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Vestnik Kavkaza, Russia
May 12 2012
Russia in the Caucasus: view from the south
Spartak Zhidkov, Sukhumi-Vladikavkaz. Exclusively to VK
In late April issues of contemporary policy of Russia in the Caucasus
were discussed at the international scientific conference organized by
the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies in Vladikavkaz Management
Institute. Experts from all Caucasian countries, except Georgia, came
to Vladikavkaz, but it didn't prevent the participants from discussing
Georgian foreign policy.
The initiators of the discussion intended to make it widely covered by
analysts and predictors. The topic was the Strategy of Russia in the
Caucasus in the 21st century. It is obvious that sooner or later
Moscow will have to make decisions similar to those made in August
2008. Even if Russia doesn't want any changes, sooner or later the
waves of the Arab Spring will cover the Caucasus or the Iranian crisis
will be settled; and these circumstances will change the political
atmosphere.
For most experts who deal with Russian policy in the Caucasus the
complex solution of all these problems is an essential task. For
example, the unsettled contradiction between Russia and Georgia on the
Abkhazian and Ossetian issues (political and military targets are
clear) and on cooperation with Armenia, which is very important for
this country. On the one hand, a direct opponent of Russia like
Mikhail Saakashvili is beneficial for Tskhinvali and Sukhumi. While
Saakashvili is President, Moscow sees no reasons for changing the
course: strict confrontation with Georgia and intensive military
security of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgia is not a threat to
Russia. On the other hand, we shouldn't forget that Moscow's ally,
Armenia, as well as Nagorno-Karabakh are separated from Russia by
Georgian territory. Therefore, if the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict
starts again, if Turkey remains hostile to Armenia, and Iran is
involved in a conflict with NATO, how can Moscow protect the
Armenians? Is power change in Georgia beneficial for Russia? There is
no clear answer.
The second problem discussed at the conference was the problem of
terrorism in the Caucasus. The phenomenon has always had a political
basis. Today terrorism in the North Caucasus is more acute than in the
1990s. In that period it was obvious that the common center of
anti-Russian forces in the Caucasus were the authorities of rebellious
Chechnya. Today there is no clear center, and it is difficult to
define where the threat comes from, what targets the terrorists have
and whether they cooperate with the local population. Terrorism
doesn't weaken, it evolves. The number of specialists on terrorist
operations reduced. They are residents of the post-Soviet republics
and Russia itself. A new model of extremist organizations appeared,
i.e. transnational net structures that are able to commit terrorist
attacks in any place of the world.
According to experts, the situation is caused by several negative
processes in the North Caucasus - consolidation of extremist and
criminal groups and conveyance of new political concepts. One of them
is the idea of the `genocide of the Circassians' launched by Georgian
politicians. It should be admitted that this project of Georgian
diplomacy appeared to be viable and influences the minds of the
population of the North-Caucasus republics. It is interesting that in
the 1990s such an initiative had no chances of being understood,
despite the Chechen war. But now the idea is perceived not only by
young people, but also by ideologists-Caucasiologists.
What is the reason? It seems Russian analysts are not fast at reacting
to new phenomena. Sometimes the Caucasian mentality is not taken into
consideration, while tolerance is lacking. The senior vice-principal
of the Vladikavkaz Management Institute, Taimuraz Kusov, urged a
reconsideration of some of the concepts of economic development which
are aimed at tourism promotion in the North Caucasus. The connection
between social phenomena and political attitudes is obvious.
At the same time, it is necessary to deal with an ideological
contradiction, which often dominates other problems. Vladimir Chernous
thinks that the establishment of the NCFD caused a contradiction which
is used by Georgian political technologists. They try to form
pan-Caucasian identity in opposition to a Russian one. Russia is slow
to react and misses many important moments.
A surprise opinion was voiced by Arif Yusufov on the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. According to him, for Armenians the Karabakh war is not only
a national, but a religious conflict, they see a confrontation of the
Christian and Muslim worlds in it. The political scientist Rachya
Arzumanyan replied to this: `You think Armenians are reckless, but not
nearly as bad: to live among Islamic countries and fight against Islam
is nonsense for real politics.'
In Vladikavkaz an effort to gather information on the situation in the
various regions of the Caucasus was made, and it was discussed through
benefits of and threats to the influence of Moscow. This work should
be fruitful.
May 12 2012
Russia in the Caucasus: view from the south
Spartak Zhidkov, Sukhumi-Vladikavkaz. Exclusively to VK
In late April issues of contemporary policy of Russia in the Caucasus
were discussed at the international scientific conference organized by
the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies in Vladikavkaz Management
Institute. Experts from all Caucasian countries, except Georgia, came
to Vladikavkaz, but it didn't prevent the participants from discussing
Georgian foreign policy.
The initiators of the discussion intended to make it widely covered by
analysts and predictors. The topic was the Strategy of Russia in the
Caucasus in the 21st century. It is obvious that sooner or later
Moscow will have to make decisions similar to those made in August
2008. Even if Russia doesn't want any changes, sooner or later the
waves of the Arab Spring will cover the Caucasus or the Iranian crisis
will be settled; and these circumstances will change the political
atmosphere.
For most experts who deal with Russian policy in the Caucasus the
complex solution of all these problems is an essential task. For
example, the unsettled contradiction between Russia and Georgia on the
Abkhazian and Ossetian issues (political and military targets are
clear) and on cooperation with Armenia, which is very important for
this country. On the one hand, a direct opponent of Russia like
Mikhail Saakashvili is beneficial for Tskhinvali and Sukhumi. While
Saakashvili is President, Moscow sees no reasons for changing the
course: strict confrontation with Georgia and intensive military
security of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgia is not a threat to
Russia. On the other hand, we shouldn't forget that Moscow's ally,
Armenia, as well as Nagorno-Karabakh are separated from Russia by
Georgian territory. Therefore, if the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict
starts again, if Turkey remains hostile to Armenia, and Iran is
involved in a conflict with NATO, how can Moscow protect the
Armenians? Is power change in Georgia beneficial for Russia? There is
no clear answer.
The second problem discussed at the conference was the problem of
terrorism in the Caucasus. The phenomenon has always had a political
basis. Today terrorism in the North Caucasus is more acute than in the
1990s. In that period it was obvious that the common center of
anti-Russian forces in the Caucasus were the authorities of rebellious
Chechnya. Today there is no clear center, and it is difficult to
define where the threat comes from, what targets the terrorists have
and whether they cooperate with the local population. Terrorism
doesn't weaken, it evolves. The number of specialists on terrorist
operations reduced. They are residents of the post-Soviet republics
and Russia itself. A new model of extremist organizations appeared,
i.e. transnational net structures that are able to commit terrorist
attacks in any place of the world.
According to experts, the situation is caused by several negative
processes in the North Caucasus - consolidation of extremist and
criminal groups and conveyance of new political concepts. One of them
is the idea of the `genocide of the Circassians' launched by Georgian
politicians. It should be admitted that this project of Georgian
diplomacy appeared to be viable and influences the minds of the
population of the North-Caucasus republics. It is interesting that in
the 1990s such an initiative had no chances of being understood,
despite the Chechen war. But now the idea is perceived not only by
young people, but also by ideologists-Caucasiologists.
What is the reason? It seems Russian analysts are not fast at reacting
to new phenomena. Sometimes the Caucasian mentality is not taken into
consideration, while tolerance is lacking. The senior vice-principal
of the Vladikavkaz Management Institute, Taimuraz Kusov, urged a
reconsideration of some of the concepts of economic development which
are aimed at tourism promotion in the North Caucasus. The connection
between social phenomena and political attitudes is obvious.
At the same time, it is necessary to deal with an ideological
contradiction, which often dominates other problems. Vladimir Chernous
thinks that the establishment of the NCFD caused a contradiction which
is used by Georgian political technologists. They try to form
pan-Caucasian identity in opposition to a Russian one. Russia is slow
to react and misses many important moments.
A surprise opinion was voiced by Arif Yusufov on the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. According to him, for Armenians the Karabakh war is not only
a national, but a religious conflict, they see a confrontation of the
Christian and Muslim worlds in it. The political scientist Rachya
Arzumanyan replied to this: `You think Armenians are reckless, but not
nearly as bad: to live among Islamic countries and fight against Islam
is nonsense for real politics.'
In Vladikavkaz an effort to gather information on the situation in the
various regions of the Caucasus was made, and it was discussed through
benefits of and threats to the influence of Moscow. This work should
be fruitful.