the PKK, however, are a relatively small issue
in the Russo-Turkish agenda. Much more important are the issues
pertaining to Syria and missile defense against Iran. In the 1990s,
Turkey viewed the Russian-Iranian partnership as a counterweight to
Turkish influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia; in the early
2000s, Moscow showed signs of anxiety over the rapid improvement in
Turkish-Iranian contacts. Turkey was left a bitter impression that an
old friend of the West was turning away. It certainly looked as though
Turkey considered Iran a friend and Israel an enemy, although Turkish
officials vehemently denied these allegations.
Turkish-Iranian relations are changing. Here too one sees an erosion
of the congruence of outlooks that previously characterized
Russo-Turkish relations. Turkey's demands that Syrian President Bashar
al-Asad step down due to his violent repression of political protests
clashes with Russia's support for him and staunch opposition to any
foreign intervention in Syria. Arguably, the longer civil strife there
continues, the more pressures will build for overt Turkish
intervention. Indeed, by the end of 2011, not only was Turkey
providing sanctuary and material assistance to insurgents, but
DavutoÄ?lu was publicly discussing the possibility of intervention by
either the Arab League or Turkey'which he considers `members of the
family' and thus not really intervening external actors. Turkey had
also imposed its own sanctions on Syria.
If an intervention occurs, it is as likely as not to be associated
with or to be in the name of Europe and trigger further Russian ire.
Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolai Patrushev already
accuses NATO of planning such an intervention from Turkey and using
Turkish forces either to intervene directly in Syria or at least to
establish a buffer zone within it. They also claim that NATO, which
denies it, is discussing setting up a no fly zone in Syria that
recalls the pretext for intervention in Libya. In the larger context,
Turkey's converging posture with the West toward the Arab revolutions
is an important factor drawing Turkey, Europe, and the United States
closer together while distancing Turkey from Russia and Iran.
Moscow has reacted sharply to the perceived threat of NATO
intervention despite NATO's denials of that intention. Apart from
sending warships in November 2011 to defend Syrian waters against some
expected NATO `intervention,' Russia's military has also added to the
hysteria in Moscow about NATO intentions. In October 2011, Chief of
the General Staff General Nikolai Makarov told the army that the
events in North Africa and the Middle East were so unpredictable and
rapid in their development that nobody could foretell their future
impact upon states. Therefore the army must be prepared for a Libyan
or similar scenario. Escalating his rhetoric, Makarov then warned in
November 2011 that tensions in Russia's neighborhood were rising and
could even escalate to nuclear use: `The possibility of local armed
conflicts virtually along the entire perimeter of the border has grown
dramatically. I cannot rule out that, in certain circumstances, local
and regional armed conflicts cold grow into a large-scale war,
possibly even with nuclear weapons.'
Makarov further warned, `We have it all in the doctrine, all the
circumstances when the use of nuclear weapons is warranted.' For
Makarov, the cause for such wars in the CIS lies in NATO's advancement
to the CIS and Russia's borders. This is not a new position. As his
predecessor General Yuri Baluyevsky said in 2005, while Russia faced
no direct threat of aggression, `[given] the existence of nuclear
weapons, any localized armed conflict'let alone a regional
conflict'could lead the international community to the brink of a
global war.'
In January 2012, Moscow sent an armed ship through the NATO blockade
to Syria to show its defiance of NATO and provide ammunition to the
Syrian regime, if not also to the terrorists of Hizballah and Hamas,
which it regularly supports with Russian weapons through Syria.
Besides these forceful moves to deter NATO, Moscow has blocked UN
resolutions against Syria and attacked NATO for staging a `political
provocation' there. These actions, taken together, suggest that it
sees Washington and NATO'now visibly including Turkey'as particularly
prone to such interventionist unilateralism on behalf of democracy.
Therefore they must be strongly deterred by even unilateral and
forceful Russian action if necessary.
Thus to the degree that Turkey becomes a consistent advocate of
democracy in its neighborhood, its relations with Russia will suffer.
As one Turkish official put it:
Ankara came to a conclusion that as democracy is spreading around its
neighborhood, Turkey only benefits from it. Countries like Bulgaria,
Romania, and Georgia are testament(s) to this reality when we look at
the great relations Turkey is having with these countries compared
with the past. Just like the domino theory, we see democracy as an
unstoppable force of history and we arrived at its doorstep.
Meanwhile, Turkey is also contending with Iran, Syria's main regional
protector and ally in the Middle East, and Russia's partner there as
well. Just as Irano-Russian relations have improved due to their
congruent stands regarding Syria and the threat of NATO intervention,
Turkey's relations with Tehran and Moscow have worsened, and not only
over Syria. This erosion has occurred despite the fact that Turkey
opposes sanctions on Iranian oil and gas, which it buys. Turkey also
attempted in 2010 to propose an alternative UN draft resolution with
Brazil to mitigate the threat of sanctions on Iran and is proposing
the resumption of talks on Iran's nuclear program, which should be
held in Turkey.
Indeed, 30 percent of Turkey's oil comes from Iran and is among Iran's
top consumers of crude oil, obtaining just over 200,000 BPD. Not
surprisingly, then, Turkey has indicated that it will not be bound by
the newly proposed U.S. and European sanctions against Iranian oil.
Therefore, and also to avoid a Sunni-Shi'i split over Syria and Iraq
in the Middle East, Turkey has ample reasons to try to maintain its
relationship with Iran. Although ties with Tehran may have weakened,
Turkey still has enough credibility there to propose its territory as
the site of a new attempt to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the
issues surrounding Iranian nuclearization in talks with the United
States, Russia, the UK, France, Germany, and Iran. This initiative
again indicates its desire to stabilize its neighborhood and advance
Turkey's international standing as an `order creating' power.
Nevertheless the signs of decreasing amity with Tehran are visible and
increasing. Turkey already competes strongly with Iran over
Azerbaijan, which Iran is now openly threatening. Iran's ambassador to
Russia, Ali Akbar Salehi, recently expressed Iran's desire to be
Russia's dependable ally. A leading pro-Iranian Russian analyst,
Radzhab Safarov, Director of the Center for the Study of Modern Iran,
followed up by saying that `the rapprochement of Tehran and Moscow
will make it possible to hinder the shortsighted policy of Turkey,
which is installing American missile defenses.' This issue of missile
defenses, just like Syria, is already estranging Turkey from both
Russia and Iran.
Turkish officials and pundits have long worried about the threat of
proliferation in the Middle East and the threat posed by long-range
missiles in the hands of Turkey's neighbors. Turkish pundits like
Duygu Bazoglu Sezer were warning about the threat posed by
proliferation from Iran and Iraq by 1995. By 1998 she was writing
that:
In July 1998, Iran successfully tested the Shahab-3 medium-range
missile. Iranian officials described the test firing as a defensive
move aimed at creating a balance in the region, meaning specifically a
balance that would neutralize the American presence in the Gulf. The
demonstration of Iran's medium-range missile capability is certainly
not a welcome development from the perspective of Turkey, especially
in view of the fact that Iran is strongly suspected'despite strong
denials'of pursuing nuclear weapons capability. It is interesting
that, following the firing, Iran took pains to send a message
virtually to the whole world that none of its neighbors seemed
troubled by the successful testing of the missile.
The situation has worsened as Iran's arsenal has grown and the
presumption of its ambition to field nuclear weapons has grown along
with that arsenal. As Ian Lesser has observed, Iran's missile
capability makes it in an operational sense, if not necessarily a
political one, a Black Sea power. Indeed, Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov has repeatedly argued, `Iran deserves to be an equal
partner of all regional countries in the resolution of the problems of
the Near and Middle East.' He has also proposed a similar involvement
of Iran in Black Sea security issues.
Accordingly, the strategic consequences of Iran's missiles could
easily affect not just regional defense agendas but also energy flows
through and in the Black Sea littoral (particularly if someone strikes
at Iran to forestall its proliferation and Iran retaliates by playing
the energy card). Consequently, Turkish defense planners are highly
sensitive to the threat. In 2008, Turkey apparently decided to buy
Russian-made S-300 surface-to-air missiles from Ukraine and Belarus
for testing and training purposes `to simulate threats that may come
from countries with ex-Soviet systems in their inventories,' i.e.,
Iran and Syria. At that time, Turkey also announced plans to buy up to
$4 billion of long-range air and missile defense systems.
Last, in September 2011, Turkey agreed to host a U.S. radar as part of
the developing missile defense system in Europe. This decision will
clearly aggravate relations with Iran since Turkey formally feels that
Iran's nuclear weapons and missile programs are a threat and that
Ankara is willing to join with NATO, the United States, and even
Israel to counter it. Indeed, in November 2011, General Amir Ali
Hajizadeh, a senior commander in Iran's Revolutionary Guard, declared
that if Iran were attacked by the United States or Israel, its first
response would be to target elements of the NATO missile shield in
Turkey. Similarly, in December 2011, the Iranian media attacked
Turkey's secular Islamic system as an unsuitable example for countries
now engulfed in the Arab Spring.
Turkey may have made this decision because NATO warned that if it
bought Russian or Chinese air and missile defense systems that were
incompatible with NATO's systems, it would then operate without NATO's
intelligence on incoming ballistic missiles. Ankara also agreed that
the United States would share this system's data and intelligence
assessments with all allies, including Israel. According to U.S.
officials, this is `probably the biggest strategic decision between
the United States and Turkey in the past 15 or 20 years.' Yet it also
implicates Turkey in Russia's hostile response to these missile
defenses as announced by President Medvedev on November 23, 2011.
Medvedev announced the following decisions:
First, I am instructing the Defence Ministry to immediately put the
missile attack early warning radar station in Kaliningrad on combat
alert. Second, protective cover of Russia's strategic nuclear weapons
will be reinforced as a priority measure under the program to develop
our air and space defenses. Third, the new strategic ballistic
missiles commissioned by the Strategic Missile Forces and the Navy
will be equipped with advanced missile defense penetration systems and
new highly effective warheads. Fourth, I have instructed the Armed
Forces to draw up measures for disabling missile defense system data
and guidance systems if need be. These measures will be adequate,
effective, and low-cost. Fifth, if the above measures prove
insufficient, the Russian Federation will deploy modern offensive
weapon systems in the west and south of the country, ensuring our
ability to take out any part of the U.S. missile defense system in
Europe. One step in this process will be to deploy Iskander missiles
in Kaliningrad Region. Other measures to counter the European missile
defense system will be drawn up and implemented as necessary.
Furthermore, if the situation continues to develop not to Russia's
favor, we reserve the right to discontinue further disarmament and
arms control measures. Besides, given the intrinsic link between
strategic offensive and defensive arms, conditions for our withdrawal
from the New START Treaty could also arise, and this option is
enshrined in the treaty.
Thus Turkey and its allies will become targets of Russia's nuclear and
conventional missiles. Further, should a new European arms race
develop'though Russia sells military technology to Turkey and has a
substantial economic trade and reciprocal investment process with
it'Turkey will be targeted. Indeed, one of the Iskander-E missiles to
be deployed by Russia against the NATO missile shield will be deployed
in Krasnodar on the Black Sea coast. They can reach Turkey in four
minutes from launch. This will eliminate a major basis for the
rapprochement between Moscow and Ankara during the past decade. The
Russian Foreign Ministry even stated publicly that Medvedev's
countermeasures, cited above, were justified because of the placement
of a NATO missile defense radar in Turkey.
Insofar as Russian officials, and not only analysts, see Turkey as
striving to dominate the Middle East and Syria, which Moscow regards
as an ally, and to the extent that such an outcome jeopardizes
Moscow's naval base at Tartus, Russia, might come to see Turkey as a
rival in the Middle East. Turkey will also become'if it is not
already'the target of Iranian and Syrian missiles. This fact should
enhance the value of the missile defense system and continue to bind
Turkey to NATO and the United States.
Russia will now mount a threat against Turkey and its NATO allies,
thus undermining a major basis for the previous decade of partnership.
In the context of mounting frictions over all the issues outlined
here, Russia's reply on missile defenses, along with other
manifestations of Russian policy, almost inevitably means that a cycle
of recriminations and tension in Russo-Turkish relations will
intensify. This will lead Turkey to draw closer to its NATO allies and
to the United States than has been the case for many years. Indeed, in
December 2011, Turkey authorized the purchase of two F-35 Lightning II
Fighter aircrafts from the United States.
The Caucasus
Indeed, the Caucasus exemplifies those not so hidden antagonisms, and
bilateral tensions are now visible there too. The Azeri-Turkish
reconciliation, of which the energy deal is a part, precludes
normalization with Armenia, which still receives Russian military
assistance against the possibility of renewed fighting in
Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan told students in
July 2011, that future generations would and should undertake the task
of reclaiming what was once Western Armenia, historically part of the
medieval Armenian kingdom, but part of Turkey since the time of the
Ottoman Empire. Ankara's response was predictable. Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an immediately demanded an apology. Yet no such
response came nor is any forthcoming. Worse, Sargsyan admitted that
Armeno-Turkish relations were deadlocked and that clearly, no progress
was to be expected in that regard. Meanwhile, he still apparently
expects Turkey to `repent' without any preconditions, so relations
remain deadlocked.
This means that until Turkey delinks normalization with Armenia from
the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh, no progress will be possible. Yet
such delinking is ever more unlikely, especially in view of the
evidence presented here. Given Russian imperial designs on the
Caucasus as outlined here and in many other works, the U.S. position
that these issues should be delinked appears quixotic and unrealistic.
This is the case even if Washington correctly argues that the status
quo in Nagorno-Karabakh cannot last long and that this is an urgent
issue. Certainly the U.S. position will not bring about a negotiated
settlement given local realities.
For example, Armenian political scientist Arman Melikyan claims that
in earlier tripartite negotiations in 2011, Russia ostensibly
`brokered' Moscow to arrange for the surrender of liberated
territories, thereby ensuring its military presence in return and
establishing a network of military bases in Azerbaijan to prevent any
further cooperation between Azerbaijan and NATO. While Armenian
authorities reportedly accepted this plan, Baku refused to do so and
saved Armenia (which clearly wants to incorporate Nagorno-Karabakh)
from relinquishing the territory to it. Since recent Wikileaks
revelations show that Azerbaijan desires NATO's full cooperation and
says it would even consider membership in NATO if not for implied
Russian and Iranian opposition, its rejection of this transparent
neo-imperialist Russian ploy is hardly surprising.
Moreover, these revelations show the danger in leaving the initiative
in negotiating an end to the conflict in Russia's hands alone. Azeri
officials, such as Elchin Gusseynli of the Ministry of International
Affairs, have accused the OSCE of passivity and support for Armenia
rather than Azerbaijan's just position. Gusseynli rightly cited the
Armeno-Russian military collaboration, which underscores the conflict
and reflects Moscow's unrelenting desire to recover some of its lost
imperial heritage in the Caucasus. In response to Moscow and Yerevan,
Turkish Defense Minister Ismet Yilmaz said in Baku that Turkey was
ready to support and join with the Azeri army in defense production.
Both states have also signed an agreement on strategic cooperation and
formed a high advisory council. Thus, Azerbaijan decided to reject
Moscow's demand that it subordinate its defense and security policy to
Moscow.
Adding to Russia's discomfiture on this issue is the fact that the EU
has now registered its unhappiness with the stagnation of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. European Parliament member Kristian
Vigenin, upon returning from Yerevan, stated openly the parliament's
dissatisfaction with the failure of the OSCE Minsk Group process to
get anywhere and added that the parliament suggested replacing
France's delegate to the Minsk process with an EU representative, even
possibly the EU Commissioner for External Relations and Security
Policy, Catherine Ashton.
Although there has been no sign of this previously, Moscow also
apparently believes that Washington is trying to revive the Bush
administration's `Big Caucasus Project' to pull the Transcaucasus out
of Russia's orbit and somehow supplant Russia in the Karabakh process.
Turkey's realignment with Azerbaijan clearly ranges it opposite
Armenia and Russia, and if there are EU moves to join the process and
weaken Russia's position there, it is not unlikely that Turkey will be
on Baku's side against Yerevan and Moscow. In another irritation, a
Russian strike team of eight agents killed three Chechens in Istanbul
on September 16 execution-style in broad daylight. This obviously
irritated Turkish officials, not only because there are many
sympathizers with the Chechens and other North Caucasus insurgents in
Turkey but also because of the blatant disregard for Turkish
sovereignty.
Yet beyond these currents, there are even more tensions rising in the
Caucasus, mainly due to the increasingly strong Russian anxiety that a
U.S. or Israeli strike against Iran might spill over into this region,
if not Central Asia. According to Sergei Konovalov, Moscow is
receiving reports of a U.S.-backed Israeli (if not U.S. too) surprise
strike on Iran. When added to the civil war now germinating in Syria,
these reports have generated great concern in Moscow for the fate of
Russian troops in the Caucasus and Caspian basin. Thus Moscow has
launched military and diplomatic moves to forestall such a strike or
if that fails to be prepared to respond credibly to any threats
arising out of them. Indeed, these preparations began in 2010. During
October-November 2011, Moscow optimized the 102nd Military Base in
Armenia. Dependents were withdrawn to Russia, the garrison near
Yerevan was reduced, and subunits stationed there redeployed to Gyumri
nearer to the Turkish border. On December 1, 2011, Russian forces at
their bases in South Ossetia and Abkhazia were put on full combat
readiness. Russian land forces in Armenia are now essentially isolated
because Georgia has broken off the treaty allowing military transit
through its territory to this base in Armenia. This has led some
former commanders of this force to opine about having to launch
breakthrough operations to support this force in the event of a
conflict in Iran.
Meanwhile, the Black Sea Fleet is patrolling near Georgia, which could
side with the anti-Iran forces. A separate coastal missile division
with Bal-E (Bastion) coastal anti-ship missiles that have a range of
130 km was placed on permanent combat readiness. The missile launchers
of the Caspian Flotilla were redeployed from Astrakhan southwards to
Makhachkala and Kaspiysk to form a single ship grouping there. The
small artillery ship Volgodonsk will join the missile patrol ship
Tatarstan, the Flotilla's flagship, and the Dagestan missile ship. The
Tatarstan's missiles have a range of up to 200 km. An aircraft carrier
group of the Northern Fleet has departed for the Mediterranean led by
the aircraft cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov to call at Tartus. Given the
possibility of a war in Nagorno-Karabakh, which could break out in
conjunction with a conflict of Iran, the military commentator Col.
Vladimir Popov raised the possibility of a Russian operation to defend
Armenia against Turkey, a NATO member, a threat that led Russia in
1993 to warn Turkey that such an operation risked nuclear war.
Whatever else these military moves suggest, they certainly do not
suggest deepening amity with Turkey. Quite the opposite, they clearly
show continued suspicion of Turkish aims here, particularly in
conjunction with U.S./NATO intentions, which Moscow views so
negatively. Perhaps this is why Moscow arranged another summit with
Armenia and Azerbaijan on January 23-24, 2012. Finally these moves are
another example of the increasing resort to military threats in
Russia's relations with its neighbors, interlocutors, and partners.
Nor do such threats end at the former Soviet border. They have been
seen in Syria, and they also appeared directly in response to Turkish
actions in Cyprus.
The Cyprus Gas Conflict
New tension brewed between Turkey and Cyprus after Cyprus's and
Israel's enormous gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean in
2010-2011. Turkey's reaction to those finds was extremely negative.
Turkey was embroiled with a conflict, not only with Cyprus, its
European backers and Israel, but with Russia as well. During 2009 and
2010, Cyprus and Israel discovered enormous natural gas deposits off
their shores in the Mediterranean Sea. Then, in late 2011, Noble
Energy, the firm contracted by Cyprus to explore its waters for gas,
announced a discovery estimated at 5-8 trillion cubic feet of natural
gas there. This discovery could not have come at a better time for
Cyprus, which in 2011 endured a slippage in its fiscal ratings, was
shut out of international capital markets, was hit by a large
munitions blast, and was finally forced to accept a Russian bailout.
All told, the discoveries by both countries amount to 33 TCF of gas.
The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that the Levant Basin, where most
of these discoveries have occurred, may hold 122 TCF.
Yet these discoveries have also had some negative repercussions. They
have heightened tensions between the TRNC and the Greek-led Republic
of Cyprus. The discoveries offer Cyprus the prospect of becoming a
local economic powerhouse in contrast to the near disasters of 2011,
and of thus reducing Turkish leverage upon Cyprus's policies regarding
the Cypriot Turks and Cyprus's policies in general. Indeed, the gas
finds to date give Cyprus enough gas to meet its needs for an
estimated 150 years, fully satisfy its electricity generating needs
for 210 years, and provide it with billions of dollars of revenues
that will allow it to become a major exporter to Europe once pipelines
or tankers carrying LNG can be built. So it can also expect an influx
of much more foreign European capital to build those facilities and to
strengthen and diversify its sources of foreign investment. It is
likely that any pipeline will have to be built to connect with those
that now or soon will cross Turkey or that a liquefaction plant will
need to be built to process Cypriot and Israeli gas finds.
Not surprisingly, the TRNC government reacted coolly to the gas
discovery, and Turkey, which does not recognize the government of
Cyprus, even sent an exploration ship accompanied by warships and
fighter jets to the area after Noble started drilling. Turkey's
threats against Cyprus and Israel to their exploration and drilling
for gas in the Eastern Mediterranean also caused concern in Russia.
Moscow recently organrized a large loan to Cyprus to sustain it
against a crisis should Greece default, since so many Russian accounts
are held in Cyprus's banks. Cyprus then reinvested in Russia or
laundered the elite's money by cycling it out of Russia into the
global banking system.
Clearly Moscow cannot allow Cyprus to go under without incurring
serious domestic losses. Turkish threats therefore deeply disturb both
Cyprus and Russia. Once Turkey's navy openly threatened Cyprus for
signing an agreement with the Texas-based firm Noble Energy, which is
a partner with Israel in developing Israel's maritime gas fields,
Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly backed Cyprus's right to
develop its Mediterranean gas. Cyprus in turn labeled Moscow `a shield
against any threats by Turkey.' Furthermore, Russia dispatched an
aircraft carrier with fighter planes, and at last one submarine to
Cyprus as a show of support in another open example of gunboat
diplomacy.
Russia has already demonstrated its will and ability to check Turkey
in regard to Cyprus. That interest will only grow in the future,
because it is inconceivable that Moscow, which sees itself as Europe's
main gas supplier, will simply let Israel and Cyprus cut into its
sales with such massive impact and compete with it at no cost. This
does not mean the use of military force, but it does suggest that
Moscow will bring substantial pressure to bear on Cyprus, if not
Israel, to demand entrée into the gas business from their recent
discoveries. Not only does this make it harder for Turkey to coerce
Cyprus, it also has two negative implications for Turkey.
First, Russia's presence in this sector of the gas market would
enhance its leverage vis-Ã-vis Turkey in their bilateral energy
dealings and would limit Turkey's ability to posture as an energy hub
with the attendant benefits thereof. Second, geopoliticians and
geographers of all stripes have known that whoever controls Cyprus
possesses the means to threaten with serious damage Turkey's
Mediterranean ports. Given Russia's proclivities and that of its naval
commanders, who seek permanent anchorages and bases in the
Mediterranean and may be in trouble in Syria due to its civil war, to
seek such a facility at Cyprus may be tempting. This challenges
Turkish security and NATO planning as well. However, in conjunction
with the Turkish threats to Cyprus and Moscow's expected demand for a
major place in Cyprus's energy trade, it is a highly probable outcome
based on existing trends.
The Cyprus issue, considered in all its many dimensions, highlights
the fact that Turkey's zero problems with neighbors has run aground on
the shoals of these neighbors' competitive interests with those of
Turkey and with great power politics in the overall Mediterranean
basin. The Cyprus issue also shows the limits of Turkish power despite
the ambitious and even aggressive rhetoric emanating from Ankara. It
suggests the need for Turkey to find a modus vivendi with Cyprus, if
not Israel, as it did earlier with Russia. Some will say that it also
shows the need for arriving at such an outcome as well or continuing
to abide by the existing one with Moscow. Yet here, in fact, there was
such an agreement. Despite the recent energy agreements signed on
December 30, 2011, with Russia, Cyprus is merely one of many signs of
what is arguably a worsening trend in Turkey's relations with a Russia
that is as ambitious as Turkey and even more aggressive insofar as its
vital interests are involved.
The Cyprus energy conflict also serves as another reminder that energy
politics are inseparable from larger security considerations and
produce new issues and combinations that undermine the status quo. It
also shows the urgency of making progress on the tangled issue of
Cyprus's future and the relationships among its two ethno-religious
groups and of fully integrating Turkey into Europe. Turkey's exclusion
from the EU, in part a direct result of the Cyprus question, limits
the ability of both sides to live up to and maximize their potential
for enhancing security, democracy, and prosperity. As these events
show, the failure to overcome these obstacles always leaves open the
possibility of regression to heightened interstate conflict on Cyprus
and international strife in the Mediterranean.
These developments are part of a larger theme. For Turkey, the idea of
zero problems with neighbors while it serenely navigates along the
complex shoals of Mediterranean Europe, the Middle East, and the
Caucasus and gains leverage throughout these zones has proven
unsustainable. There are too many issues that preclude upholding this
posture while everyone else is pursuing their own national interests,
and Turkey cannot stop them. The failure of neighboring governments
like Syria, Russia, and Iran to heed Turkish interests or refrain from
threatening them clearly betokens the failure of Turkey's policy to
increase Turkey's standing and leverage among its neighbors. This is
especially the case when the issues involved are central to those
governments' economic and political objectives. This failure could
then translate as well into domestic opposition to a failed foreign
policy.
Therefore the failure of the `zero problems with neighbors' policy
could eventually lead to serious domestic political costs. Turkey's
recent foreign policy moves have estranged Israel, Syria, Cyprus,
Greece, Russia, and Iran, and have certainly caused major headaches
for U.S. policymakers trying to tamp down the angry rhetoric against
Israel, Turkey's erstwhile ally. Although Russian threats in the
Caucasus and bullying tactics regarding energy in Southeastern Europe
demonstrate Moscow's unregenerate neo-imperialism and traditional
outlook toward these areas, the fundamental concept of Turkish foreign
policy has also been weighed in the balance and been found wanting.
Not surprisingly Turkey is now in many cases, notably Cyprus and
Israel, lashing out and trying to assert itself in forceful rhetoric,
which, however, cannot be sustained by equally forceful deeds.
It remains to be seen how Ankara will extricate itself from its
largely self-made difficulties. Turkey possesses considerable assets
and strategic importance. Nonetheless, it has clearly overreached and
based its foreign policy on unwarranted and unsustainable
presuppositions. Since greater powers than Turkey have failed to
secure lasting influence in their Southeastern European and Middle
Eastern policies, Ankara should have realized that it could not
supplant them and thus should have aimed for more modest objectives.
Certainly Turkey alone cannot resist Russian encroachments in the
Caucasus and Europe, resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict, ensure good
governance in Syria, become a Eurasian energy hub, and uphold its
security against Iran all by itself.
Hopefully upon sober reflection Ankara will realize its need for
democratic friends and partners if not allies, as in the case of
missile defense. This might even mean a return in the direction of the
historic Kemalist orientation toward Europe, which has been so
antithetical to the AKP Party's ideology (though not necessarily all
of its practice). Indeed, by all accounts, despite the rupture with
Israel and its missteps in Cyprus, Turkey's relations with Washington
have been at a recent high. This is no doubt due to the Syria and Iran
issues. Although the quest for partnership within Europe has run
aground in the past, a carefully prepared and more targeted, even
modest, objective may be within reach. This would apply to energy
policy in particular as well as to missile defenses, and to Syria if
Ankara can draw the appropriate lessons from its current predicament.
One can only hope that Ankara will learn from these sobering and
disappointing experiences, lest it experience even more and possibly
greater rebuffs in the future.
Yet these events also have significant implications for Russia. One
sees an unremitting determination to extinguish the sovereignty of
Central Asian and European members of the CIS. Not only have Putin and
Medvedev pursued these policies against Turkmenistan, but Russia is
also shutting down Belarus' sovereignty by taking over its energy and
key economic sectors and attempting to do the same with Ukraine. It is
quite clear that it does not regard these states, or for that matter
the former members of the Warsaw Pact and Serbia, as truly sovereign.
Moreover, its representatives lose no opportunity to remind them of
their vulnerability and make demands that Moscow have an unlimited
right to intervene in their affairs. Indeed, Russian legislation
enacted under Medvedev gives the President the right to intervene
militarily in their affairs without any accountability to the Duma or
anyone else whatsoever.
In addition, Russia continues to see NATO and the United States as
powers that are intent on dismantling its pretensions to a
neo-imperial domination of Eurasia in the name of democracy and as
attempting to intimidate it by depriving it of its main military
trump, i.e., its ability to intimidate Europe with its nuclear and
conventional missiles. Thus it has demanded legally binding guarantees
that missile defenses will not threaten its nuclear arsenal, despite
scores of briefings and acceptance of the fact that these systems
cannot threaten Russia's nuclear weapons by Russian experts, but
refuses to suggest giving Europe such guarantees. It also clearly sees
itself under threat from these NATO policies. It believes these
policies will inevitably lead to a coercive NATO operation in the CIS
or Russia itself'either by actual force majeure or `information
warfare' to undermine Russia's imperial pretensions and political
system, without which it believes Russia would cease to exist as a
state or independent great power. Thus operations like those in Libya
or those it believes will take place in Syria potentially have direct
consequences for Russia. It will reply in the only language it knows,
i.e., military and other threats.
Russia's position, its insistence on a free hand at the expense of
every other state east of the Elbe, and its presupposition of conflict
with NATO all but ensure that the reset policy will run aground over
the issues of regional security in Eurasia. That denouement is clearly
in the wind as Moscow's statements on missile defense all but rule out
an improvement in relations with NATO at the May 2012 Chicago summit.
Turkey cannot escape the inevitable consequences of this outcome,
because so many of its vital interests are now threatened by Russia's
resort to gunboat diplomacy, military threats, and coercive energy
diplomacy. Here too, as in the Middle East, zero problems with
neighbors has foundered on the inevitable rocks of competing national
interests, including Russia. Yet Russia has also succumbed to the
temptation to define its interests as being a priori hostile to those
of its principal interlocutors. Turkey's democracy allows it the
opportunity to rethink its policy, liquidate over-extended positions,
and regain strength in what will hopefully be a revived Atlantic
alliance, concomitant advance in European integration and democracy in
the Middle East. Yet Russia has clearly opted'or is now opting
for'another round of self-imposed neo-imperial isolation that it
cannot sustain and which it can only defend by threats of force. While
it may not be too late for Turkey to repair its position with Israel,
Cyprus, and NATO, it appears that for Russia the die has already been
cast and not in favor of international reconciliation.
Younkyoo Kim, PhD (Purdue University) is an associate professor in the
Division of International Studies, Hanyang University, Seoul. Stephen
Blank, PhD (University of Chicago) is Professor of Russian National
Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army
War College. They wrote this article for the MERIA Journal, a
publication of the GLORIA Center, from where it is adapted.
http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=73149&pageid=13&pagename=Analysi s
From: A. Papazian