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Regional Policy and Nagorno-Karabakh
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Policy and Nagorno-Karabakh
Igor Muradyan, published in the Irates De-Facto
Story from Lragir.am News:
http://www.lragir.am/engsrc/comments26077.html
Published: 16:59:23 - 05/05/2012
The international reaction to the parliamentary, presidential and location
elections in Nagorno-Karabakh Republic always looked concentrated with
attention and forms of expression. The European Union and the Council of
Europe, a number of European states and Turkey expressed a definitely
negative attitude to those elections. Russia used relatively moderate
wording, while the United States did not declare its attitude,
demonstrating readiness to continue to provide financial assistance to the
Armenian population of this region of the Caucasus.
This international reaction contains a certain portion of emotionality
which may increase skepticism among the political sets in NKR and Armenia
and the public at large. It should be noted that the political government
of NKR did not react to analogical attitude of different countries and
regional organizations to different elections. The NKR political government
apparently chose to observe, not even to wait.
This position might be determined by the underestimation of the existing
political resource, the factor of the presidential election, the general
uncertainty of the political situation in the South Caucasus and the
absence of a multi-direction external political analysis. This position of
the NKR political leadership in fact encourages such attitude of the
external environment to such an important process as the elections of the
legislature and the executive. The reaction of NKR was expressed by the
civil society institutions mainly.
We offer a specific analysis and vision of the situation, as well as some
recommendations. At the same time, it is necessary to take note of the
following circumstance: it was understood a long time ago that neither
Armenia, nor the Diaspora organizations supporting Armenian government took
any efforts to promote the recognition of NKR which is certainly determined
by the wish to defy the recommendations of foreign parties.
The necessity to follow the wish of external partners was the condition of
comfortable existence of the government of Armenia, and they consistently
played a game of unfolding the international situation around the Karabakh
issue. In addition, the United States, Russia and France spoke in one voice
to forbid Armenia to even mention the recognition of the independence of
NKR.
Neither Abkhazia, nor Ossetia, and not even Kosovo have been in such a
situation. As a result the precious time when the balance of forces in the
South Caucasus was more favorable was wasted.
At the same time, the period when the positions of the United States and
some European states were archaic has passed, and the issue of independence
of NKR was subjected to a single position. The United States has obviously
reviewed all the postulates which led its geopolitics into deadlocks for a
long time. Was this issue brought up in the parliaments of the leading
states? Someone has to deal with it, don't they?
No doubt the stakeholders are informed well enough about the political and
social processes happening in NKR. This information is found not only in
government but also the leading think tanks of the United States, the U.K.
and Russia. There is a gap between the level of information of the global
mass media and the analytical community of the leading countries of the
West and Russia, which indicates that this information on the situation in
NKR is special, official and probably closed.
Recently the diplomatic missions of stakeholders have been actively engaged
in gathering and systemizing information on NKR, hiring experts belonging
to different political and ideological streams. Formerly the government
agencies of the Western society had standard evaluations of the lasting and
deepening economic and social crisis in Armenia and NKR which were based on
the propagandist activities of the pro-All-Armenian Movement opposition and
several `political services' of the Armenian Diaspora, now these
evaluations have changed thanks to the professional activities of
alternative experts.
In particular, the functional structures and agencies of the United States
and the European community have understood that NKR is stirred by an active
process of establishment of a civil society, economic and administrative
reforms, the legislative and executive powers are being strengthened, the
authority of the president, the government, political and civil groups is
increasing. The armed forces continue to be improved.
The NKR population displays sufficient civil and political maturity,
different interesting political and social initiatives are taken. The NKR
government concludes that it will have to interact with the civil sector
and more reliable partners in the political field.
It should be noted that the NKR parliamentary elections in 2010 were
practically ignored by both Armenia and the world. These elections did not
interest anyone because they were just a cartoon which highlighted the
`political history' of NKR.
The Karabakh society lives its own life, not paying much importance to the
role and functioning of the government. A military elite and caste has
emerged in NKR which also does not pay importance to the position of the
authorities, knowing that the future of NKR is in the hands of the military
caste and the Karabakh society.
The position of the authorities explained by servile attitude in
interaction with Yerevan is understood by the military and the society. NKR
and the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh remains the priority of the Armenian
nation which continues to support the `Karabakh idea' as a national idea
despite the tough economic situation in Armenia and a number of foreign
communities.
The United States and Europe noticed that with the incomplete situation in
Karabakh the threat of aggression by Azerbaijan persists the NKR society
conducts local elections, presidential and parliamentary elections, setting
economic and social priorities. The West (perhaps Russia, Turkey and Iran)
was surprised and could not understand the new situation. The international
community was facing the reality of creating full sovereignty in a small
territory of the South Caucasus, practically in extreme conditions.
Along with the formation of criminal environments and hotbeds of extremism
in the territory of other unrecognized states - Kosovo, Chechnya, Bosnia,
Transdniestrie, NKR formed a national democratic state. The important
factor was that NKR adapted to the international conditions and in this
stage of development its priorities are not security or international
recognition but economic issues.
It worries the European Union and the Council of Europe which view the
South Caucasus as a region integrating with the European institutions,
where despite the European rules of behavior a new model of a sovereign
state is emerging. It will question the system of the European community
which has to make concessions to Turkey and even counteract the U.S.
strategy in Western Europe and other regions.
The current geopolitical situation is not useful to the United States which
cannot act productively enough, especially in a number of regions. The
United States understood that the existing geopolitical framework must be
reviewed, and the creation of new states, fragmentation of other existing
states, redrawing of some regional borders will be the objectives of the
U.S. foreign policy. In addition, the process will start in South Asia.
Unlike the United States, the European community cannot conduct a real
consistent policy in such regions as the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
In these regions only the powers which have established their military
presence can conduct an active, `real politik'. The European states and
structures (including the European forces of rapid reaction) do not have
adequate goals and interests in these regions.
The European structures are not significant sponsors of Western Europe. In
this regard, the Europeans can afford to make solely political steps to
which hardly anyone will pay attention.
It should be noted that for a number of years the United States made
efforts to play down the activities and role of the OSCE - an international
organization where Russia and the Europeans have the right to veto and
which limits the effective foreign political decisions of the United
States. Along with the OSCE the United States seeks to play down the role
of the UN and even NATO for similar goals.
At the same time, the OSCE is a basis institution of European security, and
the Europeans seek to reanimate its role. It appears to be an important
goal of the European politics as a whole. In the spring of 2001 the United
States were able to play down the role of the OSCE and the Minsk Group in
the settlement of the Karabakh issue and try to cover this problem in a
rather frozen state. This goal requires from the Europeans a position which
will differ from that of the United States which suggests total
non-recognition of NKR and other analogical states, maintaining a
meaningless negotiation process by the scheme Armenia-Azerbaijan. Recently
the United States has reanimated the Minsk Group as a convenient arena for
agreement of positions of the United States, France (or Europe) and Russia.
The other goal of the Europeans is rejection of recognition of the `new
status' of certain ethnic territories. It is growing urgent because the
United States has apparently decided to settle ethnic conflicts by way of
granting these territories a definite status which is related to the
geostrategic goals of the United States to ensure long-term military bases
in Kosovo, Bosnia, Iraqi Kurdistan and other regions.
The number of analogical territories will grow. It is possible that this
process will affect Turkey, Central Asia, North Africa, Southwestern Asia
and Southern Europe. The United States considers some of these territories
urgent, while it views others as a reserve in a geostrategic perspective.
For Europe with its political mentality it is an unpleasant, uncertain
perspective.
For a long time the United States viewed not only NKR but also Armenia as
its geostrategic reserve, and in this connection the Karabakh issue is not
a problem for the United States as such. Armenia, as well as the Karabakh
issue have been picked up from the reserve by the Americans and became an
important factor of constraining Turkey's ambitions only after crossing the
line in the Turkish and American relations.
Among the factors influencing the position of Europeans is the urge to
balance the influence of Europe and Russia on the Caucasus, which will
hardly be considered an important factor, even though the countries of the
South Caucasus are assigned the status of `close neighbors'. In the past 20
years the Europeans did everything they could to minimize Armenia's
pretensions and have expressed readiness in most ugly ways to ignore the
interests of Armenia.
At the same time, as soon as the United States adopted a new policy of
Turkey, Europe started considering the role of the Armenian factor in
constraining the efforts of Turkey to join the European Union more openly.
This position of the Europeans became an instrument for the U.S. strategy,
as the main constraint to Turkish expansion.
Since the European political arena is not important for the interests of
Armenia, especially for NKR, with weak hopes for a positive relation of
European structures to NKR, it is possible to demonstrate the efficiency of
Stepanakert's policy and the ability of NKR to react to such steps and
statements by bringing the example of interaction with Europeans.
We think it is necessary to link this position of the Europeans with the
activities of the OSCE Minsk Group and the OSCE. In NKR the subject of
foreign political interactions is first of all the president. To refuse the
legitimacy of the president and the parliament of NKR, even as elective
bodies of the unrecognized state, will question the possibility of
interaction with the OSCE as an organization representing Europe.
There may be some objections that this path will lead to the isolation of
NKR and limit freedom of foreign political maneuvers. In reality, NKR has
no arena for foreign political interaction except the United States. Only
this country's government provides assistance to NKR.
What will this position lead to? It will lead to tough consequences for the
OSCE which will call for review of the position of Europeans. It may take
some time and there may be a period of `crisis' for the NKR foreign policy.
Thus NKR will declare itself a conflict side without whose participation
the negotiations will be meaningless. The Minsk Group visit NKR as some
semi-restricted area which does not bring anything into the strengthening
of NKR. This situation is destructive, and the NKR authorities are
responsible for it.
Nevertheless, the European arena will have an important economic role for
Armenia, even though the role of the United States is crucial for the
recognition of NKR, the unrecognized state must receive the `certificate'
of independence from Europe, at least formally. Therefore, if for the U.S.
democracy in NKR is a sign of readiness for independent and secure
existence, for Europe democracy in NKR is a condition of top importance.
With all their refined principles the Europeans cannot leap across the
informal state of things with democracy and freedoms. The Europeans would
like to have two incompatible situations: security and conflict for
unrecognized states; lack of democracy and reason for reproaching,
instructions and political tribunal.
The elections in NKR must eventually embarrass the Europeans and lead them
to a deadlock. The Europeans are seeking for ways of setting a high
benchmark of democracy for NKR which means turning NKR into a society which
recognizes fully such pseudo-humanist values as the return of Azerbaijani
refugees, but they will have to recognize the distinct characteristics of
NKR and its independence.
It is possible not to recognize `self-proclaimed' states but it is
impossible not to recognize the elections otherwise who will get in touch
with the foreign stakeholders. This is a key argument which NKR must insist
on, despite the risks. To refuse this policy to the NKR authorities is a
political crime.
X-Sender: Asbed Bedrossian
X-Listprocessor-Version: 8.1 -- ListProcessor(tm) by CREN
Policy and Nagorno-Karabakh
Igor Muradyan, published in the Irates De-Facto
Story from Lragir.am News:
http://www.lragir.am/engsrc/comments26077.html
Published: 16:59:23 - 05/05/2012
The international reaction to the parliamentary, presidential and location
elections in Nagorno-Karabakh Republic always looked concentrated with
attention and forms of expression. The European Union and the Council of
Europe, a number of European states and Turkey expressed a definitely
negative attitude to those elections. Russia used relatively moderate
wording, while the United States did not declare its attitude,
demonstrating readiness to continue to provide financial assistance to the
Armenian population of this region of the Caucasus.
This international reaction contains a certain portion of emotionality
which may increase skepticism among the political sets in NKR and Armenia
and the public at large. It should be noted that the political government
of NKR did not react to analogical attitude of different countries and
regional organizations to different elections. The NKR political government
apparently chose to observe, not even to wait.
This position might be determined by the underestimation of the existing
political resource, the factor of the presidential election, the general
uncertainty of the political situation in the South Caucasus and the
absence of a multi-direction external political analysis. This position of
the NKR political leadership in fact encourages such attitude of the
external environment to such an important process as the elections of the
legislature and the executive. The reaction of NKR was expressed by the
civil society institutions mainly.
We offer a specific analysis and vision of the situation, as well as some
recommendations. At the same time, it is necessary to take note of the
following circumstance: it was understood a long time ago that neither
Armenia, nor the Diaspora organizations supporting Armenian government took
any efforts to promote the recognition of NKR which is certainly determined
by the wish to defy the recommendations of foreign parties.
The necessity to follow the wish of external partners was the condition of
comfortable existence of the government of Armenia, and they consistently
played a game of unfolding the international situation around the Karabakh
issue. In addition, the United States, Russia and France spoke in one voice
to forbid Armenia to even mention the recognition of the independence of
NKR.
Neither Abkhazia, nor Ossetia, and not even Kosovo have been in such a
situation. As a result the precious time when the balance of forces in the
South Caucasus was more favorable was wasted.
At the same time, the period when the positions of the United States and
some European states were archaic has passed, and the issue of independence
of NKR was subjected to a single position. The United States has obviously
reviewed all the postulates which led its geopolitics into deadlocks for a
long time. Was this issue brought up in the parliaments of the leading
states? Someone has to deal with it, don't they?
No doubt the stakeholders are informed well enough about the political and
social processes happening in NKR. This information is found not only in
government but also the leading think tanks of the United States, the U.K.
and Russia. There is a gap between the level of information of the global
mass media and the analytical community of the leading countries of the
West and Russia, which indicates that this information on the situation in
NKR is special, official and probably closed.
Recently the diplomatic missions of stakeholders have been actively engaged
in gathering and systemizing information on NKR, hiring experts belonging
to different political and ideological streams. Formerly the government
agencies of the Western society had standard evaluations of the lasting and
deepening economic and social crisis in Armenia and NKR which were based on
the propagandist activities of the pro-All-Armenian Movement opposition and
several `political services' of the Armenian Diaspora, now these
evaluations have changed thanks to the professional activities of
alternative experts.
In particular, the functional structures and agencies of the United States
and the European community have understood that NKR is stirred by an active
process of establishment of a civil society, economic and administrative
reforms, the legislative and executive powers are being strengthened, the
authority of the president, the government, political and civil groups is
increasing. The armed forces continue to be improved.
The NKR population displays sufficient civil and political maturity,
different interesting political and social initiatives are taken. The NKR
government concludes that it will have to interact with the civil sector
and more reliable partners in the political field.
It should be noted that the NKR parliamentary elections in 2010 were
practically ignored by both Armenia and the world. These elections did not
interest anyone because they were just a cartoon which highlighted the
`political history' of NKR.
The Karabakh society lives its own life, not paying much importance to the
role and functioning of the government. A military elite and caste has
emerged in NKR which also does not pay importance to the position of the
authorities, knowing that the future of NKR is in the hands of the military
caste and the Karabakh society.
The position of the authorities explained by servile attitude in
interaction with Yerevan is understood by the military and the society. NKR
and the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh remains the priority of the Armenian
nation which continues to support the `Karabakh idea' as a national idea
despite the tough economic situation in Armenia and a number of foreign
communities.
The United States and Europe noticed that with the incomplete situation in
Karabakh the threat of aggression by Azerbaijan persists the NKR society
conducts local elections, presidential and parliamentary elections, setting
economic and social priorities. The West (perhaps Russia, Turkey and Iran)
was surprised and could not understand the new situation. The international
community was facing the reality of creating full sovereignty in a small
territory of the South Caucasus, practically in extreme conditions.
Along with the formation of criminal environments and hotbeds of extremism
in the territory of other unrecognized states - Kosovo, Chechnya, Bosnia,
Transdniestrie, NKR formed a national democratic state. The important
factor was that NKR adapted to the international conditions and in this
stage of development its priorities are not security or international
recognition but economic issues.
It worries the European Union and the Council of Europe which view the
South Caucasus as a region integrating with the European institutions,
where despite the European rules of behavior a new model of a sovereign
state is emerging. It will question the system of the European community
which has to make concessions to Turkey and even counteract the U.S.
strategy in Western Europe and other regions.
The current geopolitical situation is not useful to the United States which
cannot act productively enough, especially in a number of regions. The
United States understood that the existing geopolitical framework must be
reviewed, and the creation of new states, fragmentation of other existing
states, redrawing of some regional borders will be the objectives of the
U.S. foreign policy. In addition, the process will start in South Asia.
Unlike the United States, the European community cannot conduct a real
consistent policy in such regions as the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
In these regions only the powers which have established their military
presence can conduct an active, `real politik'. The European states and
structures (including the European forces of rapid reaction) do not have
adequate goals and interests in these regions.
The European structures are not significant sponsors of Western Europe. In
this regard, the Europeans can afford to make solely political steps to
which hardly anyone will pay attention.
It should be noted that for a number of years the United States made
efforts to play down the activities and role of the OSCE - an international
organization where Russia and the Europeans have the right to veto and
which limits the effective foreign political decisions of the United
States. Along with the OSCE the United States seeks to play down the role
of the UN and even NATO for similar goals.
At the same time, the OSCE is a basis institution of European security, and
the Europeans seek to reanimate its role. It appears to be an important
goal of the European politics as a whole. In the spring of 2001 the United
States were able to play down the role of the OSCE and the Minsk Group in
the settlement of the Karabakh issue and try to cover this problem in a
rather frozen state. This goal requires from the Europeans a position which
will differ from that of the United States which suggests total
non-recognition of NKR and other analogical states, maintaining a
meaningless negotiation process by the scheme Armenia-Azerbaijan. Recently
the United States has reanimated the Minsk Group as a convenient arena for
agreement of positions of the United States, France (or Europe) and Russia.
The other goal of the Europeans is rejection of recognition of the `new
status' of certain ethnic territories. It is growing urgent because the
United States has apparently decided to settle ethnic conflicts by way of
granting these territories a definite status which is related to the
geostrategic goals of the United States to ensure long-term military bases
in Kosovo, Bosnia, Iraqi Kurdistan and other regions.
The number of analogical territories will grow. It is possible that this
process will affect Turkey, Central Asia, North Africa, Southwestern Asia
and Southern Europe. The United States considers some of these territories
urgent, while it views others as a reserve in a geostrategic perspective.
For Europe with its political mentality it is an unpleasant, uncertain
perspective.
For a long time the United States viewed not only NKR but also Armenia as
its geostrategic reserve, and in this connection the Karabakh issue is not
a problem for the United States as such. Armenia, as well as the Karabakh
issue have been picked up from the reserve by the Americans and became an
important factor of constraining Turkey's ambitions only after crossing the
line in the Turkish and American relations.
Among the factors influencing the position of Europeans is the urge to
balance the influence of Europe and Russia on the Caucasus, which will
hardly be considered an important factor, even though the countries of the
South Caucasus are assigned the status of `close neighbors'. In the past 20
years the Europeans did everything they could to minimize Armenia's
pretensions and have expressed readiness in most ugly ways to ignore the
interests of Armenia.
At the same time, as soon as the United States adopted a new policy of
Turkey, Europe started considering the role of the Armenian factor in
constraining the efforts of Turkey to join the European Union more openly.
This position of the Europeans became an instrument for the U.S. strategy,
as the main constraint to Turkish expansion.
Since the European political arena is not important for the interests of
Armenia, especially for NKR, with weak hopes for a positive relation of
European structures to NKR, it is possible to demonstrate the efficiency of
Stepanakert's policy and the ability of NKR to react to such steps and
statements by bringing the example of interaction with Europeans.
We think it is necessary to link this position of the Europeans with the
activities of the OSCE Minsk Group and the OSCE. In NKR the subject of
foreign political interactions is first of all the president. To refuse the
legitimacy of the president and the parliament of NKR, even as elective
bodies of the unrecognized state, will question the possibility of
interaction with the OSCE as an organization representing Europe.
There may be some objections that this path will lead to the isolation of
NKR and limit freedom of foreign political maneuvers. In reality, NKR has
no arena for foreign political interaction except the United States. Only
this country's government provides assistance to NKR.
What will this position lead to? It will lead to tough consequences for the
OSCE which will call for review of the position of Europeans. It may take
some time and there may be a period of `crisis' for the NKR foreign policy.
Thus NKR will declare itself a conflict side without whose participation
the negotiations will be meaningless. The Minsk Group visit NKR as some
semi-restricted area which does not bring anything into the strengthening
of NKR. This situation is destructive, and the NKR authorities are
responsible for it.
Nevertheless, the European arena will have an important economic role for
Armenia, even though the role of the United States is crucial for the
recognition of NKR, the unrecognized state must receive the `certificate'
of independence from Europe, at least formally. Therefore, if for the U.S.
democracy in NKR is a sign of readiness for independent and secure
existence, for Europe democracy in NKR is a condition of top importance.
With all their refined principles the Europeans cannot leap across the
informal state of things with democracy and freedoms. The Europeans would
like to have two incompatible situations: security and conflict for
unrecognized states; lack of democracy and reason for reproaching,
instructions and political tribunal.
The elections in NKR must eventually embarrass the Europeans and lead them
to a deadlock. The Europeans are seeking for ways of setting a high
benchmark of democracy for NKR which means turning NKR into a society which
recognizes fully such pseudo-humanist values as the return of Azerbaijani
refugees, but they will have to recognize the distinct characteristics of
NKR and its independence.
It is possible not to recognize `self-proclaimed' states but it is
impossible not to recognize the elections otherwise who will get in touch
with the foreign stakeholders. This is a key argument which NKR must insist
on, despite the risks. To refuse this policy to the NKR authorities is a
political crime.