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AZERBAIJAN-IRAN TENSIONS SERVE RUSSIAN ENERGY INTERESTS
By Dmitry Shlapentokh (04/18/2012 issue of the CACI Analyst)
Tensions between Iran and the West were exacerbated even further by
Israel's sale of sophisticated weapons to Baku in February this year. The
regional states hold differing views on the crisis depending on their
interests and geopolitical outlook. In Russia's case, the objectives are
clear. On the one hand, Russia is not interested in a full-fledged war
which would hold unpredictable consequences for all parties involved,
including Russia itself. On the other hand, it is in Moscow's interest to
keep the area unsafe and unstable as this will improve Moscow's chances of
monopolizing the supply of gas to Europe.
*BACKGROUND: *Hydrocarbon* *exports are of key importance to Russian
foreign policy. Exporting oil and gas is vital not only for a few
interested `oligarchs,' but for the stability of the regime. Indeed,
Russia's economic rise over the last decade is limited and there is little
industrial development in spite of Putin's assertions that Russia has made
a great leap forward after the end of what Moscow terms the `troubling
1990s' (likhie devianostye). Instead, money obtained through energy exports
have provided most of the cash for the regime coffers, and has ensured the
regime's comparative stability and Putin's reelection. The high gas and oil
prices are therefore crucial for Moscow, which has worked hard to
monopolize Europe's gas supply.
Accordingly, Moscow has sought to secure agreements with Central Asian
states, of which Turkmenistan is of paramount importance due to its large
reserves, implying that their gas is transferred to the European market
through the Russian pipeline system inherited from the USSR. Turkmenistan,
however, soon lost interest in Moscow as an intermediary and turned to
China which has increasingly emerged as a major consumer of Turkmen gas.
Moscow was undoubtedly upset with China's emergence as alternative
customer. Still, its major goal remains the prevention of alternate routes
to Europe, and major problems have emerged in this regard.
Azerbaijan has emerged as one of the major potential sources of gas for
Nabucco or similar gas pipelines designed to deliver Caspian gas to
European markets, which is clearly disturbing to Moscow. Consequently,
Moscow has focused its attention on Azerbaijan and the adjacent region, and
has employed a variety of tactics in dealing with Baku. The first was an
attempt to convince Baku to sell all its gas to Russia, which was the main
objective of Medvedev's unsuccessful visit to Baku on September 2-3, 2010.
Just after Medvedev's visit, the EU Commission President José Manuel
Barroso visited Azerbaijan and signed an agreement stipulating that Baku
would provide gas for Nabucco or other similar gas pipelines which would
deliver gas directly to Europe.
Baku could also potentially upset other strategic goals on Moscow's part.
Moscow has sought to monopolize control over gas pipelines transiting
Belarus and Ukraine, which are essential for Moscow's control of gas
deliveries to Europe. While such designs proved successful in Belarus,
problems still exist in Moscow's dealings with Kiev which resists foreign
control over its pipeline system. Moscow has raised the prices of exported
gas and oil to force Kiev into submission. However, Kiev has engaged in
negotiations with Baku, which is a potential source of alternative gas and
oil also for Ukraine.
One potential strategy for Moscow to prevent the construction of new,
unwanted gas pipelines is contributing to the fear of regional instability
and rising tensions in the region which would likely scare off potential
investors.
**
*IMPLICATIONS: *Moscow has sought to maintain a level of regional
instability in several ways. First, on 9-26 September, 2011, Moscow engaged
in military maneuvers in the Caspian Sea. Russian officials stated that
Russia will sustain a military presence there and will not think twice
about using it if nearby states - implying a direct message to Azerbaijan
and Turkmenistan - would attempt to construct pipelines along the Caspian
Sea without the approval of all littoral states, including Russia. This is
a risky enterprise and Moscow has no interest in instigating any real
military confrontation in the region since such developments would have
most unpredictable consequences. However, the increased tension centered on
Azerbaijan serves Moscow well.
Azerbaijan also has a tense relationship with Iran. While this conflict is
rooted historically in conflicting nationalistic and territorial claims
between the two states, it has recently been actualized by Iranian concerns
that Azerbaijan could constitute a launch pad for a U.S./Israeli strike
against Iran. Adding to the complex picture of regional tension is
Azerbaijan's conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.
Israel's decision in February 2012 to sell sophisticated weaponry - anti
aircraft missiles and drones - to Baku immediately raised concerns in both
Iran and Armenia, who perceived it as preparation for war. Moscow could
easily have assured Iran that it would not allow this to happen, by
providing Iran with the S-300 anti-missile/anti-aircraft system which
Teheran clamors or at least sell it other weapons which are not covered by
sanctions. Alternatively, Moscow could have delivered weapons through
Belarus, which maintains a closer relationship with Iran. Minsk would
hardly fear international sanctions in addition to the ones already in
force. In 2007, Moscow actually signed an agreement with Teheran to supply
these missiles, and Teheran even made an advance payment. Yet, Moscow
procrastinated and finally joined the Iran sanctions which preclude sales
of advanced weaponry to Iran, the S-300 system included. Moscow has neither
condemned nor approved of the arms deal between Israel and Azerbaijan. As
many other foreign policy actions, the implications of these moves can have
different interpretations. They could be taken to indicate Moscow's desire
to remain neutral, but could also imply that Moscow is actually interested
in exploiting the increased instability in the area.
Russia also maintains a military presence in Azerbaijan through its radar
station in Gabala and keeps Baku and Teheran in the dark about what it
would do in case of increased hostilities between the two, in which the
station would most certainly be affected. Moscow continues to play the same
game with Armenia. The relationship between Yerevan, which is Moscow's most
reliable ally in the region and also enjoys a cordial relationship with
Teheran, and Baku is extremely tense due not only to Armenia's support of
Nagorno-Karabakh, legally still a part of Azerbaijan.
Yerevan was alarmed by the Israel-Azerbaijan arms deal. However, as in the
case with Teheran and Baku, Moscow has retained an ambivalent stance. On
the one hand, it keeps a strong military presence in Armenia through its
military base in Gyumri. On the other hand, Armenia can hardly trust
Moscow's security guarantees in case of war with Azerbaijan. The very fact
that Moscow did not criticize Azerbaijan's weapons purchase from Israel
contained a message to both Teheran and Yerevan. This message implied that
in the case of war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, it remains unclear
whether Moscow would choose to intervene or not, which certainly increases
uncertainty and tensions in the region. This, in turn, works in Moscow's
favor, helping to construct an image of the recent interactions between
Azerbaijan, Iran and Armenia as signifying the increasing instability of
the Caspian region, making it unreliable as a source of gas for Europe. The
implication is very simple: Europe has no other stable supplier than
Russia.
The instability also provides Moscow with opportunities for maintaining its
military presence in the region and assures both Baku and Yerevan, and
possibly Teheran, that a strong Russian presence is the only true guarantee
for their territorial integrity and possibly their very existence, provided
that they observe Russian interests. In addition, the setup not only
provides Russia with the opportunity to act as a geopolitical kingmaker but
also generates additional income by sales of weapons to all sides, as well
as keeping the prices of gas and oil at a high level.
**
*CONCLUSIONS: *Israel's sale of sophisticated weapons to Azerbaijan
increased the tension between Baku, Teheran and Yerevan. Russia retains an
ambivalent position the regional conflict dynamics; it does not want a
full-scale war in the region which would hold unpredictable consequences.
At the same time, the rise in tensions around Azerbaijan and Iran serve
Russia well, as it reduces the prospects for emerging alternative gas
pipelines to Europe. Consequently, Moscow has no desire to reduce the
tensions. Moreover, it has shown a capacity for fueling regional conflict
dynamics either directly by threatening the use of force if pipelines are
constructed across the Caspian Sea without Russian approval, or indirectly
by engaging all sides. One of the major reasons for such Russian behavior
is to raise the stakes in the construction of alternative gas pipelines to
Europe.
*AUTHOR'S BIO:* Dmitry Shlapentokh is Associate Professor of History,
Indiana University at South Bend.
http://www.cacianalyst.org/newsite/?q=node/5757
From: A. Papazian
By Dmitry Shlapentokh (04/18/2012 issue of the CACI Analyst)
Tensions between Iran and the West were exacerbated even further by
Israel's sale of sophisticated weapons to Baku in February this year. The
regional states hold differing views on the crisis depending on their
interests and geopolitical outlook. In Russia's case, the objectives are
clear. On the one hand, Russia is not interested in a full-fledged war
which would hold unpredictable consequences for all parties involved,
including Russia itself. On the other hand, it is in Moscow's interest to
keep the area unsafe and unstable as this will improve Moscow's chances of
monopolizing the supply of gas to Europe.
*BACKGROUND: *Hydrocarbon* *exports are of key importance to Russian
foreign policy. Exporting oil and gas is vital not only for a few
interested `oligarchs,' but for the stability of the regime. Indeed,
Russia's economic rise over the last decade is limited and there is little
industrial development in spite of Putin's assertions that Russia has made
a great leap forward after the end of what Moscow terms the `troubling
1990s' (likhie devianostye). Instead, money obtained through energy exports
have provided most of the cash for the regime coffers, and has ensured the
regime's comparative stability and Putin's reelection. The high gas and oil
prices are therefore crucial for Moscow, which has worked hard to
monopolize Europe's gas supply.
Accordingly, Moscow has sought to secure agreements with Central Asian
states, of which Turkmenistan is of paramount importance due to its large
reserves, implying that their gas is transferred to the European market
through the Russian pipeline system inherited from the USSR. Turkmenistan,
however, soon lost interest in Moscow as an intermediary and turned to
China which has increasingly emerged as a major consumer of Turkmen gas.
Moscow was undoubtedly upset with China's emergence as alternative
customer. Still, its major goal remains the prevention of alternate routes
to Europe, and major problems have emerged in this regard.
Azerbaijan has emerged as one of the major potential sources of gas for
Nabucco or similar gas pipelines designed to deliver Caspian gas to
European markets, which is clearly disturbing to Moscow. Consequently,
Moscow has focused its attention on Azerbaijan and the adjacent region, and
has employed a variety of tactics in dealing with Baku. The first was an
attempt to convince Baku to sell all its gas to Russia, which was the main
objective of Medvedev's unsuccessful visit to Baku on September 2-3, 2010.
Just after Medvedev's visit, the EU Commission President José Manuel
Barroso visited Azerbaijan and signed an agreement stipulating that Baku
would provide gas for Nabucco or other similar gas pipelines which would
deliver gas directly to Europe.
Baku could also potentially upset other strategic goals on Moscow's part.
Moscow has sought to monopolize control over gas pipelines transiting
Belarus and Ukraine, which are essential for Moscow's control of gas
deliveries to Europe. While such designs proved successful in Belarus,
problems still exist in Moscow's dealings with Kiev which resists foreign
control over its pipeline system. Moscow has raised the prices of exported
gas and oil to force Kiev into submission. However, Kiev has engaged in
negotiations with Baku, which is a potential source of alternative gas and
oil also for Ukraine.
One potential strategy for Moscow to prevent the construction of new,
unwanted gas pipelines is contributing to the fear of regional instability
and rising tensions in the region which would likely scare off potential
investors.
**
*IMPLICATIONS: *Moscow has sought to maintain a level of regional
instability in several ways. First, on 9-26 September, 2011, Moscow engaged
in military maneuvers in the Caspian Sea. Russian officials stated that
Russia will sustain a military presence there and will not think twice
about using it if nearby states - implying a direct message to Azerbaijan
and Turkmenistan - would attempt to construct pipelines along the Caspian
Sea without the approval of all littoral states, including Russia. This is
a risky enterprise and Moscow has no interest in instigating any real
military confrontation in the region since such developments would have
most unpredictable consequences. However, the increased tension centered on
Azerbaijan serves Moscow well.
Azerbaijan also has a tense relationship with Iran. While this conflict is
rooted historically in conflicting nationalistic and territorial claims
between the two states, it has recently been actualized by Iranian concerns
that Azerbaijan could constitute a launch pad for a U.S./Israeli strike
against Iran. Adding to the complex picture of regional tension is
Azerbaijan's conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.
Israel's decision in February 2012 to sell sophisticated weaponry - anti
aircraft missiles and drones - to Baku immediately raised concerns in both
Iran and Armenia, who perceived it as preparation for war. Moscow could
easily have assured Iran that it would not allow this to happen, by
providing Iran with the S-300 anti-missile/anti-aircraft system which
Teheran clamors or at least sell it other weapons which are not covered by
sanctions. Alternatively, Moscow could have delivered weapons through
Belarus, which maintains a closer relationship with Iran. Minsk would
hardly fear international sanctions in addition to the ones already in
force. In 2007, Moscow actually signed an agreement with Teheran to supply
these missiles, and Teheran even made an advance payment. Yet, Moscow
procrastinated and finally joined the Iran sanctions which preclude sales
of advanced weaponry to Iran, the S-300 system included. Moscow has neither
condemned nor approved of the arms deal between Israel and Azerbaijan. As
many other foreign policy actions, the implications of these moves can have
different interpretations. They could be taken to indicate Moscow's desire
to remain neutral, but could also imply that Moscow is actually interested
in exploiting the increased instability in the area.
Russia also maintains a military presence in Azerbaijan through its radar
station in Gabala and keeps Baku and Teheran in the dark about what it
would do in case of increased hostilities between the two, in which the
station would most certainly be affected. Moscow continues to play the same
game with Armenia. The relationship between Yerevan, which is Moscow's most
reliable ally in the region and also enjoys a cordial relationship with
Teheran, and Baku is extremely tense due not only to Armenia's support of
Nagorno-Karabakh, legally still a part of Azerbaijan.
Yerevan was alarmed by the Israel-Azerbaijan arms deal. However, as in the
case with Teheran and Baku, Moscow has retained an ambivalent stance. On
the one hand, it keeps a strong military presence in Armenia through its
military base in Gyumri. On the other hand, Armenia can hardly trust
Moscow's security guarantees in case of war with Azerbaijan. The very fact
that Moscow did not criticize Azerbaijan's weapons purchase from Israel
contained a message to both Teheran and Yerevan. This message implied that
in the case of war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, it remains unclear
whether Moscow would choose to intervene or not, which certainly increases
uncertainty and tensions in the region. This, in turn, works in Moscow's
favor, helping to construct an image of the recent interactions between
Azerbaijan, Iran and Armenia as signifying the increasing instability of
the Caspian region, making it unreliable as a source of gas for Europe. The
implication is very simple: Europe has no other stable supplier than
Russia.
The instability also provides Moscow with opportunities for maintaining its
military presence in the region and assures both Baku and Yerevan, and
possibly Teheran, that a strong Russian presence is the only true guarantee
for their territorial integrity and possibly their very existence, provided
that they observe Russian interests. In addition, the setup not only
provides Russia with the opportunity to act as a geopolitical kingmaker but
also generates additional income by sales of weapons to all sides, as well
as keeping the prices of gas and oil at a high level.
**
*CONCLUSIONS: *Israel's sale of sophisticated weapons to Azerbaijan
increased the tension between Baku, Teheran and Yerevan. Russia retains an
ambivalent position the regional conflict dynamics; it does not want a
full-scale war in the region which would hold unpredictable consequences.
At the same time, the rise in tensions around Azerbaijan and Iran serve
Russia well, as it reduces the prospects for emerging alternative gas
pipelines to Europe. Consequently, Moscow has no desire to reduce the
tensions. Moreover, it has shown a capacity for fueling regional conflict
dynamics either directly by threatening the use of force if pipelines are
constructed across the Caspian Sea without Russian approval, or indirectly
by engaging all sides. One of the major reasons for such Russian behavior
is to raise the stakes in the construction of alternative gas pipelines to
Europe.
*AUTHOR'S BIO:* Dmitry Shlapentokh is Associate Professor of History,
Indiana University at South Bend.
http://www.cacianalyst.org/newsite/?q=node/5757
From: A. Papazian